JUDGMENT S. N. Phukan, J.—This is a petition filed under sections 401 and 482, Cr. P. C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the Sessions Judge, Shimla in criminal revision No. 5-S/10 of 1991 dated 5-8-1993. By the said order the learned Sessions Judge affirmed the order of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rampur, District Shimla in case No. 38-IV of 1989. It may be stated that the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate awarded maintenance of Rs. 200 per month to respondent No, 1 in a petition under section 125, Cr. P. C. by respondent No. 2. 2. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows. Respondent No. 2, Smt. Sewa Dassi, filed a petition under section 125, Cr. P. C. before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, claiming maintenance for herself and her son. It was alleged that there was intimacy between Smt. Sewa Dassi, respondent No. 2 and the present petitioner Prem Nath and they also had sexual intercourse. According to respondent No. 2, Prem Nath had agreed to marry her and after sexual intercourse, she gave birth to a child It has also been stated that the present petitioner Prem Nath agreed that the child would be the share-holder of the property. The child was born on 30-3-1989 and according to respondent No. 2, Sewa Dassi, Prem Nath came alongwith Shri Kamla Nand, Narsingh Dass and Roop Dass to her house for settlement of the matter. According to respondent No. 2, the present petitioner offered a sum of Rs. 5,000 for settling the matter, but he did not agree to take the child. Therefore, the present petition was filed for maintenance under section 125, Cr. P.C. as stated above. 3. The learned trial Court, after considering the evidence on record as well as the documents held that Smt. Sewa Dassi was not duly married to the present petitioner Prem Nath, but the present petitioner was the father of respondent No. 1, that is, the child which was born and accordingly the learned trial Court awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200 per month for the child, through respondent No. 2. 4. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner filed a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, which was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 5-8-1993. 5. Heard Mr. Praneet Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. 200 per month for the child, through respondent No. 2. 4. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner filed a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, which was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 5-8-1993. 5. Heard Mr. Praneet Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Devyani Kuthiala, learned Counsel for the respondents. 6. The first point urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents is that the present revision petition is not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the apex Court as well as other courts. Learned Counsel urged that second revision petition is barred in view of the provisions contained in section 397 (3), Cr. P. C. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondents has drawn attention of this court to the decision of the apex Court in Dharampal v. Smt. Ramshri and others, AIR 1993 SC 1361. In this case it was held by the apex Court after considering the scope of sub-section (3) of section 397 and also section 482, Cr. P C that when a revision petition is dismissed by the Sessions Judge, the High Court cannot entertain a second revision petition in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482, Cr. P. C. 8. The attention of this court was also drawn to the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Soni and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1983 PLR 615. In this case the learned Single Judge considered the scope of section 397 (3), Cr. P C. with reference to section 482, Cr. P. C. and held that a concurrent jurisdiction is vested under the law in the Court of Sessions and the High Court and the Sessions Judge can exercise powers of revision. It is further held that it is provided in section 397 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure that if an application for revision is made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by either of them. Obviously second revision petition could not have been filed in that case and that is why a recourse to section 482, Cr. P. C. seems to have been made. However, such a course cannot be permitted in the garb of an application filed under some other provision of law. 9. Obviously second revision petition could not have been filed in that case and that is why a recourse to section 482, Cr. P. C. seems to have been made. However, such a course cannot be permitted in the garb of an application filed under some other provision of law. 9. In view of the above settled law, there cannot be any dispute that a second revision petition cannot be entertained by this court either under section 482, Cr P, C or under Article 227 of the Constitution. 10. It may be stated that under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of this court is limited inasmuch as this court has to ensure that the subordinate court or tribunal exercise their powers within the provisions of law. In the case in hand, it cannot be said that the learned Sessions Judge exceeded its jurisdiction or went out side the provisions of law and, there fore, the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution is also not applicable to the case in hand. 11. On this point alone, the second revision petition is not maintain able and the present petition is liable to be dismissed. However, as the various contentions have been raised before this pourt by the learned Counsel for the parties, I would like to deal with the said contentions 12. Relying on the decision in Bhaskaran v. Kunhipennu, I960 Cr LJ 353, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in such a case the court ought not to decide that the petitioner was the father of respondent No. I on the uncorroborated testimony of respondent No. 2, who is the mother of the child. Law is well settled that in such a case, more particularly, when a lady is married, the court must insist on corroboration for deciding the paternity of the child. On that point there is no dispute. 13. Now the question is whether in the case in hand there is any other corroboration. In this behalf, learned Counsel for the respondents has drawn the attention of this court that after the child was born and when the respondent No. 2 asked the present petitioner to take the child as his father, the present petitioner went to the house of the respondent No. 2 alongwith other persons who have been examined and offered Ks. 5,000 as settlement of the entire dispute. 5,000 as settlement of the entire dispute. Both the courts below have discussed the evidence on record regarding this part of the story and have accepted it. In a second revision, I am unable to disagree with the reasoning given by the court below. I may also add here that the court below has duly considered the entire evidence on record and has held that there was sufficient corroboration to support the fact that the present petitioner was the father of respondent No. 1. It has also been held by the court below that respondent No 1 was born due to illicit connection and sexual intercourse between the present petitioner and respondent No. 2. The reasoning given by the court below cannot be faulted and there is no question of any interference by this court on this factual matter. It has been urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that as respondent No, 2, Sewa Dassi was married to one Sunder and the marriage was subsisting, the finding of the court below that the present petitioner is the father of respondent No. 1 is contrary to law. On a perusal of the record I find that Sewa Dassi, respondent No. 2, specifically stated that there was divorce between her and Sunder and in support she brought on record certified copy of the Pariwar Register, Ex. P-l and according to the said certificate it was recorded that she was wife of Sunder, but on execution of divorce on 10-5-1986, her name was struck off from the family of Sunder. 14. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Ex. P-l cannot be accepted. In reply, learned Counsel for the respondents has pressed before this court the decisions of various courts in support of her contention that the document Ex. P-l being a public document can be accepted in evidence. 15. 14. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Ex. P-l cannot be accepted. In reply, learned Counsel for the respondents has pressed before this court the decisions of various courts in support of her contention that the document Ex. P-l being a public document can be accepted in evidence. 15. In Tarak Chandra Chuckerbutty and another v. Prasanna Kumar Saha, AIR 1924 Cal 654, A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court considered section 35 of the Evidence Act and held that this section is based upon the circumstances that in the case of official documents entries are made in discharge of public duty by an officer who is authorised accredited agent appointed for the purpose, The law reposes such a confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity 16. The Punjab High Court in Sant Ram and others v Sital Dass, AIR 1952 Punj 301, held that section 35 of the Evidence Act is based upon the circumstance that in the case of official documents entries are made in the discharge of public duty by an officer who is authorised and is an accredit ed agent appointed for the purpose and that the principle underlying section 35 is that the person making the entry should be a person vested with authority to record a decision, which so far as the matter before him is concerned, will be final. 17. The Patna High Court in Bhujhawan Singh & others v. Ml Shyama Devi and others, AIR 1964 Pat 301, held that entries in birth and death register are public documents and are admissible under section 3S of the Evidence Act. It was also held that the ground of reception of such evidence is that it is the public duty of a person who keeps the register to make such entries after satisfying himself of the truth. The court further held that when it is the duty of a public servant to make such entries in any public or official register, it becomes admissible to prove the truth of facts entered as well as the fact that the entries were made by the officer. The court further held that when it is the duty of a public servant to make such entries in any public or official register, it becomes admissible to prove the truth of facts entered as well as the fact that the entries were made by the officer. According to the Division Bench, the entries in the register of birth, death or marriage are at least prima facie, though they may not be always conclusive evidence and it is not necessary to prove who made the entries and what was the source of his information. 18. I am in respectful agreement of the above decisions and I hold that in the case in hand also Ex. P-l has been proved on record as a public document and on this basis the court has rightly held that there was a divorce between respondent No. 2, Sewa Dassi and Sunder. I may add here that no evidence in rebuttal has been adduced by the present petitioner. 19. For the reasons stated above, I hold that apart from the fact that the present second revision is not maintainable, even on facts no case is made out by the present petitioner to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and accordingly the present petition has no merit. Therefore, the petition is dismissed. Costs on parties. Petition dismissed.