Sunanda Bhandare ( 1 ) THIS revision petition under Section 25-B (8) ofthe Delhi Rent Control Act, hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Act is filed against theorder of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dated 11. 5. 1993 whereby theapplication for leave to defend filed by the petitioners herein was rejected and adecree for eviction was passed in favour of respondent No. 1 under Section 14dread with Section 25b of the Act. ( 2 ) THE brief facts relevant for the decision of this petition are as follows:property bearing No. D-10 (Front Portion) Vasant Vihar, New Delhi was letout to the petitioners herein by respondent No. 1 and her late husband Shrim. M. L. Hooja on 8. 10. 1992 vide lease dead dated 31. 10. 1972. The lease wassubsequently renewed on 13/05/1975, 29/12/1978, 8/10/1979,23rd, December, 198 1/11/1984, 6/06/1988 and lastly on 6/07/1987. The husband of respondent No. 1 after his retirement fromgovernment service had moved to Calcutta where he got employment asdirector in M/s. B. N. Elias and Company in 1974. Respondent No. 1 also leftfor Calcutta alongwith her late husband. The appointment of the husband ofrespondent No. w with M/s B. N. Elias and Company was initially for a periodof five years but it was later extended twice for a further period of five yearseach. The late husband of respondent No. 1 filed an eviction petition undersection 14c of Delhi Rent Control Act since he wanted to come and live in hishouse at Delhi. However, he died during the pendency of the petition andthe said petition was dismissed. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 herein filedthe present petition under Sec. 14d of the Act. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 sought eviction of the petitioners on the ground thatshe needed the premises bona fide for her residence inasmuch as she had nointerest or reason to stay in Calcutta in her old age and wants to reside in herpremises in New Delhi where she has her roots having spent nearly 29 years ofher married life. She also alleged that her close relatives are residing in Delhiand she would be confortable to live in Delhi where her relations reside. Respondent No. 1 herein stated in the petition that her mother Smt. Radha Bai Bhagat, aged about 93 years was residing in a rented house at 14 Ramakishoreroad, Delhi, her real sister Smt. Kanta Grover married to Mr. Respondent No. 1 herein stated in the petition that her mother Smt. Radha Bai Bhagat, aged about 93 years was residing in a rented house at 14 Ramakishoreroad, Delhi, her real sister Smt. Kanta Grover married to Mr. Justice A. N. Groverresided alongwith her husband in a rented house at 123 Sunder Nagar, Newdelhi, her husband s real sister Smt;pushpa Chopra also resided in Vasant Vihar,new Delhi and her brother Shri Lalit Mohan Bhagat resided at Kingsway Camp,delhi and her other brother Shri Man Mohan Bhagat resided at I Tees January Lane,new Delhi. She stated that she came from a respectable family of status andstanding as her father late Rai Bahadur Jagan Nath Bhagat retired as the Districtand Sessions Judge at Jullundur in 1941 after which he was Chief Justice, State ofkota, Rajasthan for six years. She has her independent source of income of approximately Rs. 45,000. 00 per month apart from the fact that she is also receivingrs. 9,000. 00per month as rental income from the rear portion of the suit property. She is accustomed to live in spacious bungalows with spacious lawns particularlybecause spacious accommodation was allotted to her husband who was an IFSOfficer of 1939 batch and who retired as Vice Chairman, Committee on Policetraining, Ministry of Home Affairs, Governmnet of India, New Delhi on 3 1/12/1972. She stated that the premises on occupation of the petitionersherein were let out to them for residential purpose and she now required thembona fide for her own residence. She further stated that her eldest son Shri Anupam Hooja is now in U. S. A. , her second son Shri Pawan Hooja is doing business atbombay and her third son Shri Alok Hooja is also doing business at Bombay. Herhusband executed a will on. 6. 3. 1987 bequeathing his share in the suit property torespondent No. l herein. Assuch, respondent No. 1 had become owner/landlordof the suit premises. Respondent No. 1 thus sought eviction of the petitionersunder Section 14d read with Section 25 B of the Act. ( 4 ) SUMMONS in Schedule III Form were issued and the petitioners herein filedtheir common application for leave to defend on 1. 10. 1990. Respondent No. 1herein filed the reply on 10. 1. 1991. The application for leave to defend filed by thepetitoners was dismissed in default and the restoration application filed by themwas also dismissed by the Trial Court on 26. 8. 10. 1990. Respondent No. 1herein filed the reply on 10. 1. 1991. The application for leave to defend filed by thepetitoners was dismissed in default and the restoration application filed by themwas also dismissed by the Trial Court on 26. 8. 1992 and aneviction order in favourof respondent No. 1 was passed. However, the order of eviction was set asideby the High Court on 6. 1. 1993 in a revision petition filed by the petitioners hereinbeing C. R. No. 738 of 1992. On remand the Trial Court again heard the parties. Inthe meanwhile, the petitioners filed a fresh application under Order VII Rule 7read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code on 24. 2. 1993 with a prayer to bring on recordsubsequent events regarding the death of the mother and sister of respondent No. I and also that one Mr. Cristates, a foreign national who was occupying the rearportion of the premises had vacated the unit on 31. 10. 1992 and the said portion wasre-let by respondent No. 1 herein to one Mr. Agnitapolis, a Greek national fromnovember 1992 at exorbitant rate of rent. It was stated in the application thatrespondent No. 1 having failed to occupy the rear portion which had fallen vacantduring the pendency of the eviction petition had disentitled herself from gettingeviction of the petitioners under Section 14d of the Act. ( 5 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 herein filed a reply to that application and stated that therear portion of the suit premises was let out to Embassy of Greece and though Mr. Cristates had vacated the premises, another Greek gentlement Mr. Agnitapolisoccupied the premises and continued the lease. She denied that the premises hadfallen vacant or that she had re-let the premises to a new tenant. Alongwith herreply she filed a letter dated 22. 10. 1992 of the Embassy of Greece which reads thus: "22. 10. 1992mrs. RAJESHWARI Hoojan-122, Geater Kailash INew Delhi. C-10 Paschimi Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. Mr. Gerassimos Christatos has been residing in your abovepremises since August 1989. His tenure in India is over and in his place Mr. G. Anagnos to poulos from our Embassy will now be staying at C-IO Paschimimarg, Vasant Vihar, from early November 1992 and he will continue thelease. C-10 Paschimi Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. Mr. Gerassimos Christatos has been residing in your abovepremises since August 1989. His tenure in India is over and in his place Mr. G. Anagnos to poulos from our Embassy will now be staying at C-IO Paschimimarg, Vasant Vihar, from early November 1992 and he will continue thelease. Yours sincerely,sd/-Evangelos Theophilouattache"to show that it was Embassy of Greece which was the tenant and there wasno fresh letting of the premises to a new tenant, respondent No. 1 alsomoved anotherapplication bringing on record another letter dated19. 3. 1993 written by the Embassy of Greece which reads thus:151 "19. 3. 1993mrs. Rajeshwari Hooja,n-122, Greater Kailash INew Delhi. C-10 Paschimi Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. Dear Madam,the above mentioned premises has been rented by the Embassy ofgreece for the residence of the diplomatic staff since August 1989 and willcontinue to do so on the basis of the same lease. "yours sincerely,sd/-Evangelos Theophilouattache"this application was filed by the respondent No. 1 after the hearing of thecase was concluded but before the judgment was delivered. The petitionersherein filed their reply to the said application and reiterated that the premiseswere re-let and the plea taken by the respondent No. 1 that the Embassy ofgreece was the tenant is incorrect. ( 6 ) THE Trial Court considered both the letters filed by respondent No. I herein and came to the conclusion that there was no re-letting of the premises toa new tenant. The Trial Court held that no ground for leave to defend was madeout by the tenants and accordingly dismissed the application for leave to defend. The Trial Court further came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 requires thesuit premises for her bona fide use for her own residence and, therefore, passedthe eviction order by way of the impugned judgment. ( 7 ) IT was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Trialcourt erred in taking into consideration the facts stated by the respondent in thesecond application filed by her after the hearing had been concluded. It wassubmitted that the Trial Court should not have taken into consideration the letterof Embassy of Greece filed alongwith that application because no arguments wereadvanced on that application. It wassubmitted that the Trial Court should not have taken into consideration the letterof Embassy of Greece filed alongwith that application because no arguments wereadvanced on that application. He further submitted that respondent No. 1having failed to produce the lease deed entered into with the Embassy of Greece,adverse inference ought to have been drawn against her and no credence couldbe placed on the letters. Learned Counsel further submitted that respondentno. 1 having re-let the premises which had fallen vacant, her need for the suitpremises was not genuine and bona fide and thus the order of eviction ought to beset aside on that ground. Learned Counsel relied on the judgments of the Supremecourt in Precision Steel and Engineering Works and Anr. v Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tyal, AIR 1982 SC 1518 , Gulab Bai v. Nalni Narsi Vohra 6 Ors. , 1991 Volume 2rcr 453 and Surjit Singh Kalrav. Union of India and Anr. , 1991 (1) RCR 347 andsubmitted that since a triable issue had been raised by the petitioners, leave todefend ought to have been granted. He submitted that it was not open to the Trialcourt to look beyond the application filed by the petitioners for leave to defendand the documents placed by the respondent on record ought to have beenignored. He further submitted that as held by the Supreme Court in Surjit Singhkalra s case (supra) it was imperative for respondent No. 1 to prove her bona fideneed and since she did not occupy the rear portion which fell vacant, her need wasnot bona fide and eviction petition ought to be dismissed on that ground alone. Learned Counsel did not assail the impugned order on any other ground. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent however contended that respondentno. 1 being a widow requires the premises for her own residence as she had noother premises in her occupation when she filed the petition for eviction undersection 14d of the Act. He reiterated that the rear portion of the premises neverfell vacant and the second Greek gentleman occupied the premises because therear portion was let out to the Embassy of Greece and the Embassy of Greece couldinduct an imployee of the Embassy in the rear portion without respondent No. 1signing any fresh lease to that effect. He reiterated that the rear portion of the premises neverfell vacant and the second Greek gentleman occupied the premises because therear portion was let out to the Embassy of Greece and the Embassy of Greece couldinduct an imployee of the Embassy in the rear portion without respondent No. 1signing any fresh lease to that effect. He further submitted that no written leasewas executed by respondent No. 1 or her late husband with the Embassy of Greeceand thus there was no question of producing the lease deed. The second Greekgentlement occupied the premises in the rear portion immediately and thepossession was never handed over to respondent No. 1 after the first Greekgentleman vacated the premises. He further submitted that in any event,respondent No. 1 had a choice of selecting the premises more convenient to herunder Section 14d (2) of the Act. It was submitted that respondent No. 1 hadmade that choice when she filed the petition and the rear portion was not vacantthen and even on the date the decree was passed the Embassy of Greece continuedto occupy the same. Thus the requirement of the premises in possession of thepetitioner was genuine and the Trial Court rightly dismissed the application forleave to defend and ordered eviction of the petitioners. Section 14 D of the Act reads thus: "14-D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to awidow:- (1) Where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her,or by her husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may applyto the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. (2) Where the landlord REFERRED TO to in Sub-section (1) has let out more than onepremises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that Subsection in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her. "section 14d (1) requires that the landlord is a widow and the premises let out byher or by her husband are required by her for her own residence. The Sectionprovides that in such a case she can apply to the Controller for recoveringimmediate possession of Such premises. ( 9 ) IN the present case it is not in dispute that respondent No. 1 is a widow. Itis also not in dispute that she is the landlord. The only question, therefore, to beseen is whether respondent No. 1 requires the premises for her own residence. ( 9 ) IN the present case it is not in dispute that respondent No. 1 is a widow. Itis also not in dispute that she is the landlord. The only question, therefore, to beseen is whether respondent No. 1 requires the premises for her own residence. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court in Surjit Singh Kalra s case (supra) has held that atenant is entitled to raise all relavent contentions as against the claim of theclassified landlords and the fact that no reference to the word bona fiderequirement is made in Section 14-D does not absolve the landlord from provingthat his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not boanfide. The Supreme Court observed as follows: ". . . . . IF the application is filed under Section 14-B, the summons should statethat the application is filed under Section 14-B and not under Section 14 (l) (e)orl4-A. Likewise if the applications are under Sections 14-C to 14-D, thesummons should state accordingly. That would indicate me scope of thedefence of the tenant for obtaining leave REFERRED TO to in Sub-section (5) ofsection 25-B. Under Sub-section (5), the tenant could contest the applicationby obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in the applicationof the landlord depending upon whether it is under Section 14-A, 14-B, 14-C or 14-D or under Section 14 (l) (e ). The tenant cannot be allowed to takeup defence under Section 14 (l) (e) as against an application under Section14-B. There cannot be any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claimor right of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against our jurispru-dence. It is unlikely that the Legislature intended the result for which thecounsel for the tenant contended. It will be mechanical interpretation of theenactment defeating its purpose. Such an interpretation has never foundfavour with the Courts which have always adopted a purposive approachto the interpretation of statutes. Section 14-8 and other allied provisionsought to receive a purposeful construction and Sub-section (5) of Section 25-B should be so construed as to implement the object and purpose of Section14-B to 14-D. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the intention of thelegislature as expressed in Section 14-B to 14-D. . . " "the tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as againstthe claim of the classified landlords. . " "the tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as againstthe claim of the classified landlords. The fact that there is no reference tothe word bona fide requirement in Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolvethe landlord from proving that tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enough indication in support of this construction from the titleof Section 25 (B) which states "special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. " ". . . . . . . . . The social setting demanding summary proceeding, the nature of thesubject matter and above all the legialativediction which has beendeliberately designed, differ in two provisions. The Controller s powerto give leave to contest the application filed under Section 14 (l) (e) or Section14a is cribbed by the condition that the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosessuch facts and would dis-entitle the landlord from obtaining an order forrecovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in therespective sections. Needless to state, therefore, if an application is filedunder Section 14b or 14c or 14d the tenant s right to contest the applicationis narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the respectivesections. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section14 (l) (e ). We find nothing contrary to our view in Precision Steel and Engineering Works and Anr. v Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tyal, 1982 Vol. 3 SCC 270. Sub-section (5) of Section 25 is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code has nopart to play there. We, therefore, reiterate the view expressed in Bushingschmitz Pvt. Ltd. case. "thus, the parameters for deciding the question of bona fide need of the landlordas provided in Section 14d have to be considered by the Rent Controller beforepassing an eviction order undersection 14d of the Act. Whereas Section 14 (l) (e)of the Act provides that the premise let out for residential purposes are requiredbona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or any memberof his family dependent on him, he has also to prove that he is the owner thereofand no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is available withhim. Whereas Section 14 (l) (e)of the Act provides that the premise let out for residential purposes are requiredbona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or any memberof his family dependent on him, he has also to prove that he is the owner thereofand no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation is available withhim. Under Section 14d it is not necessary that the premises occupied by thetenant were let out only for residential purpose. Section 14d does not require thelandlord to prove that no reasonably suitable residential accommodation is available with the landlord before she seeks eviction under Section 14d of the Act. However, for showing the bona fide requirement that would be relevant consideration because if the landlord who is a widow has accommodation in her possession which is reasonably suitable, her need of the premises in possession of thetenant may or may not be necessarily genuine and bona fide. That of course willdepend on facts of each case. What is important is that the Controller has to besatisfied about the genuineness of the claim established from all surroundingcircumstances. If the Controller is satisfied that the widow is not seeking evictionfor ulterior purpose, then an order of eviction must follow. Furthermore, if thewidow does not have suitable accommodation in her possession and there waremore than one premises let out to tenants, she has a choice under Sub-section (2)of Section 14d to choose any of the premises let out by her. In such a case, it is notopen to the tenant to contend that the premises in occupation of another tenantwould be more suitable for her than the premises in respect of which evictionpetition has been filed. ( 11 ) IT is not disputed that in the present case when the eviction petition wasfiled there was no vacant accommodation available with respondent No. 1 for heroccupation. In fact, a choice had been made by her late husband when he filed thepetition under Section 14c of the Act. Both, respondent No. 1 and her latehusband had considered that the front portion of the premises would moresuitable for their occupation. Respondent No. 1,therefore, filed the petition undersection 14din respect of the premises after her husband died because the petitionfiled by her husband under Section 14c had to be dismissed on his death. Both, respondent No. 1 and her latehusband had considered that the front portion of the premises would moresuitable for their occupation. Respondent No. 1,therefore, filed the petition undersection 14din respect of the premises after her husband died because the petitionfiled by her husband under Section 14c had to be dismissed on his death. It is alsonot disputed by the petitioners that the rear portion of the premises was let out toa Greek gentleman. The question is whether that original tenant had vacated thepremises during the pendency of the petition and respondent No. 1 inducted a newtenant in the rear portion and this fact disentitled her from getting eviction of thepetitioners from the front portion of the premises. It is also not disputed that inthe rear protion now another Greek gentleman from the Embassy of Greece isliving. The moot question is whether a fresh lease was executed with the secondgreek gentleman and, therefore, there was afresh letting of the rear portion. Apartfrom the averments made by her in the reply filed by respondent No. 1 to theapplication of the petitioners under Order VII Rule 7 read with Sec. 151 CPCbringing subsequent events on record, respondent No. 1 had filed a letter dated22. 10. 92 given by the Embassy of Greece which clearly states that the tenure ofmr. Gerassimos Christatos is over and in his place Mr. G. Anagnostopoulos fromthe Embassy of Greece will now be staying in the premises owned by respondentno. 1 from early November 1992. Now even if the second letter filed byrespondent No. 1 dated 19. 3. 1993 is not taken into consideration, on a plainreading of letter dated 22. 10. 1992 it is clear that the premises, which were earlieroccupied by Mr. Gerassimos Christatos fell vacant on the conclusion of his tenurein India and the Embassy of Greece allotted the said premises to Mr. G. Anagnostopoulos for his occupation from November 1992. It is interesting to find that thepetitioners herein had not filed any rejoinder to the reply filed by respondent No. I to the application for leave to defend filed by the petitioners and it was only afterthe order of eviction passed by the Trial Court on 26. 8. 1992 was set aside by thehigh Court and the case again came up before the Trial Court on remand that thepetitioners moved the application on 24. 2. 8. 1992 was set aside by thehigh Court and the case again came up before the Trial Court on remand that thepetitioners moved the application on 24. 2. 1993 bringing the subsequent events ofchange of tenancy of the rear portion of the premises on record. Thus, it isalleged that the rear portion fell vacant in October 1992 and a new tenant wasinducted on 1. 11. 1992. No such allegation was made by the petitioners tillfebruary 1993. In fact, as stated hereinabove an eviction order was passed by thetrial Court in favour of respondent No. 1 on 26. 8. 1992 itself and on that date nonew tenant as alleged was inducted in the rear portion. The petitioners have notchallenged before me any of the other averments made by respondent No. 1regarding her bona fide need of the premises for her own residence. Thepetitioners have not challenged that respondent No. 1 is a widow, a landlord, thatat present she has no other accommodation, she is a lady of status and that herother relations are staying in Delhi. ( 12 ) ON consideration of the facts placed on record by the parties it appearsthat the rear portion of the premises is let out to the Embassy of Greece and not toin individual Greek tenant. If a new tenant had been inducted in the rear portionhe would not have occupied the premises immediately on the next day after theprevious tenant vacated the premises. Such a thing could be possible becausethe premises were in possession of the Embassy of Greece and both S/shirgerassimos Christatos and G. Anagnostopoulos were employees of the Embassy. It is commonly known that as and when a new tenant is inducted, the landlord isexpected to at least white-wash the premises before the new tenant occupies thepremises. That would take at least sometime. The fact that on the very next day,the second Greek gentleman occupied the premises shows that the rear portionwas never handed over to respondent No. 1 by the Embassy. Furthermore,sub-section (2) of Sec. 14d provides that when more than one premises are let outby a widowed landlord, it is open to her to make an application in respect of anyone of the premises which is owned by her. Furthermore,sub-section (2) of Sec. 14d provides that when more than one premises are let outby a widowed landlord, it is open to her to make an application in respect of anyone of the premises which is owned by her. From the facts of the present caseit is clear that respondent No. 1 always preferred TO to have the front portion for herown residence and she had made that choice when she filed her petition undersection 14d. Not only that, her late husband had also filed a petition under Sec. 14 C in respect of these very premises. It appears that respondent No. 1 and herlate husband have been trying to get the front portion vacated for their occupationfor more than five years because the front portion was more suitable for theiroccupation. ( 13 ) AS observed by the Supreme Court in M/s. E. M. . C. Steel Limited, Calcuttav. Union of India and Another 1991 (1) RCJ 321, Section 14d was introducedto assist a vulnerable and needy Section of the society to recover possession of thepremises as expeditiously as possible without the usual trial and tribulations. In the overall view of the matter and consideration ail the aspects it appears thatthe need of respondent No. 1 to get the premises in occupation of the petitionervacated for her own residence is genuine and bona fide and as such she isentitled to get an order of eviction for. recovering immediate possession of thesaid premises. The revision petition is dismissed. ( 14 ) THE Trial Court by way of the impugned order had given the petitionerssixmonthstimetovacatethepremisesfromll. 5. 1993 which expired in November1993. However, the petitioners continue to be in possession of the premisesbecause of the stay of dispossession ordered by this Court. The petitioners havealready enjoyed the premises even after the eviction order was passed by the Trialcourt for a considerable long time. ( 15 ) THERESPONDENTNO. LISNEARING70yearsofage. Her hus band died duringthe pendency of the petition under Section 14c of the Act and thus could not getthe accommodation owned by him in his old age. However, in the interest ofjustice, time is granted till 31/03/1994 to vacate the premises.