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1994 DIGILAW 155 (GUJ)

Kiritkumar Ramrai Jani v. Gangaram Gopalbhai

1994-04-30

B.N.KIRPAL

body1994
JUDGMENT : B.N. Kirpal, J. The challenge in this petition is to the order passed by the trial court requiring the petitioner/plaintiff to pay court fee on the basis of Rs. 40,000/-. 2. The plaintiff had filed the suit inter alia alleging that he had purchased plot No. 3 in S. No. 92 for Rs. 3,000/- by registered deed dated 9.11.1976 from one Virendrakumar Mobjibhai through his guardian, Manjibhai Nathubhai. Said Virendrakumar had, through his said guardian, purchased the aforesaid plot from the original owners, Patel Naranbhai Shivram and Kanjibhai Budhabhai, on 27.10.1976. The said lands had been divided into 10 plots and one of the plots had been purchased by the petitioner/plaintiff. It was further alleged in the plaint that the respondent purported to have purchased this very land from the original owner and he was trying to disturb the plaintiff's possession and some bricks also have been thrown on the land in question. Permanent injunction was prayed for by the petitioner against the respondent. 3. The case of the respondent before the trial court was that he had purchased the property in question for Rs. 40,000/-. The trial court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff, in effect, seeks nullity of the sale deed in favour of the respondent, who is stated to have purchased the land for Rs. 40,000/- and, therefore, court fee must be paid on Rs. 40,000/-. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the present suit falls under Section 6 (d) of the Bombay Court Fee Act, 1950 and, therefore, court fee was payable under the said provision. On the other hand, it is the submission of Mr. Shah that this was a suit for injunction simpliciter and following the decision of this Court in XX G.L.R. 514. Section 6 (d) was not applicable. 5. The aforesaid judgment will have no application on the facts of the present case. Paragraph 9 of the plaint specifically states that it is a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. Then again in paragraph 11 pertaining to relief in the plaint it is stated that the plot in question is of the plaintiff's ownership and possession. Reading the two together, there is no doubt that the plaintiff was seeking a decree for declaring him to be the owner of the plot. Then again in paragraph 11 pertaining to relief in the plaint it is stated that the plot in question is of the plaintiff's ownership and possession. Reading the two together, there is no doubt that the plaintiff was seeking a decree for declaring him to be the owner of the plot. Court fee had, therefore, to be paid in terms of Section 6 (d) but not on the ground that the plaintiff was seeking to challenging the title or the claim to ownership, by virtue of a document of the defendant. To put it differently, the suit did not challenge the sale deed in favour of the defendant but the present suit was for declaration as to the ownership as well as permanent injunction. This being so, provisions of Section 6 (d) clearly became applicable. The trial court should, therefore, compute the court fee under Section 6 (d) and the same will be payable by the plaintiff. 6. The petition is disposed of in aforesaid terms. Counsel for the parties have agreed that in view of the recent amendment, the question with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction will no longer survive. Ad interim relief stands vacated. Rule discharged. No order as to costs. Deficit court fee may be paid within 8 weeks from today. Order Accordingly.