JUDGMENT A L. Vaidya, J.—-Krishan Murari, present petitioner is occupying the demised premises as tenant under Amar Dutt Sharma, the landlord-respondent. Sh. Amar Dutt Sharma, landlord had preferred an eviction petition against the tenant (Rent Petition No 20/2 of 1990) under section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter to be called as the Act), on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent for the period from 1-12-1985 to 31-3- 990. 2. The tenant contested the petition which was ultimately allowed on 25-11-1993 and the Rent Controller held that the tenant was in arrears of rent with effect from 1-12-1985 to 31-3-1990 at the rate of Rs. 400 per month amounting to Rs. 20,800 plus statutory interest thereon, upto 24-11-1993 amounting to Rs. 8,600 plus costs of the petition assessed at Rs. 300 and therefore it was held that the total amount due was Rs 29,700 (Rs. Twenty nine thousand seven hundred only) and further Rent Controller directed the tenant-respondent to put the landlord-petitioner in the vacant possession of the premises, in question and in case tenant-respondent pays the amount due within a period of thirty days, from the date of the eviction order, he shall not be evicted from the demised premises. 3. The aforesaid eviction order was assailed by the tenant-respondent in an appeal before the lower Appellate Authority, Solan, who vide judgment dated 5-5-1994, came to the conclusion that the tenant-respondent was in arrears of rent of Rs. 12,800 which he was liable to pay with statutory interest and costs as assessed by the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal. The tenant-respondent did not rest there but assailed the order passed by the lower Appellate Authority in a revision petition before this court, where he was again unsuccessful as the civil revision No. 107 of 1994 was dismissed on 13-5-1994 holding, that the petitioner in the revision, was in arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 12,800 with effect from 1-12-1985 to 31-3-1990 and that the Appellate Authority was, therefore, quite justified in holding that the petitioner-tenant was in arrears of rent and that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller deserved to be upheld 4. 12,800 with effect from 1-12-1985 to 31-3-1990 and that the Appellate Authority was, therefore, quite justified in holding that the petitioner-tenant was in arrears of rent and that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller deserved to be upheld 4. The landlord filed execution petition for procuring the possession on the ground that the tenant had failed to deposit or to pay the amount due within the statutory period of 30 days from the date of order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. In the said execution petition, the tenant preferred an objection petition on 8-4-1994 wherein it was pleaded that the execution proceedings have been filed at a premature stage as the judgment-debtor preferred an appeal against the impugned orders before the lower Appellate Authority, where the appeal was pending for disposal for 2-5-1994 It was also pleaded that there has been apparent error even on the face of the record and the decree had been obtained against the objector by a fraud played by the decree-holder upon the court as well as on the judgment-debtor, as in fact during the pendency of the eviction proceedings, the decree-holder received a sum of Rs. 19,000 that is, rent upto 31st March, 1990 and last cheque was received by him on 25th March, 1990 for Rs. 6,000 though it was dis-honoured, but later on Amar Dutt received the aforesaid amount in a criminal proceedings before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan Thus, it was prayed that the decree so obtained was the result of fraud and the same be set aside. 5. Another objection petition was preferred on 25-5-1994 wherein it had been pleaded that tenant had already paid Rs 19,000 and the amount due stood discharged. However, it was also pleaded that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on 25-11-1993, was modified by the Appellate Authority, Solan, on 5-5-1994 in appeal No. 18-S/14 of 1994 and confirmed by the Honble High Court in Civil Revision No. 107 of 1994 dated 13-5-1994 and the applicant-tenant, as such, on the basis of those orders, wanted to deposit arrears of rent, amounting to Rs 12,800, along with interest and costs, even though the applicant tenant had already paid the full amount of arrears while the matter was pending in the court. Through this objection petition, it was further averred that tenant wanted to deposit a sum of Rs. 21,842, that is, Rs 12 800 towards arrears of rent upto 31-3-1990 and interest of Rs. 8,742 upto 30-5-1994 and Rs. 300 as costs, hence for that purpose, application was moved. The applicant- rented prayed that he be permitted to deposit Rs. 21,842. 6. The landlord in his reply to the objection petition submitted that the execution has been filed after the expiry of 30 days from the order passed by the Rent Controller and the applicant-tenant had not deposited the amount, for which eviction order had been passed by the Rent Controller, within 30 days and even till reply was filed, such amount was not deposited. The other averments were denied. It was also pleaded that objections regarding payment of some amounts had already been taken by the tenant in the main petition which were not substantiated and now such plea cannot be raised. It has been very specifically pleaded that deposit of rent was not within time and same has been deposited after the expiry of thirty days from the order of the Rent Controller and the deposit has been made by the tenant at his own risk and costs, which is not a valid tender or valid deposit after the expiry of thirty days as ordered by the Rent Controller. 7. The Rent Controller, after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that order of eviction has become final between the parties and cannot be assailed on the basis of the fraud as alleged in the objection petition and that the tenant has failed to deposit the amount due within the statutory period. He has rendered himself liable for eviction from the premises in dispute and the objections referred to above raised by the tenant, were accordingly dismissed. 8. The aforesaid order of the Rent Controller, dismissing the objections, has been assailed in the present revision petition on various grounds. 9. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the entire record very minutely. 10. 8. The aforesaid order of the Rent Controller, dismissing the objections, has been assailed in the present revision petition on various grounds. 9. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the entire record very minutely. 10. The legal proposition now submitted before this Court on behalf of the tenant/petitioner has been, that no doubt, the amount due has not been deposited within thirty days of the passing of the order dated 25-11-1993 by the Rent Controller, but the tenant was entitled to fresh period of thirty days from the date of judgment of the Appellate Authority, that is, 5-5-1994 when the order was modified and the tenant has deposited the amount due within thirty days from the order passed by the lower Appellate Authority, accordingly, he shall be deemed to have complied with the statutory requirement in this behalf and therefore his eviction from the premises in dispute on that ground could not be executed. 11. It is not so a simple matter, as has been contended on behalf of the tenant-petitioner. In order to appreciate this aspect of the matter, the provisions as provided under the Act and Law as laid by various Courts in this behalf have to be taken note of. Section 14 (2) of the Act runs as under : "Section (1) Section (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. Section 14 (2) of the Act runs as under : "Section (1) Section (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant is satisfied— (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable : Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at 9 per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the rent within the time aforesaid : Provided further that if the arrears pertain to the period prior to the promulgation of this Act, the rate of interest shall be calculated at 6 per cent per annum : Provided further that the tenant against whom the Controller has made an order for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due from him, shall not be evicted as a result of his order, if tenant pays the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of order." 12. Tenant in the aforesaid provisions has been afforded two opportunities to be availed of by him in order to avoid his eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. The first and Second proviso referred to above deal with first opportunity which the tenant can avail in order to avoid eviction order. In this regard third proviso contains the second opportunity. 13. It has been contended on behalf of the landlord-respondent that third proviso only gives to a tenant thirty days from the order of the Controller alone to deposit the amount due and not otherwise. In this regard third proviso contains the second opportunity. 13. It has been contended on behalf of the landlord-respondent that third proviso only gives to a tenant thirty days from the order of the Controller alone to deposit the amount due and not otherwise. It has been contended on behalf of the tenant that in case Controller dis-allowed the eviction petition and the lower Appellate Authority accepts the same on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent, time for depositing the arrears of rent and other amounts, thirty days time limit would start from the date of the order passed by the lower Appellate Authority and not from the order of Controller. 14. Insofar as, third proviso is concerned it clearly makes out that where the Controller has made an order for eviction on the ground of non payment of arrears of rent, due from him, in that event, tenant shall not be evicted as a result of his order (i. e. order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller), if the tenant pays the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of order. This proviso clearly speaks regarding the order of eviction passed by the Controller, but this provision is Dot to be read in isolation. There may be a case as submitted by the learned Counsel for the tenant-petitioner that Controller has dis-allowed eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent but the same has been allowed by the lower Appellate Authority and in case third proviso deals with order of Controller alone, it will not at all serve the purpose and intention of the Act insofar as the order of eviction passed upon arrears of rent due is to be made and complied with. 15. At this stage, sections 24 (4) and (5) of the Act can safely be referred which runs as under :— "Section 24 (4) The decision of the Appellate Authority and subject only to such decision, an order, of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of Jaw except as provided in sub-section (5) of this section. Section 24 (5), The High Court may at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit." 16. Section 24 deals with Power of the State Government for conferring powers of Appellate Authority for the purposes of the Act and also deals with right of the party to file an appeal assailing the order of the Controller passed for recovery of possession etc The aforesaid provision of law makes it very clear that the decision of the Appellate Authority and subject only to such decision, an order, of the Controller shall b; final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided in sub-section (5) of this section. This provision only means that insofar as the order of Controller, is concerned it would remain final subject to variations made to such an order by the Appellate Authority in an appeal preferred before this Authority or subject to revisional powers of the High Court as provided under sub-section (5) above. 17. These provisions clearly reflected that in case Rent Controller has dis-allowed the petition and the Appellate Authority has accepted the eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent, tenant could legally avoid eviction order in case tenant deposits the arrears of rent etc. within thirty days from the passing of the order by the Appellate Authority and in case Rent Controller and lower Appellate Authority have both disallowed the eviction petition, and the High Court in revision passed eviction order, in that event, thirty days period for depositing rent would start from the date of passing of the eviction order by the High Court. 18. In the present case, Rent Controller passed eviction order on 25-111993, which order of eviction was maintained by the lower Appellate Authority, though amount due was varied. 18. In the present case, Rent Controller passed eviction order on 25-111993, which order of eviction was maintained by the lower Appellate Authority, though amount due was varied. It may be very specifically referred here that admittedly the amount due was not deposited by the tenant within thirty days from the passing of the eviction order by the Rent Controller on 25-11-1993 The eviction order has been maintained uptil High Court though the amount due as observed by the Appellate Authority was maintained by the High Court also. It is not a case where the Rent Controller dis-allowed the petition and the lower Appellate Authority allowed the eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent but it is otherwise. Order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was assailed before the Appellate Authority, was not at all stayed by the lower Appellate Authority, otherwise if it had been stayed insofar as depositing of amount due within thirty days from the order of Rent Controller was concerned, this statutory period could not have been enlarged by any authority whatsoever. The tenant selected not to deposit the amount due as ordered by the Rent Controller within 30 days of the passing of the order. The risk was his and he assailed the order of eviction before the lower Appellate Authority. On the basis of the grounds taken by him, entire order passed by the Rent Controller, could have been set aside and in that event tenant could have got the benefit but the risk taken by him was not successful. He avoided to comply with the directions of the Rent Controller to deposit the amount within thirty days He has to bear all the legal consequences for not complying with that order. 19. At this stage, some decided case law can safely be referred. 20. In 1994 Supp (1) SCC 437, Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood, it has been held that the Rent Control Acts are necessary social measures for protection of tenants, and the Rent Control laws have tried to balance the equity. 19. At this stage, some decided case law can safely be referred. 20. In 1994 Supp (1) SCC 437, Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood, it has been held that the Rent Control Acts are necessary social measures for protection of tenants, and the Rent Control laws have tried to balance the equity. Their Lordships observed that landlord is duty bound to satisfy the ground of eviction mentioned in various Rent Acts and if he does not satisfy, he cannot get the order of eviction merely because the Act restricts his rights, but there arc certain Rent Acts which, even when a ground of eviction is satisfied, still confer powers on the Rent Controllers to consider the question of comparative hardship and it is only in those types of cases, if the Controller is satisfied, he can decline passing orders of eviction. But if there is no such limitations, the Rent Controllers, after the ground of eviction specified in the Act is made out, have no discretion to reject the application. It was further observed that once the order of eviction is passed, the executing court is duty bound to execute its orders. No question of equity or hardship arises at this stage. 21. Their Lordships further observed taking note of the facts of the case that in the present case, the tenant spared no efforts to harass the landlords and after the order of eviction, the tenant again failed to pay the rent and the landlord was forced to file another eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and it was only after the filing of the said eviction petition and in order to avoid eviction he deposited the rent. The matter did not rest there even and it was only after the notice of the special leave petition was issued in the present case that the tenant chose to pay the rent after keeping it in arrears for practically six years and under the circumstances, Supreme Courts interference under Article 136 is called for. 22. The matter did not rest there even and it was only after the notice of the special leave petition was issued in the present case that the tenant chose to pay the rent after keeping it in arrears for practically six years and under the circumstances, Supreme Courts interference under Article 136 is called for. 22. It was further held that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, impugned order of the High Court dated May 17, 1991 and the order of the Rent Controller dated May 18, 1990 were set aside and the Rent Controller was directed to issue warrants of possession for ejectment of the respondent from the premises in dispute and place the landlords/appellants in possession. The apex Court held that order being not without jurisdiction, right or wrong, executing court had not to go behind its own order and grant extention of time. 23. In ILR (Himachal Series) (1982) p 279, in M/s. K. N. Trading Company v. Masonic Fraternity of Simla, following observations of this Court would be very much relevant : "Section 14. This section (section 14) gives various opportunities to a tenant to pay the arrears of rent. The second proviso gives a last chance to the tenant to pay up the amount due from him. This he can avail even after the order of eviction has been passed. The period during which be can deposit the dues is fixed. It is 30 days from the date of the order. He can save the eviction only if he pays the amount due within the prescribed period in terms of the aforementioned proviso. This period can neither be enlarged nor abridged by the court. There is no provision for condonation of the delay in depositing the rent. Since the time is fixed by law there is no question of anyone misleading the tenant about the same." 24. Earlier decision of this very court in Krishan Kumar v. Gurbax Singh, 1977 (2) RCR 62, was also taken note of while disposing of the aforesaid proposition of law. In Krishan Kumars case {supra) this court held : "It is apparent that the statute itself provides a period of 30 days from the date of the order for payment of rental arrears by the tenant. On such payment, the statute declares, effect will not be given to the order of eviction. In Krishan Kumars case {supra) this court held : "It is apparent that the statute itself provides a period of 30 days from the date of the order for payment of rental arrears by the tenant. On such payment, the statute declares, effect will not be given to the order of eviction. The statute does not leave the determination of the period to the Rent Controller. It is not open to the Rent Controller when, disposing of the petition for eviction, to make an order either abridging or enlarging the period of 30 days Indeed, the period having being determined by the statute itself, no order was necessary by the Rent Controller." 25. In M/s. K. N. Trading Company v. Masonic Fraternity of Simla, referred to above, facts appear to be of identical nature as in the present case. However, in the reported case, even there was a stay order passed by the Appellate Authority against the order of eviction of the Controller, but inspite of that it was held that period of 30 days would start from the passing of the eviction order passed by the Controller. 26. The aforesaid citations clearly established that the date when eviction order was passed by Rent Controller on the basis of arrears of rent, would be the date to be taken note of for depositing the amount due by the tenant within 30 days and not from the date of the order passed by the Appellate Authority or by the High Court where the eviction order had been maintained, as passed by the Controller. 27. In the present case, the tenant if so advised could have deposited the amount due as arrived by the Rent Controller within thirty days from the date of passing of the order by Rent Controller and in case, as has happened in the present case, the amount being varied by the higher authority it could have been permitted to be withdrawn by the tenant but the original amount required to be deposited could not have been under the provisions of the Act deferred for a period not allowed by the statute. 28. 28. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contention that as the Appellate Authority modified the amount due, therefore, it could be so deposited within thirty days from the order passed by the Appellate Authority, in view of the above discussions and the provisions of the Act does not hold good. In case learned Counsels line of argument has to be considered then why from the date of order of the lower Appellate Authority and why not from the date of the order of the High Court and in that event thirty days period could start from the date when the High Court passed final order. Such an interpretation, on the basis of the circumstances, present in the case cannot be applied and cannot be made available to the tenant, as per discussion referred to above. Accordingly, with all this context order of Rent Controller, dismissing the objection petition does not suffer from any legal infirmity and as such cannot be interfered with. No other point has been stressed. In view of the foregoing reasons, present petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.