JUDGMENT - Dr. E.S. DA SILVA, J.:-The petitioner who is a tenant of the ground and the first floor of House No. 177, situated at Fr. Miranda Road, Margao, owned by the respondent No. 2 and wherein he carries on the business of a Hotel and Restaurant under the name and style of Bambino Hotel challenges in this petition the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal which has ordered his eviction from the suit premises and directed him to hand over its vacant possession to the respondent No. 2. 2. The respondent No. 2 had filed an application to the Rent Controller against the petitioner seeking his eviction from the premises, being Case No. 48 of 1981 under section 22(2)(p)(i)(c) and (d) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter called the Act) on the main ground that the petitioner was indulging in the use of the said premises for immoral purposes, namely, for carrying on prostitution on large scale. By judgment dated 15-3-1990 the Additional Rent Controller dismissed this application but in appeal the Administrative Tribunal reversed the findings of the lower Court and passed the impugned order directing the petitioners eviction and vacant possession to be given to the respondent No. 2. 3. On behalf of the petitioner it is contended, by relying on section 22(2)(d) of the Act and its Explanation, that a ground for eviction can arise only if a finding of guilty is recorded either by the Criminal Court or by the Rent Controller. In other words a tenant must be found guilty for that purpose and until and unless such finding is arrived at, it is not permissible to hold that the requirement of section 22(2)(d) has been complied with. Similarly, the meaning of the expression "nuisance" in sub-Clause (d) has been defined in the Act which definition is inclusive of an act which constitutes an offence under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the SITA). Reliance was also placed on the meaning of the word "brothel" in the SITA which according to its definition in section 2(a) includes any house, room or place or any portion of any house, room or place which is used for purpose of prostitution for the gain of another person or for mutual gain of two or more prostitutes. 4. Reliance was also placed on the meaning of the word "brothel" in the SITA which according to its definition in section 2(a) includes any house, room or place or any portion of any house, room or place which is used for purpose of prostitution for the gain of another person or for mutual gain of two or more prostitutes. 4. It was then submitted by Shri Dias, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that for that matter there was no iota of evidence to show that there was something conclusive on record to enable the Tribunal to qualify the suit premises as brothel under the SITA. Thus, according to the learned Counsel, the flagrant misinterpretation by the Tribunal of the Explanation to section 22(d) to the effect that it was observed that it need not be an offence is an obvious error apparent on the face of the record. While so holding, it is manifest that the Tribunal acted illegally and without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, therefore inviting interference by this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers. It was further urged that when the Act itself made express mention to any act which constitutes an offence under the SITA, it is clear that the law requires that it should be an act amounting to an offence and in this respect the learned Counsel contends that there is no titre of evidence against the petitioner to make him incur in the liability of an act which constitutes an offence under the SITA. Hence if there could be no nuisance without an actual act committed by him the question of the petitioner being guilty of an act or an offence of nuisance, in the learned Counsels submission, would not then arise at all. 5. I have gone through the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and of the Rent Controller as well. I have also perused the records of the lower Court and considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for both the parties. 5. I have gone through the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and of the Rent Controller as well. I have also perused the records of the lower Court and considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for both the parties. Apart from the over enthusiastic propensity of the learned Tribunal, which is expected to draw its judgments always in a simple, calculated and sober language, to often embark itself in refined and burilated literary exercises which are not at all required for the purpose of adjudication of the jural aspects of the matter, in my view, the reading of the legal provisions by the learned Tribunal appears to be correct and need not be disturbed. In this respect Shri Rebello, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2, has rightly urged that the interpretation of section 22(2)(d) sought to be advanced by the petitioner and with which apparently the Rent Controller concurred is unacceptable to the extent that it suggests that the Court below seems inclined to hold that only in the event a tenant is convicted under the SITA then it amounts to an offence within the purview of the Act. A plain reading of the language used in section 22 clearly points out to the fact that the word quilty does not necessarily mean or imply a conviction of the tenant by a Court of law and instead suggests that what is necessary is that the fact of nuisance reflected by a certain set of acts or conduct of the tenant is to be established by cogent and conclusive evidence. Explanation to section 22 refers to some of such situations which is like an inclusive provision and brings within the compass of the definition of nuisance any act which amounts to an offence under the SITA. It thus follows that if the essential ingredients of such offences are there, then the act or conduct by itself is to be deemed as constituting a nuisance under the Act. 6. In the instant case it is seen that the petitioner has examined four witnesses who have given testimony on the basic facts complained of. The first witness is the very complainant/respondent No. 2, the owner of the premises, who, along with his family members and professional clients, according to his own version, had to directly face and bear with the humiliation of seeing his own house visited by dubious characters. The first witness is the very complainant/respondent No. 2, the owner of the premises, who, along with his family members and professional clients, according to his own version, had to directly face and bear with the humiliation of seeing his own house visited by dubious characters. His testimony and the documentary evidence on record shows that all his attempts in the past to react against this unfortunate state of affairs going on around him were frustrated in the competent fora always on merely technical grounds. Advocate C. Alvares is one more person who has spoken on the strange happenings and dubious presences witnessed by him in the suit premises and which substantially seem to corroborate the grievances of the respondent No. 2 with regard to the immoral activities suspected to be allowed by the petitioner in the suit Hotel. Nagesh Naik is the driver of a taxi who has allegedly transported customers to the Hotel and has deposed on the same facts in support of the complaint. The last witness is the then Inspector Raikar who has testified on the several raids conducted by him in the petitioners Hotel with regard to the illegal and illicit activities suspected to be carried on therein and in respect whereof at least in one case it was successful and led to the conviction of one Miss Clementina for an offence under the SITA in case No. MAG-35/85. On the strength of this evidence, the Tribunal chose to believe the testimony of these witnesses supported by documents produced on their behalf. 7. I have purposefully scrutinized this evidence in detail from the records of the trial Court and I am satisfied that there appears to be no illegality, perversity or error of jurisdiction committed by the learned Tribunal in arriving at the conclusion that the same is enough to materially substantiate a case of nuisance within the purview of the Act and therefore the petitioner was to be held guilty of acts and conduct as envisaged in the relevant provisions of the Act, namely, in Clause (d) of section 22(2) along with its Explanation. 8. 8. Further the circumstances of the petitioner himself having not been personally convicted for any offence under the SITA is also irrelevant once the material available strongly suggests that whatever illegal and immoral activities indulged in the demised premises are allowed to be carried on therein with the consent and/or full knowledge of the petitioner. Section 3(2)(a) of the SITA which seems to take care of this aspect is attracted in this case and the evidence led by the respondent No. 2 strictly falls within the ambit of the definition. In this regard the findings of facts recorded by the learned Tribunal are not to be defaulted with also on this score. 9. It is thus obvious that once the petitioner is to be held guilty of acts of nuisance within the meaning of section 22(2)(d) an order of his eviction should follow. The learned Tribunal appears therefore to have been right and justified in so holding and therefore the direction given to the petitioner to hand over vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondent No. 2 is not required to be unsettled. 10. Shri Rebello has placed reliance on the case of (Smt. Kanchanmala Dassi v. Smt. Lilabati Debi)1, A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 164, which appears to be very much to the point. This was a case under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act (XXXVIII (38) of 1948), namely, its section 11(1)(c) and (e) wherein premises had been used by the tenant as brothel. While dealing with the question of immoral purpose and the test to find out the tenants conduct causing nuisance and annoyance, the Court held that a tenant who has taken a house on rent and who has been using the premises or allowing the premises to be used as a brothel which is the cause of nuisance and annoyance, to the occupiers of adjoining or neighbouring houses is not entitled to claim the protection granted by section 11 of the Rent Control Act. The Court has further held that in deciding the question as to whether the purpose is moral or immoral the Court does not act as a Court of morals, but acts as the Court of law deciding the question. The Court has further held that in deciding the question as to whether the purpose is moral or immoral the Court does not act as a Court of morals, but acts as the Court of law deciding the question. It is not either the private morality of the Judge deciding it or the fanciful morality of persons who happen to be propounding the new sociology or advanced philosophy of morals that can be allowed to operate as the test of morality but in deciding this issue the Court has to adopt and go by the ordinary normal standards of morality prevailing and accepted in the society. On the point as to whether the tenant himself is to be guilty under the Rent Act the Court observed that where the tenant has been using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral or illegal purposes such a tenant cannot obtain the protection granted by section 11 of the Rent Act. In that case the Court found on facts that the tenant had been using premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral purposes. Thus the Court was of the view that where the tenant has been guilty of a conduct which is a nuisance and annoyance to occupiers of adjoining or neighbouring premises, such a tenant also could not ask for protection under section 11. In this regard, again, on facts the Court found that the tenant took the house on rent and has been using it as a brothel and that user was the cause, of nuisance and annoyance to the occupiers of adjoining or neighbouring premises. Therefore, the Court ruled that in that context the tenant could not ask for protection of the Rent Act, 1948. 11. The petitioner inspite of all efforts has been unable to successfully convince me that the learned Tribunal has fallen into an error of law which is apparent on the face of record in order to warrant interference. 12. In the result, I see no merit in this petition as no case seems to have been made out for this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Hence, rejected with costs. Petition dismissed. *****