B. N. KIRPAL, J. ( 1 ) ). This is an instance of stay granted by a court which in my opinion is not warranted by law. ( 2 ) ). The petitioner-bank had filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 2 67 593. 6 plus interest thereof. The allegation was that respondent No. 1 had applied for loan on 19-6-1989 for the purpose of purchasing of Tata Mercidise Chesis. A loan of Rs. 2 65 0 was sanctioned and the same was availed by the respondent No. 1 after he had executed several documents including a letter of hypothecation. According to the terms of the loan the sum was to be repaid in 42 monthly instalments of the Rs. 6310. 00 plus interest each. The entire loan amount was required to be repaid on or before March 1993. ( 3 ) ). When the payment was not made regularly the plaintiff-bank wrote a letter dated 26-2-1991 requiring the said respondent to regularise the loan account. This was followed by another letter dated 27-7-1992 whereby the bank demanded entire amount due of the term loan from the respondents. When the money was not paid the present suit was filed for a sum of Rs. 2 67 593. 6 plus interest thereof. ( 4 ) ). Alongwith the suit the plaintiff-bank filed an application for attachment before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 of the C. P. C. In view of the fact that the truck in question was in the custody of Jawahar Police Station Vadodara the plaintiffbank also filed an application under Order Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code praying for an injunction restraining the respondent No. 1 from taking possession of the said vehicle. Notwithstanding the pendency of these two applications the respondent No. 1 filed an application for the custody of the vehicle in question By the impugned order dated 10-9-1993 possession of the vehicle was given to respondent No. 1 subject to conditions mentioned therein viz. lump sum payment of Rs. 35 0 plus monthly due of Rs. 10 0 from the date of repairing of the truck. ( 5 ) ). It is the aforesaid order dated 10-9-1993 which is challenged in this Court. ( 6 ) ). lump sum payment of Rs. 35 0 plus monthly due of Rs. 10 0 from the date of repairing of the truck. ( 5 ) ). It is the aforesaid order dated 10-9-1993 which is challenged in this Court. ( 6 ) ). It does not appear that respondents had disputed the fact that money was owed by them to the petitioner-bank Excecution of the hypothecation deed also does not-appear to have been disputed Clause 8 of the deed of hypothecation clearly states that if the amount outstanding is not paid to the bank on the demand raised by it it shall be lawful for the bank to call upon them to deliver possession of the hypothecated vehicle. The said clause further provides that in case of any default in the delivery of the possession the officers of the bank can take possession of the vehicle and get the same transferred to its name ( 7 ) ). The bank is dealing with public money. The claim in the suit appears to be unanswerable. That the order which passed by the trial court also seems to recognise the claim of the petitionerbank because respondent No. 1 has been directed to pay the amount claimed by the plaintiff though the payment was allowed to be by instalment. ( 8 ) ). The effect of the impugned order is that though it is the plaintiff who had sought relief in the suit the relief has in effect been granted to the defendants. By allowing payment by instalments the plaintiff-bank has in effect been denied permission to exercise its right under Clause (8) of the deed of hypothecation. Furthermore the trial Court had decided and allowed the application of the respondent No. 1 without deciding the petitioners application under Order 38 Rule 5 of the C. P. C. for attachment before judgment and the application under Order 39 Rules 1 of the C. P. C. for injunction. The said application was prior in point of time and allowing the respondents application as a result of in effect dismissing the plaintiffs application without even hearing them on merit. Apart from the propriety in the cause which is followed it would appear that the order of the Court is clearly contrary to the terms of the agreement between the parties. Apart from the propriety in the cause which is followed it would appear that the order of the Court is clearly contrary to the terms of the agreement between the parties. The Court was required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties flowing out of the terms of the contract entered into between them. By directing the handing over of the vehicle to respondent No. 1 and allowing the respondents to make payment not in the manner and within the time contemplated by the deed of hypothecation the effect is that the terms of the contract have in a sense been altered without the consent of the plaintiff-bank. In my opinion this is not permissible. Money has been advanced by the bank and the contract has been voluntarily been entered into between the parties. Both bank as well as the respondent No. 1 are bound by the terms thereof. Unless and until the bank agrees the Court cannot under these circumstances pass order which is at variance with the terms of the agreement. It is possible that the Court may have decreed the suit and then allowed payment of the decretal amount by instalments for this is permissible under the provisions of C. P. C. But in the absence of the decree being passed an interim order like the present could not have been issued by the Court. ( 9 ) ). For the aforesaid reasons the petition is allowed and the order dated 10-9-1993 passed by the trial court is set aside. Passing of this order will in no way prejudice the contempt proceedings which are stated to have been initiated by the petitioner-bank. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs. .