JUDGMENT D. P. Sood, J.—In this regular second appeal against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge (I), Kangra at Dharamshala, passed on July 11, 1988, whereby the decision of the.trial Court has been reversed and plaintiffs suit stood dismissed, two substantial questions of law upon which it was admitted, are involved, which are : 1 Whether the possession of the tenant of the dominant tenement for a short period will not amount to the possession of the landlord, i e. owner of the dominant tenement? 2. Whether tenant who is in possession of the premises enjoying an easement, as of right, acquires it for the landlord, if yes, its effect? 2. In order to determine the above said points, it is absolutely essential to detail certain necessary material facts pleaded by the parties to the instant Us. 3. Plaintiff Rattan Chand and his brother are owners of khasra No. 671 which continued to be reflected in the revenue record as "Gair Mumkin Ghural". Defendant Sobhan Ram is the owner of khasra No. 669, which is shown as Banjar Qadim in the concerned revenue record Both these khasra numbers adjoin each other. In other words, there is common boundary line carved out by the properties belonging to the parties to the instant appeal. The case of the plamtiff is that he constructed shop cum-flat in khasra No. 671 in the year 1962 and since then he alongwith his brother, have continuously enjoyed the said rights for a period of 20 years, as of right uninterruptedly and to the knowledge of the defendant He asserts that they had been enjoying passage to the shop of the plaintiff through khasra No. 669 owned by the defendant in the manner stated above. According to htm, defendant has started raising structure upon his land contained in khasra No 669 in close proximity to khasra No. 671 and thereby completely blocked the light, air and passage to the shop as a result of which the shop of the plaintiff/respondent has become useless, His further case is that said attempt of raising structure was initiated by the defendant on March 22, 1985 with intent to adversely affect and deprive the plaintiff of deriving the benefits being enjoyed by him since long. Thus, he filed the instant suit on 13-5-1985, seeking a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant raising any structure, shop etc just close to the shop of the plaintiff marked in the site plan as "ABCD" and located in khasra No. 671 measuring 0-00-71 hectares as reflected ia the jamabandi for the year 1979-80 situated in Mohal Kandbari Teh. Palampur and thereby to allow him to continue using the easementary right of air, light and passage to his property, referred to above. 4. Defendant, Sobhan Ram, resisted and contested the suit by raising various preliminary objections with respect to the non-joinder of necessary parties, locus-standi, valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction and cause of action. On merit, he has admitted the ownership of the land of the plaintiff. However, he has denied the case asserted by the plaintiff with respect to construction of shop-cum-flat in the year 1962. He contended that the plaintiff raised the structure 9-10 years back. He further denied the allegation that the front of the house of the plaintiff is towards the north. In other words, the courtyard of the plaintiffs building-shop-cum-flat is not towards his land or the structure raised thereupon, He has also denied the enjoyment of easementary right of light, air and passage etc. by the plaintiff as alleged. Defendant has specifically pleaded that plaintiff has made an opening in the back-wall of his house about 4 or 5 years back prior to the institution of the suit mala fide with a view to grab his land. Rather, according to him, he (defendant) has raised a shop in his own land, with tin sheefs much before the institution of the suit where he is running a karyana shop. He has denied having raised any wooden structure as alleged. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed eight issues, out of which issues (i), (it) and (iii) pertaining to the case on merit, are material for the purpose of deciding the controversial points arising in between the parties to the instant appeal which are as under : (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the easementary right of light, air and passage as alleged ? OPP. (ii) Whether defendant is interfering in the enjoyment of easementary right of plaintiff as alleged ? OPP. OPP. (ii) Whether defendant is interfering in the enjoyment of easementary right of plaintiff as alleged ? OPP. (iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of mandatory injunction by demolition of wooden structure in khasra No. 669? OPP. 6. The trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant and decreed the suit, which was successfully appealed against by defendant Sobhan Ram. Feeling aggrieved with the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the plaintiff has now come up in this Regular Second Appeal, raising the above said substantial questions of law. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also carefully examined the entire record and evidence, oral as also documentary, in detail. After close scrutiny thtreof, to my mind, the appeal in question has no substance and merits dismissal, for the reasons discussed hereafter. 8. At the very outset, it may be slated that in the instant case, plaintiffs pleadings are wanting on material particulars He has not annexed even a rough plan indicating the situation of his house from the common boundary line carved out by khasra Nos. 679 and 669 which adjoin each other. He has also not pleaded the distance in between his house and that of khokha nor even stated on oath as PW-1 regarding the above said facts. The tatima Ex P-2 annexed with the plaint, merely indicatesthat khasra No 671 is located adjoining to khasra No. 669 towards the northern side of the latter. Apart from the above, the contents of the plaint as pleaded in paras 3 to 5 indicate that allegation with respect to the raising of khokha by the defendant has been alleged to be in close proximity of khasra No 671 and not vis-a-vis his building i.e. shop-cum-flat. It is in the light of these facts emerging from the record that the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties as also the. evidence adduced by them before the trial Court, has to be judged and controversial points determined by this Court. 9. In the first instauce, I would deal with the documentary evidence. Presumption of truth attaches to the revenue record, I have already observed that khasra No. 671 is shown to be Gair Mumkin Ghnral till the year 1985. evidence adduced by them before the trial Court, has to be judged and controversial points determined by this Court. 9. In the first instauce, I would deal with the documentary evidence. Presumption of truth attaches to the revenue record, I have already observed that khasra No. 671 is shown to be Gair Mumkin Ghnral till the year 1985. There is no entry indicating the existence of shop cum-flat on khasra No. 671 It is true that Rattan Chand, as PW-1, has categorically stated that he had constructed the above said shop-cum-flat in the year 1962. Perusal of Jamabandi for the year 1979 80 shows that plaintiff Rattan Chand alongwith his brothers S/Sh. Kishori Lai and Nikku Ram were co-sharers, to the extent of 1/2 alongwith S/Sh. Sharda Ram, Munshi Ram, Baisakhi Ram and Bhawani Singh. Column of possession thereof shows that other co-sharers, namely, S/Sh Sharda Ram and three others were in the hissedari possession of this khasra No. through the predecessors of the plaintiff and his brothers as tenant-at-will. Nothing has been entered in the column of land. Same are the entries with respect to the column of ownership and possession in jamabandi for the year 1984-85 (Ex. D-l). In the column of rent, payment of Galla-batai to the extent of 1/2, after deduction of the weight of seeds from the share of the crops excepting that of grass and maize crop ianda, is shown. In other words, irrespective of the consideration whether these co-sharers were necessary parties or not, plaintiff has not been shown to be in possession of the land in question. Thus, as per the pleadings of the plaintiff and his statement on oath, he was the owner in possession of the shop-cum-flat in question. As defendant has admitted in his written statement this averment, I will not go into the question as to what is the impact of the documentary evidence on the main case. At this stage, it would be worthwhile to mention that the findings of the first appellate Court with re>p?ct to the enj jyment of the easementary rights of light, air and passage have neither been disputed by the plaintiff/appellant nor any substantial question of law has been framed to that effect. At this stage, it would be worthwhile to mention that the findings of the first appellate Court with re>p?ct to the enj jyment of the easementary rights of light, air and passage have neither been disputed by the plaintiff/appellant nor any substantial question of law has been framed to that effect. In this view of the matter, the finding of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court on the basis of appreciation of evidence, oral as also documentary, has to be taken as such. The first appellate Court, after detailed discussion thereof, has concluded that the plaintiff has failed to prove the period reckoned by hjm to claim the continuous enjoyment of easementary rights Rather, according to him, the period reckoned by the plaintiff-respondent to claim easementary rights, was disrupted by letting out of the shop to the defendant for a period of 3-1/2 years, the effect whereof is that the period prior to such unity in ownership and possession of servient and the dominant tenements would not be reckoned in computing the number of years of enjoyment. According to the first appellate Court, a fresh period of 20 years of enjoyment is necessary to acquire an easement after the cessor of the unity. As the two substantial questions of law are intrinsically mixed up with each other, I proceed to decide them together. 10. A close reading of sections 15, 4?, 49 and 51 of the Easements Act, 1982 shows that the Act divides the casement into two classes ; "continuous and dis-continuous casements" If an easement be enjoyp^ for a period exceeding 20 years and it is still in the process of acquisition for a mere non-user for a period of two years, the enjoyment ot such kind of easement would, by itself, defeat the previous enjoyment for the purpose of acquisition In other words, when the plaintiff intends to complete the enjoyment of the period of easement for a period of 20 years and the same is disrupted for a period of more than two years, thtn under section 15 itself, the period of previous enjoyment is disrupted and such period cannot 6e reckoned for considering the completion of the prescriptive easement. In the instant case, as per the plaintiff, only a portion of the building, namely, shop had been let out to the defendant for a period of 3-1/2 years since the year 1981. In the instant case, as per the plaintiff, only a portion of the building, namely, shop had been let out to the defendant for a period of 3-1/2 years since the year 1981. According to his own testimony, the shop was constructed in the year 1962. The period of 20 years of continuous enjoyment of the easement was to end in the year Iv82. In between, the shop had been let out. As per the pleadings of the plaintiff, the decree for permanent prohibitory injunction has been sought restraining the defendant from raising any construction and obstructing the user of the prescriptive easement as alleged, vis-a-vis the shop only. Photograph Ex. DW- I/A is of the * uilding of tlie plaintiff. Ex. DW-2/B, a portion in the main photograph is shown to be the khokha belonging to the defendant. From the bare perusal of the said photograph, it appears that there is a shop-cum-flat. Khokha indicated in Ex. DW-l/B, docs not cover the portion of the flat which has three windows. In this view of the matter as well, there being no evidence of existence of any window etc. in the shop towards the khokha of the defendant coupled with the findings of the first appellate Court, there appears to be no case either pleaded or proved on record by the plaintiff vis-a-vis his shop. Thus, in that view of the matter, even if the claim was with respect to the right of light, air and passage vis-avis the shop, the acquisition of the prescriptive casement had been disrupted for a period of more than two years. In view of these circumstances also, such disruption for a period of more than 2 years by itself, was fatal to the case of the plaintiff and in that view of the matter, possession of the tenant for the above said period extinguished the right of easement of the plaintiff. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, both the above said points are decided against the plaintiff/appellant. Even otherwise, after having gone through the reasonings adopted by the first appellate Court, I am of the firm view that he has rightly appreciated the entire evidence in reversing the lower Courts judgment and decree ind dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. 11. As a sequel to the discussion made above, the appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs. 11. As a sequel to the discussion made above, the appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed