Judgment : Defendants 1 to 3 in O.S.No.92 of 1992 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Mayiladuthurai are the appellants herein. The respondents are the plaintiffs. The suit is for declaration that the order of eviction dated 11. 1983 made in R.C.O.P.No.51 of 1981 on the file of the learned Rent Controller, Mayiladuthurai (District Munsif) confirmed by the Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.4 of 1983 and as confirmed by this Court in C.R.P.No.3220 of 1984 is invalid in law, null and void, inexecutable and unenforceable, having been passed without jurisdiction, and for permanent injunction restraining defendants 1 to 3 from enforcing the said order of eviction and interfering in any manner with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by plaintiffs. 2. The plaintiffs are the sons of Rajagopala Van-daiyar and they had become divided already by partition of their joint family properties. Later on, they started a partnership business in the name and style of “Rajagopala Vandaiyar and Sons” with the father as managing partner on 4. 1976. Later on, Rajarajan, the 1st plaintiff herein expressed a desire to retire from the partnership and the other two partners agreed for reconstitution of the said partnership with the 2nd plaintiff and the 5th defendant alone as partners and a partnership agreement dated 3. 1978 was entered into and the same continued till 1981 when the rent control proceedings in R.CO.P.No.51 of 1981 was initiated. During this time, there were other partners in the firm besides Rajagopala Vandaiyar who were interested in the suit property. The suit property is situated in T.S.Nos.1127 and 1128 within the municipal limits of Mayiladuthurai. The total extent is 8,848 sq.ft., in which there are 3 small shops in 200 sq.ft. each and the remaining space being vacant site. 3. One Joseph Nadar, the husband of the 1st defendant was the owner of this property. One Nataraja Iyer took lease of the suit property from the aforesaid Joseph Nadar on 211. 1959 for the purpose of opening and running a service station for heavy motor vehicles. He had run the lease from 20.5.1959 till the expiry of the lease period of ten years. One Nataraja Iyer took lease of the suit property from the aforesaid Joseph Nadar on 211. 1959 for the purpose of opening and running a service station for heavy motor vehicles. He had run the lease from 20.5.1959 till the expiry of the lease period of ten years. The said Nataraja Iyer conveyed the superstructures along with site to one Thirun-avukkarasu Pillai, who after his purchase, executed a lease in favour of the above said Joseph Nadar for a period of five years and he was running the service station thereafter till it was purchased by the fourth defendant herein. .4. The fourth defendant through its managing partner the 5th defendant, purchased the said business as a going concern on 211. 1976 for a sum of Rs.40,000and has been running the service station by making additional improvements. The fourth defendant has also executed the lease deed in favour of the above said Joseph Nadar for a period of 5 years and has been conducting business ever since 10. 1976. The lease period granted to the 4th defendant was to expire on 30.9.1991 and before then, Joseph Nadar issued a notice calling on 9. 1991 upon the latter to vacate the premises after removing the superstructure as he wanted to have the premises for demolition and reconstruction. Then, Joseph Nadar filed R.C.O.P.No.51 of 1981 against defendants 4 and 5 and obtained an order of eviction dated 11. 1983. The said eviction order was passed after contest. Defendants 4 and 5 filed R.C.A.No.4 of l983 against the order of eviction before the Appellate Authority and the same was dismissed and defendants 4 and 5 filed C.R.P.No.3220 of 1984 in this court and the same was dismissed here also. Further defendants 4 and 5 took the matter to the Apex Court by a Special Leave Petition which was also dismissed. It is stated in the Plaint that an ex pane order was passed granting six months time to vacate with an opinion to the defendants to take steps against it if they felt aggrieved. 5. During the pendency of the civil revision petition in this Court, Joseph Nadar died and defendants 1 to 3 were impleaded as legal representatives and as such, they are lessors of the suit property entitled to proceed R.C.O.P.No.51 of 1981 and execute the eviction order. The purported lease deed dated 211. 5. During the pendency of the civil revision petition in this Court, Joseph Nadar died and defendants 1 to 3 were impleaded as legal representatives and as such, they are lessors of the suit property entitled to proceed R.C.O.P.No.51 of 1981 and execute the eviction order. The purported lease deed dated 211. 1976 has been admittedly executed by the 4th defendant, firm through the managing partner, the 5th defendant as in the sale deed and not by Rajagopal Vandaiyar in his personal or individual capacity. This fact has been overlooked as inadvertent mistake in the earlier proceedings mainly the R.C.O.P. R.C.A. and C.R.P. and the same vitiated the orders passed in the above said proceedings. The firm has not been included in the definition of a "tenant" in the Rent Control Act and hence, the lessor could not resort to the said Act to evict the firm since there is no provision in the said Act similar to that of O.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure and so, the Rent Controller cannot have also any jurisdiction as against Rajagopala Vandaiyar, the 5th defendant in herein who figured as second respondent in the R.C.O.P., as he was not a lessee and had not executed the lease deed in his individual capacity and so, he can at best be deemed only to be a permissive occupier or a licensee only as against whom a suit alone would lie and not R.C.O.P. .6. The lessor has wilfully resorted to proceed under the Rent Control Act in order to avoid the filing of a suit also to deprive the plaintiffs of an opportunity to seek relief under the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act and the carelessness and negligence on the part of the 5th defendant in not raising proper legal defences to non suit the petitioners in the R.C.O.P. which resulted in an illegal and unenforceable order. The order of eviction dated 11. 1983 cannot operate as against these plaintiffs who are not eo-nominee parties to the said proceedings and it cannot be enforced against them especially when the second plaintiff has become a sole tenant. The partnership business was carried on by the second plaintiff and the 5th defendant alone as partners as per the partnership agreement dated 3. 1978 and 4. 1983 cannot operate as against these plaintiffs who are not eo-nominee parties to the said proceedings and it cannot be enforced against them especially when the second plaintiff has become a sole tenant. The partnership business was carried on by the second plaintiff and the 5th defendant alone as partners as per the partnership agreement dated 3. 1978 and 4. 1978 till 313.1988, when by mutual consent the 5th defendant also retired and the second plaintiff alone became solely entitled to the entire assets and liabilities of the partnership firm. Defendants 1 to 3 are fully aware of the change in the original partnership and the fact that Rajagopala Vandaiyar and Sons solely belongs to the second plaintiffs. 7. The plaintiffs filed I.A.No.574 of 1992 for an interim injunction restraining defendants 1 to 3 from in any way executing the order and decree made in R.C.O.P.No.51 of 1981 on the file of the learned Rent Controller, Mayiladuthurai till the disposal of the suit. The first respondent/lst defendant filed a counter-affidavit stating as follows: The first respondent’s husband Joseph Nadar filed R.C.O.P.No.51 of 1981 against respondents/ defendants 4 and 5 and defendants 4 and 5 filed R.C. A.No.4 of 1983 against the eviction order and it was dismissed. The 4th defendant was taking part in the earlier proceedings between 1981 and 1991 and the 4th defendant was one of the partners in the firm. The 4th defendant was the managing partner in the firm. The 4th defendant did" not inform the court in the previous proceedings that the partnership was changed even otherwise, representation was made by defendants 4 and 5 in the earlier proceedings that the partnership was changed from 3. 1978. The first respondednt/ first defendant knew about the proceedings. Even in the application for impleading, the legal representatives of Joseph Nadar, the first defendant did not inform the court about the new partnership or the change of firm from 3. 1978, whereas he has mentioned the court that he was one of the part-ners of the firm. The defendant does not admit the change of partnership from 3. 1978. The partnership dated 3. 1978 is a concocted document for the purpose of the suit.The plaintiffs are bound by an estoppel as they have taken part in the previous proceedings. 1978, whereas he has mentioned the court that he was one of the part-ners of the firm. The defendant does not admit the change of partnership from 3. 1978. The partnership dated 3. 1978 is a concocted document for the purpose of the suit.The plaintiffs are bound by an estoppel as they have taken part in the previous proceedings. The contention that the provision under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act will not apply to the facts of the case is not tenable. 8. In the course of enquiry, the plaintiffs filed Exs.A-1 to A-4 and the defendant has filed Ex.B-1. There is no oral evidence in this case. The lower court, after considering the rival contention of the parties, allowed the application by granting interim injunction as prayed for aggrieved with that order, the present C.M.A. has been filed. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the provision under O.30, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not apply to the proceedings under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and so, the order obtained by the respondents in the R.C.O.P. is not null and void. In support of his contention, he relied upon a judgment in M/s.Chhotelal Pyarelal v. Shikharchand, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1570: (1984)4 S.C.C. 343 . The Supreme Court observed as follows: "Since the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to proceedings under the Rent Control Order, no application for eviction can be maintained against a firm in the firm name. The firm is merely a compendious name for the partners constituting it and it is only by virtue of the provisions of O.30 of the C.P.C. that a firm can sue and be sued in its own name without the partners being impleaded as nominee. Therefore, the firm could not be sued in the firm name by the landlord in so far as the application for eviction under the Rent Control Order was concerned. However, this cannot by itself result in the dismissal of the application, filed for eviction of the firm by the landlord as it would be merely a case of misdescription. Such misdescription can be corrected at any stage of the proceedings as there can be no doubt that the partners of the firm were before the court though in a wrong name. Such misdescription can be corrected at any stage of the proceedings as there can be no doubt that the partners of the firm were before the court though in a wrong name. Consequently, the landlord was allowed to amend the cause title of the original eviction application and to add the names of the partners of the firm along with the firm". 10. The judgment has been later on followed in Doshi M/s. N.S. v. P.Ganesan, (1988)I. L.W. 433. This Court (Sivasubramaniam, J.) has held as follows: "It has been held in M/s.Chhotclal Pyarelal v. Shikharchand, A.I.R- 1984 S.C. 1570: (1984)4 S.C.C. 343 . that the firm is "merely a compendious name for the partners constituting it and it is only by virtue of the provisions of O.30 of the C.P.C., that firm can sue and be sued in its own name without the partners being impleaded "eo nominee". It is therefore, clear that the firm could not be sued in the firm name insofar as the application for eviction under the H.R.C. order was concerned". But it would be merely a case of misdescription of the respondents to the application and this misdescription can be correct at any stage of the proceedings. There can be no doubt that the partners of the firm are before the court though in a wrong name. The eviction petitions cannot be dismissed solely on the ground that the partners have not been impleaded". In another decision in Common Wealth Packing Industries v. S.S.Perumar, Proprietor, Pioneer Engineering Works, (1988)2 L.W. 62, this Court (Srini-vasan, J.), held as follows: "This revision was preferred by the tenant of the building, which comprised of a firm,against an order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority impleading the partners of the firm as parties to the proceedings and holding that there was no necessity to grant any liberty to the partner to file any additional counter to the original petition. Held: In this case, there is no plea that the firm omitted to raise any important defence originally when the counter was filed in the eviction proceedings. Justice has been done by the court below by merely impleading partner as parlies eo nominee and at the same time refusing to grant them any permission to file an additional counter in the original proceedings. Justice has been done by the court below by merely impleading partner as parlies eo nominee and at the same time refusing to grant them any permission to file an additional counter in the original proceedings. The observations of the Supreme Court M/s.Chhotclal Pyarelal v. Shikharchand, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1570: (1984)4 S.C.C. 343 , put the matter beyond doubt that even if the cause title refers only to the firm by its name and the names of partners are parties to the proceedings and they are before court though in a wrong name. This does not mean that the partners become parties to the proceedings for the first time only when they are described eo nominee. Hence, there is no question of granting any liberty to the partners to file any additional counter to the original petition". 11. In Yousuff Sait and Sons v. A.Shafeed Ahamed, 100 L.W. 278, this Court had an occasion to consider similar question. Therein, it is observed as follows: "In M/s.Chhotelal Pyarelol v. Shikharchand, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1570: (1984)4 S.C.C. 343 , it has been held that since the Civil Procedure Code did not apply to proceedings under the said Rent Control Order, no application for eviction could be maintained against a firm in the firm name because the firm was merely a compendious name for the partners constitui-ing it and it was only by virtue of the provisions of O.30 of the Civil Procedure Code, that a firm can sue and be sued in its own name without the partners being impleaded eo nominee. The Supreme Court also observed in the same case that where a party is described by his firm name, it would be merely a case of misdescription of the party which could be corrected at any stage of the proceedings. In view of this decision, the landlord filed a petition C.M.P.No.12331 of 1986 for joining the partners of the tenant firm as respondents 2 to 5. This petition is allowed. However, what was necessary to be done for proper adjudication was that the partners were required to be joined as respondents to the main petition for eviction". 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon a judgment in Shah Phoolchand Lalchand v. Parvathi Bai, (1989)1 S.C.C. 556 . This petition is allowed. However, what was necessary to be done for proper adjudication was that the partners were required to be joined as respondents to the main petition for eviction". 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon a judgment in Shah Phoolchand Lalchand v. Parvathi Bai, (1989)1 S.C.C. 556 . The Supreme Court observed as follows: "Mr.Nayar, learned counsel for the appellants has urged before us that the impugned judgment must be set aside as the eviction petition is filed against the appellants firm and on other partnership firm, M/s.Adeshwar Class Mart without joining any of the partners of the said firms as respondents or serving them as partners and hence, the eviction petition was not maintainable at all. He placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court in M/s.Chhotelal Pyarelal v. Shikharchand, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1570: (1984)4 S.C.C. 343 . In that case an eviction petition was filed by the respondent/ landlord against the appellant-a partnership firm under Clause 13(3)((vi)and (vii) of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. The appellant raised a preliminary objection that the application against the partnership firm was not maintainable without joining its partners as respondents. It was held by this Court that it is only by virtue of the provision of O.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that a firm can sue and be sued in its own name without the partners being impleaded. It was pointed out by Mr.Nayar that the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to the proceedings under the said Rent Act either and hence, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decision was directly applicable to the case before us. In our view, it is open to Mr.Nayar to raise this contention at this stage at all. This contention is not one which would have been fatal to the eviction petition. Had this contention been raised in the trial court or even in the first appellant court, it would have been open to the respondent to amend the eviction petition and join the partners as respondents. In the aforesaid decision in M/s.Chhotelal Pyarelal case. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1570: (1984)4 S.C.C. 343 , relied upon by Mr.Nayar the objection to the maintainability of the petition was raised at the earliest stage and was wrongly negatived by the trial court. In the aforesaid decision in M/s.Chhotelal Pyarelal case. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1570: (1984)4 S.C.C. 343 , relied upon by Mr.Nayar the objection to the maintainability of the petition was raised at the earliest stage and was wrongly negatived by the trial court. In fact, this Court observed as follows: (1984)4 S.C.C. 343 at 345 para. 2 "But, we agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that this cannot by itself result in the dismissal of the application. It would be merely a case of misdescription of the respondents to the application and this misdescription can be corrected at any stage of the proceedings. There can be no doubt that the partners of the firm are before the court though in a wrong name". "In the case before us, no such objection has been raised at all till the stage of special leave and it is surely not open to the appellants to raise such an objection at a very late stage and thereby delay matters for a number of years. This contention must, therefore, be negatived". 13. The plaintiffs are the sons of Rajagopala Vandaiyar who is the managing partner of Rajagopala Vandaiyar and Sons, the first respondent in the R.C.O.P. and Rajagopala Vandaiyar in his individual capacity was the second respondent in the R.C.O.P. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed in the R.C.O.P., will not bind the sons of Rajagopala Vandaiyar who arc the plaintiffs in the suit. The firm has been properly represented by Rajagopala Vandaiyar in the rent control proceedings even though it does not disclose the names of the partners. It cannot be said that the firm was not properly represented by Rajagopala Vandaiyar. It cannot be contended that Rajagopala Vandaiyar committed any fraud in getting the order against him in the rent control proceedings. Rather he has contested the same upto the highest court of this land. In the circumstances, the plaintiffs are not entitled to interim injunction and the petitioners in the R.C.O.P. are permitted to amend the decree by impleading plaintiffs also as respondents and in this view, the order of the lower court is set aside. The civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed. No costs.