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Allahabad High Court · body

1994 DIGILAW 158 (ALL)

S. B. Nath v. Committee of Management, Anglo Bengali Inter College, Allahabad

1994-02-14

A.P.SINGH

body1994
JUDGMENT A.P. Singh 1. Petitioner, S. B. Nath, a lecturer of Biology in Anglo Bangali Inter College, Allahabad, (herain-after referred to as the 'College'), has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution for the grant of the writ of prohibition so as to restrain the respondents, namely, the Managing Committee of the College through its Manager, Ashish Chandra Misra lecturer of Economics of the College, the Seniority Committee/Sun-Committee of the College and the District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad (herein-after referred to as the 'Inspector'), from considering the question of seniority, as the same has already been settled. A Writ of Mandamus has also been sought for appointing him as officiating Principal of the College in the vacancy which is likely to arise consequent to the retirement of Dr. J. M. Banerjee it's regular Principal. Notice of one Sri M. C. Chattonpadhya, member of the seniority Committee dated 8-1-91 was also sought to be quashed by a writ of Certiorari. 2. In brief, the facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as demonstrator in the College on 13-7-1965, This appointment of the petitioner as demonstrator was approved by the Inspector by his order dated 16-12-65. Petitioner, thereafter, applied for appointment on the post of lecturer Biology by application dated 20-5-68 whereupon selection was held and the petitioner was selected which resulted in issue of appointment letter dated 13-7-1968 appointing the petitioner in the lecturer's grade subject however to the approval of the Inspector. On 24-8-68 petitioner sent his consent for joining the post of lecturer of Biology and he joined the said post on that date. The Inspector granted approval to the appointment of the petitioner by order dated 20-1-69 with the stipulation that the order of approval was to take effect from the (Bate of joining. Thereafter, on 15-7-69 the petitioner was confirmed as Biology lecturer with effect from 24-8-69. Consequent to the retirement of Sri J. M. Banerjee regular Principal of the College, vacancy arose for appointment on that post. The petitioner and respondent no. 2 Sri Ashish Chandra Misra, both laid their respective claims for appointment as ad-hoc Principal of the College under section 18 of U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982. Consequent to the retirement of Sri J. M. Banerjee regular Principal of the College, vacancy arose for appointment on that post. The petitioner and respondent no. 2 Sri Ashish Chandra Misra, both laid their respective claims for appointment as ad-hoc Principal of the College under section 18 of U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982. On the one hand, petitioner maintained that since he had been appointed as lecturer Biology by way of promotion with effect from 13-7-68, as such, he was senior to respondent no. 2 who was appointed as lecturer of Economics on 1-8-68. On the other hand, respondent no. 2 claimed that he was senior to the petitioner as his 3 date of joining as lecturer was 1-8-68 whereas the date of joining of the petitioner as lecturer was 24-8-68. It was maintained that the seniority was to be determined on the basis of their joining of the post as per the order of approval dated 20-1-69 of the Inspector in which it was specifically mentioned that the approval was being given to the appointment of the petitioner as well as to respondent no. 2 which was to be effective from the date of their joining. The Managing Committee, however, maintained that section 18 of U. P. Act No. 5 of,1982 is not applicable as the College was a. minority institution under the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution, as such, the said Act had no application to it and it was free to make appointment of the post of Principal under the provisions of U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (here-in-after called the 1921 Act') It was also maintained that respondent no. 2 is senior to the petitioner and in any case respondent no. 2 and not the petitioner was entitled for being appointed as ad-hoc Principal of the College, even if U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982 was applicable. It was further alleged on behalf of the Managing Committee that the question of seniority had not been decided ever before, it was on the demand of the teachers' representative in the Managing Committee of the College that the Managing Committee of the College appointed a sub-committee for deciding the question of seniority amongst the teachers of the College grade-wise under Regulation 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations (here-in-after called the Regulations) framed under 1921 Act. The sub-committee thereupon invited objections from concerned teachers in the matter and both petitioner as well as respondent no. 2 submitted their respective representation before the subcommittee on consideration thereof respondent no. 2 has been held to be senior by an order of the managing committee passed on 11-6-93 which has been upheld by the Regional Deputy Director of Education by order dated 4-10-93 on an appeal filed by the petitioner S. B. Nath. These two orders, namely, the order of the Managing Committee holding respondent no, 2 as senior to the petitioner and the order of the Regional Deputy Director of Education dated 4-3-93 dismissing petitioner's appeal against the order of the Managing Committee were passed after this Court modified the stay order by order dated 30-4-93. Both these orders have also been challenged by the petitioner by way of an amendment application in this writ petition. 3. At the Bar, Sri A. P. Sahi, who has appeared as counsel for the petitioner, has made two arguments in support of the writ petition. First argument of Sri Sahi was that seniority between the petitioner and respondent no. 2 had been settled long back by order of the Managing Committee dated 26-2-1976, which is annexure 2 to the writ petition and again by order dated 4-8-79 which is annexure 4 to the writ petition, therefore, according to the learned counsel, it is now not open for the Committee of Management to reopen the long settled question of seniority between petitioner and respondent no. 2. In support of this contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of S. K. Chaudhary v. Manager, 1991 (1) UP LB EC 250. In this case, it has been held that the question of seniority which has been finally settled between the parties should not be reopened at the instance of the person who did not challenge the same earlier. 4. Next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that under the provisions of section 16--F of 1921 Act, as it -stood in 1968, no appointment on substantive basis of a teacher: of a recognized institution could be made by the Managing Committee without approval of the Inspector. 4. Next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that under the provisions of section 16--F of 1921 Act, as it -stood in 1968, no appointment on substantive basis of a teacher: of a recognized institution could be made by the Managing Committee without approval of the Inspector. The date of substantive appointment, therefore, according to the learned counsel, cannot be a date earlier to the date cm which the approval is given by the Inspector for the appointment. The date of appointment, therefore, has to be a date either the date on which the approval is given or some other date subsequent thereto when actual appointment is made and since appointment of the petitioner as well as of respondent no. 2 was approved by the Inspector by a common order dated 20-1-69, as such, the date of substantive appointment both of petitioner and respondent no. 2 for the purpose of Regulation 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations has to be 20-1-69 and since the petitioner is older in age as compared to respondent no. 2, as such, under Regulation 2, he has to be treated as senior. It was further contended that the Inspector had no power or authority under law (under section 16-F of 1921 Act) to grant approval with retrospective effect so as to validate the appointment from the date of joining as the Committee of Management possesses no power, whatsoever, under the law to make appointment and allow the joining on the post of a (teacher of a recognised educational institution without first obtaining approval from the Inspector. To substantiate his above argument, Sri A. P. Sahi, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on three judgments of this Court-first being Ram Chandra Sharma v. State of U. P., 1980 UP LB EC 245 in which this Court has held that the approval order of the Inspector will not relate back to the date of appointment in case the appointment of the incumbent was made earlier to the date of the order when the approval was granted by the Inspector. Next case relied on was Lalit Mohan Misra v. D.I.O.S., 1979 ALJ 1025, in which it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the appointment of a teacher cannot relate back to a date earlier to the date of approval Order passed by the Inspector. Next case relied on was Lalit Mohan Misra v. D.I.O.S., 1979 ALJ 1025, in which it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the appointment of a teacher cannot relate back to a date earlier to the date of approval Order passed by the Inspector. The last case on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Smt. Omi Bala Nigam v. R.I.G.S, 1986 OP LB EC 69, in which this Court has ruled that appointment of a teacher must follow the order of approval granted by the Inspector and appointment if made prior to the order of approval cannot be counted for the purposes of seniority. In his rebuttal submission, Sri A. K. Yog, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 argued that at no stage whatsoever the seniority between the petitioner and respondent no. 2 was ever determined under Regulation 3 of Chapter II. According to the learned counsel the orders dated 26-2-76 and 4-8-79, which respectively are annexures 2 and 4 to the writ petition, on which petitioner has placed reliance to show that the seniority question had long back been determined, are not the orders for the purposes of determining seniority under Regulation 3 of Chapter II, but are the orders passed for determining seniority of teachers of the College under Regulations 1, 2 and 4 of Chapter I of the Regulations for the purpose of rotational representation of teachers in the Committee of Management of the College. Learned counsel has drawn distinction between the seniority list prepared under Regulations 1, 2 and 4 of Chapter I and seniority list prepared under Regulation 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations. According to him, while seniority list under Regulations 1, 2 and 4 of Chapter I is prepared from the date of initial appointment of the teachers of any grade in the College whereas seniority under Regulation 3 of Chapter II is determined on the basis of the appointment of a teacher on substantive post in a particular grade. It was argued that institutional seniority referred to in Chapter I for the purpose of rotational representation of teachers in the Managing Committee is quite different than the gradewise seniority of teachers prepared for the purpose of promotions which is done under Regulation 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations. It was argued that institutional seniority referred to in Chapter I for the purpose of rotational representation of teachers in the Managing Committee is quite different than the gradewise seniority of teachers prepared for the purpose of promotions which is done under Regulation 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations. According to the learned counsel, seniority relevant for the purposes of ad-hoc appointment as Principal under section 18 of U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982 is not the seniority determined under Rules I, 2 and 4 of Chapter I but under Regulation 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations and since seniority under Regulation 3 of Chapter II was never prepared earlier as such the Managing Committee or the sub-committee thereof cannot be prevented from completing the exercise undertaken by them in this regard nor orders dated 11-6-93 and 4-10-93 passed respectively by the Committee of Management and the Regional Deputy Director of Education holding respondent no. 2 senior to the petitioner which is under challenge by way of amendment application can, therefore, be quashed., The present exercise which has been undertaken by the Managing Committee is for determination and preparation of grade-wise seniority of teachers of the College under Regulation 3 of Chapter II which, according to the learned counsel, was never done before and the petitioner is obviously wrong in relying on the Full Bench judgment of this Court. 5. In reply to the second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri A. K. Yog, learned counsel for respondent no. 2, has submitted that the seniority between the petitioner as well as respondent no. 2 has to be determined with effect from the date of their joining as lecturer and not from the date on which the order of approval was passed by the Inspector inasmuch as the order of the Inspector granting approval itself provided that the approval was being granted to the appointments from the date of the joining of the post by the incumbents named therein including petitioner and respondent no. 2. On that strength, it was argued that since the petitioner had joined lecturer post on 24-8-68, he must certainly be junior to respondent no. 2. On that strength, it was argued that since the petitioner had joined lecturer post on 24-8-68, he must certainly be junior to respondent no. 2 who had joined as lecturer of Economics on 1-8-68 and, therefore, the consideration of age factor becomes wholly irrelevant inasmuch as age factor, for the purpose of determination of seniority, has to be taken into consideration only when the date of appointment and joining by the two incumbents in a particular grade is the same. It was further maintained by the learned counsel for respondent no. 2 that the three judgments on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument that appointment, if any, made earlier to the order of approval will have no relevance for the purpose of determining seniority are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the approval order passed by the Inspector in the present case is different from those under consideration in those three cases, In the present case the date of appointment in substantive capacity for the purposes of Rule 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations shall be the date of joining of the post of lecturer by petitioner and respondent no. 2 as per the order of approval passed by the Inspector and not the date on which the approval order was passed by the Inspector. According to the learned counsel 'approval' of the Inspector, required for the purpose of appointment by section 16-F of the 1921 Act (as it stood in 1968) as per his order dated 20-1-69 shall be deemed to have been given in case of respondent no. 2 on 1-8-1968 and in case of petitioner on 24-8-68 which are the dates on which they joined the post of lecturer consequent to their appointment by the Managing Committee. According to the learned counsel, since the order of approval is to relate back to the date of the joining of the post both by the petitioner as well as by respondent no. 2, therefore, respondent no. 2 and not the petitioner will be senior under Rule 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations. According to him, in none of the cases cited on behalf of the petitioner this Court has held that approval cannot be given to an appointment with retrospective effect. 6. 2, therefore, respondent no. 2 and not the petitioner will be senior under Rule 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations. According to him, in none of the cases cited on behalf of the petitioner this Court has held that approval cannot be given to an appointment with retrospective effect. 6. Sri L. P. Naithani, Senior Advocate, who has appeared on behalf of the Managing Committee, respondent no. I, apart from adopting the arguments of SRI A. K. Yog. has argued that the question of seniority between the teachers of various grades in the College was never determined under Regulation 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations. The exercise of deciding seniority amongst the teachers of various grades of the College as required by Regulation 3 was taken up by the Managing Committee for the first time on the constant demand of the teachers representative in the Managing Committee inasmuch as various teachers who had retired from service or had died were still continuing to be shown in the list of teachers of the College. It was argued that respondent no. 2 is senior to the petitioner inasmuch as petitioner had submitted his joining report on the post of lecturer of Biology on 24-8-68 whereas respondent no. 2 had joined on the post of lecturer of Economics on 1-8-68 although both of them had been issued orders of appointment on 27-7-68. It was further argued by him that seniority determination orders dated 2-6-76 and 4-8-79 were issued under Regulations 1, 2 and 4 of Chapter-I of the Regulations for the purpose of rotational representation of teachers of the College in the Committee of Management of the College which is required to be prepared on the basis of seniority in the service of the College irrespective of the grade and not from the date of joining or appointment in a particular grade as required by Regulation 3 of Chapter II thereof, which is to be prepared gradewise for the purpose of promotions and other service benefits. Sri A. P. Sahi in his rejoinder submission reiterated his arguments made by him at the initial stage without making any further additional submissions. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and haying examined the averments made on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents, following facts emerge. 8. Petitioner had been appointed in the College as demonstrator earlier to the respondent no. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and haying examined the averments made on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents, following facts emerge. 8. Petitioner had been appointed in the College as demonstrator earlier to the respondent no. 2 on 13-7-65 in the L.T. grade. This appointment of the petitioner was approved by the Inspector by order dated 16-12-65. Thus petitioner's appointment for the purpose of seniority under Regulations 1, 2, and 4 of Chapter I will be with effect from 16-12-65. Petitioner then applied for appointment on the post of lecturer of Biology whereas respondent no. 2 applied for appointment cm the post of lecturer of Economics. The Manager issued appointment orders to both petitioner and respondent no. 2 on the same date i.e. 17-7-68. While respondent no. 2 joined his post as lecturer of Economics on 1-8-68, for some reason, petitioner joined the post of lecturer of Biology on 24-8-68. The Inspector exercising the power under section 16-F of 1921 Act, granted approval to the appointment of the petitioner as well as of respondent no. 2 by order dated 20-1-69 according to which the approval was to relate back to the date of the joining by the concerned teachers. Thus appointment of petitioner as lecturer of Biology was approved by the Inspector on 24-8-68 whereas appointment of respondent no. 2 as lecturer of Economics was approved by the said officer under Section 16-F on 1-8-63. Thus for the purpose of Rule 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations the date of petitioner's appointment in the lecturer's grade is 24-8-68 whereas the date of respondent no. 2's appointment in the lecturer grade is 1-8-68. The Inspector in his order of approval dated 20-1-69, which has been filed as Annexure 11 to the counter affidavit of respondent no. 2, has specifically mentioned that the approval is being accorded for the appointment of teachers named therein with effect from the date of their joining. The relevant portion of the order reads as under :- "Unke karyabhar grahan karne kii tithi se anumodit kiya jata hai." A perusal of this order would show that by the said order of 20-1-69 the Inspector had granted approval for the appointment of Sri Alok Palit as lecturer of Mathematics; respondent no. 2 as lecturer of Economics. The relevant portion of the order reads as under :- "Unke karyabhar grahan karne kii tithi se anumodit kiya jata hai." A perusal of this order would show that by the said order of 20-1-69 the Inspector had granted approval for the appointment of Sri Alok Palit as lecturer of Mathematics; respondent no. 2 as lecturer of Economics. petitioner as lecturer of Biology, Chitranjan Gupta as Science teacher, Ashok Kumar Sharma as demonstrator, H. K. Banerjee as Assistant Teacher in High School, S. M. Chaudhary as Assistant Teacher Bengali in Intermediate Section and Virendra Prasad Misra as Assistant Teacher Sanskrit. All these appointments were approved by the Inspector as seen above, from the date of their respective joining. 9. It has been alleged in the counter affidavit of respondent no. 2 that petitioner has been paid salary in the lecturer's grade with effect from 24-8-68 on the basis of the approval order dated 20-1-69. This fact has not been controverted by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit. IT has also been alleged by respondent no. 2 that petitioner was confirmed as Biology lecturer by order dated 15-1-69 with effect from 24-8-69 whereas respondent no. 2 was confirmed as Economics lecturer by the same order with effect from 1-8-69, Confirmation order, according to respondent no. 2 was made counting the service of the petitioner and respondent no. 2 from the date of their joining the post of lecturer as per the Inspector's order of approval dated 20-1-69. This fact has also not been denied by the petitioner. Thus it is without dispute that the petitioner was appointed on 24-8-68 whereas respondent no. 2 was appointed on 1-8-68 in the lecturer's grade. This position has remained undisputed since 1969 inasmuch as neither the petitioner nor any one else ever challenged the order of the Inspector dated 20-1-69 granting approval to the appointments of teachers, whose names have been mentioned therein including respondent no. 2, with effect from the date of their joining. Petitioner himself accepted the order of the Inspector dated 20-1-69 by claiming salary in the lecturer's grade with effect from 24-8-68 and also his confirmation in that grade with effect from 24-8-69 so also by not protesting ever before against the confirmation of respondent no. 2, with effect from the date of their joining. Petitioner himself accepted the order of the Inspector dated 20-1-69 by claiming salary in the lecturer's grade with effect from 24-8-68 and also his confirmation in that grade with effect from 24-8-69 so also by not protesting ever before against the confirmation of respondent no. 2 in that grade with effect from 1-8-69 which was not at all passible but for the order dated 20-1-69 granting approval for the appointment with effect from the date of the joining. Further, it will appear that whenever temporary vacancy arose on the post of Principal in the College due to the absence of the regular Principal, respondent no. 2 used to be appointed as Principal on officiating basis only because of his seniority which too was quietly accepted by the petitioner without making any protest ever. Allegations in this respect have been made by respondent no. 2 in paras 23 and 23A of his counter affidavit. The orders passed by the Manager and the resolution passed by the Managing Committee appointing respondent no. 2 as officiating Principal in absence of the regular Principal on several occasions have also been filed with the counter affidavit. This fact has not been denied by the petitioner nor he has referred to any protest ever made by him against the officiating appointment of respondent no. 2 as Principal of the College. One of such orders has been filed as annexure 19 to the counter affidavit of respondent no. 2. These allegations have been replied by the petitioner in para 17 of the rejoinder affidavit in which he has not denied these facts. IT is thus apparent that petitioner himself accepted respondent no. 2 as senior to him and without protest allowed him to officiate as Principal on the dates when the regular Principal was absent from the College. IT, therefore, follows that apparency petitioner is junior to respondent no. 2 for the reason of his joining as lecturer of Economics on 1-8-68 as against the joining of petitioner as lecturer of Biology on 24-8-63 as the; date of their respective appointment in the lecturer's grade as per the approval order of the Inspector dated 20-1-69 is the date on which they joined the service in the lecturer's grade. 2 for the reason of his joining as lecturer of Economics on 1-8-68 as against the joining of petitioner as lecturer of Biology on 24-8-63 as the; date of their respective appointment in the lecturer's grade as per the approval order of the Inspector dated 20-1-69 is the date on which they joined the service in the lecturer's grade. IT is to be noted that as per Regulation 2 (1) of Chapter II of the Regulations only senior most teacher in the lecturer's grade can officiate as Principal in the temporary absence of the regular Principal. 10. Petitioner, however, seeks to maintain in view of the ratio laid down by this Court in the cases of Ram Chandra Sharma (supra), Lalit Mohan Misra (supra) and S. K. Chaudhary v. Manager (supra), he has to be treated as senior to respondent no, 2 inasmuch as the date of appointment of respondent no. 2 as well as of the petitioner in the lecturer's grade is 20-1-69 on which date the approval order was passed by the Inspector and since the petitioner was older in age to the respondent no. 2, as such, he had to be treated as senior to respondent no. 2 as per Regulation 3 of Chapter II. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, is not acceptable. If the date of appointment of the. petitioner as well as of respondent no. 2 in the lecturer's grade is 20-1-69, it is not understandable as to how the petitioner drew his salary in the lecturer's grade from 24- 8-68 because the salary to a teacher is payable with effect from the date of his appointment and not from a date earlier to the date of appointment. It is also not understandable as to how the petitioner accepted without portest his own and confirmation of respondent no. 2 in the lecturer's grade with effect from 24-8-66 and 1-8-69 respectively and not with effect from 20-1-70 which according to the Rules will be the date of confirmation as on that date the period of one year's probation would came to an end. If the case of the petitioner is accepted then his probation should start on 20-1-69 in that case one year's period of probation comes to an end on 20-1-70. If the case of the petitioner is accepted then his probation should start on 20-1-69 in that case one year's period of probation comes to an end on 20-1-70. It is, however, to be seen in the present case that in petitioner's case also confirmation order was made with effect from 24-8-69 while confirmation of respondent no. 2 was made with effect from 1-8-69 which was obviously in keeping with the order of the Inspector dated 20-1-1969 whereby he granted approval to the appointments to all the incumbents named in that order with effect from the date of their respective joining. Petitioner thus himself has taken advantage of the order of the Inspector dated 20-1-69 for the purposes both of drawing salary with effect from 24-8-68 and for confirmation in the service in lacturer's grade with effect from that very date. However, when it comes to the question of determination of seniority between him and respondent no. 2, for appointment on the post of Principal he questions the legality of the order of the Inspector in so far as it gives approval to the appointment of respondent no. 2 from the date of his joining. No prayer has been made in this respect by the petitioner either in the writ petition or in the amendment application. In my opinion, petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge the order of the Inspector not only on the ground of estoppel, acquiscence and latches but also on the ground that all other teachers whose appointments were approved by that order and have all derived benefit therefrom for a very long time have not been made parties in the writ petition nor are present for hearing before the Court. If the order of the Inspector in so far as it grants retrospective approval to the appointments with effect from the date of joining is quashed the quashing order will not only be to the detriment of respondent no. 2 but also to the detriment of others whose names occur in ill. This Court obviously will not pass an order adversely affecting the rights of persons who have not been brought before it and have not been given opportunity of hearing. 2 but also to the detriment of others whose names occur in ill. This Court obviously will not pass an order adversely affecting the rights of persons who have not been brought before it and have not been given opportunity of hearing. This Court, therefore, will not permit the petitioner to question the legality of the order of the Inspector dated 20-1-69 in so far as it accords approval to the appointment of persons named therein with effect from the date of their respective joining nor it is legally permissible for the petitioner to single out respondent no 2 only for the purpose of determining seniority under Regulation 3 of Chapter II. Since the petitioner himself has availed benefit of that order by claiming salary as well as for the purpose of confirmation in the grade of lecturer, it is, therefore, not open for the petitioner to question the legality of that order of the Inspector on the ground that the Inspector possesses no power to give approval to the appointments under Section 16 of the 1921 Act with retrospective effect. I. therefore, do not think it at all necessary to decide the question as to whether the order of the Inspector granting approval to the appointment of teachers whose names have been mentioned in the said order, including that of the respondent no. 2, with effect from the date of their respective joining on the post is permissible under the provisions of Section 16-F of' 1921 Act as it then stood as the petitioner for the reasons indicated above is estopped from questioning the legality of that order. So far as the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitionee on the question that the order of approval passed by the Inspector cannot relate back to the date of appointment, if the appointment has been made prior to it, are concerned it will be sufficient to observe that the question which arises for consideration in the present case in the context of it's peculiar facts did not arise for decision in any of those cases nor this question on the facts of the case needs to be decided as the petitioner is estopped from raising this question for the treasons already given in this judgment above. A question of law can be derided in a particular case provided that question on the facts of the case requires decision for the purposes of the effective disposal of the case, if however for some reason or the other the question, though arising for decision on the facts of the case, need not be decided on some other ground or consideration the Court should refrain itself from deciding it only for academic interest. I, therefore, do not consider it at all necessary to make any comment on this question and this question is left undecided. 11. It, therefore, has to be held that petitioner having been appointed on 24-8-68 as lecturer of Biology is certainly junior to respondent no. 2 who was appointed as lecturer of Economics on 1-8-68 and the date of appointment of petitioner as well as respondent no. 2 for the purposes of determination of inter se seniority between them as per the approval order of the Inspector dated 20-1-1969 has respectively to be 24-8-1968 and 1-8-1968. 12. The next point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the question of seniority which has long back been finally settled by orders dated 26-2-76 and 4-8-79 cannot be reopened, is concerned, the same too deserves rejection. As noticed above, the seniority lists filed as annexures 2 and 4 to the writ: petition respectively of 1976 and 1979 were issued under Regulations 1, 2 and 4 of Chapter I for the purposes of rotational representation of teachers as members in the Committee of Management of the College. Such a seniority list as per Regulation 2 of Chapter I of the Regulations is required to be prepared on the basis of the substantive service of a teacher in the institution and not in a particular grade. Regulation 4 would show that the Manager has to prepare and maintain a seniority list showing therein the date from which a teacher is entitled to count his seniority. Thus what is relevant for the purpose of seniority list to be prepared under Regulations 2 and 4 of Chapter I is the date of his substantive appointment in the service of the institution whereas Regulation 3 Chapter II which was introduced for the first time in July 1970 requires the preparation of the seniority list of teachers of the institution grade-wise. Clause (a) of sub-rule (1) of Regulation 3 reads as follows : "The seniority list shall be prepared separately for each grade of teachers whether permanent or temporary, on any substantive post." Sub-clause (b) of the same sub-rule, which is also relevant, reads as follows : "Seniority of teachers in a grade shall be determined on the basis of their substantive appointment in that grade. If two or more teachers were so appointed on the same date, seniority shall be determined on the basis of age." Thus it will be apparent that seniority list of 26-2-76 on which petitioner has placed reliance is the seniority list prepared under Regulation 2 and 4 of Chapter I, this position has been conceded by the learned counsel Sri A. P. Sahi inasmuch as on 26-2-76 seniority list could not be prepared under Regulation 3 of Chapter II which, as seen above, was introduced in the Regulations for the first time on 10-9-1976. So far as seniority list prepared on 4-8-79 is concerned, that seniority list itself states that it was prepared under Rule 4 of Chapter I. No reliance, therefore, can be placed on these two seniority lists by the petitioner so as to contend that fresh exercise undertaken by the Managing Committee on by the sub-committee thereof for determination of seniority under Regulation 3 of Chapter II of the Regulations is not permitted by law and for this reason the Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of S. K. Chaudhary does not render any help to the petitioner while on the other hand, it disentitles the petitioner from questioning the seniority of respondent no. 2 on the; basis that his date of appointment is 1-8-1968 and not 20-1-1969. The seniority of teachers under Regulation 3, as will appear from the facts noticed above, was never determined before and it was for the first time in 1990 that the exercise in this respect was undertaken by the Managing Committee on the demand of the teachers representative in the Managing' Committee, whereupon the present writ petition was filed by the petitioner. This Court being satisfied that grade- wise seniority list of the teachers of the College as required by Regulation 3 of Chapter II must be prepared, modified the stay order dated 30t4-93, whereupon the Managing Committee after hearing all the persons, including the petitioner and respondent no. This Court being satisfied that grade- wise seniority list of the teachers of the College as required by Regulation 3 of Chapter II must be prepared, modified the stay order dated 30t4-93, whereupon the Managing Committee after hearing all the persons, including the petitioner and respondent no. 2, passed the order dated 11 6-93 holding respondent no. 2 as senior to the petitioner, this order of the Managing Committee was also approved by the Regional Deputy Director of Education by order dated 4-10-93 and petitioner's appeal filed against the order of Managing Committee was rejected. Both these orders, which are under challenge before me, have been passed after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, petitioner also has not been able to point out any illegality In these orders except for his argument that the Managing Committee and the Regional Deputy Director of Education committed illegally in reopening the seniority question. This argument having already been rejected by me in the earlier part of this judgment, it cannot be said that the Managing Committee or the Regional Deputy Director of Education committed any illegality in determining the seniority of the petitioner taking his date of appointment as 24-8-68 and that of respondent no. 2 as 1-8-68, the orders passed in this respect by the Managing Committee and the Regional Deputy Director of Education, to my mind, need no interference both on facts or on law. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on two other judgments, namely, Dr. Nilofer Insaf v. State of M. P., AIR 1991 SC 1872 and Surendra Prasad Singh v. D.P.O.S., 1990 LIC 1440. The Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Nilofer Insaf ruled that long standing orders even if passed illegally will not be allowed to be challenged. In my opinion the 'ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is much to the disadvantage of the petitioner than to his advantage. As seen above, the order of the Inspector dated 20-1-69 giving retrospective effect to the approval of appointment was allowed by the petitioner to continue for a very long time. He also took advantage thereof, he also allowed respondent no 2 being treated senior on that basis, as such, on the ratio of Dr. Nilofer Insaf be is not allowed to now question it. 14. He also took advantage thereof, he also allowed respondent no 2 being treated senior on that basis, as such, on the ratio of Dr. Nilofer Insaf be is not allowed to now question it. 14. The other case of Surendra Prasad Singh is not applicable to the facts of this case inasmuch as in that case this Court has ruled that question of seniority cannot be reopened after 15 or 20 years. As seen above, seniority between the petitioner and respondent no. 2 or for that matter between other teachers of the institution was never determined under Regulation 3 of Chapter II. This Judgment, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case. No other submission was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. In view of the discussions made and for the reasons stated above, the petitioner is not at all entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for by him in this writ petition, the orders of the Managing Committee and Regional Deputy Director of Education, which are subject matter of challenge by way of amendment application, do not also suffer from any illegality. Before parting with the case, it is to be pointed out that Writ of Pohibition does not issue to administrative authorities like Managing Committee and Inspector, it is issued to courts of law. 16. In the result, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed, however, without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.