Judgment :- Arunachalam, J.: These two habeas corpus petitions are disposed of together by a common order, on the ground of expediency, for the detenus concerned in both these petitions are stated to be involved in the same crime and arguments advanced are identical. 2. Ita D’Monte petitioner in H.C.P.No. 2257 of 1993 is the wife of Alistair D’Monte, who has been detained under the provisions of Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as “TADA ACT”). 3. Gloria Rozier, petitioner in H.C.P.No. 2258 of 1993 is the mother of one of the detenus Franklin Rozier, detained similarly as Alister D’Monte, in the other habeas corpus petition. Gloria Rozier has also prayed for issue of a writ of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ in respect of two others, Anthony Martin and A. Shankar, who are working along with her son Franklin Rozier in Halliburton logging Services Inc. at Nerkundram, Madras. 4. Prayer in both these habeas corpus petitions is for production of the concerned detenus, by issue of appropriate writs, for their ultimate release, from detention, under the provisions of TADA Act. 5. Affidavits sworn to by Ita D’Monte and Gloria Rozier show, that one. of the detenus Alister D’Monte was a shop Foreman in Nalliburton logging services, while other detenus were employees in the same company, On 29. 1993 a complaint was preferred by Davit Troost, District Operations Manager of the Company, against Alister D’ Monte, Franklin Rozier, Anthony Martin and three others, which did not include detenu A. Shankar, alleging that theft had been committed of radioactive sources belonging to the company. On the basis of this complaint Cr.No. 2325 of 1993 was registered at Maduravoyal Police Station for an offence punishable under Sec. 381, I.P.C. Except Shankar, one of the detenus in H.C.P.No. 2258 of 1993, other detenus in both these habeas corpus petitions, obtained anticipatory bail on 10. 1993, by preferring Crl.O.P.No. 11481 of 1993 before this Court. In pursuance of the order of anticipatory bail, these detenus surrendered before XIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras on 10. 1993 and in obedience to the conditions imposed, were reporting before Maduravoyal Police Station thrice daily. Vane Fernandez and Crucio Julien, two other accused in Cr.No. 2325 of 1993 were arrested on 29. 1993 and 10. 1993 respectively and remanded by Judicial Magistrate, Poonamallee. 6. 1993 and in obedience to the conditions imposed, were reporting before Maduravoyal Police Station thrice daily. Vane Fernandez and Crucio Julien, two other accused in Cr.No. 2325 of 1993 were arrested on 29. 1993 and 10. 1993 respectively and remanded by Judicial Magistrate, Poonamallee. 6. On the orders of the Director General of Police, Madras, made on 10. 1993 and communicated to Crime Branch, C.I.D. Madras on 10. 1993 investigation in Cr.No. 2325 of 1993 was transferred to the file of C.B., C.I.D. Chengalpattu-M.G.R. East Unit. K.G. Raja Kumar, Inspector of Police in this unit, took in investigation on 10. 1993. 7. According to the petitioners, Alister D’Monte was arrested suddenly on 110. 1993 when he went over to report before the Inspector of Police, Maduravoyal, while other detenus, except Shankar, were similarly arrested on 10. 1993 when they had gone over to Maduravoyal Police Station to report, in compliance with the conditions imposed in the anticipatory bail order. Detenu Shankar was arrested on 110. 1993. According to the petitioners, respective detenus were not intimated about the grounds of their arrest. Further, petitioners were also not intimated about such arrest of the detenus by the arresting officials. However, petitioners chose to enquire at Maduravoyal Police Station, when they were informed about the arrest of the respective detenus under the provisions of TADA Act by the respondent, who had taken over investigation. When they made further enquiries from the respondent, they were informed that the respective detenus had been already produced before Designated Court No. II, Madras under the Special Act, and the said court had remanded them to prison. Petitioners claim, to have met the detenus at Central Prison, Madras and asked them the reasons for their rearrest in the same case, in which most of them had obtained anticipatory bail. The reply of the detenus was, that they were not informed by the respondent about the grounds of their arrest and they were totally unaware of the cause. 8. While so, Franklin Rozier, Anthony Martin and Shankar preferred Crl.M.P.No. 278 of 1993 before the Designated Court praying for permission to peruse through their counsel, documents on the basis of which they were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. Learned Designated Judge permitted counsel to peruse the First Information Report alone; while negativing their pleas to peruse other documents. 8. While so, Franklin Rozier, Anthony Martin and Shankar preferred Crl.M.P.No. 278 of 1993 before the Designated Court praying for permission to peruse through their counsel, documents on the basis of which they were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. Learned Designated Judge permitted counsel to peruse the First Information Report alone; while negativing their pleas to peruse other documents. In this order, the Designated Court has pointed out on the basis of a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Selvanathan alias Raghavan v. State by Inspector of Police, 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 503, that unless a final report was laid accused will be entitled only to copies of the first information report and remand order and not to any other document. In the opinion of the Designated Court, allowing perusal of documents, not contemplated by the Full Bench, or supply of those copies, may have to be placed, on the same pedestal. Both the petitioners have stated in their respective affidavits that noncommunication of grounds of arrest by the respondent to the detenus, was violative of Arts. 21 and 22 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of India, as they have been denied protection afforded by those articles. They have also urged in their respective affidavits, that the respondent had violated the mandate of Sec. 50(1), Crl.P.C. as he had failed to communicate to the detenus concerned full particulars of the offence for which they stood arrested or other grounds for such arrest. The further grievance of the petitioners is that the respective detenus are unable to move applications for bail before the Designated Court, as they are totally unaware of the basis of their arrest and consequent remand. They are in the dark, about the provisions of law, under which they stood arrested. Principles of natural justice have thus been violated as the detenus are handicapped for, without material they would be unable to satisfy the strict mandate for bail, contemplated under Sec. 20 (8) of the Special Act. 9. They are in the dark, about the provisions of law, under which they stood arrested. Principles of natural justice have thus been violated as the detenus are handicapped for, without material they would be unable to satisfy the strict mandate for bail, contemplated under Sec. 20 (8) of the Special Act. 9. Mr.N. Natarajan learned senior counsel, appearing of behalf of the petitioners in both these habeas corpus petitions, submitted that grounds of arrest had not been informed to any of the detenus and that was in violation of Art. 22(1) and (2) of the Constitution as well as Sec50(1), Crl.P.C. He argued that there was no duty cast upon the detenus to ask for the grounds of arrest and that the arresting officer was obliged in law to communicate such grounds to arrestees. The grounds expected to be communication are reasons or conclusions drawn by the arresting authority and such reasons or conclusions must be informed to the persons arrested in a clear manner without any prevalent vagueness, so that the arrestees can understand the purpose behind their arrests which, in turn, would facilitate their right to consult, and to be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice. Under Sec. 50(1), Crl.P.C. This aspect has been made clear in that every police officer or other person arresting any person, without warrant shall have to communicate to the arrestee full particulars of the offence for which he stood arrested or other grounds for such arrest. Unless the provisions of the Special Act wipe away this right, under Sec. 50(1) of the Code, arresting officers are bound to communicate grounds of arrest, since serious nature of the offence committed under the TADA Act, must be brought to the notice of the arrested persons. He further argued, that mere repetition of the words in Sec. 3 of the Special Act, that detenus did have "intent to strike terror in the people" will not be sufficient, for state of mind required, or the act committed, in pursuance of such state of mind, must be based on some foundation. In other words, he submitted, that any crime was bound to strike terror and people getting terror striken. Contra, distinguished from this general concept, investigating agency, must have had material, before they chose to arrest the detenus, under the TADA Act that they had intended to strike terror. In other words, he submitted, that any crime was bound to strike terror and people getting terror striken. Contra, distinguished from this general concept, investigating agency, must have had material, before they chose to arrest the detenus, under the TADA Act that they had intended to strike terror. He pointed put, that the letters forwarded by the company to the investigating agency, do disclose the intent of the employees of the company, to teach a lesson to the company and such activity cannot be correlated to striking terror. He submitted, that the enthusiastic police should not be allowed to covert an ordinary offence into one under the TADA Act. This Court should satisfy itself, on the basis of remand report and other documents, that invoking of the provisions of the TADA Act, against the concerned detenus, was justified. 10. Per contra, Mr.I. Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor referred to the counter-affidavits filed by the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., before the streamlined, his submissions. He referred to the following passage in paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit: "My investigation revealed that the petitioner’s husband. (Alister D’Monte) along with five others namely, Anthony Martin, Fabian Simon, Franklin Rozier, Crucio Julien and A. Shankar conspired together, removed the three radioactive sources from the containers, kept in the safety area of the workshop, at Halliburton Company, on 19. 1993, with intent to strike terror to the people by exposing radio active sources stolen by them and thereby cause extensive loss to human life besides damage to properties. It also came to light that on the instigation of the petitioner’s husband (Alister D’Monte) the five accused (already named) temporarily dropped the said radioactive sources in the Coovum, below Napier Bridge, on the Kamarajar Salai, Madras.....I respectfully state that since the abovesaid materials disclosed acts preparatory to a terrorist act, punishable under Sec. 3(3) of Terrorist and Disruptive (Prevention) Act, 1987. I have arrested Anthony Martin, Fabian Simon and Franklin Rozier on 10. 1993 at 19.00 hours after informing them the full particulars of the offences for which they were arrested. The fourth accused A. Shankar, S/o. Arumugham has stated during the course of his statement under Sec.15 of the TADA (P) Act, that on 19. I have arrested Anthony Martin, Fabian Simon and Franklin Rozier on 10. 1993 at 19.00 hours after informing them the full particulars of the offences for which they were arrested. The fourth accused A. Shankar, S/o. Arumugham has stated during the course of his statement under Sec.15 of the TADA (P) Act, that on 19. 1993 all the six accused conspired in a Hotel in the Esplanade Madras and it was only Alistair D’Monte, who suggested the plan of removing the sources, hide them temporarily for sometime and thereafter expose them near the company premises to cause extensive damage to the life and property in and around the company premises. The petitioner’s husband (Alistair D’Monte) was arrested on 110. 1993 at 19.00 hours and I informed him the full particulars of the offences for which he was arrested and produced him before the Designated Court No. II Madras .... The requisition for remand contains the basic allegations against the petitioner’s husband (Alistair D’Monte) and others. I respectfully state that after scrutiny of the remand requisition the learned Designated Judge informed the petitioner’s husband (Alistair D’Monte) the reasons for arrest and production before the court and remanded him to judicial custody till 12. 1993. (Furnishing of similar information, to other detenus, has also been stated in one or other of the counter-affidavits) .... the sixth accused Crucio Julien was arrested an 110. 1993 and on his confession photos taken on 19. 1993 by the petitioner’s husband (Alistair D’Monte) were recovered from his residence. It is further more submitted that all the six accused have given voluntary statements before the Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D. Madras ...." .11. In another portion of the counter-affidavit respondent, while denying that it was not correct to state, that the detenus were not aware of the grounds of arrest, has specifically averred that all of them were duly informed of the grounds of their arrest. According to the respondent, there has been no violation of the mandatory provisions under Sec.50(1), Crl.P.C. or Arts.21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India, as alleged. He has further stated that, on the basis of disclosure made by accused Anthony Martin the radioactive sources were retrieved after a good deal of anxiety mental anguish to the officials and the general public, besides expenditure to the tune of nearly Rs.75 lakhs. He has further stated that, on the basis of disclosure made by accused Anthony Martin the radioactive sources were retrieved after a good deal of anxiety mental anguish to the officials and the general public, besides expenditure to the tune of nearly Rs.75 lakhs. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor pointed out, the averments made by the petitioners in their respective affidavits, which show that they were informed by the respondent,that the detenus were arrested under the TADA Act and produced before Designated Court No. 11, Madras and judiciary remanded. Affidavits further disclose that only because of such awareness, some of the detenus had moved the Designated Court for perusal of certain documents. Mr.I. Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, contended that, on the basis of such overwhelming material, it will be idle to contend, that the detenus had not been informed about the grounds of their arrest. He submitted, that the Full Bench of this Court, had not mandated, that communication under Sec.50(1), Crl.P.C. must be in writing though it may be desirable to do so. He has placed before us the case diary, containing the confessional statement of the detenus and the other accused, as well as remand requisitions, to substitute the stand of the respondent, that not only the investigating agency had material to arrest the detenus concerned under the TADA Act, but had also informed them about grounds of their arrest. He submitted, that in these two habeas corpus petitions allegations made by the petitioners in their respective affidavits, have been denied by the investigating officer and if this Court was satisfied about the availability of material in the case diary, to prosecute the detenus under the TADA Act, that would be the end. He submitted, that Art.22(1) of the Constitution in its reference to punitive arrest, uses the words ‘informed’ contra distinguished from the word communicate used in Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India, in relation to preventive detention. He contended, that the word ‘communicate’ found in Sec. 50(1), Crl.P.C. must be given, the meaning of the word ‘informed’ incorporated in Art. 22(1) of the Constitution. His emphatic submission was, that the purpose behind this information or communication was that, the detenus should not be kept in dark and denied quick legal assistance. He contended, that the word ‘communicate’ found in Sec. 50(1), Crl.P.C. must be given, the meaning of the word ‘informed’ incorporated in Art. 22(1) of the Constitution. His emphatic submission was, that the purpose behind this information or communication was that, the detenus should not be kept in dark and denied quick legal assistance. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further contended that the detenus concerned have been validly remanded upto 3.21994 under the TADA Act by the Designated court and if that be so, impugned petitions, pleading for issue of habeas cannot arise. 12. Counsel on either side, have placed for our scrutiny certain decided cases, which we will refer to, at the appropriate time. We have assessed with care and concern the divergent contentions urged by the respective counsel. 13. Art.22 guarantees the fundamental right of protection against arrest and detention. This is supplemented by Sec.50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec.50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a corollary to Art.22(1) and (5) of the Constitution of India. 14. Arrest and remand in cases where an offence is committed will attract Art.22(1) while to cases of preventive detention, Art.22(5) would come into play. The objects of Sec.50, Crl.P.C. as well as Art.22 stand clarified by the provisions themselves. 15. There is no dispute that when some of the detenus moved for anticipatory bail, prior to conversion of this crime into one under the TADA Act, they were aware as to why they were shown as accused in the impugned crime. The main thrust made on behalf of the petitioners is that, when the detenus stood arrested, on the basis of crime, under the TADA Act, they were not informed about the grounds of arrest. They were not furnished with full particulars of the offence for which they were arrested, leave alone non-communication of other grounds for such arrest. Before discussing this question in detail it will be better to dispose of the second contention urged by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor about the maintainability of these habeas corpus petitions. .16. In A. Lakshmanarao v. Judicial Magistrate, Parvatipuram, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 187, Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of Sec. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as well the right of the accused to plead for issue of a habeas under Arts. .16. In A. Lakshmanarao v. Judicial Magistrate, Parvatipuram, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 187, Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of Sec. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as well the right of the accused to plead for issue of a habeas under Arts. 32 and 226 of the Constitution, stated as hereunder: .“Detention pursuant to an order of remand which appropriately falls within the terms of Sec. 344 is accordingly not open to challenge, in habeas corpus.” .17. A Division Bench of this Court in T. Mohan v. State by Inspector of Police, C.B., C.I.D., Madras, 1993 M.L.J. (Crl.) 628: 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 392. After analysing the case law, held as hereunder: .“Viewed from that angle coupled with the fact that subsequently there is a valid remand order, the relief of habeas corpus cannot be granted.” 18. On this question of jurisdiction, Mr.N. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 922. While considering the several provisions under the Terrorists and Disruptive (Prevention) Act, Supreme Court stated as hereunder: “At the very outset, Shri Poti, learned counsel appearing for the State Government, with his usual fairness, unequivocally accepted that the provisions of the Act do not take away the constitutional remedies available to a citizen to approach the High Court under Art.226 or Art. 227or move this Court by a petition under Art.32 for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order. It must necessarily follow that a citizen can always move the High Court under Art.226 or Art.227 on this Court under Art.32 challenging the constitutional validity of the Act or its provisions on the ground that they offend against Arts. 14, 21 and 22 or on the ground...” Mr.N. Natarajan argued that the petitioners were justified in moving this Court for exercise of powers under Art.226, in the present contingency. 19. Mr.I. Subramaniam learned Additional Public Prosecutor, referred to a decision of the Queen’s Bench Division (1991)1 All.E.R. 858 in R. v. Sheffield Justices, (1992)1 Crimes 658, wherein the following observations have been made. “In my judgment, therefore, the justices who committed this applicant for trial on 20th September, 1990 were entitled to commit him in custody. No complaint is made that any later custody time limit has been exceeded, so no subsequent order continuing his detention can be faulted. “In my judgment, therefore, the justices who committed this applicant for trial on 20th September, 1990 were entitled to commit him in custody. No complaint is made that any later custody time limit has been exceeded, so no subsequent order continuing his detention can be faulted. It follows that since he is now in lawful custody, the application for a writ of habeas corpus must fail as must the applications for mandamus and prohibition”. 20. We do not intend dwelling at length, on this question of jurisdiction, for, in these habeas corpus petitions, the remand orders or their validity, do not stand challenged, and further we have already entertained these habeas corpus petitions, on yet another ground, of the effect of non-communication of grounds of arrest, to the detenus concerned. We will rather prefer to go on substance, than on shadow, on the peculiar facts unfurled in these habeas corpus petitions. In that view, we will now straightway plunge into the validity of the main ground urged by the petitioners. 21. As far as the dates, of initial arrest or obtaining of anticipatory bail or even with regard to subsequent arrest of the detenus are concerned, there is no divergence whatever. Facts stated earlier will clearly show, that on and from 10. 1993, investigation taken over in Cr.No. 2325 of 1993 (Maduravoyal Police Station), by the Inspector of Police, C.B., C.I.D. Chengalpattu-M.G.R. East Unit. On the basis of investigation conducted by this officer there was revealation, that the detenus and two others had conspired together, in pursuance of which they had removed three radioactive sources from the containers kept in the safety area of the workshop at Halliburton Company, on 110. 1993 with intent to strike terror to the people, by exposing thee stolen radioactive sources and thereby cause extensive loss to human life, besides damage to properties. Respondent had enquired Anthony Martin and Franklin Rozier on 10. 1993 at Maduravoyal Police Station. Those two statements have been placed for our perusal. These two statements certainly do provide material, for the averments made by the respondent in his counter-affidavit, in relation to conspiracy entered into by the detenus and two others with intent to strike terror to the people by exposing radio active sources, which they did steal, in pursuance of conspiracy aforestated. State of mind required under the TADA Act, certainty gets disclosed. State of mind required under the TADA Act, certainty gets disclosed. That such act, was for the purpose of causing extensive loss to human life, besides damage to properties, also have a foundation in these statements. It may be, as pointed out by Mr.N. Natarajan, that on 29. 1993, detenus and others had resented transfer of Alistair D’ Monte to the Bombay office of the company and therefore, decided to cause damage to certain properties, mentioned in the complaint of the company to the Inspector of Police, Maduravoyal Police Station made on 29. 1993, in order to pressurize the management to withdraw those orders. It is apparent, that the company had only that much of information on 22nd September, 1993. However, on 23rd September, 1993, company informed the same police officer that, after all the incidents mentioned in their previous letter, something more had happened, in that radioactive sources were found removed from the locked an secured storage containers. They have also mentioned, that those radioactive sources were very dangerous in nature and could cause serious damage to the public. They have reiterated that, because of the extreme danger to the public they would kindly request all possible assistance in obtaining information, as to locating those radio-active sources. It appears, prima facie, that not having been able to achieve the object of pressurizing the management and tarnishing the name of the company, due to failure of their initial attempts, detenus and others had conspired to expose radio active material and thereby cause destruction to human life by striking terror in a section of the people, besides damage to properties. We also find from the case diary that the requisitions for remands, made on different occasions, contain averments, connecting and other accused, with offences punishable under the TADA Act. It may be, that usually a court does not inform the accused, unless asked for, the grounds of arrest at the time of remand and, therefore, the statement of the respondent, in his counter-affidavit, that the Designated Court had informed the detenus concerned the reasons for arrest and production after scrutiny of remand requisition, may appear rather odd, but sometimes truth is stranger than fiction. In any event, we will not attach much importance to the averments made in the counter-affidavits, of information having been passed on by the Designated Judge to the detenus concerned, about the grounds of their arrest. In any event, we will not attach much importance to the averments made in the counter-affidavits, of information having been passed on by the Designated Judge to the detenus concerned, about the grounds of their arrest. We will independently scrutinise,if the detenus concerned; had been informed of the grounds of their arrest or they themselves were aware of such grounds and the complaints made, as though such grounds were not within their knowledge, lack lustre of reality. 22. In In re. Madhu Limaye, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1014: (1969)3 S.C.R. 154, Supreme Court stated as follows: "As stated in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 277, this Court has often reiterated that those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty must, strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of law. Whenever that is not done the petitioner would be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus directing his release." That was a case, where the petitioners claimed, to have been bold, that they had been arrested, under sections which were bailable. They had not been communicated the reasons of the grounds for arrest. The grounds of challenge were, that the arrest was illegal in as much as it had been effected by police officers, for non cognizable offence. Further, there was a violation of the mandatory provisions of Art.22(1)of the Constitution. Again the orders for remand were bad and vitiated. Arrest itself was effected for extraneous considerations, actuated by mala fides. While holding in favour of the petitioner therein Supreme Court stated as follows: "The submission of Madhu Limaye on the second point was hardly been effectively met on behalf of the State. Art.22(1) provides that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Madhu Limaye had in his petitions addressed to this Court, made a positive assertion that he and his companions had not been informed of the grounds for their arrest. In the return filed by the state this assertion has neither been controverted nor has anything been stated with reference to it. Madhu Limaye had in his petitions addressed to this Court, made a positive assertion that he and his companions had not been informed of the grounds for their arrest. In the return filed by the state this assertion has neither been controverted nor has anything been stated with reference to it. It appears that the authorities wanted to invoke all kinds of provisions like Secs. 151, 107 and 117 of the Crl.P.C. apart from Sec. 188 of the Indian Penal Code. Since no arrest could be effected for an offence under Sec.188 by the police officers without proper orders these officers may have been naturally reluctant to comply with the mandatory requirements of Art.22(1) by giving the necessary information. At any rate whatever the reasons it has not been explained even during the course of arguments before us why the arrested persons were not told the reasons for their arrest or of the offences for which they had been taken into custody." Observations made in Madhu Limaye’s case, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1014: (1969)3 S.C.R. 154, were apparently so made, on the basis on the non controversion of the facts alleged by the petitioner therein. In the instant case, the respondent has controverted the stand taken by the petitioners that the detenus were not informed or communicated about the grounds of arrest at the time when arrest were made. In these petitions of oath against oath, we are able to visualise, from the case diary placed before us, that there was prima facie material before the investigating officer to convert the crime, into one under the TADA Act. We have no reason to doubt the statement of the respondent, that he had, in fact, informed the grounds of arrest to the detenus concerned for, the affidavits sworn to by the petitioners themselves disclose, that when they approached the respondent, soon after the arrest of the detenus concerned he had informed them, that the detenus stood arrested under the TADA Act and they had been produced before the Designated Court, Madras and judicial remand obtained. That the arrest, after initial anticipatory bail in respect of this crime, was necessitated due to offence under the TADA Act, was well within the knowledge of the petitioners. Of course knowledge of the petitioners cannot be equated to information or communication of grounds, to the detenus concerned at the time of arrest. That the arrest, after initial anticipatory bail in respect of this crime, was necessitated due to offence under the TADA Act, was well within the knowledge of the petitioners. Of course knowledge of the petitioners cannot be equated to information or communication of grounds, to the detenus concerned at the time of arrest. We cannot overlook, that this requirement of information to the arrested person or the reason why he was so seized cannot naturally exist, if circumstances are such, that he must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he stood detained. In other words, if an offender is caught red-handed and the crime is so patent it will be odd to expect the arresting officer to explain the reasons for such arrest. All the detenus have confessed to the crime committed by them, which brings them within the purview of the TADA Act. Confessions made to the Superintendent of Police or officers higher in rank are admissible in the trial of such person, for an offence under the TADA Act or the Rules made thereunder, as is apparent from Sec. 15 of the act. Even before approval, to include Sec. 3(3) of the TADA Act, in this crime for purpose of further investigation, confessional statement of Anthony Martin one of the detenus in H.C.P.No. 2258 of 1993 was available. Naturally when Anthony Martin was aware of the crime committed by him, to which he had confessed it will be odd to suggest that he was not aware of the grounds, which led to his arrest. In any event, inspite of his awareness of such grounds, which cannot be disputed, we have the statement on oath of the respondent, that such grounds of arrest were made known to him when he was apprehended. 23. Detenu Franklin Rozier was arrested along with Anthony Martin on 10. 1993 at 7 p.m. according to the respondent, he had informed him the full particulars of the offence for which he stood arrested. We have already held that Anthony Martin, on whose statement the TADA offence stood disclosed, was made aware of the grounds of arrest and if that be so it stands to reason, that the claim of the respondent, that he had informed Franklin Rozier who was arrested along with Anthony Martin,of the full particulars of the offence for which he stood arrested, is entitled to creditable acceptance. Similarly, we have no reason to doubt the sworn statement of the respondent, that detenu Shankar and detenu Alistair D’Monte were also informed of the particulars of offence for which they stood arrested. To reiterate, in Madhu Limaye’s case, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1014: (1969) 3 S.C.R. 154, there was non controversion of the stand taken by Madhu Limaye whereas in the instant cases, not only the allegations made by the petitioners have been controverted, but also a specific stand has been taken, that the detenus were informed, the reasons for their arrest and the particulars of the offence, when they were arrested wealth of details are found in the confessional statements and the remand requisition reports to which at this stage, detenus will not be entitled to. As a matter of fact, in Madhu Limaye’s case, Supreme Court has extracted certain propositions laid down by Viscount Simon which were not meant to be exhaustive the third proposition will be relevant for the instant cases. It reads as hereunder: "The requirement that the person arrested should be informed of the reason why he is seized naturally does not exist if the circumstances are such that he must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he is detained." "Lord Simonds gave on illustration of the circumstances where the accused must know why he is being arrested." "There is no need to explain the reasons of arrest if the arrested man is caught red-handled and the crime is patent to high Heaven. We are satisfied that, in the instant cases, they were not only aware by themselves of the alleged offence for which they were arrested and detained, but were also informed of the particulars of offence, by the arresting officer. 24. It will be relevant at this stage to extract the observations of the Supreme Court, in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, 1977 Crl.L.J. 1606: (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 533: (1977)4 S.C.C. 39 : A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2018. 24. It will be relevant at this stage to extract the observations of the Supreme Court, in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, 1977 Crl.L.J. 1606: (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 533: (1977)4 S.C.C. 39 : A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2018. In that case, while discussing relevant factors, of the duty of court at the stage of framing a charge or discharging the accused, in a sessions trial which stood initiated (Secs.227 and 228, Crl.P.C.) Supreme Court stated: "But at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court, to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused." This principle will certainly stand attracted at the stage of investigation. 25. Ratnavel Pandian, J. then Officiating chief Justice, speaking on behalf of the Full Bench in Selvanathan alios Raghavan v. State by Inspector of Police, 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 503, while construing the mandate under Sec. 50(1), Crl.P.C. observed as follows; "Though Sec. 50 of the Code, as we have stated earlier does not state in specific terms that a copy of the first information containing the full particulars of the offence or the grounds should be given in writing to the accused as under Sec. 154 of the Code, as per which a copy of the information as recorded under Sec.154(1) should be given free of cost, to the informant,. in order to avoid any controversy with regard to the communication of the full particulars, we are of the firm view that it would be desirable, that the particulars enumerated by us above, be communicated to the arrestee in writing and free of cost, which would be in strict compliance of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Sec. 50 of the Code. If the Investigating Officer, for the purpose of convenience prefers to give a copy of the First Information Report itself, such a course would be a welcome measure and would meet the requirements of Sec. 50 of the Code in its true tenor and spirit. If the Investigating Officer, for the purpose of convenience prefers to give a copy of the First Information Report itself, such a course would be a welcome measure and would meet the requirements of Sec. 50 of the Code in its true tenor and spirit. We are alive to the situation that there may be cases of mass arrest in which it may be possible for the concerned police officer to communicate forthwith in writing the full particulars of the officer in which event, the particulars may be communicated first orally and then in writing as expeditiously as possible. In this connection, we would like to express our view that the failure to communicate the particulars as required under Sec. 50 of the Code in writing would not render the arrest and the subsequent investigation, illegal, because arrest takes place before the prescribed communication and any lapse in respect of this subsequent fact would not vitiate the very arrest itself. However, failure to communicate the particulars as required by Sec.50 would have a deterrent effect on the judicial remand which follows the arrest. No doubt, it is. true that if a duty is cast on the arresting officer to comply with certain statutory formalities, there is a corresponding duty cast on the Magistrate who is called upon to pass remand orders to satisfy himself whether the statutory formalities have been strictly complied with or not. In case the Magistrate is not satisfied that the requirements of Sec.50 of the Code have no been complied with, he can limit the judicial remand in the first instance to such period as would be necessary thereby affording an opportunity to the police officer to communicate in writing the full particulars of the offence for which the accused is arrested or the other grounds of such arrest." 26. Again Gujarat High Court, in Natverlal v. State of Gujarat, 1983 Crl.L.J. 1124 and in Anop Kanver Kartha Kanver v. State, (1984)1 Crimes. 44 , has taken the view, that cases of preventive detention differ from those of arrests, under the Code. An arrest under the Code is not detention without enquiry and further an arrest is subject to extensive judicial review. Therefore, the salutary provisions of Art.22(5) are not required to be applied to arrests under the Code. It was further held, that compliance of Sec. 50 (1) need not have to be in writing. An arrest under the Code is not detention without enquiry and further an arrest is subject to extensive judicial review. Therefore, the salutary provisions of Art.22(5) are not required to be applied to arrests under the Code. It was further held, that compliance of Sec. 50 (1) need not have to be in writing. In corporation of Sec. 50(1), Crl.P.C. was to bring the law in conformity with the provisions of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution, to enable the person arrested, to move for habeas corpus to obtain his release. The view of the Gujarat High Court, is that, requirements of Art.22(1) and Art.22(5) of the Constitution are laid, in relation to different contingencies. 27. We are prepared to hold that information contemplated under Art.22(1) of the Constitution or Sec. 50(1) of the Code need not necessarily have to be in writing. Mandate under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution is certainly different since the object underlying it is to communicate to the person preventively detained the grounds on which detention order had been made and afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against that order. It is in pursuance of this mandate, that preventive detention acts, prescribe a time-limit, for furnishing the grounds of detention on which preventive orders were founded. 28. Observation made by the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1962 will be relevant. “To put in differently the ratio of the decision is that the provisions of the Act need not be resorted to if the nature of the activities of the accused can be checked and controlled under the ordinary law of the land. It is only in those cases where the law enforcing machinery finds the ordinary law to be inadequate or not sufficiently effective for tackling the menace of terrorist and disruptive activities that resort should be had to the drastic provisions of the Act. While invoking a criminal statute, such as the act, the prosecution is duty bound to show from the record of the case and the documents collected in the course of investigation that facts emerging therefrom prima facie constitute an offence within the letter of the law. While invoking a criminal statute, such as the act, the prosecution is duty bound to show from the record of the case and the documents collected in the course of investigation that facts emerging therefrom prima facie constitute an offence within the letter of the law. When a statute provides special or enhanced punishments as compared the punishments prescribed for similar offences under the ordinary penal laws of the country a higher responsibility and duty is cast on the judge to make sure, there exists prima facie evidence for supporting the charge levelled by the prosecution. Therefore, when a law visits a person with serious penal consequences extra care must be taken to ensure that those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute are not roped in by stretching the language of the law. But that does not mean that the judicial officer called upon to decide whether or not a case for framing a charge under the act is made out, should adopt a negative attitude. He should frame a charge if the prosecution shows that the material placed oh record and the documents relied on give rise to a strong suspicion of the accused having committed the crime alleged against him. It is clear that there was rivalry between the party of the accused on the one hand and Raju and Keshav on the other. The former desired to gain supremacy which necessitated the elimination of the latter. With that in view they launched an attack on Raju and Keshav killed the former and injured the latter. Their intention was clearly to eliminate them and not to strike terror in the people or a section of the people. It would have been a different matter if to strike terror some innocent persons were killed. In that case the intention would be to strike terror and the killings would be to achieve that objective”. 29. We are unable to agree with Mr.N. Natarajan, that, without collection of material during investigation the following words “to strike terror” in the people had been mechanically added, to bring the offenders under the provisions of the TADA Act. Once the foundation of challenge stands erased, there is no scope whatever, for issuing a writ of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ, as pleaded for by the petitioners. Once the foundation of challenge stands erased, there is no scope whatever, for issuing a writ of habeas corpus or any other appropriate writ, as pleaded for by the petitioners. We are unable to find merit in those habeas corpus petitions. Both of them shall stand dismissed.