P. N. Nag, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER has challenged the order passed by Depot Manager, Delhitransport Corporation dated 31. 7. 1991, Annexure P-l whereby he has beendeclared unfit for the post of Driver on account of medical report of Medical Board,dtc as per provision of Clause 10 of DRTA (Conditions of Appointment andservice) Regulations,1952. The petitioner was asked to appear before the Medical Board for eye test. Themedical Board not only conducted eye test of the petitioner who was working asdriver but also declared him unfit for the post of Driver and on that basis theimpugned order has been passed. On the last date of hearing Mr. Sharma, learnedcounsel for the petitioner cited a judgment of two Honourable Judges of thesupreme Court arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No-1575/90, Ved Prakashsingh (Conductor) v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Others whereby he pointedout the policy being adopted by the Supreme Court of taking recourse torehabilitate handicapped persons and submitted that in view of such observationsof the Supreme Court, the petitioner being handicapped person should be offeredsome suitable job. In view of such submission we directed the respondent toconsider the case in the context of observations of the Supreme Court. The matteragain has been heard today and learned Counsel for the respondent has brought toour notice another judgment of the Supreme Court by three Honourable Judges inthe case of U. P. State Road Transport Corporation and Another v. Mohd. Ismailand Others, AIR 1991 SC 1099 . In para-11 of the judgment, the Supreme Court hasobserved that the statutory authority has to exercise discretion in such case and thecourt cannot direct the statutory authority to exercise the discretion in a particularmanner not expressly required by law. The observations of the Supreme Court arereproduced in para-ll of the judgment which are re-produced below: "the High Court was equally in error in directing the Corporation to offeralternative job to drivers who are found to be medically unfit before dispensing with their services. The Court cannot dictate the decision of thestatutory authority that ought to be made in the exercise of discretion in agiven case. The Court cannot direct the statutory authority to exercise thediscretion in a particular manner not expressly required by law. The Courtcould only command the statutory authority by a writ of mandamus toperform its duty by exercising the discretion according to law. The Court cannot direct the statutory authority to exercise thediscretion in a particular manner not expressly required by law. The Courtcould only command the statutory authority by a writ of mandamus toperform its duty by exercising the discretion according to law. Whetheralternative job is to be offered or not is a matter left to the discretion of thecompetent authority of the Corporation and the Corporation has to exercisethe discretion in individual cases. The Court cannot command the Corporation to exercise discretion in a particular manner and in favour of a particularperson. That would bebeyond the jurisdiction of the Court. " ( 2 ) IN view of the aforementioned judgment of the U. P. State Road Transportcorporation and Another (supra) we are of the opinion that the respondents shouldconsider the question of offering alternative suitable employment to the petitioner. However, learned Counsel for the petitioner has also brought to our notice the caseof Anand Bihari and Others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation,jaipur and Another AIR 1991 SC 1003 . In that case, the Supreme Court, whileconsidering the question whether the termination of services of drivers on accountof medical unfitness for driving heavy motor vehicles because of weak eye sightamounted to retrenchment under Section 2 (00) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947and whether the services of the drivers have been rightly terminated. It has beenheld by the Supreme Court in that case that such termination of services beingcovered by Sub clause (e) of Section 2 (00) would not amount to retrenchmentwithin the meaning of Section 2 (00) of the I. D. Act and, therefore, the terminationper se is not illegal. However, it has further been observed by the Supreme Courtin that case that although the order of termination of service perse cannot be faultedon the ground of the breach of the Act, the important question that still remains tobe considered is whether in the circumstances of the case and against the background of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, it can be said that the actionof the Corporation is proper, equitable and justified when the workmen have putin service with the Corporation for long periods and all of them are above 40 yearsof age and their superannuation age is 58 years. In that case, the drivers developeda weak or sub-normal eye-sight or lost their required vision on account of theiroccupation as drivers in the Corporation. In that case, the drivers developeda weak or sub-normal eye-sight or lost their required vision on account of theiroccupation as drivers in the Corporation. Having this background in view, thesupreme Court came to the conclusion that the service conditions of the workmensuch as the drivers, therefore, must provide for adequate safeguards to remedy thesituation by compensating them in some form for the all-round loss they suffer forno fault of theirs. The Supreme Court in those circumstances asked the Corporation to formulate a scheme and after having found an unhelpful attitude of thecorporation, they formulated the scheme for the workmen like the drivers whichis mentioned in para 12 of that judgment. This Scheme was formulated by thesupreme Court having kept in mind that the workmen concerned were incapacitated to work only as drivers and were not rendered incapable of taking any otherjob either in the Corporation or outside. Further the workmen were at an advancedage of their life and it would be difficult for them to get a suitable alternativeemployment outside and the relief made available under the Scheme should not besuch as would induce the workmen to feign disability. ( 3 ) THIS scheme was formulated by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthanstate Road Transport Corporation (supra ). This scheme inter-alia provides foralternative job available with the respondent-Corporatioh and amount of compensation having regard to the length of service and the age of workmen etc. We failto understand why such analogous scheme cannot be formulated by the respondents for their drivers. In this case we are told that petitioner has rendered 26 years of service and isabove 50 years and the age of Superannuation is 58 years. 59in these circumstances, we are of the opinion that this is a case where thedrivers of the respondent-corporation should be considered for alternative suitable employment or should be given compensation in the light of the judgment ofthe Supreme Court in Anand Bihari v. Rajashtan State Road Transport Corporation s (supra) case. The question whether the appropriate Govt. can refuse reference to Labour Court is left open. The question whether the appropriate Govt. can refuse reference to Labour Court is left open. In the light of what is discussed above, the respondents are directed (1) toformulate a scheme analogous to the scheme formulated by the Supreme Courtpreferably within three months from today; (2) to offer the petitioner alternativesuitable employment; and (3) In case it is not possible to employ him, then therespondents are directed to consider for payment of compensation to the petitionerin the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court aforementioned.