ORDER : The Petitioners are in occupation of a large chunk of land which was given to them on lease for a period of 20 years. It was found as a fact by the Collector that the land was given to them from Kharif 1952 to Rabi 1972. This factual finding came to be affirmed by the Commissioner in appeal and by the Financial Commissioner in revision. Thereupon, the petitioner approached the High Court by way of Writ Petitions which came to be heard by a learned single Judge who dismissed them as wholly lacking in merit by the order dated June 8, 1991. Against the said order dismissing the Writ Petitions, Letters Patent Appeal was preferred but the same came to be summarily dismissed as the Bench saw no ground to interfere. Hence these Special Leave Petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution. 2. Under the East Punjab Utilisation of Lands Act, 1949 (hereinafter called 'the Act') the Collector was empowered to issue notice to the owner of any land which has not been cultivated for the last six or more harvests to show cause why the land had not been cultivated and if the Collector was not satisfied with the explanation offered by the owner he was empowered to take possession of the land forthwith for the purposes of the Act notwithstanding any law to the contrary. The proviso empowered the Collector to take possession of the land even without issuing a notice if in his opinion the owner was wrongfully shown in the Revenue Records to have cultivated the land which in fact had remained uncultivated for six or more harvests prior to such wrong entry. Once the Collector enters upon the possession of the land by virtue of the power conferred by Section 3 of the Act, Section 4 provides for payment of compensation in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Once the Collector enters upon the possession of the land by virtue of the power conferred by Section 3 of the Act, Section 4 provides for payment of compensation in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 5 next provides that where the Collector has taken possession of any land under Section 3, "he may lease it to any person on such terms and conditions as he may deem fit for the purpose of growing food and fodder crops provided that the period of lease shall not be less than 7 years or more than 20 years." Section 6 next provides that if a person to whom the land has been leased commits a breach of any of the terms and conditions thereof, the Collector shall, without prejudice to any other right or remedy against him, have the power to determine the lease and take possession of the land. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 provides that where the lease has been determined by the Collector the lessee shall not be entitled to any compensation. In the instant case on the expiry of the period of 20 years the lease came to be determined and, therefore, the petitioners were not offered any compensation. The section posits that where any land, taken possession of under Section 3 is on the expiry of the lease to be returned to the owner, the Collector may after making such enquiry, if any, as he considers necessary specify by order in writing the person to whom the possession of the land shall be given. From the scheme of the aforesaid provisions it seems clear to us that on the expiry of the period of lease the Collector is entitled to enter upon possession of the land without payment of compensation and return the same to the original owner from whom the possession was taken under Section 3. This is in brief the scheme of the Act. 3. The provisions of this Act came up for consideration before this Court in Dasaudha Singh v. State of Haryana, (1973) 2 SCR 1006 . This is in brief the scheme of the Act. 3. The provisions of this Act came up for consideration before this Court in Dasaudha Singh v. State of Haryana, (1973) 2 SCR 1006 . After setting out the provisions of the Act to which we have made a reference, Grover, J. who spoke for the three Judge Bench observed as under : "It is thus clear that the Collector was empowered to take possession from the owner only after a maximum period of 20 years for which he could lease it out to a tenant. It was thus clearly contemplated that on the expiry of that period the Collector would restore possession to the owner. The Act nowhere contemplated that the owner should be completely deprived of his ownership rights. The compensation to which he was entitled under Section 4 was for the temporary deprivation of the exercise of ownership rights for the period during which the possession of the land had been taken over by the Collector and given on lease to the tenant. Section 7(1) when read in this context clearly shows that it was intended to empower the Collector to make an order in writing after the expiry of the lease saying that the possession of the land shall be given to the person named or specified in the order." Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the construction put on the relevant provisions to the Act, namely, the compensation payable under Section 4 was for the temporary deprivation of the exercise of the ownership rights for the period during which the possession of the land was taken over by the Collector and given on lease to a tenant, was erroneous. We are afraid we cannot subscribe to that submission. Even otherwise we are bound by the view taken by the three Judge Bench in this behalf. 4. It may next be stated that an attempt was made in that case to place reliance on the provisions of the Tenancy Act in support of the argument that no eviction could take place of a tenant unless compensation has been awarded to him under the provisions of the Act. 4. It may next be stated that an attempt was made in that case to place reliance on the provisions of the Tenancy Act in support of the argument that no eviction could take place of a tenant unless compensation has been awarded to him under the provisions of the Act. This Court after analysing the relevant provisions of the said statute pointed out that the Word 'tenant' was defined to mean a person to whom the land was leased by the Collector under the provisions of the Act which definition was totally different from the one found in the Tenancy Law. The Court observed : "It is hardly possible to regard a tenant of the Collector under the Act as falling within the definition of a "tenant" under the Tenancy Act." That would as rightly pointed out, defeat the entire purpose of the Act. 5. Lastly, counsel placed reliance on the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. He pointed out that the argument based on the provisions of this Act had not been pressed before this Court and hence the said submission is available to him. We are afraid this contention is not available to the learned counsel. The paragraph to which our attention was drawn reads as under : "Before the High Court it has been urged on behalf of the appellants that they could be ejected only in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. The High Court held that owing to Section 21(1) nothing contained in that Act shall affect any land held by a tenant or lessee under the Government. Mr. Dutta who represented some of the appellants before us did not press any arguments relating to the applicability of the provisions of the Land Tenures Act to the case of the appellants. At any rate, this position has been rightly conceded by the counsel for the respondents." 6. In our view, Section 21(1) is quite clear and says that nothing contained in this Act shall affect any land held by a tenant or lessee under Government, or local bodies in the State, or any unallotted evacuee land. The land in question was clearly held by the petitioners as lessees of the Government and they had paid the charges in respect thereof to the Government throughout the period of 20 years. The land in question was clearly held by the petitioners as lessees of the Government and they had paid the charges in respect thereof to the Government throughout the period of 20 years. Therefore, the provisions of the said Act can have no application and the contention was rightly not pressed by Mr. Dutta in view of the plain language of the Section. 7. For the above reasons we see no merit in these petitions and the same are dismissed but we make no order as to costs. 8. No orders on application for intervention. Petitions dismissed.