Judgment Samir Kumar Mookherjee, J. 1. A Revisional Application being C.O. No. 2021 of 1992, had been moved, challenging Order No. 17, dated 13th August, 1992, passed by the Learned First Assistant District Judge, Hooghly, in Title Suit No. 3 of 1992, wherein, the State Bank of India was the Plaintiff, praying for, inter alia, recovery of money lent and advanced, enforcement of pledge and/or hypothecation/mortgage/guarantees making the revisional petitioner and Opposite Parties 2 to 7 defendants. In course of an application for appointment of receiver in the said suit, a question arose as to who had the authority and right to represent the Defendant No. lithe Revisional Petitioner in the said suit. The Learned Trial Judge held in favour of opposite parties 5, 6 and 7, who were represented by Sri Sanat Kumar Biswas, a Learned Advocate. 2. The said Revisional Application was disposed of, in course of contested hearing on 17 November, 1992, on the basis of an agreed order, virtually, affirming the order, challenged in the Revisional Application with a rider to the effect that the Order, dated 17th November, 1992, would not prevent the parties from moving any other appropriate forum for getting the disputes between the petitioner and opposite parties 5, 6 and 7, adjudicated according to law in any other proceeding. 3. It is significant to note that xerox copies of the said Order dated 17tlt November, 1992 had been received by the Learned Advocates on records for the contesting parties on 4th, 14th and 15th December, 1992, respectively, and that corrections were made on 27.11.92 by hand in the said Order upon mentioning by the Learned Advocates representing the respective contestants. Such corrections also were incorporated in the xerox copies prior to their delivery. 4. On or about 18th January, 1993, the instant application was filed on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 1 and Opposite Parties 5, 6 and 7, for variation and/or modification and/or recalling of the said Order dated 17.11.1992. 5. In substance, the grounds on which the application for reconsideration of the order was sought to be maintained were: (a) Failure of the applicants' representative to appreciate the implication of the ad vices of their learned advocates. (b) Probable communication gap to the extent that it was understood that the effect of the Order would be confined to the hearing of the receiver application alone. (b) Probable communication gap to the extent that it was understood that the effect of the Order would be confined to the hearing of the receiver application alone. (c) The paint about the entitlement to. represent the company would be decided in the same proceeding, (d) The senior counsel representing the applicant could not be properly instructed. (e) One of the applicants being a minor without the leave of the Court, his or her interest could not be affected and the invalidity of the consent order for non-compliance with provisions of Order 23, Rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code. 6. The averments made in the application in question, if properly read and considered, unequivocally show that the fact that Order in question was a consent Order had been accepted but after the matter went back to the Trial Court, an the basis of a note sent by the Learned Advocate far the applicants in the Trial Court to. his learned counterpart in this Court after the former had studied the case thoroughly and deciphered the scope of the dispute between the contesting parties relating to the representation of the Company, that the applicants could appreciate the necessity of making the present application. The prayer far recalling, also, substantially seeks sustenance from the alleged non-enforceability of the said Order and/or absence of authority of the representative giving such consent due to failure of such representative to appreciate the effect, implication and impart of the advice given by the Learned Advocates concerned. It is judicially well established that no. party will ordinarily be allowed to. resile from the consent order even on such grounds except when there is a serious miscarriage of justice, there is a lack of good faith in the lawyer or there is a specific instruction from the clients to the contrary (Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar vs. Shankarlal Gulab Chand and Ors., reported in AIR 1975 SC 2202 and Employers in relation to Monohar Bahl Colliery, Calcutta vs. K.N. Mishra and Ors., reported in the same Volume at page 1732). In the instant case, the specific benefit, which the applicants, along with other parties to the Civil Revisional Application wanted to achieve was to expedite the disposal of the receiver application the hearing of which was fixed an 24th November, 1992, and for which they consented to the order in question. In the instant case, the specific benefit, which the applicants, along with other parties to the Civil Revisional Application wanted to achieve was to expedite the disposal of the receiver application the hearing of which was fixed an 24th November, 1992, and for which they consented to the order in question. Upon a proper reading of the averments, it also becomes inconvertible that the legal effect or implication had also been considered before giving of such consent that too restricted to a part of the Order. Applying the settled principles, therefore, there is no question of recalling a consent Order or allowing the applicants from going back an it (Vide the case of Shah Mulchand & Co. vs. Jawahar Mills Limited, reported in AIR 1993 SC......). There cannot be again any question of miscarriage of justice because the receiver application required all expeditious disposal and that purpose cannot be achieved, if the consent is now allowed to be withdrawn. The question of minority of one of the parties to the proceeding does not have much relevance as the minor was represented in conformity with the requirements of law. 7. It is pertinent to note also that in between the hearing dates as also the date of disposal, there were reasonable gaps of time in addition to the rectification of the Order in question after 10 days of the date of the Order in the presence of the Learned Advocates for the parties and a further gap of more than a month between the date of obtaining the xerox copy of the Order and filing of the instant application. These gaps also amply demonstrate that the grounds taken and advanced for nullifying the consent order should not be entertained. 8. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. 9. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 10. In view of the aforesaid order, the application made by State Bank of India becomes partly infructuous and is disposed of as such subject to the direction only for correction, namely, that the names of the counsel representing the State Bank of India, respondent No.1, as recorded ill the Order dated 17th February, 1993, having been wrongly recorded, though they were absent on that day, may be treated as deleted. Nripendra Kumar Bhattacharyya, J.; I agree. 12. Nripendra Kumar Bhattacharyya, J.; I agree. 12. It has been brought to our notice at the time of delivery of judgment that during the continuance of the interim order passed by us, an Order was passed by the Trial Court for absence of notice on its part about the said subsisting interim order. It has further been informed, upon production of a certified copy of the Order of the Trial Court, dated 25th February, 1994, that the Trial Court, on being apprised about such a situation, had recorded that the order passed by it due to ignorance of the existence of the inteirm order being Order No. 44 dated 7.2.1993 as nullity, but the said order is required to be formally recalled. On the next date fixed, the Trial Court may be apprised for passing a formal order recalling the said wrong Order No. 44 dated 7.2.1993. Since the main Revisional application has been disposed of, the interim order also stands vacated. 13. Let xerox copies of the Judgment and Order be handed over to the Learned Advocates, for both the parties, on their usual undertaking to apply for and obtain urgent certified copies. Application dismissed.