K. Shivashankar Bhat ( 1 ) THE petitioner has sought several reliefs,mainly challenging the validity of Rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (Rules forshort ). The petitioner also sought the quashing of certain orders made by therespondents under the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Act ). The petitioner manufactures a commodity calledplexol-150 which is an oil editive used extensively in the petroleum industry as apour-point depresent and also as a de-waxing aid in solvent de-waxing process. Inthe process of manufacturing this commodity (REFERRED TO hereafter as the endproduct), there is an intermediate stage at which a resin type commodity emergeswhich is the subject-matter of this writ petition. For the sake of convenience thiscommodity or article may be REFERRED TO as in-process-material, though according tothe petitioner this in-process-material has no independent identity and it is notmarketable and therefore, it is not "goods" covered by the provisions of the Act. Petitioner has described the entire process as follows:- "the entire process of manufacturing Plexol-150 takes place in a large kettle. Different monomers are added into the kettle and after regulating thetemperature and adding certain catalysts to the kettle and diluting the contentof the kettle with dilution oil, the end-product Plexol-150 is obtained. Theentire process from the beginning to the final stage is carried out in the samekettle in a continuous, uninterrupted and integrated process. " ( 2 ) THE petitioner asserts that this is not resin known to the market at all andis never bought and sold. This in-process-material, though is a molten liquid,comes into existence as such at an intermediate stage in a continuous and integrated process. In para 5 of the writ petition the petitioner has described theprocess as follows:- "the entire process of manufacture of Plexol-150 is carried out in a single unitin a continuous, uninterrupted and integrated process. In the processdifferent monomers are weighed and charged into the kettle. The chain-length control agent is then added to this kettle. At this stage, the kettle isinerted and stirring is started. After about half an hour s heating of the kettlethe temperature taken to 122c using steam in the kacket. Chaser, catalystsare added in four different lots after every half hour. The chain-length control agent is then added to this kettle. At this stage, the kettle isinerted and stirring is started. After about half an hour s heating of the kettlethe temperature taken to 122c using steam in the kacket. Chaser, catalystsare added in four different lots after every half hour. The reaction is allowedto proceed for another 40 minutes at a temperature of 122c to 124 C. Dilution oil is then added to the kettle to dilute the contents of it. After all thequantity of dilution oil is added, the kettle is kept at a temperature of 115cto 120c for one hour. After checking the viscosity and solidity content, theplexol-150 is ready for packaging. " ( 3 ) THE petitioner also has produced the affidavit of an expert in the field, byname Dr. S. P. Potnis. He was a Professor of Polymer Technology, Head of Plasticsand Paints Division and Director of Department of Chemical Technology, University of Bombay. He has visited several renowned foreign Universities for technicaldiscussions and collaborative works as could be seen from para 3 of his affidavit. The process is described by him in paras 7 to 10 of his affidavit as follows:- "in order to obtain the end product Plexol-150, the starting raw materials aredescribed as monomers. Two types of monomers are taken as the startingraw materials. These monomers are subjected to the process of polymerization. It may be mentioned that the term monomer represents a single unit. When several of such single units are linked together, they are described aspolymers. The term polymer means many units. As such, this process of polymerization results in linking many monomers to form polymers. In order to carry out the aforesaid process of polymerization, after monomers areadded to the Kettle, NDDM (Normal Dodecyl Marcaptam) is added. This acts asa chain length regulator or chain control agent. It ensures that the desired chainlength of a polymer is obtained. Certain catalysts are also added which facilitatethe process of polymerization. After the catalyst is added, the mixture is heated toattain a temperature of over 120c to facilitate polymerization. After the initialreaction of polymerization is completed, it is found that the entire quantity ofmonomers is not polymerized. In order to fully polymerize the entire quantity ofmonomers, a chaser is added which helps in polymerizing the unreacted monomers. In this manner the monomers are polymerized. After the initialreaction of polymerization is completed, it is found that the entire quantity ofmonomers is not polymerized. In order to fully polymerize the entire quantity ofmonomers, a chaser is added which helps in polymerizing the unreacted monomers. In this manner the monomers are polymerized. During the entire process ofpolymerization the process is carried out in an inert atmosphere (by addition ofnitrogen ). This ensures that no decomposition takes place and this facilitatesproper polymerization. This intermediate product so obtained is maintained at ahigh temperature of over 122c to ensure that it does not become a solid mass. However, even at this high temperature, it is a very thick liquid mass in moltencondition. If the temperature is not so maintained, the product would become asolid mass and become totally unfit for use. In order to make this intermediate product marketable, it is necessary todilute the thick mass with dilution oils (mineral oils ). For the purpose of addingdilution oil, the high temperature of molten mass is maintained, otherwise, thedilution process would also not be possible. Only afterdilution oil is added, anda solution is obtained, which is called Plexol-150. This end product in solution isknown as Plexol-150. At the earlier stage, prior to the addition of oil, the intermediate product is notmarketable. In that form or condition it is not capable of being brought to themarket for sale or purchase. At the intermediate stage, this product is not amarketable commodity. " ( 4 ) DR. Potnis has also stated that the molten mass REFERRED TO as in-process-material by the petitioner cannot be packed and if an attempt is made to pack thismaterial into drums or any containers and is permitted to cool down it would notbe possible to again utilise the same and the entire product shall have to bediscarded thereafter. Any attempt to heat the cooled mass to the high temperaturefor further processing will not yield any goods of utility because the product woulddegrade and decompose. This is what the affidavit states - "if an attempt is made to pack this molten mass into drums or any containersand is permitted to cool down, it would not be possible to again utilise thesame and the product will have to be entirely discarded. Even if an attemptis made to heat thecooled mass to the high temperature required for furtherprocessing to add dilution oil, the product would degrade and decompose. Even if an attemptis made to heat thecooled mass to the high temperature required for furtherprocessing to add dilution oil, the product would degrade and decompose. On account of local or concentrated heating the polymer mass would degradeand depolymerize. As a result of such heating the links in the chain ofpolymerization break, making the product totally unfit for use. Such heatingwould also emit toxic fumes and irritable gases, and may lead to an explosion. It may also be mentioned here, that to make the cool mass reuseable, evenafter it is heated by some means one would need high pressure to get it out ofthe drum or container and the normal drums or containers will not stand suchhigh pressure. This is a further indicator to show that this thick molten massis not a marketable commodity and once it cools down it becomes unfit for useand is not marketable. As stated above, heating the cooled mass would alsorender the product unfit on account of degradation and depolymerization. " ( 5 ) DR. Potnis has categorically asserted that this in-process-material cannot bedescribed as a marketable product and cannot be equated with resins known in themarket. ( 6 ) IN the year 1975 question of classification for the purpose of levy of dutyunder the Act cropped up, with reference to the end product. Earlier Plexol-150,the end product was approved as non-excisable by the Assistant Collector ofcentral Excise, Bombay. In September, 1975 the said officer re-classified the sameas "acrylic resin" falling under tariff item 15-A. Petitioner paid the duty underprotest as per the petitioner s letter dated 23. 4. 1976. In August, 1976 the Assistantcollector classified the end product as falling under tariff item No. 68. However,regarding the in-process-material he opined that duty shall have to be paid undertariff item 15-A. Petitioner paid duty under protest accordingly. Petitioner alsopointed out that the in-process-material cannot be taxed under the Act. Petitionerpointed out that that material was not known as resin in the trade and thatmaterial had only a temporary identity at an intermediate stage. The petitioner alsocontended that Rule 9, as it then stood was not applicable because there was noremoval of the alleged goods. This protest was reflected in the letter of thepetitioner dated 4. 7. 1977 (Annexure "d ). However, the petitioner was directed tofile the classification list in terms of the opinion formed by the Revenue. Thepetitioner persisted in its protest. The petitioner alsocontended that Rule 9, as it then stood was not applicable because there was noremoval of the alleged goods. This protest was reflected in the letter of thepetitioner dated 4. 7. 1977 (Annexure "d ). However, the petitioner was directed tofile the classification list in terms of the opinion formed by the Revenue. Thepetitioner persisted in its protest. Show cause notices were issued to the petitionerby the Excise Department and there was also a demand levying duty on the in-process-material as well as the end product. Petitioner filed an appeal to theassistant Collector which was dismissed on 20. 7. 1978 as per the order marked asannexure l . Appeal of the petitioner to the Collector also failed, therefore, thepetitioner presented a revision application before the second respondent, whichwas the Revisional Authority during the relevant period. The order of theappellate Collector was dated 25. 2. 1980. Thereafter the revision application wasfiled before the second respondent and the petitioner also sought stay of therecovery. By that time there was a decision of this Court in Devi Dayal Electronicsand Wires Limited s case given on 16. 10. 1980, according to which, the intermediateproduct cannot be subjected to the duty as the question of removal -was notinvolved, when the process of manufacturing the end product was a continuousprocess in the same factory. Therefore, the petitioner sought an early hearing of therevision petition pending before the second respondent. On 20. 2. 1982 Rule 9 wasamended with retrospective effect and anexplanation was added to Rule 9, whichinfact nullified the effect of the Judgment of this Court. The explanation which isrelevant for the purpose of this case as well as the main Rule 9 (1) is quoted belowfor the sake of easy reference:- "rule 9. On 20. 2. 1982 Rule 9 wasamended with retrospective effect and anexplanation was added to Rule 9, whichinfact nullified the effect of the Judgment of this Court. The explanation which isrelevant for the purpose of this case as well as the main Rule 9 (1) is quoted belowfor the sake of easy reference:- "rule 9. Time and manner of payment of duty.-- (1) No excisable goods shallbe removed from any place where they are prodiuced, cured or manufacturedor any premises appurtenant thereto, which may be specified by the Collectorin this behalf, whether for consumption, exporter manufacture of any othercommodity in or outside such place, until the excise duty leviable has beenpaid at such place and insuch manner as is prescribed in these Rules or as thecollector may require and except on presentation of an application in theproper form and on obtaining the permission of the proper officer on theform:" [explanation.- For the purposes of this rule, excisable goods produced,cured or manufactured in any place and consumed or utilised - (i) as such or after subjection to any process or processes; or (ii) for the manufacture of any other commodity;whether in a continuous process or otherwise, in such place or any premisesappurtenant thereto, specified by the Collector under Sub-rule (1), shall be deemedto have been removed from such place or premises immediately before suchconsumption or utilisation. ( 7 ) IN the meanwhile the petitioner was agitating for the re-classification of thegoods during the subsequent period also. But the request of the petitioner wasrejected by the Assistant Collector (4th respondent) on 1. 5. 1982. The Assistantcollector held that a decision has already been given which was confirmed inappeal that the relevant product was falling under tariff item 15-A (i) (ii ). In theorder (Annexure R) the Assistant Collector also held that there was no substancein the argument that the product has not been marketable and the fact that theproduct is useful for further manufacture indicates that the product is marketableand not waste. The Assistant Collector has clearly indicated that according to himthe product in question is marketable because the said product is useful for furthermanufacture. The order nowhere states as to how and where the product inquestion could be marketed and in fact whether any particular market exists andwhether the product in question, which came into existence at the intermediatestage is capable of being marketed. The order nowhere states as to how and where the product inquestion could be marketed and in fact whether any particular market exists andwhether the product in question, which came into existence at the intermediatestage is capable of being marketed. ( 8 ) IN view of the amendment of Rule 9 the petitioner thought it fit to challengethe validity of the Rule by filing the present writ petition on 27. 5. 1982. Thepetitioner also sought the setting aside of the order of the Assistant Collector madeon 1. 5. 1982. In addition to other reliefs the petitioner also has sought a direction tothe Revisional Authority to dispose of the revision petition early. We may note herethat after the amend ment of the Act the revision application of the petitionerstoodtransferred to CEGAT which has been impleaded as 7th respondent. In the counteraffidavit there is no denial of the process REFERRED TO by the petitioner, resulting in themanufacture of the end-product. There is also no specific assertion as to how thein-process-material is marketable and whether the said material could be obtainedby a manufacturer of the end-product. It is also not stated that the in-process-material has an independent existence. The only relevant assertion reads asfollows:- , "in reply to para 4 of the petition it is admitted that a molten liquid comes intoexistence in the process of manufacture of Plexol-150 by the petitioner but thatit is not looked upon by the consumers, manufacturers and dealers as resinknown to the market for buying and selling as such, is not admitted. The factthat the product coming into existence at the intermediate stage is capable ofbeing used in further manufacture indicates that the product coming intoexistence at the intermediate stage is saleable and marketable. "therefore, it is clear that the Revenue considered the in-process-material as amarketable goods only because it is capable of being used in further manufacture. Nowhere it is stated that this in-process-material could exist independentlywithout being used further, like a yarn used in the manufacture of fabric. ( 9 ) THERE is also a contention that this Court cannot entertain this writ petitionbecause the cause of action arose at Bombay. ( 10 ) FROM the respective contentions advanced before us the following questions shall have to be answered:- (I) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider this writ petition? ( 9 ) THERE is also a contention that this Court cannot entertain this writ petitionbecause the cause of action arose at Bombay. ( 10 ) FROM the respective contentions advanced before us the following questions shall have to be answered:- (I) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider this writ petition? (ii) Whether the in-process-material REFERRED TO above falls within the concept of goods manufacture of which could be taxed under the Act? (iii) What ordershould be made by this Court, if for any reason the first twoquestions are answered in favour of the petitioner? ( 11 ) WHEN the writ petition was filed in the year 1982 the substantial groundof attack against the action of the respondents was based on the challenge to thevalidity of Rule 9 of the Rules. Further, the second respondent before whom therevision application was pend ing was situated at New Delhi. After the amendmentof the Act the revision application stood transferred to the 7th respondent which issituated at New Delhi. The order of the 5th respondent made in May,1982, atbombay was in effect an order following the earlier order which was already thesubject-matter of the revision petition before the second respondent. Havingregard to these aspects we are of the considered view that this Court had not onlyjurisdiction to entertain the writ petition but continues to have the jurisdiction todecide the writ petition, even though the challenge to Rule 9 does not survive inview of the decision of the Supreme Court in J. K. Spinning and Weaving Milklimited and Another v. Union of India and Others, 1987 (32) ELT 234 . The validity of the rule has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. ( 12 ) FURTHER the learned Counsel for the Central Government also did notseriously question our jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition having regard tothe peculiar facts of this case and its history. ( 13 ) IT is true that the revision application filed by the petitioner is pendingbefore the CEGAT but the subsequent order made in May 1982 is directly underattack in this writ petition and in the circumstances we have to consider whetherthe petitioner should be directed to approach the appellate authority nearly 11years after keeping this writ petition pending. This aspect will be considered afterexamining to the extent possible, the main plea raised by the petitioner. This aspect will be considered afterexamining to the extent possible, the main plea raised by the petitioner. ( 14 ) WE have REFERRED TO to the pleadings as also the affidavit of an experttouching upon this question. The Revenue is not in a position to categorically showthat the in-process-material has an independent identity. It is not in a position toshow that the in-process-material obtained at an intermediate stage is not transitory in character. However, the petitioner has been asserting that the in-process-material cannot be marketed at all having regard to its transient character and thatit has no independent existence. The respondents have inferred that the saidmaterial is also covered by the concept of goods because the said material isnecessary to produce any product. Only because the in-process-material whichcame into existence at the intermediate stage is capable of being used in furthermanufacture, it cannot be said that the said material would come within theconcept of goods. In-process-material actually is a stage reached before theultimate product is produced. The learned Counsel for the revenue relied upon thedecision of the Supreme Court in A. P. State Electricity Board v. Collector, Centralexcise, Hyderabad, JT 1994 (1) SC 545. In the said case the question was whether thepre-stressed cement concrete poles manufactured by the Board are goods withinthe meaning of Section 3 of the Act. The poles were actually manufactured by theindependent contractors under the direct supervision of the Board. They wereabout 100 types of poles. All the poles manufactured by the Board were utilised forits own purposes and they were not sold in the market. Because of this, the Boardcontended that the poles were not goods . The Supreme Court negatived thiscontention with the following observations: "the fact that the goods are not in fact marketed is of no relevance. So longas the goods were marketable, they are goods for the purposes of Section 3. It is not also necessary that the goods in question should be generally availablein the market. Even if the goods are available from only one source or froma specified market, it makes no difference so long as they are available forpurchasers. Now, in the appeals before us, the fact that in Kerala these polesare manufactured by independent contractors who sell them to Kerala Stateelectricity Board itself shows that such poles do have a market. Even if the goods are available from only one source or froma specified market, it makes no difference so long as they are available forpurchasers. Now, in the appeals before us, the fact that in Kerala these polesare manufactured by independent contractors who sell them to Kerala Stateelectricity Board itself shows that such poles do have a market. Even if thereis only one purchaser of these articles, it must still besaid that there is a marketfor these articles. The marketability of articles does not depend upon thenumber of purchasers nor is the market confined to the territorial limits of thiscountry. "the above observations were relied upon to contend that existence of a market forthe particular goods is not necessary to hold the article in question as goods . ( 15 ) WE are of the view that this is, not the correct reading of the aboveobservations of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court made it clear that so longas articles in question are available for purchasers the articles could be consideredas goods , and that the fact that there is only one purchaser for the articles issufficient to hold that the articles are marketable. ( 16 ) IN the instant case before us the alleged intermediate product/in-process-material is not independently manufactured and it has been shown that it cannotbe so marketed at all in that condition. The transient personality of the article is onlyan incidental stage in the process of manufacturing the end-product. In fact thesupreme Court REFERRED TO to an earlierdecision rendered in Union Carbide Indialimited Vs. Union of India, 1986 2 SCR 162 , wherein aluminium cans or torchbodies were produced in the factory of the appellant which was engaged in themanufacture and sale of flash lights. These aluminium cans were sought to be taxedas goods under the Act. It was found that the aluminium cans prepared by theappellant were manufactured by the appellant entirely for its own purposes andeven the appellant had to process the cans further before using them in themanufacture of torches. The aluminium cans were held to be in an elementary andun-finished form and were not capable of being sold to any consumer and hence notmarketable. The affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant in this regard wasaccepted by the Supreme Court. Ultimately it was held that those aluminium canswere not goods. ( 17 ) IN Bhor Industries Ltd. Vs. The aluminium cans were held to be in an elementary andun-finished form and were not capable of being sold to any consumer and hence notmarketable. The affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant in this regard wasaccepted by the Supreme Court. Ultimately it was held that those aluminium canswere not goods. ( 17 ) IN Bhor Industries Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise Ltd. 1989 (40) E. L. T. 280 (SC), the Supreme Court pointed out that to fall within the concept of goodsunder the Act it is necessary to find out whether the articles in questions are goods , i. e. to say articles as known in the market as separate, distinct, identifiablecommodities. It was further pointed out that simply because a certain article fallswithin the schedule it would not be dutiable under excise law if the said article isnot goods known to the market. Marketability is therefore, an essential ingredientin order to be dutiable under the Schedule to Central Excise Tariff, 1985. Thearticles in question before the Supreme Court were REFERRED TO as crude PVC film. These articles were produced for the purpose of use in final product such as leathercloth and laminated jute mattings and PVC tapes. The Court held that crude PVCfilm was not goods , because it was not marketable. ( 18 ) THE facts in Collector of Central Excise V. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises ,1989 (43) E. L. T. 214, have a strong bearing in the present case. The assessee/respondent contended that starch hydrolysate was not being marketed and is notcapable of being marketed and therefore was not dutiable. The contention wasaccepted and the Supreme Court made the following observations:- "the case of the respondent had always been that starch hydroly sate was notbeing marketed and is not capable of being marketed in view of its highlyunstable character resulting in fermentation even if kept for a day or two. Shriganguly appearing for the revenue sought to urge that the Tribunal waswrong in approaching the problem in that light. The test was not whether thestarch hydrolysate was not of a highly unstable character and resulted infermentation even in a day or two, but whether it was capable of beingmarketable. He submitted that the test applied was not the true test. Shriganguly appearing for the revenue sought to urge that the Tribunal waswrong in approaching the problem in that light. The test was not whether thestarch hydrolysate was not of a highly unstable character and resulted infermentation even in a day or two, but whether it was capable of beingmarketable. He submitted that the test applied was not the true test. Heurged that even transient items of articles can be goods, provided that thesewere known in the market as distinct and separate articles having distinctiveand separate uses, these would still become goods if these were capable ofbeing marketed even during short period. From a conceptual and jurisprudential point of view, Shri Ganguly is right. But we are concerned with thequestion whether actual goods in question were marketed or, in other words,if not, whether these are marketable or not. It is true that the goods withunstable character can be theoretically marketable if there was a market ofsuch transient type of articles which are goods. But one has to take a practicalapproach. The assessee produced evidence in the form of affidavit. One Shrikhandor, who filed an affidavit in support of the case of the respondent, hadstated in his affidavit that completely hydrolysed starch would start fermenting and decomposing and at higher concentration it would start crystallizingout within two or three days. This is evidence indicating propensity of its notbeing marketed. It is good evidence to come to this conclusion that it wouldbe unlikely to be marketable as it was highly unstable. " ( 19 ) THEREFORE, the theoretical possibility of an article being marketable will notmake it goods and a practical approach shall have to be adopted while consideringthe question. As already noted by us, the fact that the in-process-material isnecessary and it is used in the manufacture of the end product by itself is not aground to hold it as goods . ( 20 ) IT was then contended by the learned Counsel for the revenue that in viewof the explanation to Rule 9 inserted in the year 1982, whatever comes into existenceat an intermediate stage of production of another product is deemed to be goods because it is deemed to removable from one place to another. According to thelearned Counsel for the revenue the purpose of this explanation is to create a legalfiction and to treat all kinds of intermediate products or materials or articles as goods . According to thelearned Counsel for the revenue the purpose of this explanation is to create a legalfiction and to treat all kinds of intermediate products or materials or articles as goods . ( 21 ) IT is impossible to accept this submission. The purpose of the explanationis to create a legal fiction that the goods which had come into existence at anintermediate stage of production shall be deemed to have been removed from suchplace or premises, when the said intermediate product is consumed or utilised inthe manufacture of any end-product. The purpose of this explanation is to get overcertain judicial pronouncements which held that intermediate product whichcomes into existence and immediately thereafter consumed in the manufacture ofend-product is not "removed" from the place of manufacture and if there is no suchremoval levy under the Act cannot be imposed on the said intermediate product. ( 22 ) IT is a well known rule of construction that the deeming provision shallhave to be confined to the purpose for which it is enacted. Explanation nowheredeems every kind of transient intermediate product as goods. If that is the intentionthe proper step would have been to add an appropriate explanation to thedefinition of the "goods" under the Act. ( 23 ) IN J. K. Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and Another v. Union of India andothers, 1987 (32) ELT 234 the Supreme Court had an occasion to make the followingobservations as to the scope of Rule 9. In para 39 of the Judgment the Supremecourt observed as follows:- "it is well settled that a deeming provision is an admission of the nonexistence of the fact deemed. Therefore, in view of the deeming provisionsunder Explanations to Rule 9 and 49, although the goods which are producedor manufactured at an intermediate stage and, thereafter, consumed orutilised in the integrated process for the manufacture of another commodityis not actually removed, shall be construed and regarded as removed. "the above observation is a complete answer to the contention advanced by therevenue. ( 24 ) FROM the above it is quite clear that there is no substance in the stand takenby the Revenue regarding the marketability of the in-process-material involvedin the instant case as also the contention of the revenue based on Explanation torule 9. ( 25 ) MR. "the above observation is a complete answer to the contention advanced by therevenue. ( 24 ) FROM the above it is quite clear that there is no substance in the stand takenby the Revenue regarding the marketability of the in-process-material involvedin the instant case as also the contention of the revenue based on Explanation torule 9. ( 25 ) MR. Lokur contended that the question whether the article in question is"goods" or not is a question of fact and the statutory authorities should decide thesaid question and, therefore, we should relegate the petitioner to the statutoryremedies. ( 26 ) AS a simple proposition of law there can be no two opinions about thecorrectness of this proposition. ( 27 ) HOWEVER, in the instant case the Revenue has taken a specific, categoricalstand as to why the in-process material should be considered as goods under theact and we have already found that the stand taken by the Revenue is not properand the Revenue has mis-directed itself in its approach on the relevant question. Therefore, we do not think, we should dismiss the writ petition only on the groundthat the petitioner has effective alternative remedies. ( 28 ) THE next question pertains to the relief to be given to the petitioner. "we have expressed our opinion as to the nature of the in-process-materialand we have found that the said material cannot be brought within the term"goods" under the Act. If so, whatshould happen to the revision petition filedby the petitioner, which is pending before the CEGAT, is a matter for the saidtribunal to consider. Similarly it is open to the petitioner to seek a review ofthe order made by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, with arequest to re-classify the goods or articles in question. It is not possible for usto make an order of assessment in any manner. The same shall have to be doneby the Statutory Authorities according to law and in the light of the observations made in this order. " ( 29 ) THE revision application filed by the petitioner before the second respondent which has been transferred to the 7th respondent/cegat has to be disposedof early. We direct the 7th respondent to dispose of the said matter within six weeksfrom the receipt of this order. " ( 29 ) THE revision application filed by the petitioner before the second respondent which has been transferred to the 7th respondent/cegat has to be disposedof early. We direct the 7th respondent to dispose of the said matter within six weeksfrom the receipt of this order. It is open to the petitioner to file a certified copy ofthis order before the 7th respondent with an application for disposal of the said matter. Similarly it is open to the petitioner to seek review of the order dated 1. 5. 1985 (ANNEXURE r ) made by the assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, Division IV The writ petition is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute.