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1994 DIGILAW 183 (MAD)

Appathurai and Others v. State by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-corruption, Trichy

1994-02-15

N.ARUMUGHAM

body1994
Judgment : These revisions have been filed challenging the impugned orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trichirapalli in 10 identical cases, against the petitioners herein but however separately on 20.5.1993. 2. Short background which is necessary to be referred is stated as follows: The petitioners herein in all the cases are charged for the offences under Sec. 162, I.P.C. and 5(3)(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the trial went on before the learned trial Magistrate in all the cases. Examination of the prosecution witnesses was over and the cases were posted for further proceedings. At this stage, petitions under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were filed on behalf of the petitioners in all the cases praying the learned trial Magistrate not to proceed with the questioning of the accused under Sec. 313 of the Code for the mere reasoning that none of the prosecution witnesses had spoken against the petitioners/accused, nor the prosecution established any circumstances against them. After hearing both sides and the objection raised on behalf of the prosecution, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has rejected the prayer of the petitioners by passing the impugned orders. Aggrieved at this, petitioners have come forward with these revisions. 3. I have heard both sides and perused the impugned orders passed by the learned trial Magistrate. Before proceeding further, for the proper appreciation of the point involved in the cases on hand, it is useful to refer Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which runs as follows: "Power to examine the accused: (1) In every inquiry to trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the court- .(a) may at any stage, without previously warning the accused, put such questions to him as the, court considers necessary; .(b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case: Provided that in a summons-case, where the court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b). .(2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under Sub-sec (1). .(3) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment for refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them. .(2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under Sub-sec (1). .(3) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment for refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them. .(4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed. .4. A casual reading of the above section clearly postulates the reasons for questioning the accused by the court after examination of the prosecution witnesses. The very scheme in-built in clause (1) of the above section is unambiguous in the context that the accused must be put on extra caution about all the tendered evidence against him or the circumstances made available against him by the prosecution so as to enable him to explain the circumstances found against him. However, it is imperative on the part of the court even if the explanation or answers given by the accused when he is questioned so by the Court may be false or irrelevant, not to consider them as the parameter to place a conviction or acquittal but however, on the other hand, it enables the court to canalise the whole evidence let in by the prosecution and the circumstances established for and against the accused. Therefore, the methodology provided in the above section of law is manifest that the power given to the court is only to get the accused explain upon all the circumstances and evidence tendered against him. Of course, it is true, that the circumstances or evidence adduced by the prosecution against the accused in a court of law is the genesis and if it is available, only then, court may proceed further, if not, there would arise no need to go further. The very scheming of the above section if considered cumulatively clearly demonstrate the legal position that the trial court alone is empowered to question the accused under this section either on the basis of the tendered evidence or generally, may be pertaining to the circumstances alleged. It is not safe always to expect the court to exercise its power under this section only if oral evidence is available. It is not safe always to expect the court to exercise its power under this section only if oral evidence is available. Court is empowered to question the accused even upon the attendant circumstances that have emerged out from the phraseology employed in clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-secs.(1) and (2), particularly, the words ‘generally’ and ‘as the court considers necessary’. The legal rationale referred to above has been pronounced in very many number of cases by the courts of law in this country repeatedly. .5. Viewing the cases on hand, namely, the impugned orders passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, in the impugned orders, paragraph 5 alone is relevant, which, in my considered view, does not contain or amount to any reasoning or finding given by the learned Magistrate. It is not known whether adequate adduced evidence or circumstances are available in these cases for the learned trial Magistrate to proceed in accordance with Sec. 313 of the Code. However, a passage in paragraph 11 of the original petitions filed on behalf of the petitioners were extracted. With great constraint and respect to the learned Magistrate, I feel, in the said passage there is an apparent error and a mistake had happened in not adding the word ‘no’ when the matter was typed. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor while considering the attendant circumstances and the context has frankly conceded about the inadvertent mistake happened. If this is the position, one cannot take advantage of the same, while expecting justice from a court of law to a person, who is charged with criminal offences like the one involved in the instant cases. For the reasons aforesaid, I find that there is no reasoning or relevant finding given by the learned Magistrate upon the prayer projected on behalf of the petitioner. Even so, keeping in mind, the above legal position, and making it applicable to the facts of the instant cases, it is for the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to decide whether there are sufficient evidence or grounds or circumstances made available by the prosecution against the accused so as to proceed under Sec. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with reference to the tendered oral and documentary evidence and the established circumstances. In the context of the power fully vested with the learned trial Magistrate and for the aforesaid reasoning, I deem it that the ends of Justice would be met if the impugned orders are set aside and consequently, the whole matter is remanded back to the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for consideration of the matter afresh in the light of my above observations and to dispose the cases in accordance with law without further delay. 6. In the result, the impugned orders in all the above cases are hereby set aside and the whole matter is remitted back to the learned Magistrate for consideration afresh after giving full opportunity to both sides and to proceed further in accordance with law if he is so satisfied. Ordered accordingly.