V.Dutta Gyani, J. — The appellant-writ petitioner started his career as a Research Assistant in the year, 1971 in the Agriculture Department of the Govt. of Assam. Having served in various capacities, such as, Inspector/Extension Officer/Seed Inspector/Special Officer-cum-Secretary in State Govt. enterprises he has eventually promoted and posted as Sub Divisional Agricultural Officer at Mangaldoi vide Govt. Notification No.GAG.33/92/96 dated 24.8.92 and he joined there on 4.9.92 but just within nine months of his joining he was ordered to be transferred from Mangaldoi to Udalguri vide impugned order dated 14.6.93. The appellant, therefore, challenged the transfer order dated 14.6.93, inter alia, on the ground of malafide and extraneous consideration in Civil Rule No. 1698 of 1993 which was decided by order dated 16.12.93. Aggrieved by the same this, appeal is preferred. .2. Mr. B.K.Das, Senior Advocate with Mr. D.Majumdar and Mr. P.K. Roy Choudhury has assailed the impugned order on the following grounds : (i) that the impugned order of transfer was malafide and passed on extraneous ground, inasmuch as, the suggestion put forward by the Director was not viewed and considered as a whole in its true perspective by the Minister-in-charge, the learned Judge failed to notice that a partial reference was made to the suggestion by the Minister-in-charge ignoring the other post thereof relating to and affecting the petitioner-appellant. A mere endorsement 'Approved', made by the Chief Minister is not indicative of any application of mind to the matter as a whole; (ii) as the petitioner-appellant was working as a Assistant Electoral Registration Officer at Mangaldoi at the material time, he would be deemed to be an officer under the Election Commission within the meaning of Article 324 (6) of the Constitution of India,1950 and, as such, no transfer order could be passed unless the appellant was released by the Election Commission - consequently the impugned order of transfer was bad in law - a point though raised but the learned Single Judge omitted to decide; (iii) having come to a finding that the respondent No.5 had had worked for a long time at Mangaldoi and the impugned transfer order was passed only to bring him back to his home town where he has constructed a house of his own, the learned Judge should have quashed the order of transfer as bad in law; (iv) that the ratio decidendi of Civil Rule No (sic); (v) the impugned order of transfer was passed malafide, and the learned Single Judge while dealing with this aspect of the matter, omitted to consider , the manner in which the matter was placed before the Chief Minister by the Minister concerned, particularly with reference to the Director's recommendation as far as it related to the appellant-petitioner. Lastly, it was argued that the representation as indicated in the impugned judgment, though made in time by the petitioner-appellant, the same has not yet been considered and disposed of by the respondents. 3. Mr. Lahiri, Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondent No.5, referring to the counter affidavit sworn by respondent No.5, submitted that on facts it should not be said that the writ petitioner was subjected to frequent transfers, that there was no complete ban on transfer as contended by the appellant-writ petitioner, which could be effected, on obtaining approval of the Chief Minister, which has been obtained in the instant case. He strongly refuted the allegation of malice as made by the petitioner. There was no irregularity in obtaining Chief Minister's approval and the impugned order of transfer dated 14.6.93, was a valid one, passed in public interest. He strongly refuted the allegation of malice as made by the petitioner. There was no irregularity in obtaining Chief Minister's approval and the impugned order of transfer dated 14.6.93, was a valid one, passed in public interest. He also invited attention to certain facts, such as, permanent residence of respondent No.5, as controverted by him refuting the allegation that the impugned order was passed to accommodate respondent No.5. It was argued that the endorsement 'Approved', as put by the Chief Minister, is itself indicative of his application of mind to the matter as a whole. There was no violation of any rule or instructions issued by the Government in the matter of transfer. Supporting the judgment of the learned - Single Judge he contended that there was scope for interference, e.g. more so, in face of the fact that the appellant was also given an opportunity to make a representation in case he so desired to the State Govt., which he failed to avail of. Now that the respondent No.5 has joined duty at Mangaldoi, the petitioner-appellant could insist for his continuance at the same place. He also disputed and denied the contention that the impugned order of transfer was passed malafide on extraneous consideration. 4. Learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4, while substantially adopting the arguments as advanced by Mr. Lahiri, highlighted the actual position of the appellant and the respondent No.5, on the date when the interim order was passed by this Court on 29.6.93, the circumstances in which respondent No.5 joined at Mangaldoi and the prompt rectification of error by respondent No.4 no sooner the order was brought to his notice. He also explained the delay. He denied the allegation of malice and disputed appellant's contention that the transfer order was malafide or that it was bad in law for want of sanction by the Election Commission. According to him the impugned order was passed in public interest after complying with all legal requirements. The petitioner could not challenge the same. 5. In view of the submission made and arguments advanced in both sides, it would not be out of place to recall to mind certain basic principles, emerging from numerous judgments of the Supreme Court relating to transfer. 6. The petitioner could not challenge the same. 5. In view of the submission made and arguments advanced in both sides, it would not be out of place to recall to mind certain basic principles, emerging from numerous judgments of the Supreme Court relating to transfer. 6. Transfer being an incidence of service, an employee holding a transferable post, has no legal right to insist for his posting at a particular place of his choice. A transfer order made on administrative grounds in public interest is ordinarily, not amenable to writ jurisdiction, unless there are strong compelling grounds rendering the transfer order illegal, on account of violation of statutory rules, or is satisfactorily shown to be malafide and it may however be noted that mere t assertion of malafide is not enough, it must be substantiated as well. 7. Power to transfer is not an absolute however, and cannot be allowed to be exercised capriciously, or simply to accommodate a favoured one, it can be effective in public interest and for the exigencies of administrative purpose. If an order of transfer has been made for reasons other than administrative, and not for public purpose but to achieve a collateral purpose, in such a case it is t open to the Court to crack the shell of innocuousness which wrapes the order of transfer and find out the real purpose behind the order. It is in the light of this principle, violation of statutory rules and malafide, that the legality of the order is to be decided. Other facts, such as, frequent transfers, permanent resident of respondent No.5 or the nature of complaints made against him are merely peripheral in nature, relevant only to the extent they are helpful in determining malafide and the public purpose. 8. It is a common ground taken by both the respondent Nos.l to 4 and the respondent No.6 that transfer was effected in public interests on administrative grounds. So far as respondent No.5 is concerned he has made his position clear by saying. "Be it stated that I have got no choice for any particular place of posting......I say that the competent authority after taking into consideration relevant aspects of the matter had passed the orders of transfer in accordance with law in public interests and not for any oblique motive." It is stated that the transfer order dated 14.6.93 has been passed in public interests. This public interests is common to both the sets of respondents, as indeed, it is one of the essential conditions, coupled with administrative grounds and exigencies for transferring a public servant. What in fact necessitated the passing of the impugned order of transfer was the threat to the security of respondent No.5, as can be gathered from the counter affidavit sworn by the Deputy Secretary, Agriculture, Shri B.C. Pathak. 9. These two words 'Public Interest', derive their colour and contents in the context they are used. The same word may be used in different senses in the ) same statute, or even in the same section {Code Maxwell) on Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edn. 274). Works like nature - said Tennyson may only half reveal and may very well half conceal the soul within. Such half concealed soul may only be discovered from the context in which the word has been used. 10. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, defines public interest, thus -"Something in which the public, the community at large has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interest of the particular realities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, state or national government". 11.In the case at hand, we are concerned with transfer of a public servant claimed to have been passed in public interest. This term 'Public Interest' in ' relation to public service, really speaking does not pose any problem of interpretation. In all ordinary cases the words used bear plain meaning and their effectiveness to conote and communicate a particular thought in plain enough. The dominant and decisive factor is 'Public Interest' to which it must sub serve in contrast to wholly private and personal interest, 12. It is an admitted position that the impugned transfer was necessitated due to threats of security hold out of respondent No.4 and but for it, indisputably there could be no occasion for transfer at that stage. It was in fact argued by the Govt. Advocate that it was the bounden duty of the State to provide security to its employees, and for this reason, the respondent No.6 was required to be transferred to Mangaldoi, in place of the petitioner who was brought to Udalguri. It was in fact argued by the Govt. Advocate that it was the bounden duty of the State to provide security to its employees, and for this reason, the respondent No.6 was required to be transferred to Mangaldoi, in place of the petitioner who was brought to Udalguri. Without going into the factual controversy whether it was threats or complaints of gross misconducts (as per Annexure placed on record by the writ petitioner) it is noble and laudable on the part of the State to provide security to its employees, it is nobler still, on the part of the public servant to rise and respond to the call of duty even in face such threats to security, although except for a bold assertion of threats, there is absolutely no material placed on record in support thereof, we leave it at that. 13. Now coming to question whether the impugned order is violative of any statutory rules or passed malafide. It is common ground that the petitioner, so also the respondent No.5, were working as an Assistant Electoral Registration Officer under the Election Commissioner. It was therefore contended on behalf of the petitioner appellant that no transfer could be made or ordered without prior approval of the Election Commission, as they would be deemed to be a deputation to the Election Commission. 14. Section 13CC, of Representation of People Act, 1950 provides as follows : " 13CC. Chief Electoral Officer, District Election Officer, etc. It was therefore contended on behalf of the petitioner appellant that no transfer could be made or ordered without prior approval of the Election Commission, as they would be deemed to be a deputation to the Election Commission. 14. Section 13CC, of Representation of People Act, 1950 provides as follows : " 13CC. Chief Electoral Officer, District Election Officer, etc. deemed to be on deputation to Election Commission.- The officers referred to in this Part and any other officer or staff employed in connection with the preparation, revision and correction of the electoral rolls for, and on the conduct of, all elections shall be deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission for the period during which they are so employed and such officers and staff shall, during that period, be subject to the control, superintendence and discipline of the Election Commission." It is significant to note that such officers are deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission for the period, during which they are so employed and secondly, such officers and staff shall be subject to control, super intendance and discipline of the Election Commission, as is evident from the plain language of the section itself, yet if any authority is needed, the State of Karnataka & another vs. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & anothers (1977) 4 SCC, 471 may be referred to with advantage. 15. Undeniably, no prior approval for petitioner's transfer has been obtained from the Election Commission. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in their return while professing to have issued the impugned transfer order, keeping both the officers in the same district within a very close distance (see para 6 of the counter affidavit dated 1.9.93 sworn by the Deputy Secretary) in the interest of the electoral revision work, have not even remotely suggested that prior sanction or approval of the Election Commission was obtained. The words 'Control' ' Superintendence' and' Discipline' are wide enough to cover transfer of an officer or member of the staff deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission. . 16. The words 'Control' ' Superintendence' and' Discipline' are wide enough to cover transfer of an officer or member of the staff deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission. . 16. Learned Single Judge while dealing with this aspect of the matter (see para 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment) has noted it as a fact that the Deputy Commissioner of the district who had earlier objected to petitioner's transfer and desired that he may not be released till 28.9.93, but as then learned Judge wanted to know the present position, from the Senior Govt. Advocate, he placed ( before the Court a letter dated 9.12.93' explaining the position' and the position as explained reads as follows, to quote the learned Judge - "In the said letter, informed the State Government that the writ petitioner can be released as he has not been engaged any election work in view of the Court case. Thus it appears that the plea of the writ petitioner of being engaged in election duty is not tenable at present." Apart from the flimsiness of the reason assigned post facts by the Deputy Commissioner, the question is not whether he was actually engaged in election duty, the crucial question is whether he was on deputation in the Election Commission and was released therefrom before being transferred. Look at the reason, the Deputy Commissioner informed the Govt. that the petitioner could be released (not that he was actually released by the Election Commission) as ' he had not been engaged in election work in view of the Court case. The filing of petition has come in his way. If the petitioner challenged the transfer order, by a petition under Article 226 and prosecutes the same, can it be inferred that he is not engaged in election duty. The conclusion arrived at by the learned ^Single Judge, based as it is on a post facto letter (and even without it), we are constrained to say, cannot be subscribed to. The transfer order is passed on 14.6.93 and its justification is advanced full six months and fifteen days after, that too not in the counter affidavit, but in a letter dated 29.12.93 addressed to the Senior Govt. Advocate. A post justification, taken on its face value, fails to justify the impugned order of transfer. The transfer order is passed on 14.6.93 and its justification is advanced full six months and fifteen days after, that too not in the counter affidavit, but in a letter dated 29.12.93 addressed to the Senior Govt. Advocate. A post justification, taken on its face value, fails to justify the impugned order of transfer. As noted by the learned Single Judge, the petitioner could be released (not that he was actually released towards the end, of December, 1993. If the State was keen, his withdrawal from the deputation to the Election Commission should have been sought before, transferring him, which has not been done. How this position, that he could be released towards the end of December, 1993, cannot be released back to the factual position as obtaining in June, 1993 when the impugned order of transfer was passed without obtaining any prior approval or sanction or withdrawal of the petitioner from deputation to the Election Commission. 17. Admittedly the petitioner had been working as an Assistant Electoral Registration Officer at Mangaldoi and would be deemed to be an officer under the Election Commission, within the meaning of Article 324 (6) of the Constitution, read with section 13CC of the Representation of People Act, 1950 Learned counsel is right in his contention that unless released by the Commission, the State Govt. could not have passed the impugned transfer order dated 14.6.93 '(filed as Annexure D to the writ petition), which is liable to be quashed on this short ground alone. The maxim - 'Quod initio non valet, tractu temporis non valet' is clearly attracted and applied to the facts of the case. Counsel for the appellant-petitioner also argued with reference to numerous authorities, the question of malice in law as well as fact and the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Minister in accordance sanction to the petitioner's transfer, to our mind, in view of the finding recorded above, it is not necessary to go into those question of malice and the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Minister in according sanction as the impugned order of transfer, has been quashed on the other ground. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, this appeal deserves to be allowed, it is accordingly allowed. Judgment and order dated 14.12.93 passed by this learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No. 1698 of 1993 is set aside. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, this appeal deserves to be allowed, it is accordingly allowed. Judgment and order dated 14.12.93 passed by this learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No. 1698 of 1993 is set aside. The impugned order of transfer dated 14.6.93 passed against the petitioner is also set aside. The petitioner shall continue to work in his post at Mangaldoi as was working prior to the passing of the impugned order.