A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners of these two petitions are brothers. Their holding with respect to some parcels of land is on co-ownership basis. Questions of fact and law arising in both these petitions are pratically identical. I have, therefore, thought it fit to dispose of both these petitions by this common judgment of mine. ( 2 ) IT is not necessary to set out in detail the facts giving rise to both these petitions. Each petitioner was holding certain parcels of land within the urban agglomeration of Surat. They were used for agricultural purposes. They applied for exemption under Sec. 20 (1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the Act for brief) with respect to their holding. By one order passed on 15th/ 22nd March 1978 involved in Special Civil Application No. 4804 of 1982 (the first Petition for convenience) and on 5th May 1979 involved in Special Civil application No. 5271 of 1982 (the Second Petition for convenience), the exemption as prayed for came to be granted. The exemption order is at Annexure- a to each petition. It appears that survery No. 32/2 situated at village Bathar within the urban agglomeration of Surat was owned by both the petitioners on coownership basis. The exemption with respect to that parcel of land came to be cancelled qua each petitioners share therein by one order passed on 27th December 1979 on the ground that that parcel of land was proposed to be acquired by the municipal Corporation of Surat. A copy of the aforesaid order passed on 27th december 1979 is at Annexure-AA to each petition. Thereupon an order was passed on 8th October 1980 making modification in the exemption order at annexure-A to each petition. A copy of the aforesaid modification order passed on 8th October 1980 is at Annexure-B to each petition. It appears that each petitioner filled in the prescribed form under Sec. 6 (1) of the Act with respect to his holding within the urban agglomeration of Surat. A copy of the aforesaid modification order passed on 8th October 1980 is at Annexure-B to each petition. It appears that each petitioner filled in the prescribed form under Sec. 6 (1) of the Act with respect to his holding within the urban agglomeration of Surat. Pursuant thereto, the competent Authority at Surat (respondent No. 2 in each case) by his order passed on 25th March 1982 involved in the First Petition and on 14th April 1982 involved in the Second Petition, declared the holding of the petitioner of the First petition to be in excess of the ceiling limit by 5506 square metres and the holding of the petitioner of the Second Petition to be in excess of the ceiling limit by 1777. 54 square metres respectively. A copy of the aforesaid order passed by respondent No. 2 herein is at Annexure-C to each petition. That aggrieved each petitioner. Each carried the matter in appeal before the Urban Land Tribunal at ahmedabad (respondent No. 1 in each case) under Sec. 33 of the Act. The appeal of the petitioner of the First Petition came to be registered as Appeal No. Surat- 5 of 1982 whereas that of the petitioner of the Second Petition Appeal No. Surat- 6 of 1982. By his common order passed on 30th August 1982 in the aforesaid two appeals, respondent No. 1 dismissed both the appeals. A copy of the aforesaid common appellate order is at Annexure-D to each petition. That aggrieved each petitioner. Each has thereupon moved this Court by means of his respective petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the impugned order at Annexure-C to each petition as affirmed in appeal by the common appellate order at Annexure-D to each petition. Each petitioner has also challenged the legality and validity of the withdrawal of exemption by the order at Annexure-AA to each petition. ( 3 ) THE order at Annexure-AA to each petition was obviously passed under Sec. 20 (2) of the Act. It is an admitted position that no opportunity of hearing or making representation against the proposed action was given as provided therein. The order at Annexure-AA to each petition can thus be said to be violative of the audi alteram partem rule. It cannot, therefore, be sustained in law on this ground alone. It is an admitted position that no opportunity of hearing or making representation against the proposed action was given as provided therein. The order at Annexure-AA to each petition can thus be said to be violative of the audi alteram partem rule. It cannot, therefore, be sustained in law on this ground alone. ( 4 ) IT has been urged on behalf of the petitioner in each case that the lands held by each petitioner were agricultural lands and were used for agricultural purposes on 17th February 1976 and no master plan answering its definition contained in sec. 2 (h) of the Act was in existence showing the disputed lands in the zone other than the agricultural zone, and as such the lands held by each petitioner would fall outside the purview of "vacant land" as defined in Sec. 2 (q) of the Act in view of the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Atia Mohammadi Begum v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1993 SC 2465 . As against the aforesaid submission urged before me by Kum. Shah for the petitioners, Shri Dave for the respondents has urged that each petitioner made an application for exemption under Sec. 20 of the Act qua his holding and the essential condition for applying for such exemption would be that the lands held by the petitioner in each case would be in excess of the ceiling limit for the purposes of the Act. According to shri Dave for the respondents, once an application for exemption under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act is made with respect to the holding of the applicant, he could be said to have admitted that his holding is amenable to the provisions of the Act and it would not be open to such land-holder to resile from his admission in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court. ( 5 ) IT is true that an application under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act is to be made by a land-holder if his holding is in excess of the ceiling limit. It cannot be gainsaid that the law declared by a ruling of the Supreme Court will have retrospective operation unless it is made prospective in operation. It is a settled principle of law that, when a Court decides a case, it applies the law as it was in operation. It cannot be gainsaid that the law declared by a ruling of the Supreme Court will have retrospective operation unless it is made prospective in operation. It is a settled principle of law that, when a Court decides a case, it applies the law as it was in operation. This is in consonance with the declaratory theory of law. In the process it could be the law developed by judicial precedents or what is known in the legal parlance as the case law. The function of the Court, as is popularly known, is to declare the law and not to make the one. In that view of the matter, the law declared by the Apex court in its aforesaid binding ruling can be said to be as it was when the Act came into force on and from 17th February 1976. If the lands in respect of which the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court is applicable would not answer the definition "vacant land" contained in Sec. 2 (q) of the Act, a land-holder of such lands would not, therefore, be required to make any application under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act. If he makes such application, it can be said to be under some misconception of law. It can thus be styled as an admission or a concession on a question of law. By making such application, though legally the lands in question would fall outside the purview of "vacant lands" as defined in Sec. 2 (q) of the Act in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court, the land-holder admits them to be "vacant lands" for the purposes of the Act. It can thus be said to be settled principle of law that a concession on a question of fact binds the party but not a concession on a question of law. I am, therefore, of the opinion that an application for exemption under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act under some misconception of law would not tantamount to treating the holding of the applicant to be "vacant lands" as defined in Sec. 2 (q) of the Act if that holding falls outside its purview in view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court. ( 6 ) IT may be mentioned at this stage that neither respondent No. 2 nor respondent No. 1 has focused his attention on the question whether or not any master plan was in existence on 17th February 1976 with respect to the area in which the holding of each petitioner was situated. This can best be examined by respondent No. 2 as the Competent Authority. He will have to decide the issue in the light of the following three questions : (I) Was any master plan answering its definition contained in Sec. 2 (h) of the Act in existence as on 17th February 1976 with respect to the area in which the holding of each petitioner was situated ? (ii) If it was so, were the lands held by each petitioner shown in the agricultural zone or in any other zone ? (iii) If they were shown in the agricultural zone, were agricultural operations in fact carried on in the lands in question on and before 17th February 1976 ? ( 7 ) IN order to enable respondent No. 2 to decide all these questions, the matter in each case will have to be remanded to him after setting aside the impugned order at Annexure-C to each petition as affirmed in appeal by the common appellate order at Annexure-D to each petition. The matter will have to be remanded to respondent No. 2 as the Competent Authority for restoration of the proceeding in each case to file and for his fresh decision according to law in the light of this judgment of mine. In case, after remand, respondent No. 2 herein comes to the conclusion that the holding of the petitioner in each or either case does not fall within the purview of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court, it would be open to each petitioner to harp upon the exemption sought by them under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act. In that case, it would be open to respondent No. 3 to take an appropriate proceeding, if necessary, for cancellation of the exemption or any part thereof in accordance with Sec. 20 (2) of the Act. ( 8 ) IN the result, each petition is accepted. The impugned order at Annexure-AA to each petition is quashed and set aside. In that case, it would be open to respondent No. 3 to take an appropriate proceeding, if necessary, for cancellation of the exemption or any part thereof in accordance with Sec. 20 (2) of the Act. ( 8 ) IN the result, each petition is accepted. The impugned order at Annexure-AA to each petition is quashed and set aside. The impugned order passed by the competent Authority at Surat (respondent No. 2 herein) on 14th April 1982 in the case of the petitioner of the First Petition and on 25th March 1982 in the case of the petitioner of the Second Petition at Annexure-C to each petition as affirmed in appeal by the common appellate order passed by the Urban Land Tribunal at Ahmedabad (respondent No. 1 herein) on 30th August 1982 in Appeal Nos. Surat-5 and 6 of 1982 at Annexure-D to each petition is quashed and set aside. The matter in each case is remanded to respondent No. 2 herein for restoration of the proceedings in question to file and for his fresh decision according to law in the light of this judgment of mine. Rule is accordingly made absolute in each case to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. .