Judgment :- The appeal arises from a suit for realisation of money. Defendant is the appellant. 2. The suit O.S.155/1985 before Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam was filed by respondent against appellant for realisation of an amount of Rs. 46,900/- with interest at 18 % per annum and costs of suit. Defendant had borrowed amounts from plaintiff on various occasions for purchasing a house site and constructing a building. The construction was completed and defendant is in occupation of the house. The liability was acknowledged by alerter dated 27-2-1980. In spite of promises made by defendant in several letters the amount was not paid. As per the letter dt.27-2-1980 the amount due is Rs. 26,000/- Defendant had therein promised to pay interest at 18% per annum. In a subsequent letter dt.20-8-1993 defendant had agreed to settle the amount due after the disposal of his house. In spite of repeated demands and a registered notice, the amount was not paid and hence the suit. 3. Defendant resisted the suit and contended that the suit is not maintainable since it is based on an illegal contract whose object is unlawful. Plaintiff is not a money lender as defined in the Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1959. He is a Government servant and the conditions of service prohibit transactions like money lending. Defendant further contended that there was no agreement between plaintiff and defendant to pay interest and the rate of interest claimed is also excessive. Regarding the advance of the loan it is contended that the amount was offered by plaintiff as a temporary financial accommodation in view of their close relationship and the payment was made voluntarily. There was no understanding between the parties that the advance will be treated as a loan repayable with interest. It is also contended that a substantial portion of the amount was repaid before 1-1-1980. Payments are alleged to have been made since then by two drafts, one for Rs. 1500/- and the other for Rs. 29,000/- apart from the cash payment of Rs. 300/-. An amount of Rs. 5000/- was paid as interest. The entire liability has been discharged by 24-7-1985. Defendant disclaimed liability to pay any amount. Various other contentions are also seen advanced in the written statement which are not relevant for the purpose of this appeal. 4. Documents were produced on both sides. Plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and defendant as D.W. 1. 5000/- was paid as interest. The entire liability has been discharged by 24-7-1985. Defendant disclaimed liability to pay any amount. Various other contentions are also seen advanced in the written statement which are not relevant for the purpose of this appeal. 4. Documents were produced on both sides. Plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and defendant as D.W. 1. The court below on a proper consideration of the entire evidence and documents granted a decree for Rs. 16,400/- with interest at 6% from the date of plaint and costs of suit after giving credit to the amount of Rs. 30,500/- paid by the defendant since the filing of the suit. That decision is assailed by the defendant in this appeal. 5. As many as 29 grounds spread over 8 pages are seen raised in the appeal memorandum. Though the appeal memorandum has set forth the grounds concisely in the beginning under distinct heads as enjoined by R.2 of Order 41 C.P.C., they have given way to narratives and arguments later. The grounds of attack are therefore to be culled out from these narratives and arguments and the points for determination in the appeal are to be raised on the basis of these grounds. On a reading of the various grounds interspersed in the narratives and arguments and on hearing counsel for the appellant, the following points require consideration in this appeal: 1. Whether the transaction is void and unenforceable, plaintiff not having obtained a licence under the Kerala Money Lenders Act? and 2. Whether plaintiff has succeeded in showing that the claim has been made within the period of limitation? Point No. 1. 6. Sri Parameswaran, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the contract is void for the reason that plaintiff had not obtained a licence under the Money Lenders Act. Learned counsel has taken me through the various provisions in the Money Lenders Act (Act 35/1985) in support of his contention that only a person who possesses the money lenders licence can maintain an action for return of the money advanced by way of loan. A 'money lender' has been defined in S.2(7) of the Act as a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is the business of advancing and realising loans and includes a pawn broker but does not include a bank or a co-operative society and certain other institutions enumerated therein. A 'money lender' has been defined in S.2(7) of the Act as a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is the business of advancing and realising loans and includes a pawn broker but does not include a bank or a co-operative society and certain other institutions enumerated therein. 'Loan' means an advance whether of money or in kind at interest and includes any transaction which the court finds in substance to amount to such an advance. But that does not include a deposit of money in banks and other institutions and other advances stipulated in the definition of loan' contained in S.2(5) of the Act. S.3 mandates that from the date on which the provisions of the Act were brought into force in any area, no person, firm or joint family shall except for one month or such longer period as the Government may specify, carry on or continue business as a money lender at any place in such area without a licence obtained under this Act or in contravention of the terms thereof. The penalty for carrying on the business of money lending without a licence or otherwise than in conformity with the terms and conditions of a licence is provided in S.17. S.18 provides for the penalties to be imposed against a person who contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or of any rule made thereunder or of any terms of conditions of a licence. S.20 stipulates that where a money lender is guilty of an offence punishable under this Act, any contract made by him in relation to his business of money lending shall not be void by reason only of that offence, nor shall he lose his lien on or right to the pledge of to the loan and to the interest and other charges, if any, payable in respect thereof. 7. On the basis of the aforementioned provisions in the Act, learned counsel urges that a money lending business can be carried on by a person only when he has obtained a licence under the Act and in the absence of such a licence, the transaction is illegal. But S.20 of the Act itself makes it clear that any contract made by a person who is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act for not obtaining a licence shall not be void by reason only of that offence. But S.20 of the Act itself makes it clear that any contract made by a person who is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act for not obtaining a licence shall not be void by reason only of that offence. In view of this provision the attempt of the counsel is to show that the consideration or object of the agreement is not lawful and the contract is void under S.23 of the Indian Contract Act. To appreciate the contentions we have to understand the legal position in the case of a contract of this nature. 8. If a contract is illegal under a statute either expressly or impliedly, it is void. When the intention of the legislature is clear that no such contract should be enforced, there is no difficulty. Difficulties arise when the statute merely imposes a penalty on the parties to the contract without declaring the contract to be either illegal or void. The legal position has been stated by Anson in his Law of Contract, 19th Edn. at p.206 thus: "The effect in such a case depends on the proper construction of the particular statute. But where the words of the statute leaves room for doubt as to its intention, it is material to ask whether the object of the Act in imposing the penalty is merely to protect the revenue or whether its object or one of its objects is to protect the general public or some class of the general public by requiring that the contract shall be accompanied by certain formalities or conditions, as, for example, registration in the case of money-lender. In the latter case, it is probable that the act for the doing of which the penalty is imposed is impliedly prohibited by the statute and therefore illegal." 9. A distinction is drawn in Victorian Dayles 'ford Syndicate Ltd. v. Dott (1905) 2 Ch. 624 (B) and the Statutes are grouped under two heads: (1) Those in which a penalty is imposed against doing an act for the purposes only of the protection of the revenue, and (2) those in which a penalty is imposed upon an act not merely for revenue purposes but also for the protection of the public. It is also observed that there is no question that a contract which is prohibited either expressly or by implication by a statute is illegal and cannot be enforced. It is also observed that there is no question that a contract which is prohibited either expressly or by implication by a statute is illegal and cannot be enforced. The grouping was done only to see whether the contract in that case was prohibited expressly or by implication. 10. The legal position therefore is that if the contract is illegal under the statute either expressly or impliedly, it is undoubtedly void. The position is different when a statute merely imposes a penalty on the parties to the contract without declaring it to be either illegal or void. The question to be looked into is whether the provisions are intended for the protection of State revenue or for the protection of the public also. In some enactments like the Salt Act, Abkari Act, Opium Act etc. the prohibition is intended for the protection of public also apart from the collection of revenue. If the contract is illegal from its inception, neither party can enforce it and neither party can also circumvent it. When a contract is to do a thing which cannot be performed without the violation of the law, it is void, whether the parties knew the law or not. 11. Learned counsel has brought to my attention the Full Bench decision of the Hyderabad High Court in Mohd. Bin Salem v. Uiaaji(A1R 1955 Hy. 113). That also was a case for realisation of money borrowed by defendant from plaintiff who had no licence under the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act, The Full Bench was considering the scope and effect of the Hyderabad Money Lenders Act, Sec. 9 of which as it stood on the date of the transaction provided that if a money-lender had no licence, but had proved the loan, the court should disallow the entire or part of the interest and may disallow the whole or part of the costs. Before the filing of the suit the Act was amended and in particular the direction regarding disallowing whole or part of the interest and costs of the case in S.9 was substituted by the provision to dismiss the suit on the failure to have a licence. The question whether the suit is liable to be dismissed in view of the provisions of S.9 read with the rules framed thereunder was referred to the Full Bench. The question whether the suit is liable to be dismissed in view of the provisions of S.9 read with the rules framed thereunder was referred to the Full Bench. Three questions were referred to the Full Bench of which the first question is relevant for our purpose. That question reads: "Where at the time of the transaction a money-lender within the meaning of the Money-Lenders Act does not possess a licence but produces one during the course of the suit or appeal, is his suit liable to be dismissed in view of the provisions of S.9 read with the Rules framed thereunder?" The Full bench by a majority held that the absence of a licence as regards loans given after the amendment to S.9 of the Act does not create any relationship of creditor and debtor. The contract is void and subsequent obtaining of a licence cannot resurrect something which had no earlier legal existence. It was held that the production of a subsequent licence at any stage in cases of loans after the amendment would not change the original legal position of the plaintiff and such suits are liable to dismissal on the ground that the amended provisions of S.9 read with the rules framed under the Act impose a condition for the protection of the borrowing public and the failure of having a licence had invalidated the transaction. 12. In the concurrent judgment rendered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (as His Lordship then was) reference is seen made to S.3 of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act and it is observed that S.9 of the Hyderabad Money-Lenders Act cannot be interpreted in the manner laid down in S.3 of the Punjab Act as it is not in pari materia. In the concurrent judgment rendered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (as His Lordship then was) reference is seen made to S.3 of the Punjab Registration of Money Lenders Act and it is observed that S.9 of the Hyderabad Money-Lenders Act cannot be interpreted in the manner laid down in S.3 of the Punjab Act as it is not in pari materia. S.3 of the Punjab Act reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment for the time being in force, a suit by a money-lender for the recovery of a loan, or an application by a money-lender for the execution of a decree relating to a loan, shall, after the commencement of this Act, be dismissed, unless the money-lender (a) at the time of the institution of the suit or presentation of the application for execution; or (b) at the time of decreeing the suit or deciding the application for execution- (i) is registered; and (ii) holds a valid licence, in such form and manner as may be prescribed; or (iii) holds a certificate from a Commissioner granted under S.11, specifying the loan in respect of which the suit is instituted or the decree in respect of which the application for execution is presented; or (iv) if he is not already a registered and licensed money-lender, satisfies the Court that he has applied to the Collector to be registered and licensed and that such application is pending; provided that in such a case", the suit or the application shall not be finally disposed of until the application of the money-lender for registration and grant of licence pending before the Collector is finally disposed of." 13. As observed above there is a definite provision in the Punjab Act which permits a money-lender to be registered and hold a licence either at the time of the institution of the suit or at the time of decreeing the suit or at the time of presentation of the application for execution or at the time of deciding the application for execution. Similar provisions are absent in the Hyderabad Act, S.9 of which specifically lays down that the court shall dismiss the suit if it is proved that plaintiff is a money-lender as defined in that Act and has not obtained a licence thereunder. 14. Similar provisions are absent in the Hyderabad Act, S.9 of which specifically lays down that the court shall dismiss the suit if it is proved that plaintiff is a money-lender as defined in that Act and has not obtained a licence thereunder. 14. The principles laid down by the Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court aforementioned are not applicable to the present case since the Kerala Money-Lenders Act does not contain provisions similar to S.9 of the Hyderabad Act. Provisions similar to S.3 of the Punjab Act are also absent. Section 20 of the Kerala Act does not prohibit filing of a suit by a person who has not obtained a licence under the Act, nor does it impose any condition to maintain a suit to realise the amount advanced. On the other hand, the' intention of the legislature not to prohibit the filing of a suit is manifested by stating that the contract shall not be void by reason only of the money-lender being guilty of an offence punishable under the Act. In other words, there is no prohibition in the Act for protection of the public whereas the intention is only the protection of revenue to be collected by way of licence fee. The result is that a suit can be maintained by a moneylender unless the contract is void by virtue of any of the provisions contained in the Contract Act. 15. Learned counsel has also relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Appu Menon v, Narayana Ayyar (1961 KLT 620). This court was considering an appeal by the plaintiff against the dismissal of his claim to recover money on the strength of an agreement whereby a licence for the foreign liquor tavern was held by him which was agreed to be transferred to the 2nd defendant. Second defendant, along with three others, had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff. The question arose whether the suit was maintainable on the ground of the contract being void. The Full Bench held that the contract is void. While holding so it is observed that the business had been carried out without licence by those from whom the money is claimed and the statute says that such business must be done under licence alone. The licence referred to is the licence under the Kerala Abkari Rules. The Full Bench held that the contract is void. While holding so it is observed that the business had been carried out without licence by those from whom the money is claimed and the statute says that such business must be done under licence alone. The licence referred to is the licence under the Kerala Abkari Rules. It is observed that the general policy behind the Abkari Act is not merely to secure revenue, but to serve public welfare as well. Agreements calculated to defeat the object of any enactment would be void, and therefore the absence of any such provision cannot support the legality of the agreement. 16. The Full Bench was considering the effect of a transfer of licence in contravention of the Abkari Rules. It was in that connection that this court held that a party allowing another person to do business without licence, which can be carried only under licence, should not be allowed to recover money due for doing such a business. The licence contemplated under the Money Lenders Act is only to enable a person to carry on or continue business as a money lender and the carrying on or continuance of such business without a licence is visited with some consequence in the form of penalties prescribed under Ss.17 and 18 of the Act. As observed earlier these penalties are imposed only for the purpose of collection of revenue and not in the interest of the public as manifested from S.20. The position in the case of Abkari Act and the Rules framed thereunder are entirely different. The Full Bench decision cited by the counsel is therefore of no assistance to him. The transaction is' therefore not void merely on the ground of the lender not taking out the licence as contemplated under the Kerala Money-Lenders Act. 17. Counsel for appellant has a contention that the transaction is void under the general principles of contract law and the provisions of the Indian Contract Act. In the interpretation clause contained in S.2 of the Act an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void and a contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable. In the interpretation clause contained in S.2 of the Act an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void and a contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable. What all agreement are contracts are stipulated in S.10 of the Act which provides that all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object and are not expressly declared to be void. S.20 of the Act stipulates that where both the parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void. What considerations and objects are lawful and what are not find a place in S.23 of the Act. The consideration and object of an agreement is lawful unless (1) it is forbidden by law, (2) is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law, or is fraudulent, (3) involves or implies injury to the person or property of another, and (4) the court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy. Even if the consideration or object is unlawful in part, the agreement will be void under S.24 of the Act. Ss.25 to 30 enumerates various categories of agreements which are void under law. The transaction entered into between appellant and respondent is not expressly declared to be void under any of the provisions of the Indian Contract Act. Then the only point to be considered is whether the contract is for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object. What are not lawful considerations and lawful objects are enumerated in S.23 of the Act. The advancing of a loan by a person who had not obtained a licence under the Money-Lenders Act will not come under one or other of those unlawful objects and considerations provided for in that section. It may come under the category of contracts opposed to public policy. But the transaction of lending and borrowing cannot be said to be opposed to public policy and the indication in the Money Lenders Act is to the effect that there is no bar in a person entering into a transaction without obtaining a licence under the Act. It may come under the category of contracts opposed to public policy. But the transaction of lending and borrowing cannot be said to be opposed to public policy and the indication in the Money Lenders Act is to the effect that there is no bar in a person entering into a transaction without obtaining a licence under the Act. That is manifested by the provision contained in S.20 which specifically provides that the transaction will not be unlawful solely for the reason of not obtaining a licence under the Act. By no stretch of imagination can this transaction be said to be opposed to public policy. The result is that respondent can enforce the claim for return of the money advanced by him. The consideration is legal and the object also is legal. The agreement is therefore a valid contract. The court below was right in enforcing that contract. 18. The contention raised by the appellant is unsustainable for another reason also. The transaction will not come within the purview of the Money Lenders Act. Only a person who carries on or continues business as a money lender is liable to take a licence under the Act. A "money-lender" is defined as a person whose main or subsidiary occupation is the business of advancing and realising loans. Respondent is not a person whose main occupation is the business of money-lending and money-lending is not his subsidiary occupation also. This is the only instance where he had advanced money as a loan. Moreover, appellant and respondent are close relations, they having married sisters. The amount was advanced to meet the expenses incurred by appellant in connection with the construction of a house. Respondent had produced several letters sent by the appellant wherein appellant had undertaken to discharge the liability and had also expressed his gratitude for the grant of the loan in an hour of need. In these circumstances respondent cannot be considered to be a person coming within the definition of 'money-lender' contained in S.2(7) of the Kerala Money Lenders Act and the necessity of obtaining a licence to carry on business as a money-Sender does not therefore arise. In any case therefore the Money Lenders Act is not applicable and there is no legal bar in enforcing the contract. 3RLQW No. 2 19. The appellant has a contention that the claim is barred by limitation. Respondent relied on Exts. In any case therefore the Money Lenders Act is not applicable and there is no legal bar in enforcing the contract. 3RLQW No. 2 19. The appellant has a contention that the claim is barred by limitation. Respondent relied on Exts. Al and A2 apart from other letters to bring the claim within the period of limitation on the ground that they are acknowledgments in writing. Ext. Al is a letter dt.27-2-1980 wherein appellant has mentioned the balance amount due as Rs. 24,000/-. He has also undertaken to pay interest at the rate of 18%. A calculation statement is also seen annexed to that letter wherein the payments already made are seen adjusted towards interest calculated at the above mentioned rate. Ext. A2 is another letter containing acknowledgment of liability and that is dt.23-2-1983, within three years from ExtAl. It is contended that the letter does not make mention of the amount due. S.18 of the Limitation Act only contemplates a mere admission of the right. That means that there should be an admission of the truth of one' satiability. That statement need not indicate the exact nature or the specific character of the liability. The actual amount payable need not find a place in the letter of acknowledgment whereas the words used therein should relate to a present subsisting liability. What is required is the indication of the existence of a rural relationship between the parties such as a creditor and a debtor and an intention to admit such jural relationship. There is sufficient indication in Ext. A2 regarding the liability. The jural relationship between appellant and respondent is admitted in that letter and there is also the intention to admit that relationship. Appellant had further undertaken to discharge the debt even by sale of his house, negotiation of which was going on. Ext. A2 is therefore an acknowledgment of the liability and the suit filed on 1-4-1985, within a period of three years from Ext. A2, is. within the period of limitation. The learned Subordinate Judge was right in finding the suit to be within time. 20. Appellant himself had undertaken to pay interest at 18% per annum and the amounts paid were adjusted towards interest calculated at that rate as revealed from the annexure to ExtAl letter. A2, is. within the period of limitation. The learned Subordinate Judge was right in finding the suit to be within time. 20. Appellant himself had undertaken to pay interest at 18% per annum and the amounts paid were adjusted towards interest calculated at that rate as revealed from the annexure to ExtAl letter. It is therefore futile for appellant now to dispute his liability to pay interest and much less at the rate of 18% as agreed to by him. The court below has granted interest only at 6% from the date of suit, No error has been committed in granting interest till date of suit at 18% and at 6% thereafter The amount paid since the filing of the suit has been given credit to it has not been pointed out as to how the amount decreed is incorrect. No interference is therefore called for in appeal. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal is found to be devoid of merits and in confirmation of the judgment and decree of the court below, the appeal is dismissed with costs.