Usha Mehra, J. ( 1 ) IT is said that statute is an edict of the Legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the "intention" of its maker. The duty of judicature is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (in short the Act) was amended by the amendment Act 1988. Special provisions like Sections 14-A to 14-D were added to provide rights to certain classified landlords in order to enable them to recover immediate possession of their premises for their residence. ( 2 ) THE petitioner a tenant in house No. B-126, Sarvodaya Enclave, new Delhi, has denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondent no. 1. The question raised is whether a nominee enrolled as member under Section 26 of the Delhi Co-operative Society Act or a legal heir of the deceased member would be the landlord of the tenanted premises. In order to appreciate his challenge to the impugned order, we have to have the facts before us. ( 3 ) MRS Manju, respondent no. 1 herein, moved the Rent Controller by a petition under Section 14-D, read with Section 25-B of the Act for recovery of possession of the premises consisting of two bed rooms, one sitting-cum-dining, two bath rooms-cum-lavatory, kitchen, varandah and front lawn being premises no. B-126, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi The said house was constructed on a plot of land admeasuring 601 sq yards leased by the President of India in favour of Government Emplovees sarvodaya Co-operative House Building Society) and sub leased by it to shri Bhagirath Lal Chaudhary (maternal grand-father of the respondent no. 1 ). The tenancy commenced on 1st July, 1970. Rent note was executed on 6th July, 1970 by the present petitioner in favour of late Sh. B. L. Chaudhary, landlord of the tenanted premises The premises was let out for residential purposes. Sh. B L Chaudhary died on 20th June. 1975 he was survived by his wife Smt. Kesar Devi, who was nominated as a person entitled to succeed as member of the Society by her late husband said Kesar Devi nominated Shri Arun Kumar, respondent no. 7 herein as her nominee to succeed as member of the Society. Kesar Devi died on 30th April, 1976. 1975 he was survived by his wife Smt. Kesar Devi, who was nominated as a person entitled to succeed as member of the Society by her late husband said Kesar Devi nominated Shri Arun Kumar, respondent no. 7 herein as her nominee to succeed as member of the Society. Kesar Devi died on 30th April, 1976. B L. Chaudhary and his wife Kesar Devi hed only one child namely Smt. Shakuntala Devi (mother of the respondent) who predeceased her parents on 13th October, 1969. Hence, after the death of Kesar Devi, present respondents inherited their interest in this property by operation of law They became owners/landlords of the premises in question. They continued to be joint owners till 1st October, 1985, on which, date they orally effected a partition of the properties including the premises in question. By virtue of the said partition, respondents 1 to 4 herein became exclusive owners/landlords of the tenanted premises and respondents 5 to 7 alongwith their father Shri rameshwar Dayal became owner of House no. D-13-A/10, Model Town, delhi. This oral partition was reduced to writing on 23rd October,1985. However, after the death of their father Shri Rameshwar Dayal, another oral partition took place amongst the present respondents on 23rd january, 1988. The terms of which were reduced into writing on 25th january, 1988. This partition was duly acted upon and the property in question was mutated in favour of the present respondents 1 to 4 in the records of Delhi Development Authority (in short the D. D A.) and of the society as well as of the Delhi Municipal Corporation (in short M C. D.) thus, present respondents 1 to 4 became co-owners/landlords of the premises in question ( 4 ) PRESENT respondent no 3 was in need of the accommodation as there was paucity of accommodation at Model Town Hence sought eviction of this house from the present petitioner by flling an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act Since he had no suitable accommodation available for him and his family, he had to rent out houses one after the other in different colonies and ultimately constructed a flat in tte half vacant portion of the land in question in the year 1991-92. He alongwith his family thereafter started residing in that flat which accommodation is barely sufficient for him and his family. He alongwith his family thereafter started residing in that flat which accommodation is barely sufficient for him and his family. ( 5 ) RESPONDENT no 2 is a Central Government employee posted at calcutta, Respondent no 4 is an employee of the Delhi Administration and is living in Delhi Administration allotted accommodation. ( 6 ) RESPONDENT no. 1 is a medical practitioner by profession. She does not own any other property in Delhi except the house in question She has two daughters. Till such time her husband was alive she was living with respondent no. 4, her sister in the Government allotted accommodation to her sister Her parents-in-law are living with their younger son in a Government allotted house. After the death of her husband, she alongwith her daughters and parents-in-law want to live together Her parents In-law also do not have any place for their residence. The petitioner had attorned to the respondents as their tenant and paid the rent to them through their attorney Shri Rameshwar Dayal, he also admitted them to be landlords/owners. Respondent no. 1 needs the society and help of her parents-in-law Her elder daughter is studying in class IV and second daughter v/as born in September, 1992. Her daughters are in need of society and help of their grant parents because respondent no I and her sister respondent no. 4 both are working. She cannot leave the daughters in the care of the servants. ( 7 ) ON these facts, notice to the present petitioner was issued. He filed his affidavit seeking leave to contest, inter alia, on the grounds that there did not exist any relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent no, 1 and the present petitioner. As per the record of the society, Mr Arun Kumar, respondent no. 7, herein is the recorded owner of the premises in question Smt Kesar Devi had communicated on 2lst May 1976 to the Societv that Arun Kumar be enrolled as member of the society in her place The said Arun Kumar having become member of the society, became owner/landlord of these premises. By operation of law he stepped into the shoes of the original owner. He being the landlord owner of the property, the respondent no. By operation of law he stepped into the shoes of the original owner. He being the landlord owner of the property, the respondent no. 1 has no locus standl to file the eviction petition Moreover, earlier a petition was filed under Section 14 (1) (d) and (e) of the Act by all the respondents jointly claiming themselves to be the owner of this property. The stand taken in this petition is contrary to the plea of partition now raised. The alleged oral partition is a fraud and cannot be relied upon as these are sham documents. To a petition filed by respondent no. 3, the present respondent no. 1 refused to set up any defence, hence this eviction petition was filed with a mala fide intention Since the property vest with the nominee of kesar Devi, hencethere was no question of the inheritence of this property by respondent no. 1. The provisions of Section 14-D of the Act are not attracted to the facts of this case. The present petitioner never attorned to respondent no. 1. The claim of the respondent no. 1 is based on insufficiency of accommodation with her, for this reason also the petition under Section 14-D is not maintainable. She has alternative accommodation in Delhi bearing no. D-13a/10, model Town, Delhi. In fact the flat allegedly constructed by respondent no. 3 was in fact constructed with the funds provided by respondent no. I, therefore, she has a right to live in that flat. The Rent Controller by the impugned order rejected these contentions and passed the order of eviction against the present petitioner. ( 8 ) THE petitioner has assailed the impugned findings of the Rent controller on five counts mainly that (I) Respondent no. 1 herein is not the landlady ; (II) Controller could not have relied on Memorandum of Settlement and mutation letters; (III) Respondent no. 1 does not require the premises for her bonafide needs ; (IV) Ground of insufficiency of accommodation is not covered under section 14-D; and lastly (V) She has alternative accommodation. ( 9 ) IN order to appreciate the objections raised by Mr. Lekhi, we have to know the requirements of Section 14-d of the Act. 1 does not require the premises for her bonafide needs ; (IV) Ground of insufficiency of accommodation is not covered under section 14-D; and lastly (V) She has alternative accommodation. ( 9 ) IN order to appreciate the objections raised by Mr. Lekhi, we have to know the requirements of Section 14-d of the Act. Section 14-D of the Act, which is relevant for our purpose is reproduced as under; "14-D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow (1) Where the landlord Is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her, or by her husband are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, It shall be open to her to make an application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her. " ( 10 ) BARE reading of this Section makes it clear that the landlady who files the petition must be a widow and that she requires the premises for her own residence What we have to see is whether these conditions in this case are fulfilled. As regards her being a widow, it is not disputed that her husband died on 1st March, 1993. Unfortunately she is a widow. The dispute is with regard to her being a landlady and of her need. ( 11 ) ACCORDING to petitioner, respondent no. 1 is neither the "landlady" nor he attorned to her. Relationship of the landlord and tenant never existed. Since a cloud was caste on her locus standi, the Controller ought to have grar ted leave to contest. It is an admitted fact on record that Mr, arun Kumar, respondent no. 7 herein was declared nominee by late Smt. Kesar Devi. The Society on the basis of the said nomination so communicated by Smt Kesar Devi, enrolled Arun Kumar as the member of the society Being a nominee all rights and interests in the property devolved on him after the death of Smt. Kesar Devi. Since, the tenanted property devolved on Mr. Arun Kumar (respondent no. 7), there was no question of inheritance by the legal heirs including that of respondent no. 1. Mr. Since, the tenanted property devolved on Mr. Arun Kumar (respondent no. 7), there was no question of inheritance by the legal heirs including that of respondent no. 1. Mr. Lekhi in order to prove his point that nominee after being enrolled as member gets all the rights in the property, placed reliance on section 26 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1972 read with Rule 35. Rule 35 defines nomination. It means nomination is a mode of transfer. By virtue of Section 26, the share or interest in the property would vest with the nominee after the death of the original member. Section 26 of co-operative Societies Act, 1972 and Rule 35 of Delhi Co-operative Societies rules, 1973 are reproduced as under : section 26 (1) On the death of a member a co-operative society may transfer the share or interest of the deceased member, to the person nominated in accordance with the rules made in this behalf, or if there Is no person so nominated, to such person as may appear to the committee to be the heir or legal representative of the deceased member, or pay to such nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case may be, a sum representing the value of such member s share or interest as ascertained in accordance with the rules or bye laws : provided that (i) Tn the case of a co-operative society with unlimited liability, such nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case may be, may require payment by the society of the value of the share or interest of the deceased member ascertained as aforesaid ; (ii) Tn the case of a co-operative society with limited liability, the society shall transfer the share or interest of the deceased member to such nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case may be being qualified in accordance with the rules and bye laws for membership of the society, or on his application within one month of the death of the deceased member to any person specified in the application who is so qualified. (iii) no such transfer or payment shall be made except with the consent of the nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case may be. (iii) no such transfer or payment shall be made except with the consent of the nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case may be. (2) A co-operative society shall subject to the provisions of Section 36 and unless within six months of the death of member prevented by an order of a competent Court, pay to such nominee, heir or legal representative, as the case may be, all other moneys due to the deceased member from the society (3) All transfers, and payments made by a co-operative society in accordance with the provisions of the section shall be valid and effectual against any demand made upon the society by any other person. Rule 35 : Nomination of persons : (1) For the purpose of transfer of his share or interest under Subsection (1) of section 26 a member of a co-operative society, by a document signed by him or by making a statement in any book kept for the purpose by the society, nominate any person or persons Where the nomination is made by a document, such document shall be deposited with the society during the member s life time and where the nomination is made by a statement, such statement shall be signed by the member and attested by one witness. (2) The nomination made under sub-rule (1) may be revoked or varied by any other nomination made in accordance with that sub-rule. (3) The record of nomination shall be kept by a co-operative society in such manner as may be laid down in the bye-laws. (4) When a member of a co-operative society nominates more than one person, he shall, as far as practicable, specify the amount to be paid for transfer to each nominee in terms of whole share and the interest accrued in the society, (5) The value of the share or interest transferred or paid to a nominee or nominees shall be determined on the basis of the sum actually paid by the member to acquire such or interest unless the bye laws provided for calculation on a different basis. (6) (i) Where a member of a co-operative society has not made any nomination, the seciety shall, on the member s death by and public notice exhibited at the office of the society invite claims or objections for the proposed transfer of the share or interest of the deceased within the time specified in the notice. (ii) After taking into consideration the claim or objections received in reply to the notice or otherwise, and after making such inquiries as the committee consideres proper in the circumstances, prevailing, the committee shall decide as to the person who in its opinion is the heir or the legal representative of the deceased member and proceed to take action under Section 26, subject to any appeal which may be filed to the Registrar by any person claiming the share or interest of deceased member within 30 days of the decision of the committee. The orders of the Registrar on such shall be final and binding upon all concerned. (7) If the committee refused to transfer the share or interest of the deceased member of his nominee or his successor in-interest, or fails to take a decision on the application of such nominee or the successor-in-interest as the case may be, within 30 days of the date of such refusal or the date of such application, a nominee or any person claiming to be a successor-in-interest of the deceased member shall file an appeal to the Registrar, who after hearing the society and the applicant or any other person interested, shall pass such order as he may deem fit and on such condition as he may impose and order made by the Registrar shall be final and binding on all concerned. ( 12 ) MR. Lekhi contended that the reading of the above provisions would clearly show that only Arun Kumar after being enrolled as member of the Society, stepped into the shoes of Smt. Kesar Devi The interest in property thus stood transferred in his name. Coupled with the nomination the acceptance by the Society of the nomination in favour of Arun Kumar would show that Mr. Arun Kumar is the owner. The society after enrolling him as member started corresponding with him. His name stood entered in the books of the society, after which there was nothing left for the respondent no 1 to inherit qua this property. Respondent no. Arun Kumar is the owner. The society after enrolling him as member started corresponding with him. His name stood entered in the books of the society, after which there was nothing left for the respondent no 1 to inherit qua this property. Respondent no. 1 had no focus standi to file the eviction petition. The definition of the word transfer under Section 5 of the Transfer of Properties act is cons is tan t with the definition of nominee appearing under the delhi Co-operative Societies Act. In fact, by operation of law respondent no. 7, Arun Kumar became owner of the tenanted premises. Late Shri rameshwar Dayal, father of respondent no. 1 in his cross examination admitted that in the records of the society, Arun Kumar was shown as the nominee and that the society was corresponding with him. Moreover, petitioner paid rent to him. The alleged mutation letters produced by respondent no. 1 herein, purported to have been Issued by the D. D. A. , by the Society and by the m. C. D. , is nothing but a fraud. The said authorities issued the mutation without following the procedure prescribed by law. Even otherwise, mere mutation would not confer any right on the respondent no. 1 nor can make basis of the alleged mutation. She be called "landlady" of the tenanted premises. The Petitioner herein never attorned to her nor any bona fide can be inferred from her conduct nor her needs are bona fide. The rent was paid to respondent no. 7, Arua Kumar, and prior to that to his attorney Shri rameshwar Dayal. In fact, by obtaining these mutation letters, respondent no. 1 has committed fraud and forgery. In view of the fact that present petitioner had pleaded in his affidavit fraud of facts and of law the Controller ought to have granted him the leave. ( 13 ) MR. Lekhi further contended that Section 25-B postulates that if there is a cloud of possession and ownership of the property then the leave must be granted To strengthen his argument, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Precisian Steel and Engineering Works and another v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, AIR 1982 (3) SCC 270 . Lekhi further contended that Section 25-B postulates that if there is a cloud of possession and ownership of the property then the leave must be granted To strengthen his argument, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Precisian Steel and Engineering Works and another v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, AIR 1982 (3) SCC 270 . In that case it was observed that the Controller under Section 25-B (4) of the Act is under a statutory duty to grant leave to the tenant to contest the application, if the affidavit filed by him discloses such facts which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession of the premises. It was also observed that the Controller under Section 14 (1) (c) is not to presume every averment in the petition as unchallengeable and truthful. The consequences of refusal to grant leave must stare in the face of the controller that the landlord gets an order of eviction without bettina an eyelid This consequence itself is sufficient to liberally approach the prayer for leave to contest the petition The Controller cannot get into a sort of trial by affidavits preferring one set to the other and thus concluding a trial without holding the trial test. So relying heavily on these observations mr Lekhi contended that once the petitioner disputed the relationship of the landlord and tenant particularly on account of nomination having been made in favour of respondent no. 7, ho ought to have been granted the leave to contest ( 14 ) ON the other bind Mr. Ishwar Sahai, Senior Advocate appearing for respondent no. 1 contended that so far as the observation of the Supreme court in Precision Steel as quoted by Mr Lekhi, those are not applicable to the facts in hand The Supreme Court was dealing with a case under section 14 (1) (e) of the Act and not under the Special Provisions of the amendment Act 1988. Jo succeed or fail in a petition under Section 14 (1) (e) the landlord has to prove four things namely (i) he is the owner ; (ii) his needs are bona fide, (iii) he has no other suitable residential accommodation, and (iv) that the premises were let out for residential purpose. Jo succeed or fail in a petition under Section 14 (1) (e) the landlord has to prove four things namely (i) he is the owner ; (ii) his needs are bona fide, (iii) he has no other suitable residential accommodation, and (iv) that the premises were let out for residential purpose. F but for a petition under Section I4-D, the applicant has only to prove that she is a landlady and widow and that she needs the premises for her residence. The other requirements envisaged under Section 14 (1) (e) are irrelevant. In a case under Section 14 (1) (e) if there are dispute regarding ownership or bona fide need of the owner/landlord, or the letting purpose then the Court would naturally grant leave to contest. But defence to 8 provision under Section 14-D is almost nil. ( 15 ) SO far as nomination in favour of Arun Kumar, that would not make him owner of the structure. Even otherwise by nomination, the nominee only gets rights in the shares or the capital The fact of nomination is admitted. Respondent no. 1 is the legal heir of deceased B. L. Chaudhary and Smt. Kesar Devi is also admitted. Contention of Mr. Lekhi that since there is nomination in favour of Arun Kumar, respondent no. 7 herein hence respondent no 1 being the legal heir had no right to file the petition nor could call herself landlady, to ray mind has no merits. Section 26 of the delhi Co-operative Societies Act talks about the share and interest in the capital of the member left with the Society and not the right on the property or the structure raised on the plot allotted by the society. Reliance can be placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in gopalVishnu Ghatnekar v. Madhukar Vishnu Ghatnekar, AIR 1982 Bombay 482. Bombay High Court was dealing with a case under Section 30 of the maharashtra Co-operative Society Act which is peri materia the same as section 26 of the Delhi Co-operative Society Act. The question in Gopal vishnu Ghatnekar s case was whether by mere nomination the right in the property would vest with the nominee. The answer given was in the negative. The question in Gopal vishnu Ghatnekar s case was whether by mere nomination the right in the property would vest with the nominee. The answer given was in the negative. It was observed that the intention of Section 30 is to provide for who has to deal with the Society on the death of a member and not to create a new rule of succession. The provision for transferring a share or interest to a nominee or to the heirs or legal representatives as will be decided by the Society is only meant to provide for Interregnum between the death and the full administration of the estate and not for the purpose of conferring any permanent right on such a person to a property forming part of the estate of the deceased. The idea of having this Section is to provide for a proper discharge to the society without involving the society into unnecessary litigation which may take place as a result of dispute between the heirs or uncertainly as to who are the legal representatives Even when a person nominated or even when a person is recognised as a heir or a legal representative of the deceased member, the rights of the persons who are entitled to the estate of the interest of the deceased members by virtue of law governing succession are not lost and the nominee or the heir and the legal representative recognised by the Society, as the case may be, holds the share and interest of the deceased for disposal of the same in accordance with law. The relationship of the society and member subsist only in respect of share in the property of society. A nomination is permitted only in respect of the shares in and the property of the Society. The Society is concerned only with the shares held by a member and land given by it to a member and not with the structure that a member may put up Mr. Arun Kumar who was enrolled as nominee member in the record of the Society cannot be called owner of the premises/structure raised on the plot. He at best can be called trustee for the legal heirs. He being nominee member only acquired share and interest in the capital of the deceased smt Kesar Devi with the Society. Arun Kumar who was enrolled as nominee member in the record of the Society cannot be called owner of the premises/structure raised on the plot. He at best can be called trustee for the legal heirs. He being nominee member only acquired share and interest in the capital of the deceased smt Kesar Devi with the Society. In fact no right, title and interest of the structure built on the plot devolved on Mr. Arun Kumar, respondent no. 7 herein. Therefore, by operation of law of succession the premises in question devolved on the legal representatives of the deceased Smt. Kesar devi by inheritence including that of respondent no. 7 Similar view was expressed by our own High Court in the case of Shakuntala Devi Bhaskar v. Ishwar Nagar Cooperative House Building Society, 45 (1991) DLT 518 ; wherein it was held that a mere nomination made In favour of a particular person does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the property after the death of the person concerned. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount or manage the property. The property or the amount, as the case may be, can be claimed by the heirs of the deceased in accordance with law of Succession governing, them. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of Smt, Sarbati Devi and another v. Smt Usha Devi, 1984 SC 346 held that the nominee having life insurance policy does not get absolute right to the amount due. A mere nomination does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. In view of the settled principle of law, the society, the DDA and MCD mutated the property in favour of respondents 1 to 4 Mere nomination in favour of the respondent No. 7 could not have created any bar or disability qua their right ot inheritence. Nor by issuing mutation letters these authorities committed any fraud or forgery. Respondent No. 1 inherited this property after the death of Keaar Devi by operation of law. Hence, being co-owner/landlord she had the right to file the petition for eviction for her bona fide needs. Nor by issuing mutation letters these authorities committed any fraud or forgery. Respondent No. 1 inherited this property after the death of Keaar Devi by operation of law. Hence, being co-owner/landlord she had the right to file the petition for eviction for her bona fide needs. Nomination in favour of respondent No 7 therefore did not come in the way of respondent No. 1 from inheriting the property hence, the arguments of Mr. Lekhl arc without force and merits. Admittedly, the Supreme Court in Sarbati Devi (supra) was dealing with a case under Section 39 ot the Insurance Act, 1938, but that would not make any difference so far as the proposition of law is concerned The fact remains that the Supreme Court held that the nominee does not get beneficial interest in the property, proves the case that beneficial interest goes by inheritence and not by mere nomination. Hence, respondent No. 1 cannot be denied the status of being a landlady. ( 16 ) SO far as the second objection of Mr. Lekhi, that the controller could not have relied on the mutation and the memorandums of settlement, to my mind, that is also not sustainable. Main thrust of Mr Lekhi s arguments was that these family settlements were outside the law Mr. Rameshwar Dayal had no share in B-126, Sarvodaya Enclaye, New Delhi, but in the family arrangement, he had been shown as joint owner of the property including B-126, Sarvodaya Enclave, New Delhi. Moreover, contents of Para 2 of the alleged family arrangement dated 25th January, 1988 are contradictory to Para 4 In Para 2 it was mentiontd that House No D-13a. 10, Model Town, New Delhi and B-126, Sarvodaya enclave New Delhi were joint family properties, whereas in Para 4 only d-13a/10, Model Town, New Delhi has been stated to be a joint family property. Even otherwise, no family settlement bad in fact taken place. This can be inferred from the earlier petition filed by respondent No. 3 jo which he pleaded that he alongwith respondents 5 to 7 herein submitted a building plan with the concerned authority for approval. Had there been realya partition, as alleged by respondent No. 1, then respondent no. 3 would not have denied the same by his averments in his petition. These arguments are not borne out from record. Had there been realya partition, as alleged by respondent No. 1, then respondent no. 3 would not have denied the same by his averments in his petition. These arguments are not borne out from record. The reading of the family arrangement is a whole makes it clear that only D-13a/10 was the joint family property in which late Rameshwar dayal bad a share, Sh. Rameshwar Dayal, father of the respondents, had no share in B-126 Sarvodaya Enclave and this can be in ferred from the readiog of the family arrangement/settlements dated 23rd October, 1985, as well as 25th January, 1983. Mere fact that respondent No. 1 in her passport had given her permanent address as D-I3a/10 Model Town, New Delhi would not mean that she owned that property or that family settlement or arrangement are fraud or forgery. Admittedly respondent No. 1 had been residing with her sister, respondent No 4 herein She had given her permanent address at the time of getting the passport of the house owned by her family i. e. D-13a/10, model Town, New Delhi but nothing turns on that. Mr. Lekhi then contended that Controller could not have relied on these documents as it is against the Supreme Court decision in Precision Steel where it has been observed that leave to contest should be decided on the basis of affidavit of tenant and reply affidavit, if any, and that the evidence has not to be weighed at that stage There cannot be any quarrel with this proposition of law. But in this case the learned Controller has not weighed any evidence respondent No. 1 bad incorporated the family settlements as well as the mutation letters in her reply affidavit. Therefore, those being part of the reply affidavit, the Controller was within his rights to look into the same. I see no reason to hold otherwise. It was not preferring one affidavit against the other. He discussed thereply affidavit in which these documents formed part. In the Precision Steel, Supreme Court has not said that reply affidavit cannot be discussed. ( 17 ) CONTENTION of Mr. Lekhi that the mutation letters could not be looked into because in those letters, there appears some reference to other letters which letters have not been produced on record, hence it amount to suppression of material facts. There is thus fraud of facts and law. ( 17 ) CONTENTION of Mr. Lekhi that the mutation letters could not be looked into because in those letters, there appears some reference to other letters which letters have not been produced on record, hence it amount to suppression of material facts. There is thus fraud of facts and law. In the absence of those letters mentioned in the mutation letters, the Court could not even Prima facie take note of the letter issued by the society. This argument is without merits The Controller was not called upon to determine whether the Society rightly or wrongly mutated the property in the name of respondents No. 1 to 4. Non-production of the letter referred by the Society in its letter would not entitle the petitioner the right to contest nor would disentitle the respondent No 1 from chiming the eviction. The Controller wag not called upon to decide the validitv of the oral partition pursuance to which socieyt transferred the rights in favour of respondents 1 to 4 In fact, the acted upon the oral partition and this finds support from the subsequent events, when Arun Kumar filed suit against Sh. Bharat Bhushan and Adarsh Bhushan, bearing Suit No. 498/91 asking for demarcation of his share as against the other two brothers in their joint property bearing no. D-13a/10, Model Town New Delhi. By Court order in Suit no. 498/91 decided on 14th February 1991, an arbitrator was appointed who made his award on 28th January, 1991 This shows house no. D-13a/10 as per the family settlement fall into the shares of respondents no. 5 to 7 herein. Documents in this regard formed part of respondent no. 1 s pleadings Hence, the Controller on the basis of these documents in these pleadings came to the conclusion that the tenanted premises on account of the said partition fell into the share of respondents 1 to 4 and they became co-owner of the same. I see infirmity in the reasoning of the Controller. ( 18 ) TURING to the objection of Mr. Lekhi that respondent No. 1 does not require the premises for her needs, this is also contrary to the record. Admittedly the respondent No, 1 herein is residing with her sister, respondent no. 4. Respondent No. 4 is living in Government allotted accommodation on which respondent No. 1 has no right. ( 18 ) TURING to the objection of Mr. Lekhi that respondent No. 1 does not require the premises for her needs, this is also contrary to the record. Admittedly the respondent No, 1 herein is residing with her sister, respondent no. 4. Respondent No. 4 is living in Government allotted accommodation on which respondent No. 1 has no right. She is living there at the courtsey of respondent No. 4. Being a co-owner, if the respondent No. 1 due to the unfortunate circumstances which have arisen in 1993, she wants to live in her own house in order to give company and society of her parents in law to her daughters who are very young, it cannot be said that her needs are not bona fide. At this tender age, when the younger daughter is hardly 2-3 years and elder studying in fourth class, they require the company of their grand parents, particularly when their own mother and aunt, respondent No 4 arc working women. Even otherwise the Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of V. Rajeshwari J. v. Bombay Tyres Ltd Civil Appeal No. 3006/90 decided on 18th January, 1994, held that under Section 14-D of the Act, the tenant has practically fo defence whatsoever. All that has to be proved under the said provision is that the landlady is a widow and premises are required for her own residence. Therefore, the observation made in the case of Precision Steel (Supra) would not apply to the facts in hand. The observations of the Supreme Court in V. Rajeshwari on all force are applicable to the facts of this case. ( 19 ) I am not convicted by the argument of Mr. Lekhi that the case of the respondent No. 1 is based on insufficiency of accommodation. In fact, as already observed above, she is put ing up with her sister who has a Government accommodation. She wants to shift to this house of which she is the co-owner/landlady. The contention of Mr Lekhi that the flat built by Mr. Anand Bhushan respondent No. 3 herein actually belongs to respondent No. 1 has no force. It is well settled principle of law that even one co-owner has a right to file eviction petition for his own needs. Respondent No. 3 herein had filed a petition for eviction because he was also in dire need of accommodation. Anand Bhushan respondent No. 3 herein actually belongs to respondent No. 1 has no force. It is well settled principle of law that even one co-owner has a right to file eviction petition for his own needs. Respondent No. 3 herein had filed a petition for eviction because he was also in dire need of accommodation. When the litigation prolonged, he built a flat on the half portion of the plot in question for his residence. The contention of Mr. Lekhi that respondent No 3 built the flat with the funds provided by respondent No 1, to my mind. Is too far fetched. It has been the case of the respondents that due to shortage of new accommodation at d-13a/10, respondent No. 3 took on rent house in different colonies and ultimately built the flat on the plot. Thereafter, he started residing in that flat with his family. The accommodation is hardly sufficient for him and his family. The respondent No t cannot compell the co-owner to vacate his flat and again hire a rented house in order to accommodate her. She needs this tenanted premises for her residence and residence of her family. Hence, it cannot be said that her petition is based on insufficiency of accommodation. For the reasons stated above, I find that none of the arguments raised by the petitioner required any consideration on merits nor disentitled the respondent No. 1 from claiming immediate possession of the premises in question In fact, the intention of the legislature was not to put such a classified landlords like a widow landlady to the same rigour. The order of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.