JUDGMENT S. N. Phukan, J.—This revision petition under sections 397 and 401 read with section 482, Cr. P. C. has been filed against the judgment dated 8-9-1993 passed by the learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamsbala in case No. 8-N of 1993, By the impugned judgment the learned Sessions Judge discharged six present respondents of the charge under sections 379/420/467/468/471/120-B, IP.C, and under sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act and also under section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Briefly stated the facts are as follows. A news item appeared in the newspaper, Punjab Kesari, dated 22-7-1982 in which it was reported that some illicit felling of trees was taking place in Ambel beat of Mastearh forest of Kotla Range of Nurpur Division. On the basis of this news item, the forest department of the State Government took suo motu action and deputed one Shn R. S. Hazooria who was at that time Assistant Conservator of Forests, Dharamshala to enquire into the matter The said officer conducted the enquiry and after completion of the enquiry submitted his report to the Conservator of Forests, Dharamshala The report was forwarded to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Enforcement who in turn ordered the case to be registered on the basis of such report Accordingly F I. R. No. 34 of 1984 was registered at Police Station Enforcement, North Division, Dharamshala on 3-12-1984 The police after enquiry submitted chalian against all the present six respondents who are forest officials. The learned trial Court on perusal of the relevant papers, by the impugned judgment, held that no prima facie case has been made out against all the accused respondents and accordingly discharged them. Hence the present revision petition. 3. Heard Mrs. Shyama Dogra, learned Deputy Advocate General and Mr. Jagdish Vats and Mr. Naresh Sood, learned Counsel for the respondents. 4. Before considering the facts of the case, let me discuss the law on the subject. 5. Attention of this Court was drawn to the decision of the apex Court in State of Bihar v Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 In that case rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused commuted the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 6. 5. Attention of this Court was drawn to the decision of the apex Court in State of Bihar v Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 In that case rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused commuted the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 6. The apex Court in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co Ltd v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 545, has held that it cannot be said that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the persons liberty and it cannot be said that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities by relying on the documents referred to in section 173, Cr. P. C. consider it proper to institute the case It was also held that the responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Their Lordships were of the opinion that without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution. 7. To sum up, the law laid down by the apex Court may be stated as follows. At the time of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its judicial mind as to whether there is a prima facie case against the accused persons. In doing so, the Court has to rely on the documents referred to in section 173, Cr. P. C. At this stage the Court cannot judge as to whether the evidence is correct or not. If the evidence recorded by the prosecution is accepted and it shows that there is a prima facie case against the accused, the Court has to frame charge. On the other hand, if the Court is of the opinion on the basis of the record and also the evidence produced by the prosecution, that no ease has been made out, the Court is bound to discharge the accused persons. 8. Coming to the facts of the case, the F.I.R. was lodged on 3-12-1984 and the challan was submitted before the Court on 26-54993. 8. Coming to the facts of the case, the F.I.R. was lodged on 3-12-1984 and the challan was submitted before the Court on 26-54993. This delay is sufficient to hold that the prosecution case cannot be accepted as it is settled law that a speedy trial is a fundamental right of a person. The learned trial Court has given a very reasoned judgment and it has also discussed the entire evidence collected by the prosecution. Therefore, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction it would not be proper to sit as an appellate Court and disturb the judgement. 9. It may be stated that from the impugned judgment of the learned trial Court, it is absolutely clear that the learned Public Prosecutor was fairly considerate to state that there was no substance in the accusation against the accused persons under sections 41 or 42 of the Indian Forest Act and therefore, on this concession being given by the -learned Public Prosecutor, the above charges cannot continue. 10. Regarding the charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the learned trial Court has rightly observed that there is no substance that the accused persons felled the trees for their own use. On this ground, the learned trial Court rightly refused to frame charge under the said section. That apart, the learned trial Court has also discussed that the damage report prepared was duly complied with and the persons who were supposed to have felled the trees have paid the compensation to the extent of Rs. 5,370 65 and this amount has duly been deposited in the Government account in the treasury. Therefore, their Lordships considered the scope and ambit of sections 227 and 228, Cr P. C. and held that reading both the sections together juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. It was also held that nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused, and it is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weight in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. It was also held that nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused, and it is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weight in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. It was further held that the standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under section 227 or section 228, Cr P. C. and at that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Further, their Lordships held that strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial, but at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Further, according to their Lordships, if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or there is no case under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act in their case. 11. Regarding other charges, I find from the impugned judgment that actually trees were not felled but some small shrubs were felled by the forest officials for using as fencing poles for the purpose of protecting the rare species This cannot be faulted as it was necessary to do so. The Court has duly considered the muster roll regarding felling of such trees and using them as poles for fencing for the purpose of protecting the rare species of the forest department. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly discharged the accused persons who are respondents herein. 12. The Court has duly considered the muster roll regarding felling of such trees and using them as poles for fencing for the purpose of protecting the rare species of the forest department. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly discharged the accused persons who are respondents herein. 12. It may be stated that while discharging the accused persons of the charges, the learned trial Court has neither added anything nor appreciated the evidence on record The learned trial Court only relied upon the evidence collected by the prosecution and on the evidence of the prosecution the trial Court come to the finding that no prima facie case is made out for framing charge against the accused persons. 13. For the reasons stated above, I hold that there is no illegality or irregularity committed by the learned trial Court and, therefore, it does not call for any interference by this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 14. For the reasons stated above, this petition has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.