Judgment 1. THIS matter arises out of a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. THE petitioner who is a partner of Messrs. Das and Co. had been running a business for manufacturing bricks with prior approval of the state Government for about 10 years. The petition extracted earth in 1990-91 but he did not extract any earth in 1991-92. A notice dt. 22nd June, 1992 was sent to the petitioner for finalisation of arrear dues on account of royalty for extraction of earth for manufacturing bricks. The demand notice has been marked Annexure "a" to the writ petition. In pursuance of the said notice, the petitioner attented the office of the respondent no. 2 (D. L. L. R. O. Howrah) and it was settled that 31500 cft. earth was extracted for the year 1991 and no earth was extracted for the year 1991-92 and this position was duly accepted by the respondent no. 2 by a letter market Annexure "b" to the writ petition. On 17th July, 1992, the respondent no. 2 again sent a notice of demand for arrears of royalty for the years 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92. The said notice of demand has been annexed with the writ application as Annexure "c". Immediately on receipt of the letter marked Annexure "c", the petitioner made a representation before the respondent no. 2 affirming, inter alia, his earlier position. He made a representation for clarification of the anomolies about the demand of royalty. Copy of the said representation has been marked annexure "d" to the writ petition. On 7th January, 1993, the petitioner was served with a notice restraining him from selling bricks and further restraining him from using the stock of earth measuring 49782 eft. This letter has been marked annexure "e". According to the petitioner the claim of royalty as demanded by the letter marked Annexure "c" is absolutely frivolous and the authority concerned is not entitled to claim royalty as per demand. According to the petitioner the claim of the respondent authority on account of royalty is based on fictitious rate not approved by the government and the respondent authority is not entitled to issue any notice as in the case of Annexure and that the said notice is liable to be quashed. According to the petitioner the claim of the respondent authority on account of royalty is based on fictitious rate not approved by the government and the respondent authority is not entitled to issue any notice as in the case of Annexure and that the said notice is liable to be quashed. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the notice dated 7th January, 1993 marked "e" to the writ application and the purported claim by virtue of the notice dated 17th July, 1992 marked "c" the petitioner has come before this Court for forbidding the respdt.- authority from giving effect to the letters marked Annexure "c" and Annexure "e" and for quashing and/or setting aside the said letters and for allowing the petitioner to manufacture bricks and to run his business and for a writ of certiorari commanding the respondent to transmit the entire records relating to the present proceeding to this court and other reliefs. 3. IN the supplementary affidavit on behalf of the writ petitioner it has been stated that the State Legislation for recovery of royalty for extraction of bricks soil encroaching upon the field covered by the Mines and Minerals (Randd) Act, 1957 and is ultra-vires. Imposition of royalty by the respondent is beyond its power by reason of the previsions of the said Act. Therefore, the impugned imposition of royalty should be quashed. 4. NO affidavit-in-opposition has been sworn on behalf of the state. Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, learned Advocate on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that entry 23 of list II of the Seventh Schedule to the constitution does not authorise the State Government to impose any royalty when there is a Central Legislation in the field. In support of his contention, Mr. Banerjee has referred to several reported decisions as discussed below :- 5. THE first case to be cited by Mr. Banerjee is Messrs. Banarsi Dass chadha and Brothers vs Lt. Governor. Delhi Administration and Ors. AIR 1978 sc 1587 . In that case it has been held that a substance must first be a mineral before it is a minor mineral pursuant to the power vested in the central Government under Section 3 (e) of the MMRD Act, 1957. Banerjee is Messrs. Banarsi Dass chadha and Brothers vs Lt. Governor. Delhi Administration and Ors. AIR 1978 sc 1587 . In that case it has been held that a substance must first be a mineral before it is a minor mineral pursuant to the power vested in the central Government under Section 3 (e) of the MMRD Act, 1957. If the expression "minor mineral" as defined in Section 3 (e) includes "ordinary clay" and "ordinary sand" there is no reason why earth used for the purpose of making bricks should not be comprehended within the meaning of the word "any mineral" which may be declared as a "minor mineral" by the Government. The word "mineral" is not a term of art. It is a word of common parlance capable of a multiplicity of meanings depending upon the context. In the context of the MMRD Act, the word "mineral" is of sufficient amplitude to include "brick earth". 6. THE next case cited by Mr. Banerjee is Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. State of orissa, AYR 1991 SC 1676. In that case it has been held that royalty for carrying on mining operations or tax thereon cannot be equated to land revenue. Thus the imposition of cess under the Orissa Act cannot be brought under Entry 45 List II Schedule VII of the Constitution. Tax of royalties cannot be a tax on minerals. The imposition of cess cannot therefore be justified by having recourse to Entry 50 of List II. it has been further held that the MMRD Act, 1957 is a law of Parliament. Sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Central Act is a clear bar on the State Legislature taxing royalty so as. in effect to amend the Second Schedule to the Central act and if the cess under the Orissa Act is taken as a tax falling under entry 50 it will be ultra vires in view of the provisions of the Central Act. in effect to amend the Second Schedule to the Central act and if the cess under the Orissa Act is taken as a tax falling under entry 50 it will be ultra vires in view of the provisions of the Central Act. In paragraph 50 of the reported judgment it has been held that the mere declaration of a law of Parliament that it is expedient for an industry or the regulation and development of mines and minerals to be under the control of the Union under Entry 52 or Entry 54 does not denude the State legislatures of their legislative powers with respect to the fields covered by the several entries in List II and List III. Particularly, in the field of declaration under Entry 54 this legislative power is eroded only to the extent control is assumed by the Union pursuant to such declaration as spelt out by the legislative enactment which makes the declaration. The measure of erosion turns upon the field of the enactment framed in pursuance of the declaration. 7. THE nest case cited by Mr. Banerjee is Kartick Chandra Roy vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. 1992 (1) CHN 352 . In that case it has been held that any State Legislation encroaching upon the field covered by the Minor minerals (Randd) Act, 1957 will be ultra vires. Imposition of royalty by the state Legislature is beyond its preview by reason of the provisions of the MMRD Act. 8. THE learned Single Judge in this case relied upon the principle laid down in Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. Stats of Orissa (supra. Mrs. Manjuri Gupta, learned State Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that under Section 2 of the MMRD Act, 1957, the Union has taken its control the regulations of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided under the Act 9. SECTION 14 of the said Act has clearly laid down that the provisions of sections 4 to 13 (both inclusive) shall not apply to quarry leases, mining leases and other minerals concession in respect of minor minerals. Under section 15 of the said Act, the State Government is empowered to make rules in respect of minor minerals. Mrs. SECTION 14 of the said Act has clearly laid down that the provisions of sections 4 to 13 (both inclusive) shall not apply to quarry leases, mining leases and other minerals concession in respect of minor minerals. Under section 15 of the said Act, the State Government is empowered to make rules in respect of minor minerals. Mrs. Gupta has drawn our attention to section 3 Clause (e) of the act under which the expression "minor minerals" means, building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary and other than sand used for prescribed purposes and any other minerals which the central Government may be notification tin the Official Gazette declared a minor mineral. 10. SO it is clear from above that the definition of the term "minor mineral" is inclusive and is not exhaustive. Mrs. Gupta has referred to the principle laid down in Haradhan mondal vs. State of West Bengal and Ors, 78 CWN 236. In that case it has been held that considering the background of the legislative provisions and the under lying policy and purpose of the MMRD Act, 1957, as appears from the title and preamble and an analysis of its provisions. Section 3 (e) of the said Act in so far as it authorises the Central Government to declare by a notification any minerals other than those specified as 'minor minerals' cannot be said to suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. 11. FURTHER held, on similar considerations Section 15 of the said Act in so far as it authorises the State Government to make rules for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and miming leases in respect of minor minerals does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. 12. FURTHER held, as a result of the vesting of all estates and the rights of all intermediaries in the state under the R. A. Act, 1953, the underground right including rights in minerals and mimes have also vested in the State free from all encumbrances. 12. FURTHER held, as a result of the vesting of all estates and the rights of all intermediaries in the state under the R. A. Act, 1953, the underground right including rights in minerals and mimes have also vested in the State free from all encumbrances. But in view of the fact that Parliament has declared under Section 2 of the MMRD Act, 11957 that it is expendient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation and development of mines and minerals to the extent provided in the said act, the grant of mining leases can now be regulated only by the provisions of the aforesaid Act and not by the provisions of aforesaid Act and not by the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The State of west Bengal has jurisdiction, competence and authority to insist on the compliance with the provisions of the MMRD Act, 1957 and the Rules made thereunder by the State Government for obtaining lease of rights in minor minerals. In paragraph 12 of the reported judgment at page 244, it has been held as follows :-12. "i now take up point no. 4 for my consideration. In the case of (15)State of West Bengal and Ors. vs. Jagadamba Prasad Singh, (AIR 1969 Cal. 291) the Division Bench of this court considered the question as to whether "ordinary earth for brick-making" can be equated with" ordinary clay". The said decision was based on Schedule I of the rules framed by the State Government before its amendment on 30-9-69. Schedule 1 at that time imposed royalty on "ordinary earth for brick-making. It was held in the case that the expression "clay" may be included within the expression "earth", but "ordinary earth" cannot be equated with "ordinary clay" and as such the State government had no right to make rules under the Act in respect of "ordinary earth" and had no right to insist on a permit and for payment of royalty therefor. As a result of the said decision the schedule was amended so as to substitute the expression "ordinary earth for brick making" for "brick earth". As a result of the said decision the schedule was amended so as to substitute the expression "ordinary earth for brick making" for "brick earth". It is, therefore, not necessary for the purpose of the present application to decide the question whether "brick earth" is "ordinary clay" within the meaning of Section 3 (e) of the Act, in view of the Notification by the Central government that "brick earth" as such has been declared by the notification, and in view of the amendment to the schedule to the rules made by the State Government to be a minor mineral within the meaning of Section 3 (e) of the Act, the State Government is competent to frame rules for the regulation of grant of mining leases in respect of "brick earth". It appears that the attention of the Division bench was not drawn to the notification dated 29-5-1958 declaring "brick earth" as a minor mineral. " 13. IT has been held in the case that brick earth is a mineral and the central Government was competent to declare the same to be a minor mineral under the MMRD Act, 1957. In view of the fact that the Central government has by Notification declared brick earth to be a minor mineral, the State is competent to make rules for the regulation of leases in respect of brick earth. Although silt deposited by river water on the surface of land may not be ordinary clay but if such silt is suitable for brick making and is used for such purpose it comes within the expression "brick earth" which is a minor mineral under the aforesaid Notification. 14. MRS. Gupta has submitted that from the reported decision of Kartick chandra Roy vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. (Supra) it does not appear that the principles laid down in that case covered minor minerals also. Therefore, the principle laid down in that case cannot be applied in the present case. She has further submitted that the principles laid down in orissa Cement case (Supra) involve minerals which are not minor minerals. In this connection Mrs. Gupta has drawn out attention to page 1691 of the reported decision. Mrs. Gupta has submitted that in Banarasi Dasi (Supra) the question which fell for decision was whether brick earth was a mineral or not. In this connection Mrs. Gupta has drawn out attention to page 1691 of the reported decision. Mrs. Gupta has submitted that in Banarasi Dasi (Supra) the question which fell for decision was whether brick earth was a mineral or not. It was decided that in the context of the MMRD Act, the word mineral is of sufficient amplitude to include brick earth. 15. IN Rule 3 (f) of the W. B. Minor Minerals Rule, 1973, the expression "mineral'' means minor miner s as defined in clause (e) of Section 3 of the mmrd act, 1957. We have got it that ordinary brick earth has been declared by the Central Government as minor mineral. 16. THE object of framing of the W. B. M. M. Rules is the protection of minor minerals in national interest arid for regulation of the grant of mining leases, quarry permit and other minerals concession in respect of minor minerals. This rule has been framed by the State Government under entry 23 Part II of VII Schedule of the Constitution. Section 14 of the mmrd Act, 1957 has specifically laid down that the provisions of Sections 4 to 13 shall not apply to quarry leases, mining leases etc. in respect of minor minerals. The object of exclusion of Sections 4 to 13 is only to empower the State Government to protect the minor minerals. Section 9 of the mother Act deals with royalty in respect of mining leases. Therefore, it is obvious that the imposition of royalty under the State rules is within the competence of the State Legislature From a discussion of the principles laid down in the decision cited above, it is clear that the decisions on which Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the writ petitioner has relied upon have got nothing to do with the cases covering minor minerals. On the contrary, the decisions relied upon by the Learned State Advocate and the principle laid down in AIR 1978 SC 1587 clearly are in favour of the view that it is within the legal competence of the Stale Legislature to levy royalty in respect of mining leases, quarry leases etc. so far as minor minerals are concerned. Ordinary clay or silt for making of bricks can fairly and squarely come within the ambit of the expression "minor minerals" as defined in Section 3 (e) of the parent Act, 1957. so far as minor minerals are concerned. Ordinary clay or silt for making of bricks can fairly and squarely come within the ambit of the expression "minor minerals" as defined in Section 3 (e) of the parent Act, 1957. Therefore, I find no substance in the contention of the learned Lawyer for the writ petitioner. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the petitioner has in the last leg of his argument submitted that the authority has not published any schedule of rates for royalty under Rule 18 of the W. B. M. M. Rules, 1973. 17. THE learned State Advocate has submitted a copy of the Notification of the concerned Department of the State Government dated 13th June, 1987 showing an amendment of Schedule I. Under the Notification on separate rates of royalty have been fixed for brick earth, sand, stone materials, gravels, morrum and other minerals. Since then there has been no enhancement within the stipulated period of the rate of royalty by the state Government, therefore, there is no substance in the second contention of Mr. Banerjee. As no other point has been pressed by Mr. Banerjee in support of the writ petitioner, therefore, I find that the writ petition merits an order of dismissal and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs is made. 18. THE certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the applicants as expeditiously as possible. Petition dismissed.