S. RAJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) BY these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of india, petitioners are questioning the constitutional validity of karnataka Act 18 of 1990. This Court in Yellappa Adivappa madiwalar v State of Karnataka and Others , made certain observations to the effect that land tribunals had not been carrying out the directions issued by this Court in several writ petitions in which their orders were challenged and they had not made any efforts to improve their functions in the discharge of their duties for satisfactory adjudication of tenancy rights of poor tenants and in that background recommended to the government that it will be appropriate to constitute an appellate tribunal consisting of two members one having judicial experience and the other having experience on the revenue side with power to take additional evidence, if necessary, for rendering substantial justice to the parties at the district level instead of compelling them to come to this Court wherein the power exercisable under Article 226 of the Constitution is not sufficient to give substantial relief In that regard this Court also noticed its past experience of remanding the matters over and over again. This formed part of the Objects and Reasons of the bill that ultimately became Act 19 of 1986 by which Sections 116-A and 116-B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') were introduced into the Act providing for an appeal, appellate forum and procedure thereto. However, subsequently, by Act 18 of 1990 the said provisions of sections 116-A and 116-B were deleted by Section 6 of the Act and a provision was made by Section 17 thereof to get the proceedings pending before the appellate authorities reverted to this Court after observing certain formalities as provided therein. ( 2 ) IN the Statement of Objects and Reasons while introducing the Bill which culminated in the Act impugned herein, this is what is stated: "after the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, was amended by Act 1 of 1974, it was expected that litigations pertaining to the tenancies would be disposed off early. ( 2 ) IN the Statement of Objects and Reasons while introducing the Bill which culminated in the Act impugned herein, this is what is stated: "after the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, was amended by Act 1 of 1974, it was expected that litigations pertaining to the tenancies would be disposed off early. However, the Act was again amended by Act No. 19 of 1986, and provision was made for an appeal to the land reforms appellate authority with two official members, of whom one was a Civil Judge from the Judicial Department and another from the Revenue Department not below the rank of a Deputy Commissioner. Earlier to the Amendment Act No. 19 of 1986, the orders of the land tribunals were final and they could only be questioned before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. However, from the past experience, it is found that the desired results were not forthcoming from the constitution of the appellate authorities. The system has also not proved to be beneficial in the majority of the cases. Hence, after taking all factors into consideration, the government decided to abolish the land reforms appellate authorities and to make the decision of the tribunal final. Hence the Bill. " the learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the authorities concerned could not have enacted Section 6 of the impugned Act to delete Sections 116-A and 116-B inasmuch as those provisions were enacted virtually in deference to the directions of this Court. Having done so it was not open to the legislature to have deleted the same subsequently. In Section 17 of the Act although it is provided that a petition filed by a party concerned whose proceeding is pending before the appellate authority to get the same treated as a writ petition or a writ appeal if the High Court deems fit to do so, it is virtually a mandate and judicial power is effectively taken away by a legislative fiat. And State Legislature has no power to give a mandate to the High Court and in this context relied upon a decision of this Court in Jainuddin Nizamuddin Munshi v Land tribunal , wherein it was observed by this Court, while on the previous occasion when the provisions providing for proceeding to be transferred to the appellate authorities from this Court by reason of Act 19 of 1986 were challenged, that no law can take away or curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution except by way of amendment to the constitution, It is submitted that Section 17 of the Act impugned herein is an inroad into the exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioner characterised the exercise of such power as a colourable legislation and relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in sonapur Tea Company Ltd. v Must. Mazirunnessa , to contend that a colourable legislation is one in which the Legislature transgresses limits of its legislative powers and conceals its real purpose under cover of legitimate and reasonable provisions and thus seeks to do indirectly what cannot be done directly. ( 3 ) SECTION 6 of the impugned Act repeals Sections 116-A and 116-B thus rendering remedy of appeal unavailable. Section 17 of the impugned Act reads as follows: "17. Pending proceedings. The High Court on the application filed by the appellant (which expression shall also include the petitioners of the writ petitions and appellants of the writ appeals transferred to the appellate authority) before the expiry of ninety days from the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1990, whose appeal was pending immediately before such commencement, before such authority, may if it deems fit, and after condoning the laches, if any, treat such appeal as a writ petition or as the case may be a writ appeal preferred to the High Court against the order by the tribunal under the principal Act. " it is well settled principle of law that Legislature has power to provide for an appeal and to create an appellate forum and in a given case it may omit to do so. " it is well settled principle of law that Legislature has power to provide for an appeal and to create an appellate forum and in a given case it may omit to do so. In the present case, in view of the observations made by this Court in Yellappa Madiwalar's case referred to earlier, provision for appeal against orders of land tribunals was made but as experience showed that it did not have the desired effect the Legislature thought fit to do away with such appeal. Whether an appeal should be provided or not against an order is a matter of policy with Legislature and should be left to its wisdom. If the law on the matter is so we do not think we can take any exception to the deletion of Sections 116-A and 116-B of the Act. Though this Court may have made certain observations the State having found that it did not have the desired results it was open to change its policy and do away with the appeals against the orders of the land tribunals. Hence we cannot say that Legislature had no jurisdiction to abolish appeals against orders of the land tribunal. ( 4 ) MUCH time was spent on interpreting and understanding Section 17 of Act 18 of 1990. In Section 19 of Act 19 of 1986, identical language has been used in the matter of discretion of this Court to transfer proceedings from this Court to the appellate forums. While interpreting those provisions this Court stated in Jainuddins case (supra), that the language of the section indicates that it is a discretion and not a mandate in keeping with the powers of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and therefore it does not amount to a mandate. The language used in Section 17 of the Act being identical we must reiterate what was stated therein. Having abolished the appellate remedy against the order made by a land tribunal under the Act, its order became final. However, an option was given to the concerned parties to approach this Court by filing an application under Section 17 of the impugned Act for treating the appeal pending before the appellate authority as a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution before this court. However, an option was given to the concerned parties to approach this Court by filing an application under Section 17 of the impugned Act for treating the appeal pending before the appellate authority as a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution before this court. Even in the absence of such a provision it is certainly open to this Court to review the order of the land tribunal made final under the Act, as such an order is subject to the judicial review of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution. Therefore, the application contemplated in Section 17 of the impugned Act is provided with a view to reduce the cost of litigation by waiving the court fee payable on such proceeding and maintain the continuity of proceedings for in many matters the writ petitions filed earlier in this Court had been referred to the appellate authorities. If, in those writ proceedings, applications had been filed for revival of the same on the ground that such appellate authority had been abolished, the matters could have also been certainly revived and proceeded with. Section 17 of the impugned Act merely enables this Court to entertain writ petition/appeal in a matter ending in appeal before the appellate authority. This Court can for good reasons refuse to entertain such petition or appeal. Thus the procedure prescribed in the Act is more beneficial to the parties concerned than driving them to file fresh writ petitions by paying fresh court fee. In that background if we examine the scope of Section 17 of the Act, it does not whittle down the powers of this Court in any manner nor does it direct this Court to exercise the powers in any particular manner. It merely enables this Court either to entertain a petition in a particular case or not. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners in this regard, ( 5 ) THE exercise of power by the Legislature in the impugned Act cannot be stated to be a colourable exercise at all because as already held the Legislature has necessary jurisdiction or competence to do away with appeals. While enacting Act 19 of 1986 the intention was that the appellate fora must be provided at the district levels for the parties can approach those appellate fora for quick remedies. When it did not have the desired results the appellate fora were done away with and matters were reverted to this Court by Section 17 of the Act. We cannot say that the Legislature has exercised any power which it did not have or it has exercised any power by an indirect way which it could not do directly. We find no merit in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. Hence these petitions are liable to be dismissed. ( 6 ) BEFORE parting with the cases it is necessary to not icecertain disturbing features in the frequent changes in the policy regarding provision for appeals with a revision to this Court against the orders of the land tribunals and repeal of the same made under the Act. When the Act came into force in the present form on 1-3-1974 there was no provision for appeal against the orders of the land tribunals deciding occupancy rights. By Act 19 of 1986 such provision was introduced with further revision to this Court since matters could not be settled on account of unsatisfactory functioning of the land tribunal even though 12 years had elapsed. That remedy of appeal was cheaper and nearer home than seeking judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution in this Court in which no decision on merits as in an appeal could be given. After the advent of Act 18 of 1986 it took considerable effort and time to transfer the cases to the appellate authorities from this Court. Many matters remained pending when the appellate authorities were abolished and doing away with appeal provision, reverting to the position as on 1-3-1974 by amendment made by Act 18 of 1990. Again much time was lost in retransmitting the records to this Court and in many cases records are yet to be received. Thus the litigants again are reverted to the old position and matters have reached square number one. Rights of litigants have remained uncertain even after lapse of two decades. Again much time was lost in retransmitting the records to this Court and in many cases records are yet to be received. Thus the litigants again are reverted to the old position and matters have reached square number one. Rights of litigants have remained uncertain even after lapse of two decades. It is no doubt true that it is a matter of policy with Legislature to provide for appeal or not but to let the rights of litigants in quandary by frequent changes is a matter of deep anguish and grave concern to which we are constrained to give vent to, for, time lost cannot be regained and the hardship of the litigant public cannot be recompensed. We hope the Legislature will not be unmindful of the pathetic conditions to which litigants will be led to on account of frequent change of policy in providing for appeals or repeal thereby. ( 7 ) IN the result these petitions are dismissed. Rule discharged. --- *** --- .