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1994 DIGILAW 170 (PAT)

Suprabhat Steels Ltd. v. Bihar State Electricity Board

1994-04-11

S.B.SINHA, S.K.SINGH

body1994
JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. All these writ applications. Involving common questions of law were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. In C.W.J.C. No. 1679 of 1992, the petitioner bas prayed for quashing of an order communicated to him by a letter dated 23.7.1992 by the General Manager cum-Chief Engineer of the Central Bihar Area Electricity Board, (Respondent No.2) which is contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application, whereby and where under he allowed the claim of the petitioner for remission in the charges of Annual Minimum Guarantee for the year 1989-90 in part which was claimed by the petitioner before the said authority in terms of Clause-13 of the High Tension Agreement entered into by and between it and the Bihar State Electricity Board, (hereinafter referred to as "the Beard'). 3. In C.W.J.C. No. 11111 of 1993 the petitioner has filed an application for quashing the Composite order dated 23.9.1993 passed by the respondent General Manager in the purported exercise of powers under clause-13 of the Agreement entered into by and between the petitioner and the Bihar State Electricity Board in respect of the claim or proportionate remission in Annual Minimum Guarantee and Maximum Demand charges for the financial year 1990-91 and 1991-92. 4. In C.W.J.C. No. 10719 of 1992, the petitioners have questioned the order dated 11.5.1992, passed by the respondent No.2 wherein it allowed in part the claim of the petitioner for remission in the charges of Annual Minimum Guarantee and Maximum Demand for the period 1990-91 in terms of Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. 5. C.W.J.C. No. 1036 of 1994 The petitioner in this application has prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ for quashing an order dated 29.3.1993 passed by the respondent no.2 where under its application under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement has been disposed of. 6. In this case the petitioner is a consumer of High Tension electrical energy having connected load of 1500 K.V.A. in its factory, It has an induction furnace for the purpose of melting scraps and converting the same to iron. 6. In this case the petitioner is a consumer of High Tension electrical energy having connected load of 1500 K.V.A. in its factory, It has an induction furnace for the purpose of melting scraps and converting the same to iron. According to the petitioner scrap iron melts at 14000 o C. The petitioner has contended that when in the furnace the temperature is raised of 1000 o C and if there is a tripping for a period of fifteen minutes the temperature would go down to 600 C Which would result in formation of melted iron onto lumps again and as a result thereof the said lumps are required to be broken into pieces and put into the furnace once again for the purpose of melting. 7. The petitioner was served with a bill dated 22.10.1991 demanding a sum of Rs. 6,93,803,93 paise by way of Annual Minimum Guarantee Charges for the financial year 1990 91. In the said bill it was mentioned that the petitioner was required to consume 31,53,600 units of electricity whereas it had only consumed 19.82.754 units thus leaving a shortfall of 11.70.846 units. It is stated that by miscalculation a sum of Rs. 3,014, 73 paise has been charged in excess. 8 The petitioner filed a claim for remission of Annual Minimum Guarantee charges which has been disposed of by an order dated 29.3.1993, as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application. From a perusal of the said order it appears that the remission allowed to the petitioner Was calculated on the following basis :- Years Remission allowed 1990 91 Rs 6, 93 803. 93 x 1813 hrs.= 8760 Rs. 1,43,59200 (Rupees one lac forty three thousand five hundred ninety two) only. 9. In view of the points involved in these applications it is not necessary to state the fact of the matter in great details 10. Suffice it to say that the petitioners of all the writ applications have entered into the agreements with the Board for supply of high tension electrical energy, It is admitted that in terms or Clause 13 of the said agreement, the petitioners are entitled to claim remission in the matter of payment of Annual Minimum Guarantee and Maximum Demand charges if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. 11. 11. The petitioners filed such representations before the respondent No.2 in terms of Clause 13 of High Tension Agreement for different period, which have been allowed in part. 12. The respective General Managers of the Board in their impugned orders inter-alia held as follows:- (i) The consumers are not entitled to any remission for any supply of Electrical energy upto 59 minutes inasmuch as such trippings for short duration are incidental to the business of supply of electrical energy. It was observed that the same is not hit under Clause-13 of the agreement nor the same can be considered to be akin to the aforesaid clause. (ii) For the purpose of grant of remission in the Annual Minimum Guarantee charges, the records maintained at power Sub-Stations of the Board can only be taken into consideration and not the records maintained by the Consumers in this regard. (iii) No remission can be granted in relation to maximum demand charges. (iv) The ability of the Consumer to consume electrical energy the period of supply is the only factor which can be taken into consideration for grant of remission in the Annual Minimum Guarantee as also Maximum Demand charges and for that matter inability on the part of the Consumer to take supply of the electrical energy is no relevant. 13. It was submitted that evidently the formula for the purpose of calculating Annual Minimum Guarantee Charges was adopted as it was expected that the consumer would atleast consume 25% of the electrical energy supplied to him as out of the total 8760 hours every year and thus the remission in the Annual Minimum Guarantee charges in terms of clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement should also be considered on the basis of supply/consumption of electrical energy by the Board of the Consumer. 14. Mr. Bajla the learned counsel appearing for' the petitioner at the outset submitted that the General Managers of the different Areas Electricity Boards have been adopting different standard in disposing of the consumer claims under clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. He drew our attention to the fact that the Bihar State Electricity Board has issued a circular in terms whereof the Annual Minimum Guarantee charges are to be calculated on the basis of the following formula contract Demand X Load Factor X Power Factor X Total hours in a year. 15. He drew our attention to the fact that the Bihar State Electricity Board has issued a circular in terms whereof the Annual Minimum Guarantee charges are to be calculated on the basis of the following formula contract Demand X Load Factor X Power Factor X Total hours in a year. 15. It was pointed out that the Load Factor is 25 whereas Power factor was 8 in terms of the 1983 Tariff (which has been raised to 85% by reason of 1991 and 1993 Tariff) and total number of hours in an year i.e. 8760. The contract Demand is, therefore, only variable element in calculating the minimum guarantee charges. According to the learned counsel, if a consumer has taken actual supply of electrical energy for 7000 hours in one year, the remission should be calculated on that basis namely; Contract Demand X Load Factor X Power Factor X 1760 hours. 16. In other words the learned counsel submitted that remission should have a direct relation with the inability of the Board to supply electrical energy or inability on the part of the consumer to consume electrical energy for particular periods in a year. 17. It was pointed out that the respondent No.2, however, in his impugned orders without taking into account the petitioners, inability to consume the electrical energy, granted relief to the petitioners only with reference to its ability to consume the same vis a-vis supply of electrical energy by the Board. According to learned counsel, the approach of respondent no. 2 is not only perverse but also contra to and inconsistent with the provisions of Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. 18. It was further submitted that there is absolutely no basis for not taking into consideration the crippling upto 59 minutes for the purpose of calculating the amount of remission in the Annual Minimum Guarantee charges as also Maximum Demand charges. 19. It was submitted that such an inference could not have been drawn either on construction of Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement or on any provision of any statute or any Rule or executive instructions having the force of law. 20. 19. It was submitted that such an inference could not have been drawn either on construction of Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement or on any provision of any statute or any Rule or executive instructions having the force of law. 20. The learned counsel further submitted that the records of trippling maintained by the Bihar State Electricity Board in the Power Sub-stations cannot be treated to be the sole criteria for disposing the representations of the consumers under the said provisions inasmuch as tripplings take place also for other reasons; keeping in view the fact that power lines are laid for quite a long distance from the power sub-station to the points of supply and thus records maintained by the consumer relating to proof of trippings and their duration etc. should also be taken into consideration. According to the learned counsel such document are also admissible in evidence under the provisions of Indian Evidence Act. With regard to the Maximum Demand Charges it was submitted that it is incorrect to say that no remission in relation thereto is admissible. 21. The learned counsel submitted that in fact the Supreme Court of India in Northern India Iron and Steel vs. Haryana State Electricity Board reported in 1976 S C 1000 has held that such remission in Maximum Demand Charges is also permissible it was further pointed out that the method of charging the Maximum Demand Charge on the basis of recording the level of consumption by a consumer in the Maximum Demand Indicator is not decisive inasmuch as the level of consumption in a month by a consumer is recorded in the maximum demand indicator on the basis of consumption recorded therein if there has been continuous supply of electrical energy for half an hour on any day in a month. 22. Mr. Bajla further submitted that even in terms of Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, a consumer is entitled to remission of Maximum Demand Charges as would be evident from the plain language used therein. 22. Mr. Bajla further submitted that even in terms of Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement, a consumer is entitled to remission of Maximum Demand Charges as would be evident from the plain language used therein. It was further submitted that in Northern India Iron and Steel (Supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that a consumer is entitled to remission in Maximum Demand charges even in a case where non supply of electrical energy takes place in terms of a direction issued by the State for a period of four hours a day in each evening. In that case also, according to the learned counsel, a contention was advanced to the effect that a half an hours consumption of electrical energy recorded in the Maximum Demand Indicator, would be sufficient for determining the Maximum Demand charges for in a month i.e. regarding level of consumption of electrical energy the question of granting any remission in the Maximum Demand charges would not arise but such a contention was negatived. The learned counsel further submitted chat in face the Supreme Court of India In Bihar State Electricity Board Vrs. Dhanwant Rice and Oil Mill reported in AIR, 1989 S.C. 1030 has followed its earlier decision in Northern India Iron and Steel (Supra) and in that view of the matter it is necessary to determine as to what should be the factors for grant of remission in the Annual Minimum Guarantee charges. 23. Mr. K. D. Chaterjee, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent's Board, has, however, submitted that no remission is to be granted in relation to the maximum demand charges as the same is to be levied in terms of clause 4 (c) of the agreement. It was submitted that as the parties have entered into an agreement with the their eyes wide open for payment of maximum demand charges, it cannot ask for a remission on that account inter-alia on the ground that it could not consume electrical energy. It was submitted that as the parties have entered into an agreement with the their eyes wide open for payment of maximum demand charges, it cannot ask for a remission on that account inter-alia on the ground that it could not consume electrical energy. Learned counsel next contended that on a proper construction of Clause-l3 of the agreement it must be held that ability to consume the electrical energy is the only criteria and thus if the Board had supplied electrical energy atleast to the extent of the minimum demand so as to enable it to achieve the minimum consumption of the electrical energy, it would not be entitled to obtain any grant in remission to the minimum guarantee charges. 24. It has been submitted that in terms of the agreement itself, the annual minimum guarantee charges payable by the consumer being fixed, the only question which is relevant for deciding a claim under clause 13 thereof is as to what amount of electrical energy be consumer would consume keeping in view the supplies made of the Board. It was submitted that only in case of supply of electrical energy the question or remission in the annual minimum guarantee charges would apply. It was further submitted that the Board installs a meter at the power of sub station and if any of the consumers who are connected by the same feeders does not received electricity the supply of electrical energy of all the consumers through that feeder would stop working and the meter would come back to the zero. 24. In this connection our attention has been drawn to paragraph 4 of the supplementary affidavit filed by the Board which read thus :- "That in the case of H. T. connections, if there is any breakdown in the concerned feeder leading to supply upto consumers transfer, the same is reflected at sub-station and the feeder itself trips for fault and necessary shutdown for effecting repairs is taken and recorded in the log book." 25. It was further submitted that in this view of the matter, the records maintained by the Board at the power sub-station recording the trippings etc. can only be taken into consideration and not the books of accounts and other documents maintained by the consumers. It was further submitted that in this view of the matter, the records maintained by the Board at the power sub-station recording the trippings etc. can only be taken into consideration and not the books of accounts and other documents maintained by the consumers. It was submitted that the supply of electrical energy at 11000 Voltage is stepped down to 440 Volt by the transformers of High Tension Consumers and the point of supply of the electrical energy to the said consumers starts thereafter and thus the question or transformer loss or line loss of electrical energy would not arise. 26. The learned counsel, further submitted that trippings for small period cannot be reckoned for the purpose of grant of remission to consumers and in that view of the matter, the Board has taker a decision that trippings beyond 59 minutes only would be taken into consideration for such purpose. The learned counsel also submitted that the words 'for' any reasons whatsoevers’ used in clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement should be read 'ejusdem genesis.' 27. It was submitted that the books of account maintained by the Consumers are not the primary documents. The learned counsel contended that it is not expected that a consumer shall maintain a true and correct records relating to trippings as the same may vary on each day unless a person is exclusively employed for the said purpose. It was submitted that no meter is installed by the Consumers for recording or such trippings. 28 Mr. Pawan Kumar appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 10719 of 1992 submitted that the Clause 13 has to be construed liberally as the same is a beneficent clause of contract so far as the consumers are concerned. According to the learned counsel the words reasonably beyond the control must be held to be a factor entitling the consumer to claim remission in the Annual Maximum Guarantee charge : and Maximum Demand charges and the said words cannot be read ejusdem generis. The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a passage from Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition at pages 181-2. The learned counsel submitted that rule of ejusdem generis is to be cautiously applied. Reference in this connection may be made to 1944 K.B.D. 362 at page 366. The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a passage from Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition at pages 181-2. The learned counsel submitted that rule of ejusdem generis is to be cautiously applied. Reference in this connection may be made to 1944 K.B.D. 362 at page 366. It was further submitted that Clause 13 or the High Tension agreement refers to various situations. some of which are man-made and some of which are vis major. He therefore, submitted that in a given fact situation inability to consume electrical energy even when the consumer for reasons beyond his control cannot run his factory would entitle him to claim the benefit of the clause 13 of the agreement. Our attention in this connection has been drawn to the effect that the petitioners applied for reduction of loan as supply of wheat by the Central Government was stopped. It was submitted that Clause 13 should be construed liberally. Reliance in this connection has been placed on 1986 PLJR 256 : 176 I.T.R. 117, 38 ITR 241, (SC), 122 ITR, 283, and 177 ITR 418. 29. Mr. Shiv Kriti Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Board has accepted that no uniform formula is adopted by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer while disposing of the applications filed by the High Tension Consumers for remission in the Annual Minimum Guarantee charges. The learned counsel referred to Annexure-4 of C.W.J.C. No. 1036 of 1994 for the purpose of showing that in that case proportionate of about 25% of Annual Minimum Guarantee charges had been granted. According to the learned counsel, the said formula cannot be said to be contrary to or inconsistent with Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. The learned counsel submitted that Clause 13 does not speak of computation of damages suffered by the consumers who installed induction furnace or other type of furnaces for the purpose of running their factories. According to the learned counsel such extra ordinary situations are not contemplated under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on 1990 (1) P. L. J. R. 73 (SC) 1989 P. L. J. 337 and 1993 (2) PLJR. According to the learned counsel such extra ordinary situations are not contemplated under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. The learned Counsel has placed reliance on 1990 (1) P. L. J. R. 73 (SC) 1989 P. L. J. 337 and 1993 (2) PLJR. 458 30 As there was a dispute with regard to the fact that as to whether the meter installed at the powers of substations or the Bihar State Electricity Board can record the trippings in the power supplied to High Tension Electrical energy or not, we requested Mr. Shiv Kriti Singh the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Board as also Mr. L K. Bajla and Mr. Pawan Kumar to make an inspection and submit before us a report. The learned counsels acceded to our requests and took pains in visiting the Pataliputra Sub-station of the Board. Mr. Shiv Kriti Singh and Mr. Bajla has submitted separate reports. 31. From a perusal of both the reports it appears that there is a control room in the power Substation which has control panels fitted with alarm bells as well as red and green lights connected to different feeders. Transformers have been installed for converting the incoming electrical energy at 33 K.V.A. to 11 K.V.A. and at that point a circuit breaker has been installed consisting of several parts including two over current relays, l Earth fault relay, 1 Ampere Meter, 1 volt meter and 1 power Factor Meter. 32. According to Mr. Shiv Kriti Singh, in case of any fault in the feeder lines having 11 K.V. power i.e. any fault in the distribution lines upto any step down transformer occurs the defect activates the circuit breaker causing a trip which has two effects namely; it is noticed in the control room by ringing of a bell and the red light switches off and green light gets on denoting tripping in the concerned feeder. It was stated that this is further apparent from visual red signal in the affected relays of the circuit breaker denoting the type of fault and on tripping the reading in the ampere meter goes down to Zero. It was stated that this is further apparent from visual red signal in the affected relays of the circuit breaker denoting the type of fault and on tripping the reading in the ampere meter goes down to Zero. It was further stated that the duty man in the control room is stationed round the clock to note down the exact hours and minutes of commencement of all interruptions and trippings and also the hour and minute when power supply is resumed in the feeder concerned. The entry contains remarks relating to cause of interruption and exact duration. In his report Mr. Singh stated that in conclusion, that Boards meters and records show all interruptions in the H.T. (11 K.V) line upto the supply point (the step down transformers) of the H. T. consumers. Beyond that point non utilization for any fault or otherwise has to be found out from the evidence that may be adduced by the consumers. 33. Mr. Bajla, however, in its report submitted that there are two circuits of supply. One of which goes into industrial area serves about 12 H. T. consumers. It has been stated that no meter has been installed in the sub-station which can automatically record any tripping or load shedding in the supply. According to Mr. Bajla, there is an Oil circuit breaker in the Power Substation at the point from where the supply of electricity comes out for the industrial area and only when there is any obstruction in the flow of electricity, the Circuit Breaker trips the line resulting in stoppage of supply. Such tripping is noted by the staff posted at the Substation. Then remedial actions are taken for removing the defects. After reenergizing the line; the timing when tripping took place ore recorded in the register by the person on duty. 34. It has been pointed out the maintenance of records with regard to the duration of trippings is done manually and not mechanically and some lapses were found in recording such trippings. According to Mr. After reenergizing the line; the timing when tripping took place ore recorded in the register by the person on duty. 34. It has been pointed out the maintenance of records with regard to the duration of trippings is done manually and not mechanically and some lapses were found in recording such trippings. According to Mr. Bajla, I also found lapses in such recording which I pointed out to the Executive Engineer and he accepted that there were occasional lapses by the staff responsible for recording the trippings, who were badly literate."' He, however, pointed out that the system prevailing at the Patliputra Power Substation cannot be taken to be the model for all substations as other sub power station serves a very small area. 35. Mr. Bajla along with his report submitted a sketch map showing transmission line at Dumraon where the petitioner's factory is situated, which is as follows:- Rough Sketch showing layout of supply system at Dumraon Dumraon Textiles Suprabhat Steels Petitioner To Dumraon Textiles power A. B. Swich Sub Rural Feedr To Station Rural area A. B. Switch To Dumraon Town Town Feeder Air Breaker Transformer Transformer A. B. switch To Rural areas 36. In his report the learned counsel stated in the alternative current may be going out from the transformer, but out of the lines going out, one may have some problem after the OCB point in those lines. In such case the OCB will trip in that line where there is some problem and not in both the lines. As a result the staff at the substation will not record tripping in supply as electricity from the substation continues to be supplied, even though in only one of the two outgoing circuit. From the map, this is also depicted that from the transformer one line goes directly to the Dumraon Taxtile Mills. who is a major consumer at Dumraon. This is a separate Circuit. In that view of the matter the record of tripping of Dumraon Textile Mill as well as the power Substation may not vary it they are recorded accurately. But in the case of the other line, the number of consumers is very large and so are their categories. The other lint is named as Town Feeder At the point from where the transmission line goes towards the town. There is an Air Breaker Switch. But in the case of the other line, the number of consumers is very large and so are their categories. The other lint is named as Town Feeder At the point from where the transmission line goes towards the town. There is an Air Breaker Switch. From this very point another line goes to the rural feeder and on this line, factory of the petitioner is also situated. The Air Breaker Switch is used for diverting the supply of electricity line to the rural from the Town feeder or vice versa. If the available load is less than the required amount or according to priority set for supply to rural or town areas such diversion is frequently done. It may further be noticed that after the town area at Dumraon there is another AB Switch which gives another opportunity to the Board to stop supply of electricity to areas falling after the town on the same line. There are several villages which are located on the same line after the town and if it is so desired, the Board may stop supply of electricity from going further than the town. The distance between the town of Dumraon and the power substation is about fourteen kilometers and the distance between the petitioner's factory and the power Substation is also about twelve kilometers, In between there is an AB Switch. Under the system prevailing at Dumraon Power Substation if the AB Switch is used by the Board to cut off the supply to the rural areas to supply power to the town feeder, the records at the power Station will not show any tripping at the supply of energy from the power Station will continue unabated. Nevertheless the petitioner will not be getting electricity. No records are maintained at the AB Switch as to when electricity is disconnected from one feeder and when it is restored. In that view or the matter, the records at the Power Substation fit Dumraon cannot be taken to be the reliable records showing correctly the total duration of non-supply of electricity to the petitioners factory correctly from the power Substation. 37. In that view or the matter, the records at the Power Substation fit Dumraon cannot be taken to be the reliable records showing correctly the total duration of non-supply of electricity to the petitioners factory correctly from the power Substation. 37. In view of the aforementioned rival contentions as noticed herein before the followings questions arise for consideration in this application: (a) Whether for the purpose of grant there of remission in the annual minimum guarantee and the minimum demand charges, the total hour of non supply is relevant ? (b) whether the Board is entitled to ignore, while considering the claim of the consumers for grant of remission trippings upto 59 minutes? (c) whether book of account maintained by a consumer are relevant and should have been taken into consideration by respondent no. 2 while disposing of the claim of the consumers ? (d) whether in view of clause 4 (1) of the H. T. agreement, no remission in the maximum demand charges is permissible in law? 38. Before proceeding to answer the questions raised in these application it may be noticed that the Board enters into an agreement with all High Tension Consumers of electrical energy. The Annual Minimum Guarantee charges is payable by reason of such agreement. In these cases we are not concerned with the question as to whether the levy of Annual Minimum Guarantee charges by reason of the tariff framed by the Bihar State Electricity Board in exercise of its jurisdiction under Sections 49 and 59 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 is Valid or not. However, the history relating to levy of Annual Minimum Guarantee charges may be noted shortly. In the Schedule appended to the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, there existed a provision in the shape of clause XI and XIA which entitled the licensee so charge Annual Minimum Guarantee and She minimum charges from the consumers. By reason of Indian Electricity Amendment Act, 1959 the said clauses were deleted. By reasons of the said Act 1959 Amendment section 3 (2) (d) (i) was also suitably amended. However, despite deletion at the said provisions the right of the licensee to levy charges have not been wipde of. In Naushir Bharucha's Indian Electricity Act. By reason of Indian Electricity Amendment Act, 1959 the said clauses were deleted. By reasons of the said Act 1959 Amendment section 3 (2) (d) (i) was also suitably amended. However, despite deletion at the said provisions the right of the licensee to levy charges have not been wipde of. In Naushir Bharucha's Indian Electricity Act. 1910 at pages 468 and 469 it has been stated :- ........This point of view is re informed by the fact that there is no provision in the Act preventing the licensee from levying a minimum charge. Had the intention of the Parliament been to prevent the licensee, it would have expressed this intention in very clear terms. The parliament must have known that by merely repealing Clause XIA which was a clarifying Clause, the licensee was not disabled from levying minimum charge and a specific prohibitory clause to that effect would be necessary. It should also be appreciated that side by side with the repeal of Clause XIA. Clause XI which provided for maximum charges has also been repealed. This is because the practice of incorporating in the licencee a maximum charge beyond which the licensee could not charge was also rendered superfluous in view of the fact that a ceiling over the charges was automatically placed, when the licensee under paragraph-I of the Sixth Schedule was required so to adjust his rates that his clear profit would not exceed the amount of his reasonable return The repeal of Clause XI also re-in forces the view that the intention of the Parliament was to remove the conflict and not to disable the licensee from imposing a minimum change. Minimum charge justified : Apart from the legal aspect of the problem, a minimum charge is justified in view of the fact that the licensee has to maintain In constant readiness generating capacity irrespective of the fact whether such capacity is utilized by the consumer or not. It requires an amount of capital cost to keep Such generating capacity in constant realness as also the cost of maintaining the plant and to provide for the depreciation, even though it may not be put into operation, and the licensee is entitled to be re imbued on this account. If the minimum charges were not levied to which a licensee would be entitled, would have co be made good by increased charges on other categories of consumers. If the minimum charges were not levied to which a licensee would be entitled, would have co be made good by increased charges on other categories of consumers. This in itself would be unfair. 39. It is also necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the agreement. 1. (a) The Board shall furnish to the consumer and the consumer shall accept at the point of supply mentioned in the schedule hereto, on and from the date on which the said premises shall be connected With the supply distributing mains and during the continuance of the agreement, a constant supply of electrical energy at the pressure of Volts, 50 cycles, 3 phases, 3 wires, alternating current system subject to standard variations as provided in Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 or any other statutory modification thereof as may be in force from time to time for the purpose and up to the maximum specified thereinafter referred to as the contract demand) and under the conditions laid down in the Schedule : Provided firstly that the supply of electricity as stipulated above may, with previous general or particular warning be regulated, curtailed staggered or cut off altogether by or On behalf of the Board in the opinion of the Board or its Electrical Executive Engineer for the supply area concerned by power position or any other emergency in the power system warrants such course of action; Provided secondly that the Board shall in no case whatsoever have any liability for any compensation to the consumer on account of failure in part or whole of supply of electrical energy. 4(a) Subject to the minimum Contract demand applicable fop the category of supply in which the consumer falls as per Board's tariff, the consumer shall pay to the Board for the energy so supplied and registered or taken to have been supplied as aforesaid at the appropriate rates applicable to the consumer according to the tariffs framed by the Board and in force from time to time, the presently enforced tariffs being given in the Schedule to this agreement for easy reference. Such reference is subject to provisions of clause 14 appearing hereinafter provided that notwithstanding anything said above but subject to the provisions of Clause 13 appearing hereinafter, the consumer shall have to pay minimum charges as specified in the above said tariffs framed by the Board and enforced from time to time irrespective of whether energy to that extent has been consumed or not (Such minimum charges are referred as "minimum guaranteed charges" at other places in this agreement.) 4(c) Maximum demand charges for supply in any month will be based on the maximum KVA demand for the month of 75 percent of the contract demand whichever is higher, subject to provision or clause 13. For the first twelve months' service the maximum demand charges for any month will however, be based, on the actual monthly maximum demand for that month. 13. If at any time the consumer is prevented from receiving or using the electrical energy to be supplied under this agreement either in whole, or in part due to strikes, riots, fire, floods explosions, act of God or any other case reasonably beyond control or if the Board is prevented from supplying or unable to supply such electrical energy owing to any or all of the causes mentioned above then the demand charge and guaranteed energy charge set out in the Schedule shall be reduced in proportion to the ability of the consumer to take or the Board to supply such power and the decision of the Chief Engineer, Bihar State Electricity Board in this respect shall be final. Note-The term Chief Engineer includes Additional Chief Engineer for the area concerned. 40. It is a well settled principles of construction that the relevant provisions of an instrument have to be read as a whole so as to gather the intention of the parties cost thereto Clause l(a) of the Agreement imposes a contractual obligation on the part of the Board to wake constant Supply of electrical energy. The Board has a statutory obligation to supply electrical energy to a consumer in terms of the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 read with Indian Electricity Act. 1910 and the rules framed there under. It, therefore matters not as to whether at a given point of time the consumer is requited to supply electrical energy or not. The Board has a statutory obligation to supply electrical energy to a consumer in terms of the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 read with Indian Electricity Act. 1910 and the rules framed there under. It, therefore matters not as to whether at a given point of time the consumer is requited to supply electrical energy or not. A consumer at his convenience may run his factory for a part of the day or for the whole day. Even when the machines are not operating the consumer may require supply of electrical energy for the purpose of maintenance of machinery security etc. The provisions of the contract of supply of electrical vis-à-vis the power of the Board to charge Minimum guarantee charge and maximum demand have to be viewed in the context. 41. As has been noticed herein before, the minimum guarantee charges are levied so as to compensate the Board from incurring any losses that it may suffer by reason of its not being able to supply electrical energy which may be wasted; although, it had kept itself in readiness to supply the same constantly. The electrical energy as is well known cannot be stored. What-ever be the generation of the electrical energy or whatever supplies of electrical energy are received by the Board from other sources like National Thermal Power Corporation and Damodar Valey Corporation etc are required to be supplied to the consumers immediately. In a case when the consumer is not in a position to take supply of electrical energy the Board may have to stop or curtail generation/supply of electrical energy. 42. In M/S Northern India Iron and Steel Co. etc. Vrs State of Haryana & anr. reported in 1976 SC page 1100, the Supreme Court observed :- Under close 4 (f) the consumer is entitled to a proportionate reduction of demand charges in the event of look-out fire or any other circumstances considered by the supplier beyond be control of the consumer : that is to say if the consumer is not able to consume any part or the electric energy due to any circumstance beyond its control and which is considered by the Board to be so, then it shall get a proportionate reduction in the demand charge. The circumstance of power cut which disabled the Board to give the full supply to the appellant because of the Government Order under section 22 or the 1910 Act, undoubtedly would be a circumstance which disabled the consumer from consuming electricity as per the contract. And this was circumstance which was beyond its control and could not be considered otherwise by the Board. It entitled the consumer to a proportionate reduction of the demand changes. This interpretation of sub clause (f) of clause 4 of the tariff was accepted so be the correct, legal and equitable interpretation on all hands. In our opinion it is so. In a circumstance like this, it is plan the obligation of the consumer to serve at least 3 days notice on the supplier as per the latter pare of sub-clause (f) was not attracted, as the requirement of notice was only in the case of shut down of not less that 15 days duration. we are, therefore, of the view that the inability of the Board to supply electric energy due to power cut or any other circumstance beyond its control as per the demand of the consumer according to the contract will be reflected in and considered as a circumstance beyond the control of the consumer which prevented it from consuming electricity as per the contract and to the extent it wanted to consume. The monthly demand charge for a particular month will have to be assessed in accordance with sub-clause (b) of clause 4 of the tariff and therefore, from a proportionate reduction will have to be made as per sub clause (f) We hope, in the light of the judgment, there will be no difficulty in working out the figures of the proportionate reduction in any of the cases and for any period. In case of any difference or dispute as to the quantum of the demand charge or the proportionate reduction, parties wm be at liberty to pursue their remedy as may be available to them in accordance with law. (Underline is mine emphasis) 42. The Supreme Court in Bihar State Electricity Board VS. M/S Dhanawat Rice & oil Mills reported in 1989 Sc 1030 followed its earlier decision M/s Northern India Iron and Steel Co. etc. Vrs. State of Haryana & Anr. (Underline is mine emphasis) 42. The Supreme Court in Bihar State Electricity Board VS. M/S Dhanawat Rice & oil Mills reported in 1989 Sc 1030 followed its earlier decision M/s Northern India Iron and Steel Co. etc. Vrs. State of Haryana & Anr. and observed : "We are, therefore, of the view that the inability of the Board to supply electric energy due to power cut or any other circumstance beyond its control as per the demand of the consumer according to the contract will be reflected in and considered as a circumstance beyond the control of the consumer which prevented in from consuming electricity as per the contract and to the extent it wanted to consume. The monthly demand charge for a particular month will have to be assessed in accordance with sub-clause (b) of clause-4 of the tariff and therefore from a proportionate reduction will have to be made as per sub-clause (f). We hope, in the light of the judgment there will be no difficulty in working out the figures of the proportionate reduction in any of the cases and for any period. In case or any difference or dispute as to the quantum of the demand charge of the proportionate reduction parties will be at liberty to pursue their remedy as may be available to them in accordance wish law,," Reference in this connection may also be made to Bihar State Electricity Board Vs. Green Rubber Industries reported in 1990 (1) PLJR page 73 (SC). A plain reading of Clause 13 clearly indicates different contingencies for attracting the said provision. It provides that for failure on the part of the supplier to supply and also failure on the part of the consumer to take supply of electrical energy in the circumstances like strike riot, fire, flood, explosion or Act of God or any other reason beyond the control of either of the parties; a consumer would be entitled to claim proportionate reduction of annual minimum guarantee and maximum demand charges, 44. The Supreme Court in Dhanawat Rice Mill's case (Supra) clearly held that in cases of trippings, load shedding and power cuts as also in the cases where the consumer was unable to take supply of electrical energy for one or the other reasons enumerated in clause 13 of the Agreement will be entitled to proportionate reduction in annual minimum guarantee charges. 45. 45. The submission of Mr. Chatterjee, therefore, to the effect that clause 13 shall apply only in case where there is inability on the part of the Consumer to take supply, is not correct. 46. In terms or clause 4 (a) and 4 (c) of the Agreement the Board is entitled to recover annual minimum guarantee charges and maximum demand charges. The add provisions however, are subject to the provisions of Clause 13 of the Agreement. 47. Clause 13 of the agreement in clear term, thus, applies not only in the case of minimum guarantee charges but also maximum demand charges. 48. The respective General Managers of the concerned Area Electricity Board in their impugned orders, were, therefore, no right in rejecting the claim of the petitioners in relation to the maximum demand charges. 49. It is true that in terms of Clause 4 (o) of the agreement a consumer is to pay 75% of the maximum KVA demand of the contract demand whichever a higher. It is also not disputed at the Bar that a maximum. demand indicator is installed in the premises of High Tension consumer and it records the maximum KVA demand if a consumer draws electrical energy more than the contact demand continuously for half an hour in any month. 50. In terms of the agreement the consumer is liable to pay the maximum demand charges on the basis of the recording in the maximum demand indicator as if the same had been the contract demand for the month in question, but the same, in my opinion, does not mean that if for the rest of the period the Board is unable to supply electrical energy or the consumer is unable to consume electrical energy for ore or the other reasons enumerated in clause 13 of the agreement, it would not get proportionate reduction in the maximum demand charges. The submission of Mr. Chatterjee, justifying the decision of the Chief Engineer to that extent in my considered view, cannot be upheld in view of the clear phraseology used in clause 4 (a) and (c) of the agreement. 51. The Board charges annual minimum guarantee charges on the basis of the formula, contract demand X load factors X power Fact ors X total hours in a year. 51. The Board charges annual minimum guarantee charges on the basis of the formula, contract demand X load factors X power Fact ors X total hours in a year. In relation to the aforementioned formula what is variable is the contract demand only other elements being fixed i.e. the load factor is 2.5 whereas the power factor is 85 and the number of hours in a year is 8760. 52. In view of the Supreme Court decisions referred to hereinbefore the consumer is not only entitled to proportionate reduction to the extent or the tripping load shedding and power cut but would also be so entitled thereto to the extent he was unable to consume electrical energy it his case comes within the purview of clause 13 of the agreement. Clause 13 of the agreement, in my opinion being an 'exemption' provision as also keeping in view the scope and object of the right on the part of the Board to levy Annual Minimum Guarantee Charges has to be construed liberally. 53. In Tara Steel Industries Vs. Assistant Commissioner reported in 1986 PLJR a Full Bench of this Court observed as follows : “In this peculiar context, the rule of law that any beneficent tax provision has to be liberally construed would also come into play. Way back in (1960) 38 LTR 241, 257 (Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chuganda & Co. (Securities) It has been observed as follows ;- "Lastly, it was argued by Mr. Palkhivala that, since we are dealing with an exemption clause if there was any doubt as to the true interpretation of the exemption clause, the exemption should be liberally construed provided no violence is done to the language employed in the Section. This, no doubt, has been held to be the proper canon of construction by the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Agricultural income Tax V. Raja Jagdish Chandra Deo (1949) 17 I.T.R. 426, 438 and by the Patna High Court in Kameshwar Singh Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (1954) 26 I.T.R. 121 , 132) and we certainly accept that canon of construction. Commissioner of Income Tax (1954) 26 I.T.R. 121 , 132) and we certainly accept that canon of construction. Again a Division Bench of Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Tamil Nadu I, V. Simoson and Company (1980) 122 ITR 283, has held as follows : "It is also a welt settled principle of construction that in construing a provision for exemption or relief, it should be liberally construed. The reason behind this rule of interpretation is that the administrative authorities or the courts should not whittle down the plenitude of the exemption or relief granted by Parliament by laying stress on any ambiguity here or there." Both on principle and precedent, It has therefore, to be held that a formal resolution of the Government duly published in the official gazette under the name and order of the Governor would squarely come within the ambit of notification. Consequently, the petitioner would be clearly entitled to be granted exemption under Annexure-7. 54 It is also well know that the provision should be so constituted in the context of the Act that no word is rendered superfluous or meaningless. (See 1989 SC 2227). 55. Clause 13 is not only attracted when the Board is unable to supply electrical energy but also to a case where the consumer is prevented from receiving or using the electrical energy to be supplied under the agreement either in whole or in part. It would not therefore, be correct to contend that if the Board has supplied electrical energy or has been in a position to supply electrical energy in the area concerned for a period of more than six hours on a particular day, clause 13 will not be attracted. 56. The words prevented from receiving or using the electrical energy by a consumer are significant. The words receiving or using, in our opinion, signify different contexts. Receiving of electrical energy by the consumer may have a direct nexus with supply of the electrical energy but clause 13 is also attracted in a case where the consumer is prevented from using the electrical energy. Clause 13 is also not a viss major clause simplicitor. It embraces within its fold not only acts of God but also acts of men like strikes. riots, fire and explosions. In this context the words “any other cause reasonably beyond control have to be in terpreted" . 57. Clause 13 is also not a viss major clause simplicitor. It embraces within its fold not only acts of God but also acts of men like strikes. riots, fire and explosions. In this context the words “any other cause reasonably beyond control have to be in terpreted" . 57. Craises in his Statute Law 7th Edition at pages 181-2 stated that the rule of ejusdem generis should be applied cautiously. 58. In M/s Shidheshwari Cotton Mill Pvt. Ltd Vs. Union of India & anr. reported in 1959 SC page 1019 the Supreme Court observed:- "The expression ejusdem generis-'of the same kind or nature’-signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and genus as preceding them, If a list or string or family of genus describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping up words then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scop of such words. In 'Statutory Interpretation' Rupert Cross says: “...........The draftsman must be taken to have inserted the general words in case something which ought to have been included among the specifically enumerated items had been omitted...........” The principle underlying this approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found, ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favored. This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found, ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favored. As a learned author puts it : “......If a class can be found, but the specific words exhaust the class the rejection of the rule may be favoured because its adoption would make the general words unnecessary; if however the specific words do not exhaust the class, then adoption of the rule may be favoured because its rejection would make the specific words unnecessary." See: Construction of Statutes by E.A. Driedger p. 95 guoted by Francis Bennion in his Statutory construction pages 829 and 830) Francis Bennion in his Statutory construction observed : For the ejusdem generis principle to apply there must be a significant indication of a category thee can properly be described as a such in the enactment. Further more the genus must be narrower than the words it is said to regulate. The nature of the genus is gathered by implication from the express words which suggest it........” “.. It is necessary to be able to formulate the genus for if it cannot be formulated the genus; for if it cannot be formulated it does said Farwell L.J. there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine. In SS. Magnhild (Owners) v. Meintyre Bros. & Co. (1920)3 KB 321 MC Cardie, J said; "So far as I can see the only test seems to be whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. In SS. Magnhild (Owners) v. Meintyre Bros. & Co. (1920)3 KB 321 MC Cardie, J said; "So far as I can see the only test seems to be whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. By this understand that the specified things must possess some common and dominant feature'" In Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar V. Union of India (1970)2 SCR 732 : ( AIR 1970 SC 540 ) the Court said : “........This rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words, in view of the other rules of interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect if possible that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous........” In U. P. S. E. Board V. Hari Shankar, AIR 1979 SC 65 observed: “...The true scope of the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be "applied with caution and not pushed too far" 59. In AIR 1976 SC page 2414 (The Adoni Cotton Mills Ltd. V The Andhra pradesh State Electricity Board and others the Supreme Court while construing the words "any other relevant factors" occurring in section 49 (3) of the 1948 Act observed: “….The expression "any other factors” is not to be construed ejusdem generis be cause there is no genus of the relevant factors. 60. Ejusdem generic, according to Reed Dickerson is a more specialised version of noscitur a soci is (See page 233, 234 of 'The Interpretation and Application of Statute). The learned Author states: “This says that if a series of more than two items ends with a catch all term that is broader than the category into which the preceding items fall but which those items do not exhaust, the catch all term is presumably intended to be no broader than that category. Thus in the phrase” oaks, elms and other vegetation" the term" gegetation" presumably means trees. One difficulty is that there may be other equally plausible categories (o. g. deciduous trees) that also meat the test. Whether the presumption is lexicographic ally accurate is not entirely clear. Thus in the phrase” oaks, elms and other vegetation" the term" gegetation" presumably means trees. One difficulty is that there may be other equally plausible categories (o. g. deciduous trees) that also meat the test. Whether the presumption is lexicographic ally accurate is not entirely clear. In short, every true rule or presumption of interpretation in the cognitive sense is a lexicographical assertion about general usage or behavior, because It is the basis for normal understanding. It is ironical that so few of the so-called canons of "interpretation" are usable for this purpose. 61. From the discussions made herein before it is clear that the ejusdem generis rule is required to be applied with caution and should not be pushed too far. The modem tendency of the law is to attenuate the application of the rule or ejusdem generis and for invoking the same there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to different objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. According to Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed. Vol. II p. 395) for the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the following conditions must exist; (i) the statute contains an enumeration by specific words: (ii) the members of the enumeration constitute a class : (iii) the class is not exhausted by the enumeration ; (iv) a general term follows the enumeration : (v) there is not clearly manifested an intention that the general term is to be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. 62. Rama Jois in his Legal and Constitution History of India at pages 472 and 473 states thus: (8) Gobaleevardanyayaha: "This means cattle and bull maxim. According to this, when two adjoining words having almost similar meaning are used in a provision out of which one is general and the other is more specific the latter word qualifies the former. Kulluka has used this Nyaya to interpret Manu VIII 28 which reads ; The king should take care of women who are barren, who have no sons, who have no family, wives who are faithful to their respective husbands widows who are afflicted and have none to look after. Kulluka has used this Nyaya to interpret Manu VIII 28 which reads ; The king should take care of women who are barren, who have no sons, who have no family, wives who are faithful to their respective husbands widows who are afflicted and have none to look after. Kulluka holds that in view to the last specification, the rule means that the duty of the kind is to protect all women who had none to look after. In other words he holds that the women of whatever category, who are required to be protected by the king are those who are destitutes. This Nyaya is somewhat similar to the modern rule of construction indicated by the rule of ejusdem generis which requires that a general word which follows a specific word of the same category takes the restricted meaning of the proceeding specific word. But in order to attract this rule there must be genus or category. (9) Ghata-patanyayaha : This is the converse of the rule of ejusdem generis. The meaning is, if two words, like ghata (pot) and pat a (portrait), appear one after another in a provision, one of the words cannot be understood as qualifying the other. Therefore, in such a case, the ejusdem generis rule is not applicable, as the words do not belong to the same genera. Analogous to Ghata-Patanyaya is the principle laid down by the Supreme Court that the rule or ejusdem generis is not applicable for interpreting the words 'local' or 'other authority used in Article 12 of the Constitution after the word 'State. The words any other cause reasonably beyond Control must be lead as illustrative but cannot be read as ejusdem generis to the words act of God. The Words any other cause reasonably beyond control do not signify only vis major. 63. In Sahu Gupta Vrs. The Bihar State Electricity Board, reported in 1989 PLJR Page 132, a Division bench inter-alia held that labour unrest without any farther particulars does not attract clause 13 of the agreement. 64. In M/s Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1989 PLJR - 337, a Division Bench of this Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr. Justice S Roy and Hon'ble Mr. 64. In M/s Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1989 PLJR - 337, a Division Bench of this Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr. Justice S Roy and Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. P. Singh, upon considering various other decisions including Sahu Gupta Industries case (Supra) held :- "The use of the words or any other cause reasonably beyond control makes it clear that apart from the causes enume rated, there may be other causes which would justify a claim under clause 13 of the agreement as long as those other cause are akin to those mentioned in clause 13." 65. In my opinion, therefore, what is relevant is the inability of the consumer to take supply of electrical energy for reasons beyond his control. However, what would be reasonably beyond the control of the Consumer would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 66. It is not possible for us to hold that non-supply of wheat by the Central Government would attract clause 13 of the agreement, inasmuch as it was open to the petitioner to run the factory by procuring wheat from the open market. Such a course if resorted to, might have added to the expenditure of the consumer but the same does not mean that consumption of electrical energy by him by running his factory was reasonably beyond his control. Similarly the Consumer's inability to take supply of electrical energy or Sundays and Other statutory holidays also would not attract clause 13 of the agreement. 67. The next question which is required to be considered is as to whether the Board can refuse to grant any remission for non supply of the electrical energy upto 59 minutes The answer to such a question must be rendered in negative. 68. Clause 13 of the agreement cannot be interpreted in a restrictive manner as was argued by Mr. Chatterjee. Clause 13 as noticed hereinbefore, on the other hand, must be construed liberally. The Board is bound to grant remission for any duration if a case there for, is made out. We fail to understand as to why tripping upto 59 minutes is considered to be tripping for short duration or for that matter in connection of business of supply of electrical energy. The Board is bound to grant remission for any duration if a case there for, is made out. We fail to understand as to why tripping upto 59 minutes is considered to be tripping for short duration or for that matter in connection of business of supply of electrical energy. Trippings, load sheddings or power cuts in whatever form, disruption in supply of electrical energy takes place on once or the other factors enumerated in Clause 13, a consumer as matter of right would be entitled to proportionate remission of annual minimum guarantee or maximum demand charges. In such a case it may be open to the Board to show that a trippings or power outs etc. Would not come within the purview of clause 13 of the agreement but when, If any trippings, power outs or load shedding etc. take the consumer would become entitled invoke the provisions of Clauses 13, Subject to the condition laid down therein. In a case, however, the where consumer invokes clauses 13 of the agreement on the ground that he was prevented from taking supply of electrical energy, the burden of proof shall be on him. 69. With regard to the question as to whether the records maintained by the Board only can be taken for consideration, for the disposal of the claims preferred by the consumers we may observe that the same would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In a case where the remission is claimed only on the basis of trppings, load shedding or power out on the part of the Bihar State Electricity Board, if it be shown that all the High Tension electrical consumers were supplied electricity through the same feeder, the records maintained by the Board should be the prima-facie evidence for claim of proportionate guarantee of Annual minimum guarantee and Maximum Demand Charges. But the same does not mean that the records maintained by the consumers are not admissible in evidence. A consumer is entitled to prove that he had made such arrangements so as to correctly and faithfully record the trippings, load shedding and power cuts. He is also entitled to show that the Board has not maintained its records correctly. 70. But the same does not mean that the records maintained by the consumers are not admissible in evidence. A consumer is entitled to prove that he had made such arrangements so as to correctly and faithfully record the trippings, load shedding and power cuts. He is also entitled to show that the Board has not maintained its records correctly. 70. We are, however, of the view that the Board should evolve a policy decision in this regard, as for example it may be directed the consumers to send to it the details of such trippings load shedding and power cuts at the end of each month stating the duration during which the consumer had not been able to take supply of electrical energy for the reasons mentioned in clause 13 of the agreement. The same, if done, would enable the Board to compare the same with its own records and it may in suitable cases grant the proportionate remission in the Annual Minimum Guarantee and Maximum Demand Charges itself without taking recourse to the adjudicatory process. In facts, in our opinion, the Board should evolve a policy decision whereby coordinated efforts amongst the concerned persons posted at the power of sub station, billing section and the office of the General Manager may lead to automatic grant of remission to the consumers. If such a policy decision is taken by the Board, we are sure that the same would decrease litigations to a great extent and ensure stoppage of wastage of valuable time of General Managers-cum Chief Engineers. 71. In fairness to Mr. Shiv Kriti Singh we must record that learned counsel when questioned, accepted that such a scheme is possible but according to him for claiming proportionate reduction of the A.M.G. and M.D. charges it is obligation on the part of the consumer to file an application in the prescribed proforma. 72. In the case of Asia Insulated wires Pvt. Ltd. V. The South Bihar and Chotanagpur Area Electricity Board, Ranchi and ors. reported in 1992 (2) PLJR-459, upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Shiv Kriti Singh, I had merely noticed that there existed such a proforma. In that case, however, upon noticing the decisions of Bihar State Electricity Board and another Vs. M/s Dhanawat Rice and oil Mills (Supra) as also Andhara Steel Corporation Ltd. Vs. reported in 1992 (2) PLJR-459, upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Shiv Kriti Singh, I had merely noticed that there existed such a proforma. In that case, however, upon noticing the decisions of Bihar State Electricity Board and another Vs. M/s Dhanawat Rice and oil Mills (Supra) as also Andhara Steel Corporation Ltd. Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board, reported in (1991)3 SCC page 263 it was observed: "The respondent No.2 has, thus a public duty to perform when adjudicating upon a claim of consumer for proportionate reduction in the AMG charges and particularly when its order is final. It is required to consider the genuine claim of a consumer with objectivity. It must act judicially and its decision must be supported by reasons." 73. The Board is a 'State' within the - meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It, in our opinion, has thus to act fairly and reasonably. If an appropriate scheme is adopted by the Board, the same would not only extend relief’s to the consumers but would also reduce the costs of the Bihar State Electricity Board it self to a great extent which it incurs by way of litigation at different stages as also wastage of valuable time of highest executive of the Area Electricity Board We may take judicial notice of the fact that we have came across cases where a claim of a consumer under clause 13 of the agreement has not been disposed of for a period of 10 years or so and during the pendency of the claim he had been threat end with disconnection of electrical energy. 74. It is also useful to note that recently in C.W.J.C. No. 2811 of 1993 (R) (M/S Bijay Mining Com Ltd. Vs. the Bihar State Elect. Board and ors) a Division Bench of this court held as follows :- "The fact that the supply of electricity by the Bihar State Electricity Board is erratic is not a matter which can even be doubted by any citizen living in this State. The another condition is a serious that taken judicial action at that facts heating the capital of patna, and in the capital also only in some selected areas, uncertain and prolonged power cuts is a regular feature. The another condition is a serious that taken judicial action at that facts heating the capital of patna, and in the capital also only in some selected areas, uncertain and prolonged power cuts is a regular feature. In the city of Ranchi between 5 P. M. and 10 P. M. citizens get electricity only for two hours because there is power cut every alternate hour. The result is that if any person has to perform any work at home as most of us have to. We have to never back to 19th Entry and use of hurricane lamps. Such is the progress to which the Bihar State Electricity Board has contributed by Its so called effective implementation or the policy to take this country to the 21st century. If the progress of the State has been hampered to the extent it has been we may squarely compliment the Bihar State electricity Board for its performance. Because its unreasonable attitude and arbitrary and not, it has not only raised the industrial under takings, which were functioning in the state, but it has discouraged industrial under takings from establishing new units in this state. Some of the rigger giants in the industry who have contributed greatly to the economic burden particularly of the south Bihar have now chosen to set up their; industries where other than the Bihar. There is only other field in which the Bihar State Electricity Board has made its useful contribution and that is to the prospering litigation in the High Court. Every bill submitted to a consumer by the Electricity Board involves a writ application being filed before this Court. The consumer claims proportionate rebate to the extent of power cut imposed by the Board. It is not disputed that the Board Itself maintains log books at different substations from which it can easily be verified as to what is the extent of power cut dulling that period. If on the basis of such long books rebates did proportionate reduction in A.M.G. were granted by the Board itself, perhaps, the citizens may not have to knock the door of this Court. The Board, however, insists that only when a consumer files a claim under clause 13 of the H. T. Agreement, it will act to grant relief. If on the basis of such long books rebates did proportionate reduction in A.M.G. were granted by the Board itself, perhaps, the citizens may not have to knock the door of this Court. The Board, however, insists that only when a consumer files a claim under clause 13 of the H. T. Agreement, it will act to grant relief. Our experience is that until a writ application is filed and direction is issued to the Board to dispose of the representation under clause 13 of the H. T agreement, no action is taken and the consumer is bound to pay the full amount of the bill under threat of disconnection, even it subsequently some relief is granted to him. Such being the situation, we have reached a stage when we have large number of writ petition pending in this Court. The Board is not Willing to grant proportionate reduction in the A.M.G charges while submitting these bills, and it has been left to us to pass an order in each case for filing a representation under clause 13 of the B T. Agreement, and for directing the competent authority to dispose of the same within a certain period. We are also at our wits end. In this application the grievance of the petitioner is that in the year 1991-92 a bill had submitted without granting proportionate reduction in the Annual Minimum Guarantee charges. 75. For the reasons aforementioned, these writ applications are allowed, the impugned orders passed by the respective General Manager-com-Chief Engineers are let aside and the matters are remitted back to them for fresh decision in the light of the directions/ observations made hereinbefore. Before parting with the matter, we may observe despite observation made by the Supreme Court in Northern Iron Steel Company was back in the year 1975, the difficulties are still being faced by the Board in disposing the claim of the consumers. 76. These writ applications are allowed to the aforementioned extent but without any order as to costs. Shashank Kumar Singh, J. I Agree. Applications allowed.