Judgment G.C.Bharuka, J. 1. There are two appellants in this appeal who have been held to be guilty of the offence under Sec. 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and have been sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life. 2. Appellant No. 2 Mangari Devi is the mother of appellant No. 1 Hira Sao and as per the findings of the court below they are accused of having murdered Mundri Devi, the wife of appellant No. 1 by strangulation in furtherance of common object and purpose. The formal F.I.R. was drawn on the basis of the fardbeyan of Jago Sao (PW 2), the father of the deceased which was recorded by the officer-incharge of the Barkagaon Police Station on 8-9-1988 at 12.00 noon in the house of the accused persons where the offence, is said to have been taken place, in this case altogether six witnesses have been examined P.W 1 Debal Sao and PW 5 Sukra Sao are the castemen and co-villagers ofthe appellants. They have been declared to be hostile by the prosecution. PW 5 is also the relative to the informant being his cousin brother, PW 2 Jago Sao is the informant and PW 3 Tilak Sao are, respectively, the father and brother of the deceased, PW 4 Dr. B.P. Mandal is the Medical Officer who had conducted the post-mortem and has approved his report (Ext. 3) PW 6 Arjun Singh is the Investigating Officer who was also the officer-in-charge of the concerned Police Station at the material time and has proved the seizure list (Ext. 1), inquest report (Ext. 2) and the sketch map of the place of occurrence (Ext. 5) being the author of the same. 3. 1 may first summarise certain essential facts as emerged from the evidence on record and are beyond and controversy. The deceased Mundri Devi who was aged about 18 years at the time of occurrence; she was married to appellant No. 1 only about 16 months back. She had died in the night of 7th and 8th of September, 1988 under mysterious circumstances. In that fateful night at least these two appellants were in the house where she had died. In the following morning i.e on 8th September, 1988 at 7.00 a.m. the Investigating Officer came to the house of the appellants. The body of the deceased was found lying on a cot. In that fateful night at least these two appellants were in the house where she had died. In the following morning i.e on 8th September, 1988 at 7.00 a.m. the Investigating Officer came to the house of the appellants. The body of the deceased was found lying on a cot. At about 12.00 noon the father of the deceased arrived there. Thereupon his fardbeyan was recorded and a formal FIR was drawn which have been exhibited as Ext. No. 4 and Ext. No. 7, respectively. 4. From the evidence of PW 5 and PW 2 who are respectively the father and brother of the deceased as also the fardbeyan it is quite clear that the Appellant No. 1 Hiro Sao did not have any strained relation with his wife the deceased The informant does not even allege any dowry demand as a cause for the death. It is also clear that both the families namely that of the informant and the appellants belong to poor strata of the society. The informant is a carpenter, the father of the Appellant No. l is a village labourer and his elder brother is a rickshaw-puller at Hazaribagh. 5. The inquest report (Ext. 2), the postmortem report (Ext. 3) and the evidence of the witnesses clearly goes to show that the deceased had died because of strangulation. The inquest report speaks of black marks on her neck and apart from the fact that the throat was found swollen, there was profuse bleeding through her nose and mouth. The post-mortem report is as follows: "Face is swollen and cysvosed. Both eyes protmded. Tongue protruded and swollen, dark in colour. The lips blue. Bleed from the mouth and nostrils. Hand clarched. Discharge of faeces and white discharge from the vagina." PW 2 the Medical Officer who has held the post-mortem has clearly opined that the death had caused because of strangulation. 6. So far as the place of occurrence is concerned, it is clearly borne out from the evidence that it took place in the house of the appellants and that too in the room which was used by the Appellant No. 1 and the deceased being the husband and wife. There is a clear evidence on record that Appellant No. 1 was very much in the house in that night. Admittedly there is no eye-witness to the occurrence. There is a clear evidence on record that Appellant No. 1 was very much in the house in that night. Admittedly there is no eye-witness to the occurrence. Therefore, the inference of any offence and about the offender has to be necessarily drawn from the circumstances appearing in the case. s 7 Before proceeding to examine the circumstantial evidence on the record 1 may first refer to the law laid down by the Supreme Court for connecting the accused with the offence in cases which are dependent solely on circumstantial evidence. In the case of Padala Veera Reddy V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1989 BBCJ 121, In paragraph 10 it has been held that in such cases the evidence on record must satisfy the following tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt if sought to be drawn, must be cogently and finally established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilty of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain connection must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. 8. In the above background now I may proceed to examine the evidence on record. PW 1 Deba Sao who is the neighbour of the appellants has deposed that in the evening of the fateful night at about 8.30 p.m. he had heard cries from the house of the appellant. PW 3 Sakra Sao has deposed that in between 8-9 p.m. on being called through one boy he went to see the deceased who told him that her husband had beaten her because she had gone out for easing. In that very night she died. On enquiry Appellant No. 1, her husband, told him that she had taken poison but seeing bleeding through her mouth and the face he suspected that she had been murdered. In that very night she died. On enquiry Appellant No. 1, her husband, told him that she had taken poison but seeing bleeding through her mouth and the face he suspected that she had been murdered. On a suggestion by the prosecution he denied to have stated before the police during investigation that it was a case of suspected murder because the Mundri had some affairs with one Lalman Sao of the village. The prosecution declared this witness to be hostile since as per the suggestion given to him he was trying to shield the accused being of his own caste. From the evidence of the PWs it is also clear that only male members of the family of the accused who were found to be present in the morning on 89-1988 when the witnesses reached the place of occurrence where the applicant No. 1 and his father, Sugandh Sao. From the narration and details recorded by the Investigating Officer, PW 6 in the sketch map (Ext. 5) it transpires that other two brothers of the appellant No. 1 namely, Chhannu and Bandhanua, the former had been residing in a separate house across the road facing the place of occurrence and Ole latter was working as rickshawpuller at Hazaribagh. This witness had also seized blood-stained cloth from the room of appellant No. 1 as per the seizure list (Ext. 1). 9. Keeping in view Ole aforesaid circumstantial evidence the Court below has recorded Ole finding of conviction against the appellants under Sec. 302/34, I.P.C. and have sentenced them as aforesaid. 10. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has assailed the impugned judgment on various grounds. The first ground taken by him is that in this case though the officer-in-charge of the Police Station PW 6 got the information about the occurrence early in the morning but he had recorded the formal F.I.R. only after the arrival of the father of Ole deceased namely, Jago Sao, PW 2 at 12.00 noon which was not in accordance with law and is thus fatal to the prosecution. According to him the delay caused in registration of the First Information Report has enabled the police to fabricate Ole evidence against the appellants. He has also drawn our attention to the criticism of the trial Court on this count. According to him the delay caused in registration of the First Information Report has enabled the police to fabricate Ole evidence against the appellants. He has also drawn our attention to the criticism of the trial Court on this count. To substantiate his submission he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G.B. Patel V/s. State of Maharashtra. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 135, wherein paragraph 29 it has held: "Thus considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances, this inordinate delay in registration of the F.I.R. and further delay in recording the statements of the material witnesses, casts a cloud of suspicion on the credibility of the entire warp and woof of the prosecution story." 11. For ascertainment of the reason for delayed registration of the F.I.R. I may refer to the evidence of the Investigating Officer wherein he has stated that on being learnt through some stray source about the death of some young lady in village Barwadh at 7.00 a.m. on 8-8-1988 he immediately recorded a sanaha in the station diary being entry No. 122 (Ext. 6) and proceeded to the place of occurrence alongwith a chowkidar where he remained till the arrival of the informant and after recording his fardbeyan prepared the inquest report, seized the blood-stained cloth and earth by drawing a seizure list (Ext. 1) and also prepared a sketch map by gathering information regarding the members of the family of the accused and their whereabouts. 12. I am in agreement to the learned Counsel for the appellants that in view of the provisions contained the Criminal Procedure Code, since the officer-in-charge had a definite knowledge of commission of a cognizable offence at 7 a.m. it was incumbent upon him to immediately register the First Information Report and proceed with investigation without waiting for recording of any fardbeyan of the informant till 12.00 noon. But the question is whether in the present case keeping in view the evidence on record, it can be said that the delay in registration of the F.I.R. has in any way given any chance to the prosecution so as the falsely implicate the appellants? In my opinion, no such suggestion can be accepted in the present case. It is because no evidence on record was amenable to any such manufacture. In my opinion, no such suggestion can be accepted in the present case. It is because no evidence on record was amenable to any such manufacture. The inquest report and the seizure list were prepared as per the evidence, not only in the presence of the appellants but at that time the father of the appellant No. 1 was also present. Therefore, this ground of challenge is of no avail. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the medical evidence as spelt out by the doctor, PW 4 opining strangulation to be cause of death should not be accepted. According to him, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Mayur Panabhai Shah V/s. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 66, the opinion of the doctor cannot be taken as gospel truth since as per the Apex Court it is wrong to say that the Courts in India have always taken the doctors as witness of truth. In this case it has been held that where a doctor has deposed in Court his evidence has got to be appreciated like evidence of any other witness and there is no irrebutable presumption that the doctor is always a witness of truth. 14. In our opinion as discussed above keeping in view the nature of internal injuries and external marks reflected in the inquest and post-mortem report there can be a least doubt that the death was caused because of strangulation. The submission that in the post-mortem report nothing has been said as to whether the internal injuries found on the dissection of the neck was ante-mortem or post-mortem, therefore, there was a possibility of creating such injuries even subsequent to death, thus denting the prosecution story to the extent of false implication has also got to be rejected keeping in view the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 5 and G who had all seen the swollen neck of the deceased with some marks and had found blood coming out from her mouth and nose. No doubt the prosecution has failed to send the viscera for examination but it is no consequence because of the internal injuries found in the neck leading to a definite conclusion that the cause of death was strangulation. No doubt the prosecution has failed to send the viscera for examination but it is no consequence because of the internal injuries found in the neck leading to a definite conclusion that the cause of death was strangulation. It was then submitted that all the incriminating circumstances were not put by the prosecution for examination under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the impugned judgment needs to be set aside. In support of the said submission a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Abdul Hamid Shamsi V/s. Abdul Majid, 1988 B.B.C.J. 30, has been relied upon. The proposition is well-founded. But in the present case on examination of the statements under Sec. 313, Cr. P.C. I find that all the material circumstances were put to the accused during the aforesaid examination and no prejudice can be said to have been caused to them in this regard. So this ground also fails. 15. Now what remains to be seen is whether the circumstantial evidence is such that leads to an irresistible conclusion that in all human possibilities the offence of murdering the deceased by strangulation was committed by either or both of the appellants in furtherance of any common object. At this very stage, I may record that so far as Appellant No. 2 is concerned. I do not find any evidence on record to hold that she was in any way connected with the offence in question and, therefore, she is entitled to outright acquittal. 16. So far as the case of appellant No. I is concerned as discussed above the deceased was done to death in a room of the house where she was residing with Appellant No. 1 being her husband. As per the evidence on record, discussed above she had died because of strangulation. According to the evidences of PWs 2, 3 and 5, the appellant and his father had tried to cover up the death by saying that the deceased had committed suicide by taking poison which was clearly a false statement. It has come through PW 5 that in between 8-9 p.m. on 7-9-1988 the Appellant No. 1 had beaten the deceased. It is also clear from the evidence that in the fateful night the Appellant No. 1 was the only male member in the house. It has come through PW 5 that in between 8-9 p.m. on 7-9-1988 the Appellant No. 1 had beaten the deceased. It is also clear from the evidence that in the fateful night the Appellant No. 1 was the only male member in the house. Taking into consideration the circumstantial evidence in my opinion there is no escape from coming to a conclusion that keeping in view the probabilities the homicide was committed by the appellant. The prosecution has failed to attribute any definite motive behind the commission of the offence in question. In order to discharge this part of their onus they have merely made some suggestion to PW 5 Sukra Sao to the effect that the deceased was killed by Appellant No. 1 because he had suspected her affairs with Lalman Sao and further that in the previous evening the appellant had beaten the deceased for some reasons. The two witnesses who are co-villagers namely, PW 1 and PW 5 who could have thrown some light on the issue seems to have turned hostile. The father and brother of the deceased, namely, PW 2 and PW 3 respectively had admitted that the deceased during the 16- 18 months of her marital life had visited their house 5-6 times but had never complained of any illtreatment by the Appellant No. 1 or any of the in-laws. 17. In view of these evidences what we feel is that the offence must have been committed by this appellant because of some grave and sudden provocation which might have resulted from a suspicion aroused in his mind about the character of his young wife which would have led to loss of self-control. While coming to this conclusion I feel like observing that if in a given set of circumstances the Court is required to imagine certain state of affairs, than to be fair to the accused, instead of allowing our minds to boggle we must allow our imagination to draw all reasonable and logical conclusions which may emerge from such situations. 18. Accordingly, I give the Appellant No. 1 the benefit of Exception 1 to Sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code and convict hi under Sec. 304, Part I of the said Code instead of Sec. 302. 18. Accordingly, I give the Appellant No. 1 the benefit of Exception 1 to Sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code and convict hi under Sec. 304, Part I of the said Code instead of Sec. 302. Keeping in view the young age of the said appellants coupled with his social and economical background and the unfortunate circumstances which led him to commit the offence, in my opinion, the ends of justice will be met by sentencing him to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for a term of five years only. The sentence is modified to the said extent. Appellant No. 2 stands acquitted as above. 19. The appeal is thus partly allowed. Amir Das, J. 20 I agree.