JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– Sen, J.: The petitioners are 76 in number. They are owners of buses which ply on contract carriage basis. Some of the buses are lying idle at the moment. The grievance of the petitioners is that the petitioners pay the tax levied by the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979. But an additional levy has been imposed by the West Bengal Additional Tax and One-Time Tax on Motor Vehicles Act, 1989. According to the petitioners, this levy is unconstitutional on a number of reasons. The first point urged is that there was no reason to pass a separate Act for making this additional levy sufficient power has been given by the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1979 to levy additional tax. 2. This argument is without any substance at all. A further tax might have been imposed by making additional levy under the Act of 1979. But that cannot prevent the legislature from passing another Act to impose further levies. 3. The next point urged is that undue preference has been shown to the stage carriages, Deluxe buses, Tourist buses, Express buses and buses owned of a company have been subjected to an annual rate of additional tax amounting to Rs. 4,000/-. 4. This argument is again without any substance because the State is entitled to make classification amongst the tax payers. Common people use stage carriages for every day work and possibly the State Government did not impose a larger burden of tax on them. Any levy on a stage carriage would be passed on to the passenger. It is not been shown how the classification is not reasonable. 5. The next point urged is that a sum of Rs. 5,000/- per annum or 1/52 part thereof has been imposed on buses operating in West Bengal under Inter-State permits. If the buses of the other States come to West Bengal and utilise the road services, the Stale of West Bengal is entitled to levy the tax on those buses for the user of the roads. The quantum of the tax depends on a number of days the bus operates in the State. In the object clause of the Act it has been stated that it was necessary to raise fund for the purpose of maintenance and construction of the roads. The quantum of the tax depends on a number of days the bus operates in the State. In the object clause of the Act it has been stated that it was necessary to raise fund for the purpose of maintenance and construction of the roads. The basis of the levy, therefore, appears to be reasonable. 6. Another point that was urged was that the Deluxe bus, tourist bus, Express bus and bus of a company have not been properly defined in the Act. This contention is again without substance. 7. Section 2(b) defines "bus of a company" –– "bus of a company" means the bus or omnibus registered as a private service vehicle or as a contract carriage and owned by a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or by any firm (proprietorship or partnership) or any society or any corporate body or any trust or any educational institution or any organization, whether registered or not :–– Provided that a motor vehicle not registered in the name of any individual shall be deemed to be owned by a company, firm society, corporate body, trust, educational institution or organization. 8. Section 2(c) defines "Deluxe bus" to mean "an omnibus as conforms to the specifications and standards laid down for tourist vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), not covered by any tourist permit (All Bengal or All India), or any other bus that may be specified as such by the State Government from time to time". 9. Section 2(d) defines "Express bus" to mean "an omnibus plying under a contract carriage permit or under a stage carriage permit or special stage carriage permit with a limited selected number of stages commonly known as Express bus or Limited Service bus". 10. Section 2(m) defines "Tourist bus" to mean "a bus or an omnibus registered on plying as a contract carriage and covered by a tourist permit under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) and includes a tourist omnibus". 11. Section 2(p) further provides that all other words and expressions used in this Act but not defined shall have same meaning as in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 12. In view of all these provisions, we are unable to uphold this contention that the subject matter of the levy is uncertain and vague. 13. 11. Section 2(p) further provides that all other words and expressions used in this Act but not defined shall have same meaning as in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 12. In view of all these provisions, we are unable to uphold this contention that the subject matter of the levy is uncertain and vague. 13. Lastly it was contended that there is a provision for One-Time Tax on Motor Cycle under Section 9 of the impugned Act. There are two difficulties on this point for the writ petitioners. More of the writ petitioners has claimed to be the owner of a motor cycle and, therefore, this question does not arise in this case. Moreover, levy of similar tax on motor cycle and tri-cycle by the Bombay Motor Vehicle Tax Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of (1) State of Maharashtra & Ors v. Madhukar Balkrishna Baidya & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2062 . 14. The discretionary powers of legislature to make classification in laws dealing with taxation matters is much wider than other laws. The Courts have recognised the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements and in that view of the matter has permitted a larger discretion to the legislature in the matter of classification, so long as it adheres to the fundamental principles underlying the said doctrine. The power of legislature to classify is of wide amplitude and flexibility so that it can adjust the system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It is true that the power of taxation cannot transcend the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. If the aforesaid principles which have been laid down by the Supreme Court in a number of cases are kept in view, there is no difficulty about this case. This writ petition, application and the appeal must fail and are hereby dismissed. All interim orders are vacated. LATER–– Let similar judgment be passed on the other appeal being F.M.A.T. No. 1157 of 1994. The prayer for stay of operation of the judgment is refused Let xerox copy of this judgment be supplied to the learned Counsel appearing for the parties on usual charges and undertaking. Agarwal, C. J.: I agree.