JUDGMENT Gulab C. Gupta, C. J.—This is a Letters Patent Appeal purporting to be under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of High Court of Judicature at Lahore, against the order dated 31-1-1994, passed by a single Judge of this Court (Kamlesh Sharma, J), dismissing the appellants execution application as not maintainable on the ground that all payments under the decree under execution have already been made. The appellants hold a decree dated 4-4-1979, passed in their favour in Civil Suit No. 17 of 1977, as affirmed by the judgment and decree of this Court dated 4-3-1985 in F A. O No. 15 of 1979. The appellants by an application dated 24-10-1995, put the said decree to execution The respondent, however, resisted the said execution on the ground that all payments in terms of the said decree have already been made and, therefore, nothing is due to the appellants-decree holder. The learned single Judge considering the evidence adduced by the parties held that all amounts due under the decree have already been made by the respondent-judgment debtor and hence the execution is not executable, On the aforesaid findings, the execution application was dismissed, It is this order that is challenged in this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. On 27-9-1994, when this appeal came up for consideration of this Court for the first time, it was noticed that this High Court is not constituted under any Letters Patent and, therefore, it will require consideration if such a Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable. Learned Counsel for the appellants prayed for and was granted time to address this Court on the aforesaid question. The maintainability of this Letters Patent Appeal- is, therefore, being decided by this order- 3. It is well known that the present State of Himachal Pradesh was established under section 3 of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), w. e. f. 25-1-1971. Section 21 of this Act established a separate High Court for the State and named it as the High Court of Himachal Pradesh Prior to the constitution of this High Court, judicial administration of the territories included in the present State of Himachal Pradesh was done by the Delhi High Court, constituted under the provisions of the Delhi High Court Act, 1956, (referred to as the Delhi Act). The jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court was admittedly extended to this area by a notification dated 1-5-1967. Prior to 1-5-1967, the judicial administration of these territories was done by the Court of Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh stationed at Shimla. The said Court was, however, abolished by the Delhi Act w e. f. 1-5-1967. It is also important to mention that before the constitution and establishment of Delhi High Court under the Delhi Act, the judicial administration of the territory included within the Union Territory of Delhi was done by the High Court of Punjab. The Punjab High Court does not have any Letters Patent of its own. It is, however, common ground that the said High Court has adopted the Letters Patent of High Court of Judicature of Lahore as its own Letters Patent. That is how the Letters Patent of Lahore High Court seems to be linked with this High Court. 4. The Delhi High Court, as would be clear from the perusal of the Delhi Act, was mainly constituted for the Union Territory of Delhi -Its jurisdiction was, however, extended to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh by fixing an appointed date for the purpose by a notification under section 17 of the said Act. As far as the Union Territory of Delhi is concerned, section 5 (1) of the said Act conferred all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court as under the law in force immediately before the appointed date was exercisable in respect of the said territories by the High Court of Punjab. Besides the aforesaid ordinary original civil jurisdiction was also conferred on the said High Court under sub section (2) of the aforesaid section As a necessary corollary it was provided under section 10 (1) of the said Act that where original civil jurisdiction conferred on the said High Court was exercised by a single Judge, the appeal shall He from the judgment of the said single Judge to a Division Bench of the High Court. The Delhi Act, however, did not extend the entire jurisdiction of Delhi High Court on the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, Section 17 (3) of the said Act only conferred that jurisdiction in the Delhi High Court which was exercised by the Court of Judicial Commissioner immediately before the appointed date, i e. 1-5-1967. The Delhi Act, however, did not extend the entire jurisdiction of Delhi High Court on the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, Section 17 (3) of the said Act only conferred that jurisdiction in the Delhi High Court which was exercised by the Court of Judicial Commissioner immediately before the appointed date, i e. 1-5-1967. Since the Judicial Commissioners Court did not have any ordinary original jurisdiction, sub-clause (b) of section 17 (3) of Delhi Act also conferred ordinary original civil jurisdiction on the said High Court. It, however, appears that the Parliament enacting the Delhi Act was aware that in some part of the territory now included in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, Punjab High Court had jurisdiction. Section 18 of the Delhi Act, therefore, provided that whatever jurisdiction was exercisable by the Punjab High Court over the territories now included in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh will hence forth exercisable by the Delhi High Court. It is common ground that there was neither any ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court before 1 -5-1967 nor any Letters Patent Appeal lay to that Court under the Letters Patent of Lahore High Court. Inspite of it, it is clear that Punjab High Court exercised extra-ordinary original civil jurisdiction under Clause 9 of Letters Patent of Lahore High Court over the territories now included in the Union Territory of Delhi, and a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the said Letters Patent also lay to a Division Bench of the said High Court, It, however, appears that since Delhi High Court started having jurisdiction over the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh w. e. f. 1-5-1967, it also started exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction under section 17 (3) (b) of the Delhi Act and entertained Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment and orders of a single Judge in the same manner as it entertained similar appeals in relation to territories included in the Union Territory of Delhi. The practice continued even after the constitution and establishment of this Court on 25-1-1971. 5. In order to appreciate the legal question involved in this appeal, it would be proper to quote relevant statutory provision for ready reference. Jurisdiction of this High Court, as stated earlier, is referable to section 23 of the Act which reads as under :— "23. The practice continued even after the constitution and establishment of this Court on 25-1-1971. 5. In order to appreciate the legal question involved in this appeal, it would be proper to quote relevant statutory provision for ready reference. Jurisdiction of this High Court, as stated earlier, is referable to section 23 of the Act which reads as under :— "23. Jurisdiction of High Court.—The High Court of Himachal Pradesh shall have, in respect of any part of the territories comprised in the State of Himachal Pradesh, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, are exercisable in respect of that part of the said territories by the High Court of Delhi." A bare reading of this provision would show that the jurisdiction of Delhi High Court over the territories comprised in the State of Himachal Pradesh is not the same as the jurisdiction of the said High Court over the territories included in the Union Territory of Delhi. The jurisdiction of this High Court is the same as was the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi in respect of any part of the territories comprised in the State of Himachal Pradesh. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain as to what was the jurisdiction of Delhi High Court in relation to the territories comprised in the State of Himachal Pradesh. As noticed earlier, the Delhi Act not only constituted a separate and independent High Court for the Union Territory of Delhi but also extended its jurisdiction over the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. As regards the jurisdiction of the said High Court over the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, section 17 of the said Act is relevant and reads as under :— "17. Extension of the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi —(1) As from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint (hereinafter referred to as the prescribed date), the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi shall extend to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. Extension of the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi —(1) As from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint (hereinafter referred to as the prescribed date), the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi shall extend to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. (2) As from the prescribed date the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Himachal Pradesh shall cease to function and is hereby abolished : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall prejudice or affect the continued operation of any notice served, injunction issued, direction given, or proceedings taken before the prescribed date by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Himachal Pradesh abolished by this sub-section. (3) The High Court of Delhi shall have, in respect of the territories for the time being included in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh,— (a) all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the prescribed date, is exercisable in respect of the said territories by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Himachal Pradesh ; and also (b) ordinary original civil jurisdiction in every suit the value of which exceeds (fifty thousand rupees) notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force. (4) All proceedings pending in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Himachal Pradesh before the prescribed date shall stand transferred to the High Court of Delhi. (5) Any order made before the prescribed date by the Court referred to in sub-section (4) shall for all purposes have effect not only as an order of that Court but also as an order of the High Court of Delhi. (6) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of sections 6 to II and 13 shall, with the necessary modifications, apply to the High Court of Delhi in exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section. (6) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the provisions of sections 6 to II and 13 shall, with the necessary modifications, apply to the High Court of Delhi in exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section. (7) All proceedings pending immediately before the prescribed date in any subordinate Court in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh in or in relation to any such civil suit as is referred to in Clause (b) of sub section (3) shall on that date stand transferred to the High Court of Delhi which shall proceed to try, hear and determine the matter as if it had been pending therein." In order to appreciate the distinction between two jurisdictions namely, jurisdiction of Delhi High Court over the Union Territory of Delhi and the jurisdiction of the said High Court over the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, it is necessary to refer to section 5 of the said Act which reads as under :— "5. Jurisdiction of High Court of Delhi—(1) The High Court of Delhi shall have, in respect of the territories for the time being included in the Union Territory of Delhi, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable in respect of the said territories by the High Court of Punjab. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the High Court of Delhi shall also have in respect of the said territories ordinary original civil jurisdiction in every suit the value of which exceeds (rupees one lakh)." 6. Sub-section (1) of this provision conferred all original, appellate and other jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court, as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, was being exercised by the High Court of Punjab in respect of territories included in the Union Territory of Delhi. It is common ground that Letters Patent governing the Himachal Pradesh, High Court of Punjab was the law in force immediately before the appointed date and hence came to be applied within the Union Territory of Delhi by virtue of this provision. It is common ground that Letters Patent governing the Himachal Pradesh, High Court of Punjab was the law in force immediately before the appointed date and hence came to be applied within the Union Territory of Delhi by virtue of this provision. Clause 9 of the Letters Patent only conferred on the said High Court extra-ordinary original jurisdiction and not ordinary original civil jurisdiction which had to be considered on the Delhi High Court by section 5 (2) of the Delhi Act Clause 10 of the Letter Patent provided for an appeal from the judgment of one Judge to the Division Court of the said High Court pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1935 Under the circumstances, an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letter Patent of the said High Court referred to appeals from the judgment/order of a single Judge exercising the extra ordinary original jurisdiction and not ordinary civil jurisdiction. As far as an appeal against the decree or orders of a single Judge exercising ordinary civil jurisdiction, the same lay to the Division Court of the said High Court under section 10 (1) of the Delhi Act which reads as under :— "10. Power of Judges.—Where a single Judge of the High Court of Delhi exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction conferred by sub-section (2) of section 5 on that Court, an appeal shall lie from the judgment of the single Judge to a Division Court of that High Court." It deserves notice that this provision refers only to appeals against the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court exercising ordinary civil jurisdiction under section 5 (2) of the Act does not extent to appeals against orders of the single Judge. Though the jurisdiction similar to the jurisdiction conferred on the Delhi High Court under section 5 (2) of the Delhi Act, in relation to Union Territory of Delhi was also conferred on the said High Court under section 17 (3) of the said Act in relation to Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. No provision, whatsoever was made for appeal arising out of the judgment of a single Judge exercising jurisdiction under section 17 (3) of the said Act. 7. No provision, whatsoever was made for appeal arising out of the judgment of a single Judge exercising jurisdiction under section 17 (3) of the said Act. 7. In view of this statutory provision, it deserves consideration as to how any appeal against the judgment and orders of a single Judge of this Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction can lay to a Division Bench ? No decision either of Delhi High Court or of this Court has been brought to our notice dealing with the present controversy as regards the jurisdiction of Delhi High Court over the Union Territory of Delhi The question seems to have received consideration of a Full Bench of the said High Court in University of Delhi and another v. Hafiz Mohd Said and others, AIR 1972 Delhi 102, wherein it was noticed that prior to the coming into force the Delhi Act, the ordinary original civil jurisdiction in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi was being exercised by subordinate Judges and such jurisdiction was, for the first time, conferred on the High Court under section 5 (2) of the Act. The Court, therefore, clarifies that section 10 (1) of the Delhi Act is referable to appeals against the judgment passed in exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction and not otherwise. As regards the meaning of the judgment used in section 10 (1) of the said Act, the Full Bench held that the expression judgment has the same meaning as in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court, therefore, held that an appeal under section 10 (1) of the Delhi High Court Act against the order of a single Judge in the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction to a .Division Court lies only in those cases where an order is a judgment as denned in the Code of Civil Procedure and not otherwise. Following this judgment, a Division Bench of the said High Court in Public Trustee v. Rajeshwar Tyagi, AIR 1972 Delhi 302, held that from a judgment delivered by a single Judge exercising the jurisdiction inherited from the Punjab High Court under section 5 (1) of the Delhi Act, the appeal lies under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Following this judgment, a Division Bench of the said High Court in Public Trustee v. Rajeshwar Tyagi, AIR 1972 Delhi 302, held that from a judgment delivered by a single Judge exercising the jurisdiction inherited from the Punjab High Court under section 5 (1) of the Delhi Act, the appeal lies under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. On the other hand when a single Judge delivers a judgment in the exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction obtained from the subordinate Court under section 5 (2) of the Delhi Act, then the appeal lies under section 10 11) of the said Act. These judgments recognise the basic truth that in so far as appeals arising from the judgment passed by a single Judge of the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction are concerned, they lie under section 10 (1) of the *Delhi Act and not under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the said Court. Appeals referable to Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Delhi High Court are referable to section 5 (1) of the Delhi Act and are referable to exercise of jurisdiction other than the ordinary civil jurisdiction. These cases, however, do not hold that the jurisdiction exercisable by the Delhi High Court in relation to Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh under section 17 (3) of the Delhi Act is the same jurisdiction as exercised by the Delhi High Court under section 5 of the said Act. Since sections 5 and 10 of the Delhi Act are referable only to the Union Territory of Delhi and section 17 is the specific provision in relation to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh in that very Act, it will require consideration if thus jurisdiction exercised by the Delhi High Court in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi can be treated to be the jurisdiction vested in it in relation to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh It is well settled that a statute is an edict of the legislature and has to be construed according to the intent of them that make it. It is also well settled that the Court owe a duty to act upon the true intention of the legislature While performing this task, it is the obligation of the Courts to give effect to the plain meaning of the language us-d in the statute irrespective of the consequences. It is also well settled that the Court owe a duty to act upon the true intention of the legislature While performing this task, it is the obligation of the Courts to give effect to the plain meaning of the language us-d in the statute irrespective of the consequences. It is also well settled that a statute has to be read as a whole to make it effective and workable and to so doing, it is not permissible to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplus age, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute (See Aswini Kumar Ghose and another v. Arabinda Base, AIR 1952 SC 369 p. 377). It is also important to remember that "in the interpretation of statutes, the court always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect". (See J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P., AIR 1961 SC 1170 p. 1174). It is equally well settled that the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundency to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. (See Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax, AIR 1964 SC 766 ; State of Uttar Pradesh v Radhey Shyam, AIR 1989 SC 682). Application of these well established principles would not permit this Court to ignore specific provision under section 17 (3) of the Delhi Act. 8. A comparative study of section 17 (3) and section 5 (2) of this Act would indicate that both the provisions confer ordinary original civil jurisdiction to Delhi High Court into two distinct territories under its jurisdiction. While section 5 (2) confers this jurisdiction in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi, section 17 (3) (b) confers similar jurisdiction in relation to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. While section 5 (2) confers this jurisdiction in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi, section 17 (3) (b) confers similar jurisdiction in relation to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. Inspite of these two separate and distinct provisions, the provision for appeal existing under section 10 of this Act does not include section 17 (3) (b) of the Act A literal interpretation of these provisions would, therefore, indicate that though the Delhi High Court had ordinary original civil jurisdiction in the territories included both in the Union Territory of Delhi and Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, it was not vested appellate jurisdiction while exercising this jurisdiction in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. There is nothing on record to hold that the legislature intended to treat the litigants in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh differently than the litigants in the Union Territory of Delhi. It may be recalled that prior to this arrangement, the judicial administration in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh was done through the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and this apex Court did not have ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Apparently, therefore, the legislature intended to provide the benefit of ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court to the litigants in Himachal Pradesh. In such a situation, it would be unreasonable to hold that the legislature intended to deny the right of appeal to the litigants in Himachal Pradesh. The omission in sections 10 to 17 (3) (b) of the said Act must, therefore, be held to be unintentional and accidental. It is well settled that the right of appeal is the creation of a statute and cannot be conferred by any other manner, though forum for such appeal can be provided by making rule in that behalf. (See Rani Manprasad Gordhandas and others v. Gopichand Shersing Gupta and others, AIR 1973 SC 566. Inspite of the aforesaid discrepancy, courts have assumed that section 10 of this Act confers right of appeal upon litigants in the Ur-ion Territory of Himachal Pradesh as would be clear from Asha Singh Kochhar and another v. Darshan Singh Kochhar and others, ILR HP 551. It is also deserves notice that even this High Court has been entertaining and processing such appeals for decision since its inception. This long established practice has served litigants in this State satisfactorily. It is also deserves notice that even this High Court has been entertaining and processing such appeals for decision since its inception. This long established practice has served litigants in this State satisfactorily. The assumption and the practice, as aforesaid, has in effect provided legitimacy to section 10 of Delhi Act and saved it from the vice of discrimination, which is apparent. Though the normal rule is to give effect to the language of the statute as it is, departure from literal interpretation is permissible to avoid any mischief or any part of the statute becoming ineffective or arbitrary: (See Siraj-ul-Haq v. Sunni Control Board of Wakf, AIR 1959 SC 198). Application of the mischief rule or purposive interpretation is also legitimate in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Travancore v. Mohammed Khan, AIR. 1981 SC 1744 and Hammedia Hardware Stores v B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, AIR 1988 SC 1060. Under the circumstances, it would be just and proper to read section 10 of this Act as including the right of appeal against the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court dealing with cases arising in the territories included in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Since this interpretation links the law with realities of life and promotes justice, the Court has no hesitation in adopting the same. 9. The jurisdiction, as aforesaid, is, however, not unlimited. Its ambit and scope has been determined in the Full Bench decision in Asha Singh Kochhars case (supra) and includes the right of appeal not only against decrees but also appealable orders covered by section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, those orders, which are not covered under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not appealable. This is also the view of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Ajit Kumar, ILR 1976 HP 24, and the Delhi High Court in University of Delhi and another v Hafiz Mohd. Said and others, AIR 1972 Delhi 102. 10. It may now be examined if the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore was also applicable in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh and is now the law in the State of Himachal Pradesh. Said and others, AIR 1972 Delhi 102. 10. It may now be examined if the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore was also applicable in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh and is now the law in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The argument appears to be that before the Constitution of Delhi High Court in accordance with the Delhi Act in 1966, the High Court of Punjab exercised jurisdiction over Union Territory of Delhi. The High Court of Punjab was governed by the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore. On the constitution of the High Court of Delhi, laws in force with respect to the practice and procedure of the High Court and jurisdiction, authority and powers of the Judges of the High Court of Punjab were made applicable to the High Court of Delhi by section 5 (1) of the said Act. Since the High Court of Punjab was vested by Clause 9 of its Letters Patent with extraordinary original civil jurisdiction, the same came to be vested in the High Court of Delhi by section 5 (1) of the Delhi Act. It is, therefore, submitted that because of extension of jurisdiction of High Court of Delhi to Himachal Pradesh, the Letters Patent of High Court of Lahore also became applicable to Himachal Pradesh. Section 5 (1) of the Delhi Act, to which reference has been made above, is not the provision applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh. It has already been noticed that the jurisdiction of Delhi High Court was extended to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh under section 17 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of this provision clearly indicates that before extension of this jurisdiction, the court of the Judicial Commissioner for Himachal Pradesh was the Court for the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh, If the intention of the Legislature was to extend jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi as it had over the Union Territory of Delhi, under sections 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the Act, it would have expressly indicated either in section 17 or elsewhere in the Act. This provision being a specific provision, in so far as the Himachal Pradesh is concerned, would be the only provision governing jurisdiction of High Court of Delhi over the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. This provision being a specific provision, in so far as the Himachal Pradesh is concerned, would be the only provision governing jurisdiction of High Court of Delhi over the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. If this provision is considered in the context of section 5 (1) of the Act, it would appear that though the Delhi High Court has original, appellate and other jurisdiction in respect of the Union Territory of Delhi, as was exercised by the High Court of Punjab, immediately before the constitution of the said High Court. The words High Court of Punjab do not find place in section 17 (3)(a) of the Act, which confers original, appellate and other jurisdiction over the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh on the High Court of Delhi, as was exercised by the Court of Judicial Commissioner in Himachal Pradesh. It is, therefore, clear that all jurisdiction vested in the Delhi High Court in relation to Union Territory of Delhi was not exercisable by the said High Court in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh Under the circumstances, practice and procedure or the Letters Patent of Punjab High Court, which is said to have become the part of latter within the Union Territory of Delhi under section 5 (I) of the Act, would not be the law in relation to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh It is not in dispute that the Court of Judicial Commissioner for Himachal Pradesh did not have any original civil jurisdiction and that was the reason why section 17 (3) (b) of the Act specifically conferred the said jurisdiction on Delhi High Court in relation to Himachal Pradesh. 11. Since the jurisdiction of this Court, under section 23 of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970, includes "all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, are exercisable in respect of that part of the said territories by the High Court of Delhi", the jurisdiction of this Court would be the same as under section 17 (3) of the Act. There is, therefore, no justification for the sub mission that the Letters Patent governing jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab would also govern>the jurisdiction of this High Court. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, relied upon a Division Bench of this Court in Asha Singh Kochhar and another (supra) to support his submission aforesaid. There is, therefore, no justification for the sub mission that the Letters Patent governing jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab would also govern>the jurisdiction of this High Court. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, relied upon a Division Bench of this Court in Asha Singh Kochhar and another (supra) to support his submission aforesaid. The question considered by the Court was whether an interlocutory order passed by a single Judge of this Court in the course of trial of a suit, in exercise of original civil jurisdiction was appealable before a Division Bench of this Court ? The view of Honble the Chief Justice was that an appeal from the judgment of a single Judge of a High Court to a Division Bench of that High Court cannot be sustained on the basis of section 96 or section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the learned Chief Justice, the right of such an appeal has, therefore, to be found in the particular Act establishing the High Court. Section 10 (1) of the Act was, according to the learned Chief Justice, the only provision which can conceivably provide for such a right. The learned Chief Justice, therefore, held that section 10 (1) of the Act was wide enough to include the right of appeal from the judgment of the learned single Judge of the High Court to the Division Bench of the High Court. This view was not share by Lal, J., who was the other member of the Division Bench, According to Lal, J., the expression judgment used in section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act has the same meaning, as has been given to it by the Code of Civil Procedure. Any order amounting to judgment, which is appealable, section 10 (1) will only be that order, which has been specifically made appealable in section 104 or Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Because of the difference the matter was referred to the third Judge, who agreed with Lal, J. and held that the word judgment used in section 10 (1) of the Act includes those orders which are within the scope of section 104 read with Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All the three judgment written by three learned and distinguished Judges deal with section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act but none of them noticed section 17 (3) thereof. The learned Chief Justice, however, considered the submission whether Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of High Court of Judicature at Lahore was reflected in section 10 of the Act. According to the learned Chief Justice :— ".....it seems to me, on a fair reading of section 10, that the two sub-sections of section 10 deal with allied matters. While sub-section (1) deals with the appeals arising out of the exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, sub-section (2) deals with appeals arising out of the exercise of the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction as well as the other appeals contemplated by Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Now, Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, it cannot be disputed, creates a right of appeal from the judgment of a single Judge exercising extraordinary original civil jurisdiction and also specifies the forum for such appeals. It deals with both matters, the right of appeal as well as the forum for such appeals There is every reason to hold that the same pattern is woven in the provision of section 10 (1), which relates to the newly created ordinary original civil jurisdiction. It deals with both matters, the right of appeal as well as the forum for such appeals There is every reason to hold that the same pattern is woven in the provision of section 10 (1), which relates to the newly created ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Section 10(1) must also be taken to provide (a) a right of appeal from the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court, and (b) that the forum of such appeal is a Division Court of the High Court." The learned Chief Justice thereafter held that : “....even if it is said that Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is not reflected in section 10 (2) of the Delhi High Court Act, and the latter is concerned only with what is mentioned in Clause 26 of the Letters Patent, and provisions akin to Clause 10 of the Letters Patent are to be found elsewhere in the Act, the question will still remain, the argument of the appellants being accepted that section 10 (I) of the Act provides the forum of appeal only, whether the right of appeal from the judgment of a single Judge in the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction can be discovered anything were else in the Act." It would thus appear that the learned Chief Justice did not pass any final judgment on the question whether Letters Patent of High Court of Judicature at Lahore was reflected in section 10 of the Delhi High Court. Observations of the learned Chief Justice seems to be to the contrary and are that the said power has to be discovered in the provisions of the Act itself Lal, J., who differed with the learned Chief Justice did not deal with this aspect of the matter. Indeed, according to him meaning attached to the word judgment in the Letters- Patent was not relevant and the matter has to be considered in the context of section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act Mehta, J., to whom the matter was ultimately referred also did not hold that the meaning of the word judgment in section 10 (1) of the Delhi High Court Act will be referable to the meaning attached to the word appearing in the Letters Patent He instead interpreted the word de hors the provision of the Letter Patent. However, while considering the forum for the appeal, the learned Judge noticed the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court and observed that:— "Provision for intra-court appeal is made by Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, and section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 Clause 10 of the Letters Patent contemplates intra-court appeals in cases of exercise of extraordinary original jurisdiction and of appellate jurisdiction. Section 10 of the Act saves this power in sub-section (2) and goes further by investing the High Court with additional power of hearing intra-court appeals with respect to the matters which are of the character of ordinary original jurisdiction. This is done by sub-section (1). Section 10 thus becomes an all comprehensive section by covering all the types of intra-court appeals. Thus by the application of the Act High Court has two types of original jurisdiction; namely, (1) ordinary and (2) extraordinary. The first type of jurisdiction is provided by sub-section (1) of section 10, while the second type of jurisdiction is provided by sub-section (2) thereof. Historical perspective of both these types of original jurisdiction being different, the distinction between sub-sections (1) and (2) assumes importance. Intra-court appeals contemplated by both 4 the sub-sections of section 10 are against the judgment of a single Judge because while sub-section (1) specifically refers to that expression, subsection (2) makes a reference to that expression by necessary implication because it saves Clause 10 of the Letters Patent " 13. Even while observing as aforesaid, the learned Judge did not consider section 17 (3) of the Act Indeed, it appears that the question whether the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court over the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh was the jurisdiction exercisable by it under sections 5 and 10 of the said Act or it was the jurisdiction exercisable only under section 17 (3) thereof was not pressed for consideration of the Honble Judges Under the circumstances, though this judgment is the authority for the proposition that section 10 (1) of the Delhi Act includes appeals against judgments rendered under section 17 (3) (b), it does not support the submission that the said Letters Patent is also the law in relation to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. 14. 14. Learned Counsel for the appellant also brought to our notice the decision of the Delhi High Court in Ashok Kumar v. Administrator Himachal,. 1968 DLT 82 Letters Patent Appeal in the said case was against the order of a single Judge of the Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant. The respondents took the objection that the appeal was not maintainable. The writ petition was filed in the Judicial Commissioners court but since in the meantime Delhi High Court had been constituted, the said writ petition was decided by a learned single Judge of Delhi High Court. It was not disputed that the Delhi High Court had the jurisdiction over the territory of Himachal Pradesh. The Court, therefore, held that section 10 (2) of the Delhi High Court Act makes the power under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Punjab High Court available to the Delhi High Court and hence the Letters Patent appeal was maintain able. Under the circumstances, even this judgment will not be of any help for decision of the controversy. Whatever might be the legal position before section 17 of the Delhi Act was brought into force, the jurisdiction of Delhi High Court over the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1-5-1967 would be the jurisdiction specifically conferred on the said High Court by section 17 (3) of the said Act and nothing more. In this view of the matter, there is no justification for applying the Letters Patent Lahore High Court to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh. The Full Bench of Delhi High Court deciding the University of Delhi case (supra) and the Division Bench decision in Public Trustee case (supra) also follow this very reasoning and, therefore, support our aforesaid conclusion. 15. In view of the discussion aforesaid, the Letters Patent of High Court of Judicature at Lahore has no application in the State of Himachal Pradesh and hence no appeal either under Clause 9 or Clause 10 of the said Letters Patent would lie to this High Court. The appeal against the judgment of a single Judge of this Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction will, however, lie to a Division Bench of the High Court by virtue of section 10 of the Delhi Act. The appeal against the judgment of a single Judge of this Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction will, however, lie to a Division Bench of the High Court by virtue of section 10 of the Delhi Act. This appellate jurisdiction is available against decrees and appealable orders covered under section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant case, the impugned order is admittedly not covered by any part of Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and hence no appeal against the said order would lie to the Division Bench of this Court. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.