Judgment 1. THESE four applications were taken up for hearing together, as they all raise common question of law and fact. 2. THE petitioners in all these cases are employees of the different establishments impleaded as respondents in the different writ applications. In or about the year 1965, with the financial assistance of the government of India, the Housing Department, Government of West Bengal, constructed about 1600 flats of different sizes under the subsidised Industrial Housing Scheme. According to the petitioners, these flats were public premises within the meaning of Section 3 of the West Bengal Government Premises (Regulation of Occupancy) Act, 1984. 3. IN order to utilise the flats so constructed, the State Government entered into Agreements with different industrial establishments to identify the workers to whom the flats could be allotted. In the recitals of the said agreements it was mentioned as follows :- "whereas the Government of West Bengal (hereinafter referred to as "the Government") have constructed the tenements hereinafter mentioned and described in the Schedule herein under written (hereinafter called "the said tenements") under the "subsidised Housing scheme for Industrial Workers" for the purpose of granting leave and licence to enable workers within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Factories Act, 1948 (Act CXII of 1948) to live and reside therein on payment of the prescribed fee therefor and on certain terms and conditions specified in the said scheme. 4. AND whereas the Governor at the special recommendation of the company is agreeable to grant leave and licence to such of the workers of the Company as the Company in its absolute discretion may determine from time to time to live and reside in such of the said tenements as may be allotted to them by the Government on the merits of each case, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein and in the respective licences to be granted to such workers as aforesaid. Pursuant to such Agreements the concerned respondents in the different writ applications selected the petitioners therein for allotment of flats in their favour in the aforesaid Industrial Housing Estate. 5. Pursuant to such Agreements the concerned respondents in the different writ applications selected the petitioners therein for allotment of flats in their favour in the aforesaid Industrial Housing Estate. 5. IT is the further case of the petitioners that in July, 1982 the government of India reclassified the State Sector Social Housing Scheme so that all Subsidised Industrial Estates were converted into Integrated housing Schemes an to bring the flats in question within the reach of the weaker section of the opportunity in general. 6. IN appears that in the month of March, 1988, the Government of west Bengal revoked all the agreements entered into with the different companies and on 28th March, 1988, adopted a resolution to allot the different flats directly to the occupants after realisation of the entire outstanding rents and other clauses. It was decided to constitute a committee or committees for implementing the aforesaid decision and to act as a recommendatory body. According to the writ petitioners, upon revocation of the Agreements and the adoption of the resolution dated 28th March, 1988, they became entitled to become direct tenants under the state Government, but as their cases were not being considered, the petitioner no. 1 Association in Civil order No. 5926 (W) of 1991 moved a writ application, being Civil Order No. 17168 (W) of 1989, for a direction upon the State Government to implement the said resolution as far as the petitioners were concerned. The said application was disposed of on 29th January, 1990, with a direction upon the Government to implement the said resolution and to dispose of all the pending applications for allotment in accordance with the said resolution until the same was replaced by any other duly notified resolution. The petitioners were also given the liberty to challenge any future resolutions which might be adopted by the State Government for rescinding or amending the resolution of 28th March, 1988. 7. AFTER about two years, on 20th March, 1990, the State government adopted a fresh resolution rescinding the resolution dated 28th March, 1988. 8. The petitioners were also given the liberty to challenge any future resolutions which might be adopted by the State Government for rescinding or amending the resolution of 28th March, 1988. 7. AFTER about two years, on 20th March, 1990, the State government adopted a fresh resolution rescinding the resolution dated 28th March, 1988. 8. THESE several writ applications have been filed challenging the said resolution of 20th March, 1990, and also the refusal of the respondents to pay House Rent Allowance to some of the petitioner of the rate of 15 per cent of their pay in term of finance Department Memo No. 744-F dated 20th January, 1978, and from adjusting the balance against the amounts deducted from the petitioners' salaries and remitted to the State government towards licence from payable by him against the respective flats under their occupation. From the cases made out in these writ applications, the issues which emerge for decision are broadly confined to the questions as to whether the petitioner, who have been allotted quarters, are entitled to House Rent allowance at the rate of 15 per cent, in terms of Finance Department Memo no. 744-F dated 20th January, 1978, and whether the petitioners are entitled to be recognised as direct tenants under the State Government in respect of the flats allotted to them, in view of the resolution adopted by the state Government on 28th March, 1988, despite the fact that such resolution was rescinded on 20th March, 1990. 9. APPEARING for the writ petitioners in all the four matters, Mr. Pratap Ray, learned Advocate, submitted that in terms of the Agreements entered into between the State of West Bengal and the various companies, the said companies were vested with the authority to select and recommend the names of the workers concerned to the Housing Department, Government of West Bengal, for allotment in their favour of the flats constructed under the Subsidised Industrial Housing Scheme. Subsequent to actual allotment of flats by the State Government, the individuals companies were further vested with the authority to collect the licence fees payable by the concerned workers, by deducting the same from their salaries, and to remit the name to the State Government. 10. MR. Subsequent to actual allotment of flats by the State Government, the individuals companies were further vested with the authority to collect the licence fees payable by the concerned workers, by deducting the same from their salaries, and to remit the name to the State Government. 10. MR. Ray also submitted that the Agreements further provided that in the event of revocation thereof for the reasons mentioned therein, the concerned Company would have no further liability or responsibility to collect and deposit the licence fees from the petitioners. Mr. Ray urged that from the said provisions it would be amply clear that the petitioners were direct licensees under the State Government and pursuant to the resolution of the State Government dated 20th March, 1980, they were entitled to be recognised as tenants/licensees under the state Government with liability to pay rents/license fees directly to the state Government. Mr. Ray contended that the position would be even more clear from a letter dated 16th March, 1988, written by the Executive engineer, Housing Construction Division No. V, to the Town Administrator, the Durgapur Projects Ltd., at Page 61 of the affidavit in Reply in C. O. No. 5926 (W) of 1991, informing him that a particular flat had been allotted to one Narayan Gopal Sinha from his office. According to Mr. Ray, the petitioner occupation of the different flats came squarely within the provisions of the West Bengal Government Premises (Regulation of occupancy) Act, 1984, having regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof. 11. MR. Ray submitted that since the State Government had already allotted about 300 flats to the respective occupants similarly circumstanced as the petitioners in terms of the said resolution of 28th march, 1988, but had remained inactive as far as the petitioners were concerned, a writ application had to be moved for a direction upon the government to implement its own decision, and the matter (Civil Order No. 17168 (W) of 1984) was disposed of on 29th January, 1990, inter alia, with a direction upon the State Government to implement its said resolution and to dispose of the pending applications in that light, unless of course the resolution was rescinded and replaced by another resolution, which the petitioners would be entitled to challenge in fresh proceedings. Mr. Mr. Ray urged that in view of the said order, the State Government was not competent to rescind the said resolution and to adopt another resolution which was completely contrary thereto. 12. MR. Ray submitted that in the absence of the relevant Agreements, the petitioners were unaware of the above position and were, therefore, unable to incorporate the said facts in the writ petition in Civil Order No. 5926 (W) of 1991, but after their disclosure in the Affidavit in-Opposition the same have been duly referred to and dealt with in the Affidavit in Reply and in subsequent affidavits. Referring to the resolution adopted by the State Government on 20th march, 1990, rescinding the earlier resolution was a single-line resolution bereft of any reason and was not capable of being given to since it had not been published in the Official Gazette. 13. IN support of his contention that without notification the impugned resolution dated 20th March, 1990, could not be given effect to. Mr. Ray referred to and relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad high Court in the case of M/s. Adarsh Bhander v. Sales Tax Officer, Aligarh, reported in A. I. R. 1957, Allahabad at Page 475, wherein while considering the publication of a Notification under the u. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, the Full Bench field that an Ordinance comes into operation from the date of its first publication in the gazette. Mr. Ray also referred to a Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh high Court in the case of Ramji Lal and Ors. v. Municipal Committee, piparia, reported in A. I. R. 1959 Madhya Pradesh at Page 82, wherein was also held that the notification in question would come into effect only after its publication. 14. MR. Ray then submitted that since a right had accrued to the petitioners under the resolution dated 28th March. 1980, and having regard to the order passed by Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. in CO. No. 17168 (W) of 1989, the subsequent rescinding of the said resolution by a one line order benefit of any reason, without giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard, also amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice. In support of his aforesaid submission Mr. No. 17168 (W) of 1989, the subsequent rescinding of the said resolution by a one line order benefit of any reason, without giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard, also amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice. In support of his aforesaid submission Mr. Ray referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Scheduled Castes and Workers' welfare Association (Regd.) and Another v. State of Karnataka and Others. reported in A. I. R. 1991 SC at Page 1117, wherein while considering the validity of a -Notification issued under the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, seeking to rescind an earlier notification was liable to be quashed since no opportunity of hearing had been given to the persons, who were to be affected by such action on behalf of the State, which was held to be in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court sought to emphasise that when an administrative order was to affect citizens adversely, the principles of natural justice should be applied and duly complied with. 15. MR. Ray then contended that the Notification dated 20th March, 1990, seeking to rescind the earlier resolution dated 20th March, 1988, also suffered from the vice of discrimination as it sought to violate the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, Referring to the tabular chart at Page 155 of the writ petition, Mr. Ray submitted that since the scheme under the earlier resolution had already been acted upon and about 300 persons had been directly allotted the flats under their occupation, an attempt to rescind such resolution amounted to discrimination between the petitioners and those persons to whom direct allotment had been made under the scheme contemplated by the resolution of 28th March, 1988. 16. IN support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. 16. IN support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Ray referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A. L. Kalra v. The Project and equipment Corporation of India Limited, reported in A. I. R. 1984 SC at Page 1361, wherein the Supreme Court observed that wisdom of the legislative policy may not be open to judicial review, but when the wisdom takes the concrete form of law, the same must stand the test of being in tune with the fundamental rights and if it entrenches upon any of the fundamental rights, it is void as ordained by Article 13. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in executive/administrative action, because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily invoke the negation of equality. As mentioned earlier, Mr. Ray also contended that the impugned resolution dated 20th March, 1990, was bad since it was bereft of any reason and contained only a bald statement that the earlier resolution stood rescind. Mr. Ray submitted that where the rights of a large number of citizens were involved, it was incumbent upon the Government to give reasons for rescinding the earlier resolution under which a valuable right had accrued to the petitioners. 17. IN support of his aforesaid contentions Mr. Ray referred to the following cases:- (i) M/s. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. The State of Jammu Kashmir and Another, reported in A.I.R. 1980 SC at Page 1992; (ii) Ramana Dayaram Shetty, v. The International Air-Port Authority of India and Ors., Reported in A.I.R. 1070 SC at Page 1628: and (iii) Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another, reported in A.I.R. 1978, SC at Page 597. 18. IN all of the aforesaid decisions, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles that all governmental action should be free from arbitrariness and should be guided by reason. Mr. Ray then urged that even if it be held that no right as such had accrued in favour of the petitioners by virtue of the resolution of 28th march, 1988, the petitioners did have a legitimate expectation to be given the benefits of the said resolution and such expectation could not be denied by the State Government by an unreasoned and arbitrary act on its part. 19. MR. Ray then contended that the state Government was also not entitled to adopt the resolution of 20th March, 1990, having regard to the well-known principle of promissory estoppel. 19. MR. Ray then contended that the state Government was also not entitled to adopt the resolution of 20th March, 1990, having regard to the well-known principle of promissory estoppel. In this regard, Mr. Ray referred to the case of M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. v. State of U. P. and Others, reported in A.I.R. 1979 SC at Page 621, and a decision of the rajasthan High Court in the case of Union of India v. M/s. J. K. Industries limited, reported in A. I. R. 1991 Rajasthan at Page 45. 20. MR. Ray also submitted that the principles of social justice required the State Government to act fairly and in a manner so as not to cause prejudice to one set of citizens in order to benefit another. Mr. Ray urged that even in the famous case of the pavement dwellers of Bombay, (Olga Tellis a Bombay Municipal Corporation, A.I.R. 1986, SC Page 180), the Supreme Court, while allowing the eviction of the pavement dwellers from the pavement and footpaths, gave a direction to the Bombay municipal Corporation to offer alternative plots to the pavement dwellers who were or who happened to be cencused in 1976. 21. IN this connection Mr. Ray also referred to the decision of the supreme Court in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and Others, reported in A. I. R. 1973 SC at Page 1461 and two decisions of this court in the case of (i) State Bank of India v. Amal Kr. Sen and Others. reported in 1988 (1) C. L. J. at Page 83 and (2) Sidhangsu Mohan Chakraborty v. L. I. C. of India and Others, reported in 1988 (2) C. H. N. at Page 61 wherein it was observed as follows:-"our resolve in the preamble to our constitution to secure 'social justice' to all must not be taken to be a mere sonorous prelude to a grandiloquent parchment, because in the directive principles of state policy also, which have been declared in article 37 to be "fundamental in the governance of the country," 'the state' in Article 38, has been categorically commanded" to strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting, as effectively as it may, a social order 'in which 'social justice' "shall inform all the institutions of the national life". 22. 22. ON the other question relating to non-payment of house rent allowance, which was, in fact, the main grievance of the petitioners initially, Mr. Ray submitted that by virtue of Government memo No. 744-F dated 20th January, 1978, provision was made for Government servants living in rented houses and in receipt of pay exceeding Rs.1250/ -. but not exceeding Rs.2,000/-, per month, to receive an amount equal to the excess of the actual rent paid over 8 per cent of pay. subject to a maximum of 13 per cent of pay. The Memorandum was modified by Finance department's memo No. 5597-F dated 13th May, 1978, providing that with effect, from 1st February, J977, the rate of house rent allowance for whole-time government employees drawing pay of above Rs.1250/- and living in rented house would be 15 per cent of pay, subject to a maximum of rs. 275/- per month. Mr. Ray urged that the said decision of the State Government had been accepted by the respondents. In fact, in C. R. No. 15390 (W) of 1982, u. C. Banerjee, J. by his order of 31st July, 1987, directed the Durgapur state Transport Corporation to pay house rent allowance to the petitioners therein at the rate of 15% per month, together with arrear house rent allowance as deducted. It was also contended that the division Bench on appeal, being F. M. A. T. No. 2715 of 1987, did not stay the operation of the judgment of the learned single Judge. 23. MR. Ray pointed out that by virtue of interim orders passed in some of the matters, the concerned respondent companies were paying the petitioners house rent allowance at the rate of 15 per cent of their pay. 24. MR. Ray sought to emphasise that since the respondent companies were only collecting agencies empowered to deduct the licence fees payable by the petitioners from the petitioners' salaries and to remit the same to the companies in question, it could not be contended on behalf of the said companies that the petitioners who had been provided accommodation in the above-mentioned flats were not entitled to receive house rent allowance, which the other employees were receiving, irrespective of whether they were living in rented accommodation or in their own houses. Mr. Mr. Ray pointed out that the decision adopted by the Durgapur projects Ltd. in its order dated 26th April, 1978, in this regard, was bad and discriminatory, since other employees were receiving the said benefit, irrespective of whether they lived in their own accommodation or any rented accommodation. Mr. Ray submitted that when employees living in rented accommodation or otherwise were entitled to receive house allowance at the rate prescribed in Government Memo No. 744 F died 20th January, 1978, there could be no reason why the petitioners, who were also living in rented accommodation, should be denied such benefit. 25. MR. Ray submitted that upon deduction of the licence fee payable by the petitioners on account of the flats under their occupation, they were entitled to receive the balance amount payable by way of house rent allowance, which the concerned respondents had denied to them. 26. IN this connection, Mr. Ray submitted further that since between January and march, 1988, the Housing Department, Government of West Bengal, had revoked the Agreements with the respondent companies, the said companies had no further liability or responsibility to deduct and remit the licence fees from the petitioners' salaries to the Housing Department Government of West Bengal. According to Mr. Ray, such deduction after revocation of the Agreements was also bad and the petitioners were entitled to receive the entire amount of house rent allowance without any deduction whatsoever, from the period subsequent to the revocation of the Agreements in question. 27. MR. Ray urged that appropriate directions should be given to the respondents concerned to refund the house rent allowance deducted, together with interest thereon and to continue the payment of house rent allowance at the rate of 15 per cent of pay so long as the petitioners remained in the emplay of the different companies, and for a further order directing the Housing Department and the State of West Bengal to accept rent directly from the petitioners an to implement the judgment dated 29th January, 1991, passed by Monoj kumar Mukherjee, J. in C. O. No. 17168 (W) of 1989. 28. APART from the above, Mr. 28. APART from the above, Mr. Ray submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition, some of the petitioners, who had retired in the meantime, had been denied their retirement benefits and the respondents concerned had acted illegally and in violation of Article 21 of the constitution in withholding gratuity and leave salary, Mr. Ray urged that under Section 13 of the payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, payment of gratuity could not be withhold. In this connection Mr. Ray referred to the following decisions:- (1) Som Prakash Kekhi v. Union of India and Another, reported in A. I. R. 1981 SC at Page 212: (2) Sudhir Ch. Sarkar v. The Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. reported in A. I. R. 1984 SC at Page 1064: and (3) State of Kerala and Ors. v. V. M. Padmanabhan Nair. reported in A. I. R. 1985 SC at Page 356. 29. IN the aforesaid cases it was generally observed by the Supreme Court that if rules for payment of gratuity became incorporated in the standing Orders and thereby acquired the status of statutory conditions of service, any arbitrary denial referable to the whim, fancy or sweet will of the employer must be rejected as arbitrary. The Supreme Court also observed that pension and gratuity are no longer bounty to be distributed by the Government to its employees on their retirement, but are valuable rights and property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest at the current market rate till the date of actual payment. 30. MR. Ray urged that administrative orders could not override statutory provisions and non-payment of retirement benefits to the petitioners was wholly illegal and arbitrary, as had been held in the case of C. L. Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, reported in A.I.R 1990 SC at page 463. In this regard, Mr. Ray also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Comptroller and Auditor General of India and Ors. v. Mohan Lal Mehrotra and Ors., reported in a. I. R. 1991 SC at Page 2200 and sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., reported in 1967 SC at Page 1910. 31. In this regard, Mr. Ray also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Comptroller and Auditor General of India and Ors. v. Mohan Lal Mehrotra and Ors., reported in a. I. R. 1991 SC at Page 2200 and sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., reported in 1967 SC at Page 1910. 31. IT was next contended that as beneficiaries under the Agreements entered into between the State of West Bengal and the concerned companies, the petitioners were entitled to enforce the terms of the contract which was entered into for their benefit. 32. IN support of his contention, Mr. Ray referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. C. Chacko v. The State of Travancore. reported in A.I.R. 1970 SC at Page 504, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that, although a person who was not a party to the contract cannot ordinarily enforce the terms of the contract, the recognise exception is that beneficial under the terms of the contract may enforce the covenant. It was lastly submitted by Mr. Ray that when a tenant is under threat of eviction by a person claiming pursuant title, the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act,. 1892, would not have any application. 33. IN support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Ray referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. Satyarayana v. P. Jagadis, reported in a. I. R. 1987 SC at Page 2192. 34. MR. Ray submitted, that, although, the subject-matter of the writ petition was confined mainly to the question of payment of house rent allowing and settlement of the respective flats under the petitioners in accordance with the resolution of the State Government dated 28th March, 1988, the other arguments advanced by him were the result of the acts of the respondents during the pendency of the writ applications. Appearing for the Durgapur Projects Ltd., the respondent No. 10 in civil Order No. 5926 (W) of 1991, Mr. Appearing for the Durgapur Projects Ltd., the respondent No. 10 in civil Order No. 5926 (W) of 1991, Mr. Arun Prakash Sircar first referred to the prayers in the writ petition and pointed out that the petitioners' case was confined to (i) the question of payment of House Rent Allowance to those employees who had been provided with quarters and whether such employees the House Rent Allowance payable and the amount actually deducted as licence fees (ii) whether the, respondent companies had authority to deduct trie licence fees of the petitioners even after revocation of the several Agreements and (iii) whether the petitioners should be granted tenancy rights in respect of the flats under their occupation in view of the resolution adopted by the State Government on 28th March, 1988 and the order passed by Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. on 28th January, 1990, in civil Order No. 17168 (W) of 1987. 35. MR. Sircar then submitted that allotment of the various flats had been made on the basis of seniority and that such allotment had been made by the Durgapur Projects Ltd. and not the State Government. Accordingly to Mr. Sircar, the Durgapur Projects Ltd., hereinafter referred to as "D.P.L.", was not merely a collecting agent as had been contended on behalf of the petitioners, but the bulk of the flats in the Sagar Bhanga housing Colony had been allotted by the State Government to D.P.L. Even the rents collected from the petitioners was not a licence fee, but rent as determined by D.P.L. 36. IN this regard. Mr. Sircar referred to the case made out by the petitioners themselves in Civil Order No. 5926 (W) of 1991. Referring to paragraph 4 of the writ petition, Mr. Sircar submitted that it was the petitioner's own case that after accepting bulk allotment of the flats under different lease agreements from the Housing Department, the different companies allotted such flats to their respective employees. Mr. Sircar submitted that since the petitioners appear to have had knowledge of the Agreements and had made out a specific case in respect thereof, they could not be permitted to make out a new case in reply. 37. REFERRING to the writ application of Satyanarayan Mukherjee (C. O. No. 9550 (W) of 1990) and the affidavits filed therein, Mr. Mr. Sircar submitted that since the petitioners appear to have had knowledge of the Agreements and had made out a specific case in respect thereof, they could not be permitted to make out a new case in reply. 37. REFERRING to the writ application of Satyanarayan Mukherjee (C. O. No. 9550 (W) of 1990) and the affidavits filed therein, Mr. Sircar submitted that the petitioner therein had special knowledge of the facts relating to the execution of the Agreements and their revocation, and it could not, therefore, be argued that the other petitioners had no knowledge of the facts, since the writ application of Satyanarayan Mukherjee was prior in point of time to the writ application of the Sagar Bhanga Sarkari Abashik hitsadhani Samity. 38. MR. Sircar submitted that a completely hew case had been made out in the Affidavit in Reply in C. O. No. 5926 (W) of 1991, which the respondents had not been able to meet and which was contrary to and/or different from the case made out in the writ petitions. Mr. Sircar submitted that a proceeding under Article 226 of the constitution was dependent upon and had to be decided essentially on "affidavit evidence", and there was therefore, no scope of making out different cases at different stages of the proceeding. 39. IN this regard, Mr. Sircar referred to the decision of the Supreme court in the case of Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Another v. Company Law board and Others, reported in A.I.R. 1967 SC at Page 295, wherein, amongst other matters, the Supreme Court had occasion to make certain observations with regard to "affidavit evidence" in deciding an application under Article 226 of the Constitution and the applicability of the provisions of Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the preparation of such affidavits. 40. MR. Sircar also referred to another decision of the Supreme Court in this regard in the case of A. K. K. Nambiar v. Union of India, reported in a. I. R. 1970 SC at Page 632. Mr. Sircar then urged that the Agreements entered into between the state Government and the different companies were not capable of being revoked unilaterally. In any event, Mr. Mr. Sircar then urged that the Agreements entered into between the state Government and the different companies were not capable of being revoked unilaterally. In any event, Mr. Sircar urged that the said agreements had not been acted upon and certain arrangements were ultimately arrived at between D. P. L. and the Housing Department, and d. P. L. acquired the flats from the State Government for allotment to its employees, as was also the case in respect of the other respondent companies as well. 41. MR. Sircar referred to the judgment passed by a learned Judge of this court on 7th January, 1992, on the writ application of Smt. Malati Sen, whereby Monoranjan Mullick, J. (as his Lordship then was), held the revocation of the resolution of 20th March, 1988, to be valid. 42. MR. Sircar lastly referred to some of the provisions of the West Bengal government Premises (Regulation of Occupancy) Act, 1984. Referring to the preamble of the said Act, Mr. Sircar urged that the provisions of the said Act could have no application to the case of the petitioners, since the same was relevant only in relation to occupation of government premises in West Bengal, meant for the employees of the state Government. 43. MR. Sircar urged that since the petitioners were not employees of the state Government, and the flats in question were not meant for occupation of employees of the State Government, and were not Government premises, the said Act could have no application to the petitioners. Mr. Sircar also urged that in view of the inclusion of the Sagar Bhanga Housing Society at serial No. 63 of Schedule II to the West Bengal Government Premises (Regulation of Occupancy) Act, 1984, it was "public premises" and not a "government premises", and the provisions of the Act would not apply to the petitioners on such ground also. 44. CONCLUDING his submissions, Mr. Sircar urged that the petitioners had no locus standi whatsoever to challenge the allotments made by D. P. L. in favour of its different employees. Appearing for M/s. South Bengal State Transport Corporation Ltd. (Durgapur Unit), Mr. Tapan Sengupta adopted Mr. Sircar's submissions and added that the writ petitioners had not been able to establish the fact that being provided with accommodation was part of the petitioners' service conditions. 45. MR. Appearing for M/s. South Bengal State Transport Corporation Ltd. (Durgapur Unit), Mr. Tapan Sengupta adopted Mr. Sircar's submissions and added that the writ petitioners had not been able to establish the fact that being provided with accommodation was part of the petitioners' service conditions. 45. MR. Sen Gupta added that since the petitioners claimed to have acquired certain rights and privileges under the Agreements executed by the State Government, which were contractual in nature, the remedy of the petitioners, if any, would be by way of a suit and not tinder Article 226 of the Constitution. 46. REFERRING to the cause-title of the writ petition, in Civil Order. No. 5926 (W) of 1991, Mr. Sengupta raised a question as to whether the writ petition was, in any event, maintainable against all the respondents, who were not all statutory bodies. While adopting Mr. Sircar's submissions, Mr. A. P. Lahiri, Mr. S. N. Roy and Mr. Partha Bhanja Chowdhury, appearing for Asiatic Oxygen and Hindustan Fertiliser Corporation, added that the workers did not acquire an absolute right over the flats allotted to them. On retirement, their right to reside in the said flats also came to an end and they were required to make over possession thereof to the company in question. 47. MR. Bhanja Chowdhury also submitted that the statements made in paragraph 4 of the writ petitioner (C. O. No. 5926 (W) of 1991) were incorrect, as the Hindusthan Fertiliser Corporation had 163 flats and not 246 flats in their possession. Of the 246 flats initially allotted to the corporation, 83 flats had been surrendered to the State Government prior to the moving of the writ petition, and the Corporation had no idea as to how the same were subsequently dealt with by the State Government. 48. ON behalf of the State it was contended by Mr. Banerjee that the very basis of the present writ petitioner were nonexistent, since the State government had revoked its earlier resolution dated 28th March, 1988, by the subsequent resolution of 20th March, 1990. It was submitted that, although, further to the resolution of 28th march, 1988, some flats had been settled with their occupants, the State government had to rescind and revoke the said resolution because of gradual scarcity of accommodation. 49. It was submitted that, although, further to the resolution of 28th march, 1988, some flats had been settled with their occupants, the State government had to rescind and revoke the said resolution because of gradual scarcity of accommodation. 49. THIS resulted in fresh agreements being executed by the State government with 4 companies, and some of the writ petitioners had already been allotted flats on the basis of the new Agreements, It was contended that those writ petitioners who had accepted allotment of flats in their favour pursuant to the 4 new agreements, could not now turn round and challenge the revocation of the resolution dated 28th March, 1988. According to the State, about 100 of the writ petitioners had already been provided flats in terms of the new agreements, and the writ petitioners were, therefore, bad for misjoinder of parties, as the said petitioners could not possibly have any grievance in that regard. 50. MR. Banerjee submitted that the writ petitions were misconceived and were liable to be dismissed. Replying to the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, Mr. Ray submitted that the State Government had no right to alter the original scheme, which was a scheme of the Central Government and was funded by the Central Government. Mr. Ray reiterated that the different companies were only recommending and collecting agencies, and had no right in the flats themselves. 51. MR. Ray submitted that in 1982 the Central Government reclassified the scheme and the Subsidised Industrial Housing Scheme was converted into Integrated Housing Schemes, whereby people, other than the employees of the different companies would also be entitled to allotment of flats in the Sagar Bhanga Housing Estate. Mr. Ray urgent that in this state of affairs, the State Government acted erroneously in entering into fresh agreements with some of the Companies. 52. MR. Ray urged that in view of the Judgment of Monoj Kumar mukherjee, J. In C. O. No. 17168 (W) of 1989, directing the State government to enforce its own resolution of 20th March, 1988, the scope of the writ petitions had been narrowed comprehensively and until the said order was implemented, the said resolution could not be altered, and the fresh Agreements entered upon consequent upon the revocation of the earlier Agreements could not be said to be valid. Mr. Mr. Ray reiterated that initially when the writ applications were moved, not all the facts and supporting documents were available to the petitioners, and since these facts and documents were disclosed during the pendency of the writ applications, the petitioners had incorporated the same in their Affidavit in Reply. 53. IN support of his submissions regarding maintainability of the writ petitions on the question of locus standi, Mr. Ray referred to the following decisions:- (i) Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar and Ors. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Another, reported in a. I. R. 1984 Allahabad at Page 46. (ii) Jay Engineering Works Ltd. and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., reported in a. I. R. 1968 Calcutta at Page 407, and (iii) Prabodh Verma and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., reported in a. I. R. 1985 SC at Page 167. Mr. Ray urged that the documents disclosed would speak for themselves. 54. CONTESTING the submissions of Mr. Sircar on the question of "affidavit evidence', Mr. Ray contended that the said principle could not and did not have any application to judgments of the Courts, Referring to Section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1892, Mr. Ray urged that the documents, as disclosed could not be altered. Mr. Ray urged that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Barium Chemicals Ltd. v Company Law Board and Ors. (supra)cited by Mr. Sircar had no application to the facts of this case. As to the prayers in the writ petitioners, Mr. Ray submitted that it was well-settled that the Court could always mould the prayers to suit the reliefs that could be granted to the petitioner petitioners. 55. MR. Ray urged that the writ petitions should be allowed and the prayers should be moulded to fit the reliefs. 56. IT appears from the submissions of the respective parties and the materials on record that one of the issues raised in these writ applications namely, the rights of the petitioners in respect of the flats allotted in the favour, has already been decided in several earlier writ applications is, C. O. No. 3259 (W) of 1989 (Malati Sen and Ors. v. Durgapur Projects Limited and Ors.) C. O. No. 326o (W) of 1989 (Bejoy Singh and Ors. v. Durgapur Projects Limited and Ors.) C. O. No. 326o (W) of 1989 (Bejoy Singh and Ors. v. Durgapur Project limited and Ors., C. O. No. 5545 (W) of 1989 (Sipra Chakraborty v. Durgapur projects Limited and Ors.) and Matter No. 3742 of 1990 (Kalikant Chakraborty v. Durgapur Projects Ltd. and Ors.) In the said writ applications the learned judges art-rived at a finding that the petitioners had not acquired any independent right in respect of the flats allotted to them and the same were always treated as company quarters and after retirement, the petitioners had no right to occupy the same. However, in one of the appeals taken from an order passed by a learned single Judge, inter alia, directing payment of retirement benefits, (F. M. A. T. No. 2873 of 1991) a Division Bench of this court had to consider the question whether the Durgapur Projects Ltd. was entitled to withhold retirement benefits to an employee who had after his retirement refused to vacate the quarters allotted to ham. While considering the said question and holding that the Company had no right to do so, the Division Bench observed that the learned counsel appearing for D. P. L. had not been able to satisfy the Court that the quarters occupied by the employee was really "company's Quarters". 57. THE matter was taken to the Supreme Court by D. P. L. in S. L. P. (Civil)No. (S) 12221 of 1992, but the same was dismissed on 22nd February, 1993. 58. ACCORDINGLY, although, the said observation as to whether the quarters occupied by the employee was "company's Quarters" or not was on an interlocutory application in the appeal, the same has not been interfered with by the Supreme Court. Apart from the above, I also am inclined to differ with the views expressed by the learned judges who decided the aforesaid question by holding that the employees' right to occupy the quarters allotted to them subsisted during the term of their employment only, since the same were really allotted to the companies in question and not to the concerned employee, having regard to the order passed by the Division Bench in F. M. A. T. No. 2873 of 1991, which was not interfered with by the Supreme Court. 59. 59. THERE is no doubt that the flats in question were constructed as part of a definite scheme to provide residential accommodation at subsidised rates for industrial workers on a leave and licence basis. The State government also entered into specific agreements with different companies to identify the workers who were to be provided with such accommodation, and a further responsibility was cast on the concerned company to deduct the licence fees from the salaries of the employees who were granted such allotment and to remit the same to the Government. Apart from identifying the eligible workers and acting as collecting and remitting agencies, the companies had no other or further role to play regarding allotment of flats to their workmen and, as will be apparent from the agreements entered between the State Government and the Companies and the correspondence in this regard, allotment was made directly by the state Government in favour of the workmen concerned, and the licence fees payable in respect thereof were also received by the State Government from the Companies against the accounts of the concerned workmen from whose salaries the same were deducted. 60. IN view of the clear recitals of the Agreements entered into by the state Government with the different Companies and the contents of the licence agreements, there is little or no room for doubt that the allotment of the flats in question were not with the Companies but with the employees themselves. Although, it appears that separate blocks of flats in the Sagar Bhanga housing Estate were earmarked, and set apart for the use of the employees of the different companies, there is nothing on record in support of Mr. Sircar's submissions that the said] flats were allotted in bulk to the said companies who thereupon granted its employees leave and licence to occupy the same. 61. THERE is also nothing on record to show that the Agreements initially entered into between the State of West Bengal and the different companies, were not acted upon prior to their revocation. 62. ON the other hand, after revocation of the said Agreements, the State government adopted a definite and specific resolution on 28th March, 1988, to directly allot the flats in question to the occupants after realising the outstanding rents with interest. 62. ON the other hand, after revocation of the said Agreements, the State government adopted a definite and specific resolution on 28th March, 1988, to directly allot the flats in question to the occupants after realising the outstanding rents with interest. The said resolution was acted upon in respect of many of the occupants but was rescinded on 20th March, 1990 before the same could be applied to all the petitioners' cases as well. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that the petitioners were licensees in respect of the flats allotted to them directly under the State Government and that the licence fees were remitted to the State Government by the concerned companies on behalf of the petitioners and not on their own account. 63. THE question which arises next whether having acted on the basis of the earlier resolution of 28th March, 1988, and having given the benefit of the same to about 300 persons, the State Government acted legally and fairly in rescinding the said resolution so as to deny the benefit of the same to the other similarly-placed employees. Further more, if the resolution of 28th March, 1988, is not given effect in so far as the petitioners are concerned, what should be their status vis-a-vis the flats under their occupation. 64. IN my view, since the petitioners were initially inducted in the flats in question as licensees directly under the State Government, there will be no change in their status in relation to the flats under their occupation. Had the resolution of 28th March, 1980, been made applicable to the petitioners, the only change that would have been affected, would have been in the manner of payment of licence fees to the State Government. While prior to the revocation of the Agreements and the resolution of 28th march, 1988, the concerned companies had an obligation to deduct the licence fees from the salaries of the employees and to remit the same to the state Government, after revocation of the said Agreement, there was an obligation on the petitioner to pay their licence fees directly to the State government without the concerned companies functioning as conduits. It is in this background that after revocation of the Agreements with the companies, the State Government decided to collect the licence fees payable, both current and appears, directly from the employees. It is in this background that after revocation of the Agreements with the companies, the State Government decided to collect the licence fees payable, both current and appears, directly from the employees. The resolution of 28th March, 1988, did not, therefore, after the status of the employees in respect of the flats under their occupation, and only the mode of payment of the licence fees to the State Government war altered. 65. OF course, in reasonable circumstances the Government is always at liberty to alter its policies and it cannot be tied down or held to a particular policy for all times. But the alteration must be founded on reason and must be free from arbitrations and must not be the result of a whim or capricious decision. 66. ACCORDINGLY, in my view, it is immaterial whether -the resolution of 20th March. 1980. was rescinded or not, since the occupants of the flats continued to be licensees thereof under the State Government. Having regard to the aforesaid view taken by me, it is not really necessary for me to consider the other submissions of Mr. Ray on the point relating to publication of the impugned resolution dated 20th March, 1990, and violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also not necessary for me to go into the questions of alleged denial of natural justice to the petitioners and violation of the doctrine of promissory estemped. 67. WHAT, however, maybe of some relevance is the doctine of legitimate expectation and having regard to the fact that on the basis of the resolution dated 28th March, 1980, about 300 employees were allowed to pay their licence fees directly to the State Government, the petitioners could legitimately expect that the licence fees should also be collected directly from them by the State Government, without the company in question acting as a via media. 68. CONSIDERING the principle of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Kamdhenu cattle Feed Industries, reported in 1993 (1) SCC at Page 71, observed that, although, legitimate expectation in a given situation may not itself be a distinct enforcible right, but failure to consider and give due weight to such legitimate expectation may render the decision arbitrary, since every citizen expects to be treated fairly while inter-acting with the State. In this context, I am inclined to follow the views expressed by the division Bench in F. M. A. T. No. 2873 of 1991, since I am not inclined to accept the submissions of Mr. Sircar that the status of the occupants of the flats in Sagarbhanga Housing Estate was finally decided in F. M. A. T. No. 511 of 1991. 69. IN fact, in the said appeal (F. M. A. T. No. 511 of 1991) the Division bench was considering the question relating to payment of retirement benefits and not the status of the occupants of the flats in question. In passing, certain observations were made regarding the occupation of the flats by the concerned parties beyond the period of their retirement. It cannot also be overlooked that the order in F. M. A. T. No. 2873 of 1991, was sought to be challenged by Durgapur Projects Ltd. in a Special Leave petition before the Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed on 22nd February, 1993. 70. HAVING regard to the view taken by that the petitioners are licensees directly under the State Government, and their continuance therein and/or eviction therefrom is dependent on the State Government, the State Government is directed to accept the licence fees directly from the petitioners who are not covered by any new Agreements that may have been entered into between the state Government and the companies in question. Since the new Agreements are not before me and not the subject-matter of the writ applications, I am not inclined to make any observations in respect thereof. On the question of house-rent allowance, I have not been able to understand why a distinction has been made between employees who were allotted quarters in the Sagarbhanga Housing Estate and employees living in rented quarters elsewhere, or for that matter employees living to their own houses. On the question of house-rent allowance, I have not been able to understand why a distinction has been made between employees who were allotted quarters in the Sagarbhanga Housing Estate and employees living in rented quarters elsewhere, or for that matter employees living to their own houses. Employees living in rented quarters and employees allotted flats in the Sagarbhanga Housing Estate stand on the same footing, since both the groups are required to pay house rent and/or licence fee in respect of the flats under their occupation In my view, distinction being sought to be made between the two has no logical basis and is wholly arbitrary and the denial of house rent allowance to such employees as have been allotted flats in the Sagarbhanga Housing Estate appear to me to be not only discriminatory, but also arbitrary in nature. 71. A uniform pattern of payment of house rent allowance must be followed in respect of employees and no deduction thereof can also be made merely because a specific licence fee has been fixed as far as the occupants of the flats in the Sagarbhanga Housing Estate are concerned, since in respect of the employees living in rented quarters, a flat rate is being paid towards house-rent allowance irrespective of the amount of rents being paid by them. 72. HAVING regard to the above, the respondent companies are directed to pay to the petitioners house rent allowance as admissible to other employees similarly-placed, but who have not been provided quarters in the Sagarbhanga Housing Estate, without any deduction whatsoever. The respondent companies are also directed to pay to the petitioners the balance amount payable to them as house rent allowance after deduction of the licence fees in terms of the Agreements entered into between the state of West Bengal and the, individual companies, which were subsequently revoked. Lastly, on the question of payment of retirement benefits, since the supreme Court has refused to interfere with the order passed by the division Bench directing payment of such retirement benefits to the concerned employees, irrespective of the question as to whether they have vacated their respective flats or not, nothing further need to added, since having regard to the view taken by me earlier, the petitioners' occupation of their respective flats are unlinked with the question of their employment under the companies in question. As I have observed earlier, under the agreements entered into between the State Government and the companies in question, the companies were only required to identify their workers who were eligible for allotment of flats in the Sagarbhanga Housing Estate. The privity of contract, so far as the occupation of the flats are concerned was between the State Government and the concerned employees and not between the employees and the concerned companies. 73. THE concerned respondents are, therefore, directed to delink the question of payment of retirement benefits with the question of occupation of the flats and not to withhold payment of retirement benefit, including gratuity and leave salaries, to those of the petitioners who have retired in the meantime. 74. AS was observed in the cases referred to by Mr. Ray, namely, som Prakash Rokhi v Union of India and Another (supra) and Sudhir ch. Sarkar v The Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (supra), payment of pension and gratuity are no longer bounty to be distributed to an employee on his retirement, but are valuable rights which have accrued to such employee and any wilful delay in setting the same must be penalised. On the question as to whether the petitioners were entitled to make out a new case in the affidavits filed on behalf of the parties, apart from that made out in the writ petitioners, it appears to me that all the questions are inter-related and together constitute a bundle of facts which flew from one another. 75. I have, therefore, no hesitation in considering the said points together while disposing of these four writ applications. 76. AFTER the judgment was delivered, Mrs. Debjani Sengupta, learned advocate, produced a copy of the operative portion of the judgment dated 10th march, 1994, passed in Appeal No. 154a of 1993 arising out of Matter no. 3742 of 1990, from which it appears that the appellant was given time to vacate the quarter in question within a period of two months from date, and if the quarter was so vacated, then, in such event, durgapur. Projects limited would release his retirement benefits, in accordance with law, after making adjustments. Since only the operative portion of the judgment has been produced by Mrs. Projects limited would release his retirement benefits, in accordance with law, after making adjustments. Since only the operative portion of the judgment has been produced by Mrs. Sengupta, it is not possible for me to appreciate the context in which the aforesaid order was passed and I am not inclined to alter the views taken by me on the basis thereof, moire so when the said order appears to run counter to the order passed in F. M. A. T. No. 2873 of 1991, which I have decided to follow. 77. THE writ applications are, thus, disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. A prayer for stay of this judgment is made on behalf of Durgapur projects Limited. Such prayer is considered and refused, having regard to the view taken by me. Let xerox copies of this judgment be made available to the learned advocates of the respective parties on the usual undertaking. Re:- Three applications for necessary orders for deletion of names filed by, Sri Munsi Mansad Sulauddin, Sri Sukhomoy Das and Sri sourendra Mohan Dutta filed in court today. Let it be recorded that three of the petitioners viz. Munsi Mansad Salauddin, writ petitioner No. 194, Sri Sukhomoy Das, writ petitioner No. 274 and Sri Sourendra Mohan Dutta, writ petitioner No. 361, have filed applications for deleting their names from the writ petition. The said applications are also allowed and disposed of and the judgment delivered today will not be operative as far as they are concerned. Writ petition allowed.