S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) * * * ( 2 ) THE present petitioner filed Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 56 of 1987 before civil Judge (S. D.), Navsari under Sec. 13-AA of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act) to recover possession of the residential premises leased to the opponent No. 1 Pepsi sorabji Doodha, who was original respondent has expired during the pendency of the proceeding before this Court and respondent Nos. 1/1 to 1/3 being the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased, respondents Nos. 1/1 to 1/3 were impleaded as heirs and legal representatives vide order dated 12th of April, 1991 and they have appeared before this Court through their Advocate Mr. D. D. Vyas. ( 3 ) THE case of the petitioner in his application was that he had joined the Indian army in the year 1942 and having put in service of 27 years, he has retired in the year 1969 as Major. It was his case that suit premises consisting of two rooms on the ground floor with common kitchen, bathroom and lavatory and one room on the first floor situated in the front portion of the northern side of house belonged to him and the members of his family. It was his case that since he was in Army, he was required to move from station to station and his mother was not residing at Gandevi and therefore, in or about 1963, the house was leased to respondent No. 1 Pepsi sorabji Doodha at monthly rent of Rs. 20. 00. It is his case that since he retired in the year 1969 and since he wanted to reside in his own residential house, he wanted to settle and stay at Gandevi. It is his further case that on or about 23rd of April, 1984, the respondent No. 1 has purchased another property bearing Panchayat No. 1803, which is situated in the same locality and that respondent No. 1 with the members of his family has shifted to the said new premises. He further pleaded that the respondent No. 1 has sublet the premises to respondent No. 2 and that he has been charging exhorbitant rent because of which the property tax which was assessed at rs. 21 annually came to be increased to Rs. 742 annually. He further pleaded that the respondent No. 1 has sublet the premises to respondent No. 2 and that he has been charging exhorbitant rent because of which the property tax which was assessed at rs. 21 annually came to be increased to Rs. 742 annually. It is his further case that the suit premises is required by him reasonbly and bona fide for his personal occupation and that if decree for possession as prayed for is not granted in his favour, hardship and inconvenience will be caused to him while if decree for possession as prayed for is granted in his favour, no hardship or inconvenience will be caused to the respondents as respondents have already acquired their suitable residential accommodation. He, therefore, prayed that a decree for possession should be passed in his favour. It must also be incidentally mentioned at this stage that this very petitioner has earlier instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 169 of 1983 in the Court of civil Judge (J. D.), Gandevi against the respondent to recover possession of the suit premises inter alia on the ground of reasonable and bona fide personal requirement under Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bomay Rent Act. There was some controversy about the pendency of the said suit as Mr. D. D. Vyas, learned Counsel appearing for respondents No. 1/1 and 1/3 contended before the Court that the said suit was even today pending in the trial Court. However, the petitioner has produced before this court the certified copy of the order passed below Exhibit-22 in the said suit by the trial Court as back as 10th of December, 1986 and from such order it becomes clear that Regular Civil Suit No. 169 of 1983 was permitted to be withdrawm by the trial Court with liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action on 3rd of September, 1987. In that view of the matter, the controversy attempted to be raised before this Court would not survive. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid suit of the present petitioner was resisted by the respondentdefendant in the trial Court by filing their written statement at Exhibit 21. In that view of the matter, the controversy attempted to be raised before this Court would not survive. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid suit of the present petitioner was resisted by the respondentdefendant in the trial Court by filing their written statement at Exhibit 21. In such written statement, the defence of the respondent-defendant was that application of this nature under Sec. 13aa of the Bombay Rent Act was not maintainable as petitioner-plaintiff has already earlier instituted a Regular Civil Suit No. 169 of 1983 in the trial Court on the same ground and that said suit was pending on the date of written statement. It was further contended that the petitioner-plaintiff was not in need of the residential premises as he was not staying at Gandevi and he was staying either at Bombay or at Billimora or at other places. It was further stated in the written statement that petitioner-plaintiff was not entitled to file such application as he was not the sole owner of the premises and as there were other co-owners of the premises and such co-owners of the premises cannot be said to be "specified landlord" within the meaing of Sec. 13aa of Bombay Rent Act. It was further contended that in fact new premises were acquired by the respondentdefendant at the instance of the petitioner and that petitioner has defrauded them and has not paid the amount which was required to be paid and therefore, also they have prayed that no decree for possession should be passed in favour of the petitioner-plaintiff. The allegations about premises having been sublet were denied. It was further stated that petitioner after acquiring possession of the suit premises wanted to sell away or dispose of the property and that he never wanted to utilise the suit property for his personal residential accommodation. It was further contended that suit premises were not reasonably and bona fide required by the petitionerplaintiff. Lastly, it was contended that no decree for eviction should be passed against the respondents because if such decree for eviction is passed, greater hardship will be caused to them as they will be rendered houseless and roofless. They, therefore, prayed that application of the petitioner-plaintifff should be dismissed. It may be stated that identical averments are also to be found in Exhibit- 12 which is an affidavit filed by the original respondent No. 1 in the proceeding. They, therefore, prayed that application of the petitioner-plaintifff should be dismissed. It may be stated that identical averments are also to be found in Exhibit- 12 which is an affidavit filed by the original respondent No. 1 in the proceeding. xxx xxx xxx ( 5 ) LASTLY, it is required to be noted that Mr. D. D. Vyas, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-defendants has submitted that this Court is exercising its revisional jurisdiction. In its revisional jurisdiction, this Court should not interfere with the findings of fact reached by the trial Court. He submits that unless jurisdictional error is pointed out to this Court, this Court should not interfere with the findings of fact reached by the trial Court and therefore, also in his submission, this Civil Revision Application is one which deserves to be dismissed. ( 6 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid submission in the context of Sec. 13- aa of the Act which confers right on members of Armed Forces of Union to recover possession of premises required for their occupation, it is required to be noted that under said provision a specified landlord shall be entitled to recover from his tenant the possession of any premises owned by him or by any member of his family, on the ground that such premises are bona fide required by him for occupation by himself or by any member of his family. This provision, as noted hereinabove, came to be introduced by Gujarat Act 7 of 1985. While introducing such provision, the Legislature has also introduced Sec. 31-A in the Act which provides for special procedure for disposal of certain application. The procedure which is to be followed while trying an application under Sec. 13-AA is provided by Sec. 31-A. Sec. 31- a (10) being relevant for the purpose of considering the aforesaid submission, the same is reproduced hereunder :"31-A (10) No appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the competent authority in accordance with the procedure specified in this section : provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made in any case by the competent authority under this section is according to law, call for the record of that case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. " ( 7 ) FROM the aforesaid provision, it becomes clear that when an order of recovery of possession of any premises is made by the competent authority, no appeal shall lie against such order. It is required to be noted that against any decree that may be passed in a suit filed under Sec. 12 and/or Sec. 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, an appeal is provided under Sec. 29 of the said Act. Such right of appeal is not expressly provided against an order of eviction or recovery of possession of any premises that may be passed by competent authority under Sec. 13-AA of the said Act. Not only not right of appeal is provided, by enacting Sec. 31-A (10) it is expressly stipulated that no appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the competent authority. It is, thus, clear that Legislature has deliberately omitted to provide a right of appeal against an order of recovery of possession of premises that may be passed by competent authority under Sec. 13-AA of the said Act. However, from the proviso to Sec. 31-A (10), it becomes clear that the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made in any case by the competent authority under this Section is according to law, call for the record of that case and may pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. It is in exercise of such power conferred by proviso to sub-sec. (10) of Sec. 31-A that the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked. It is, therefore, required to be seen as to whether such power can be said to be purely revisional power comparable to Sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is submitted by Mr. D. D. Vyas, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent that such power is purely revisional and since no jurisdictional error is pointed out to this Court, this Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact reached by the trial Court by re-appreciating the evidence. In my opnion, the aforesaid submission made by Mr. D. D. Vyas, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent is not well founded. The distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one. In my opnion, the aforesaid submission made by Mr. D. D. Vyas, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent is not well founded. The distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one. A right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way, as has been done in second appeals arising under the Civil Procedure Code. The power to hear a revision is generally given to a superior Court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law. Under Sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, the powers of the High Court are limited to see whether in a case decided, there has been an assumption of jurisdiction where none existed, or a refusal of jurisdiction where it did, or there has been material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The right there is confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone. In the present statutory provision under Sec. 31-A (10) the power is not so limited and the High Court is enabled to call for the record of a case to satisfy itself that the decision therein is according to law and to pass such orders in relation to the case, as it thinks fit. The phrase "according to law" refers to the decision as a whole and is not to be enquated to errors of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall decision, which must be according to law which it would not be, if here is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. Sec. 31-A (10) thus confers larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which Sec. 115 is limited. In this present case, it is required to be noted that the trial Court has mainly proceeded to reject the application of the plaintiff on the ground that such application by one of the co-owners was not maintainable. The entire reasoning of the competent authority is influenced by the fact that the application filed by the petitioner-plaintiff under Sec. 13-AA was not competent at his instance in absence of other co-owners. The entire reasoning of the competent authority is influenced by the fact that the application filed by the petitioner-plaintiff under Sec. 13-AA was not competent at his instance in absence of other co-owners. The competent authority has also not considered the question of greater hardship as it has recorded a finding that application was not competent in absence of co-owners. The competent authority also categorically noted that respondent-defendant has not controverted or disputed the say of the petitioner-plaintiff in the trial Court. It has also noted that the respondent-defendant has not led any evidence whatsoever. However, the competent authority has entered the arena of conjectures and surmises and had in absence of any evidence whatsoever, concluded that it can be assumed that petitioner-plaintiff must be residing with some relatives at Bombay and that he must not be residing in Hotels, Sanitoriums or Inns because he has not produced documentary evidence in support thereof. As pointed out here-in-above, the petitioner-plaintiff has conducted the trial himself and had during cross-examination volunteered and stated that he was possessed of necessary invoices, bills and receipts issued to him from time to time by various hotels, sanitoriums or inns. The competent authority also failed to notice the fact that the petitioner-plaintiff has no residential accommodation of his ownership available at Bombay or at Gandevi. In view of the aforesaid state of evidence and in view of absence of any documentary or oral evidence from the respondent-defendant, the finding reached by the competent authority cannot be reached as in my opinion such a finding cannot be said to be according to law. In fact, such a finding would result into miscarriage of justice. Such a finding is contrary to the evidence of the petitioner-plaintiff and his witnesses. Such a finding is contrary to documentary evidence in existence. Therefore, power under Sec. 31- a (10) can be legitimately exercised as in my opinion such power cannot be equated with a power to correct error of jurisdiction. The power conferred by Sec. 31-A (10) is larger than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which Sec. 115 of the civil Procedure Code is limited. I, therefore, do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. Vyas and the same is rejected. The approach of the trial Court while appreciating evidence is based on conjectures and surmises. I, therefore, do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. Vyas and the same is rejected. The approach of the trial Court while appreciating evidence is based on conjectures and surmises. The trial Court while appreciating evidence has missed the fact that the petitioner-plaintiff was a retired officer of the Army who has conducted proceeding himself. He was not a person well versed in law. He was not knowing as to how the documents are tendered and proved in Court. As and when he was confronted with the fact situation that he has not stayed in sanitoriums, hotels, guest houses, inns, etc. , he immediately volunteered to produce original receipts of payments. The trial Court did not see the ring of truth in such statement, but found fault with him on the ground that he has not produced evidence to show that he has been staying at sanitoriums, guest houses, inns, etc. The approach of the trial Court, in my opinion, to the evidence of such a witness is not proper. In fact, in the evidence of the petitioner-plaintiff, there is a ring of truth. There is no reason to doubt his evidence. He has stayed with his relatives for sojourn or intervals. It is but natural that a person would not stay at the house of one relative alone as such stay would be burdensome for such relative. With that process of thinking, the petitioner-plaintiff has moved from house to house and occasionally to hotels, sanitoriums, guest houses, inns, etc. If such a retired Army Officer is denied residential accommodation despite statutory protection, in my opinion, his faith from the system of administration of justice would be shaken. The very purpose for which the legislature has introduced the sec. 13-AA in the Act would be frustrated. In fact, the legislature has omitted to provide appeal with a view to seeing that much time is not consumed in successive proceeding in the higher Courts. If the aforesaid objective is kept in mind, the jurisdiction conferred by Sec. 31-A (10) shall have to be properly understood and if the order of the competent authority has resulted into miscarriage of justice, in my opinion, the order of the competent authority can be interfered with in exercise of powers conferred by Sec. 31-A (10 ). .