ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THESE three applications are interlined as they have a common genesis on a complaint filed by Smt. Satyabhama Panda, opposite party in each of the cases registered as I. C. C. No. 22 of 1994 before learned Sub divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kurda. According to Satyabhama, petitioner Solemn acted in an illegal manner in arrest ing her husband Desarathi Panda in order to satisfy the ego of petitioners Prafulla Chandra and Ramakanta, who were inimically disposed towards her, and Dasarathi. Allegations of Satyabhama were that while accused-petitioner Soleman was effect ing arrest, he misbehaved with her and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 354, I. P. C. and since he forcibly took away Dasarathi he committed an offence punishable under Section 365, I. P. C. So far as petitioner Ramakant and Prafulla are concerned, the allegation of Satyabhama was that they had masterminded the whole thing and at their behest petitioner Soleman acted. ( 2 ) ON the basis of complaint filed, cognizance has been taken by the learned SDJM. Khurda of offences punishable under Sections 354/365 read with Section 34, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'i. P. C. ') by order dated 2-2-1994. Learned SDJM expressed a view that though the petitioner Soleman was working as Sub-Inspectot of Police, Banki Police Station, he was not given protection under Section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, 'cr. P. C. ') as he had not committed the offences in course of his duty. ( 3 ) MR. R. N. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioners in each of the cases submitted that with a view to harass the petitioners, false case has been foisted by Satyabhama. Strong reliance is placed on the first information report lodged by petitioner Ratnakanta at Banki Police Station, which is sub ject-matter of adjudication in G. R. Case No. 15 of 1994 in the Court of learned SDJM, Banki. Dasarathi, the husband of Satyabhama is the accused in the said case. He was arrested on 30-1-1994 at 9. 30 p. m. and was produced in Court on 31-1-1994. He was also later on released on bail. Dasarathi, the husband of Satyabhama is the accused in the said case. He was arrested on 30-1-1994 at 9. 30 p. m. and was produced in Court on 31-1-1994. He was also later on released on bail. With reference to the order passed by the learned SDJM, Banki on 31-1-1994, it is submitted that Dasarathi did not complain of any ill treatment by Police and even did not make a statement that he was illegally arrested by Soleman. With reference to the statements in the complaint petition, the initial statement of Satyabhama and the statement of witnesses. It is submitted that falsehood is writ at large. This according to Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for petitioners is sufficient to show that Satyabhama has not come to court with clean hands, and continuance of the proceeding would be sheer abuse of process of Court. So far as applicability of Section 197, Cr. P. C. is concerned, it is submitted that the learned SDJM should not have expressed any opinion about non applicability of it. Accused-petitioner Soleman had not even appeared before him. ( 4 ) MR. D. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for Satyabhama in each of the applications, submitted that the complaint made by Satyabhama and the statement of the witnesses fully make out a ease for proceeding against the petitioners and at this stage it would not be proper co interfere with the order of cognizance passed by the learned SDJM, Khurda. ( 5 ) IN order to constitute an offence under Section 365, IPC the essential ingredients are as follows : (I) Kidnapping by the accused or abduction by him; (II) Intention of the accused is to keep that person kidnapped or abducted in wrongful or secret confinement. 'kidnapping' is defined in Section 359, I. P. C. and is of two kinds. i. e. , kidnapping from India, and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. 'abduction' is defined in Section 362, I. P. C. so far as question of kidnapping from India is concerned, there is no allegation that there was kidnapping from India. Therefore, Section 360, which deals with such kid napping has no application. The other type of kid napping is from lawful guardianship which relates to a minor under sixteen year of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female or any person of unsound mind without the consent of such guard ian. Therefore, Section 360, which deals with such kid napping has no application. The other type of kid napping is from lawful guardianship which relates to a minor under sixteen year of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female or any person of unsound mind without the consent of such guard ian. Admittedly Section 361, will have no applica tion. The only other question is whether Section 362, which deals with abduction can be applied to the facts of the case. In order to constitute an offence of abduction two essentials are to be established. i. e. , (i) forcible or forceful compulsion or inducement by deceitful means; and (ii) the object of such compul sion or inducement must be the going of a person from any place. As has been rightly submitted by Mr. Mohanty, the learned counsel for petitioners, in view of state ment of Dasarathi made before the learned SDJM, Banki that there was no ill-treatment by Police, and in the absence of a complaint that he was illegally arrested by Soleman or that he had been abducted, the question of proceeding against any of the peti tioners for commission of offence punishable under Section 365, I. P. C. does not arise. ( 6 ) SO far as Section 354, is concerned, it is open to petitioner Soleman against whom allegation of misbehaviour is made to highlight before the learned SDJM about absence of essential ingredients neces sary to constitute an offence under the said Section. ( 7 ) SO far as petitioners Prafulla and Ramakanta are concerned, a bare reading of the complaint petition, statement of the complainant and the wit nesses examined does not even by implication at tribute any overt act to bring in application of Section 34. Common intention which is sine qua non for application of Section 34, I. P. C. implies a pre arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. The essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be-known to the rest of them and shared by them. Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be-known to the rest of them and shared by them. What to speak of similar intention even same intention without shar ing each other's intention is not enough to bring in application of Section 34, I. P. C. It is true that the Court should be extremely slow to interfere with order of cognizance. But where the complaint peti tion, statement of complainant, and those of wit nesses if any taken in its entirety, without any addition or subtraction does not disclose commis sion of any offence, and that too by any person who is accused of having committed it, the Court can interfere. The case at hand falls to such category of cases. Continuance of the proceeding against Prafulla and Ramakanta would be sheer abuse of the process of law. Accordingly, the petitions tiled by Prafulla and Ramakanta are allowed and the proceedings shall not continue so far as they are concerned. ( 8 ) SO far applicability of Section 197, Cr. P. C. is concerned, the scope and ambit thereof has been elaborately dealt with, by the apex Court in Bakshish Singh Brar v. Smt. Gurmej Kaur AIR 1988 SC 257 and by this Court in Bishnu Prasad Mohapatra v. Harihar Patnaik : Vol. 34 (1992) OJD 87 (Crl.) and Sk. Siraj v. State of Orissa : (1994) 7 OCR 229. The protection given under Section 197 is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexacious criminal pro ceedings for offences alleged to have been commit ted by them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his offi cial duty and are not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his offi cial duty and are not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, be acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protec tion. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197, can be invoked it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an of fence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so such as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this Section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor it is possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. If at any stage question of applicability of Section 197, Cr. If at any stage question of applicability of Section 197, Cr. P. C. is raised, the learned SDJM shall deal with the same, keeping in view the principles indicated in Bakshish's case (supra) and Bishou Prasad's case (supra ). ( 9 ) SO far as petitioner Soleman's challenge to non-applicability of Section 354, I. P. C. is concerned, as indicated above he is free to highlight the same before the learned SDJM. Learned counsel appear ing for him states that he shall appear before the learned SDJM on 27/07/1994, and shall move for bail. On his surrendering before the learned SDJM and moving for bail, he shall be released on bail of Rs. 10,000. 00 with two sureties each for the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned SDJM, non-bailable warrant of arrest, is not already ex ecuted it not be executed till 27/07/1994. The applications are accordingly disposed of. Order accordingly. .