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1994 DIGILAW 180 (GUJ)

Ashvinkumar Jayantilal Shah v. Harichand Kedarnath Khanna

1994-06-22

S.D.SHAH

body1994
S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against judgment and order passed by Assistant Judge at Navsari in misc. Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1993 whereby the lower appellate Court has allowed the appeal preferred by the present petitioner against the judgment and order passed by Civil Judge, J. D. , Pardi below Exhibits 5 in Regular Civil Suit No. of 1993. While allowing such appeal and quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Court of Civil Judge, J. D. , the lower Appellate court has directed that the present respondents (original defendants) shall not dispossess the present petitioner of the suit factory without due process of law till the disposal of the Suit No. 73 of 1993 subject to following conditions: (1) The present petitioner shall pay the arrears of rent or hire charges on or before 28-5-1994 and shall pay the incurring rent or hire charges of Rs. 1 lac regularly to the present respondent without fail. If the present petitioner will not pay the arrears of rent or hire charges of Rs. 12 lacs by 28th of May 1994, then the injunction granted as above shall be deemed to be vacated automatically. ( 2 ) IT is against the aforesaid order passed by the lower appellate court which is substantially in favour of the present petitioner, that the petitioner has moved this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 3 ) MR. J. B. Pardiwala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has strenuously urged before this Court that though appeal of the present petitioner is allowed and accepted by the lower appellate Court, by imposition of condition which is impossible of compliance, the lower appellate Court has in substance dismissed the appeal or in substance refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law by making it impossible for the petitioner to avail of the benefit of the order of injunction. He further submitted that once it is accepted that petitioner plaintiff is in possession of the factory pursuant to hire agreement, injunction as prayed for ought to have been granted in favour of the petitioner-plaintiff and no condition could have been lawfully imposed so as to render such injunction meaningless. He further submitted that once it is accepted that petitioner plaintiff is in possession of the factory pursuant to hire agreement, injunction as prayed for ought to have been granted in favour of the petitioner-plaintiff and no condition could have been lawfully imposed so as to render such injunction meaningless. He has in this connection invited attention of this Court to the decision of the supreme Court in the case of Ram Rattan v. Slate of Uttar Pradesh reported in a. I. R. 1977 S. C. p. 619. In fact, the case relates to this defence of private defence under Sections 97 and 99 of the indian Penal Code and right of the owner of the property against trespasser. The case is directly not laying down the proposition canvased by Mr. J. B. Pardiwala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. It is observed by the supreme Court in the context of right of private defence of property that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser, while the treapasser is in the process of trespassing, and when he has not accomplished his possession. The Court has further observed that this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies available under the law. To the aforesaid proposition of law, which is well accepted in this country, no exception could be made. I am also in full agreement with the aforesaid proposition of law. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel has also invited attention of this Court to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat rao reported in A. I. R. 1989 S. C. p. 2097. In the context of unlawful dispossession of licencee by licensor before expiry of the period of licence, the Supreme Court made certain observations. In the context of unlawful dispossession of licencee by licensor before expiry of the period of licence, the Supreme Court made certain observations. Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel on the observations made in Para-8 of the report which reads as under:"it is a well-settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. " ( 5 ) THE aforesaid proposition of law is also well accepted and no exception could be made to this position of law. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, the question is as to when a person whose right to remain in possession of a parcel of land is coupled with an obligation under the agreement duly executed, and when such person fails to comply with his part of the obligation, whether the court of law would extend its helping hand by granting an equitable relief of injunction in favour of such party without putting such party to legitimate terms and conditions. In my opinion, when right to remain in possession of a premises is acquired under an agreement subject to terms and conditions specifically stipulated between the parties, the person who seeks to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court for a relief of temporary injunction without complying with, the contractual obligation on his part to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement, the Court may impose reasonable terms and conditions to grant injunction. One who seeks equity shall have to do equity and if one fails to fulfil ones own obligation under the agreement, court may be loath to extend its helping hand to such a party. It is in this perspective that the legality and validity of the order passed by the lower appellate Court shall have to be examined. The lower appellate Court has in fact reiterated the principle of law referred to hereinabove and on which reliance is placed by Mr. J. B. Pardiwala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. I am in full agreement with the conclusion reached by the lower appellate Court. I also hold that the respondent-defendants cannot take possession of the premises from the petitioner-plaintiff except in accordance with law. J. B. Pardiwala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. I am in full agreement with the conclusion reached by the lower appellate Court. I also hold that the respondent-defendants cannot take possession of the premises from the petitioner-plaintiff except in accordance with law. In my opinion, the lower appellate Court was fully justified in imposing of condition which it did. It is required to be noted that the respondents-defendants are also facing the proceeding from the bank to whom the plant and machinery of the factory are hypothecated and in fact bank has instituted suit to recover the amount of rs. 21 lacs and odd amount against the respondents-defendants in the Bombay high Court. The respondents-defendants thus subjected to a liability to make good the said amount and/or to its property being sold on hypothecation being enforced by the bank. It is in this situation that this Court shall have to see as to whether imposition of condition of payment of an amount of Rs. 1 lac as rent/licence fee as agreed by the petitioner-plaintiff can be said to be unreasonable, excessive or arbitrary condition. In my opinion, imposition of such condition in the fact situation obtaining in this case cannot, be said to be unreasonable. The lower appellate court has passed absolutely just order which it could pass in the fact situation obtaining in this case. No interference of this Court is therefore called for under section 114 of the Code of Civil procedure. However it is clarified that summary rejection of this Civil Revision application xvould not amount to saying that this Court permits the respondent- defendants to take law into its hands so as to forcibly dispossess the respondents defendants. The amount of Rs. 50,000/- which is deposited in this Court by the petitioner-plaintiff shall be paid over to the respondents defendants and the registrar is directed to make such payment forthwith by issuing account payee cheque in favour of the respondents-defendants. Petition rejected. .