JUDGMENT G.H. Guttal, J. 1. The petitioner is the employer of T.U.Vacco, the Respondent No. 1. In this petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner impugns the order of the appellate authority under the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1968 (the "Act" for brevity) in S.A. 24/1985 made under S.18(2) of the aforesaid Act whereunder the Authority granted reinstatement to the Respondent No. 1, backwages and compensation. 2. The Respondent No. 1 was an Accountant in the Petitioner's establishment from 1-4-1982 to 19-1-1985, on which date he was relieved from employment. This order was withdrawn as it was found to be erroneous. Thereafter disciplinary proceedings were initiated. The Respondent No. 1 was found guilty of as many as seven charges. The services of the Respondent No. 1 were terminated on 10-4-1985. The Appellate Authority has found that the domestic enquiry was conducted in accordance with law but he found that the charges against the Respondent No. 1 related to making erroneous entries in the accounts books. The erasures and overwritings were innocent and no advantage was drawn by the Respondent No. 1 from such entries. It was not the case of the Petitioner that the Respondent No. 1 made the entries and erasures dishonestly. The charges were of trivial nature and were mistakes not amounting to misconduct. Secondly, he found that the erroneous entries in the accounts books were made in 1982-83. Disciplinary proceedings commenced in 1985 on the basis of the stale accusations. The Appellate Authority therefore held that the mistakes were not serious enough to warrant punishment. He made two orders: a) Reinstatement with continuity of services with back wages from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement. b) If the Petitioner did not reinstate the Respondent No. 1, he was directed to pay Rs. 15,000/- as compensation in lieu of reinstatement in addition to the amount of back wages. 3. The Petitioner urged this point. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority under S.18(3) of the Act is limited to deciding the legality of the domestic enquiry. It has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon (a) the guilt or innocence of the employee or (b) the propriety or adequacy of the punishment. 4. Sub-s.(2) of S.18 creates the right of appeal. 3. The Petitioner urged this point. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority under S.18(3) of the Act is limited to deciding the legality of the domestic enquiry. It has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon (a) the guilt or innocence of the employee or (b) the propriety or adequacy of the punishment. 4. Sub-s.(2) of S.18 creates the right of appeal. The employee whose services have been terminated may appeal on two grounds, (i) There was no reasonable cause to dispense with the services, or (ii) He was not guilty of the misconduct. The existence of the "reasonable cause" or the guilt or innocence of the employee, being the grounds of appeal it follows that the Appellate Authority can examine the evidence and decide whether (i) what the employee is accused of, constitutes misconduct and (ii) there was reasonable cause for imposing the penalty. Secondly, since under sub-s.(1) of S.18 the employer can terminate the services without six months notice only on the ground of misconduct, the jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the finding about the misconduct is inherent in the powers of the Appellate Authority. The Appellate authority whose powers are coextensive with those of the trial authority, undoubtedly possesses the jurisdiction to consider whether reasonable cause and / or misconduct are proved. 5. The scrutiny by the Appellate Authority of the whole evidence and determination of the guilt or innocence of the employee is an imperative safeguard against arbitrary dismissal or dismissal for acts which do not constitute misconduct. For instance, where an employee is dismissed for writing the accounts in shabby handwriting or in an untidy manner, it cannot be said that the Appellate Authority cannot consider whether such acts provide reasonable cause or amount to misconduct. It is for this reason that the Appellate Authority has been granted the powers to "dismiss the appeal or direct the reinstatement of the employee.......". Reinstatement cannot be granted or finding about misconduct cannot be affirmed without going into the evidence. 6. The argument that the appellate power is limited to inquiry into the legality of the inquiry alone is not supported by the language of sub-s.(3) of S.18. Appeal being a continuation of the domestic enquiry the appellate authority has all the powers which the Inquiry Officer had. 6. The argument that the appellate power is limited to inquiry into the legality of the inquiry alone is not supported by the language of sub-s.(3) of S.18. Appeal being a continuation of the domestic enquiry the appellate authority has all the powers which the Inquiry Officer had. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of S.18 contain ho words which limit the power of the Appellate Authority to the legality of the enquiry. It extends to the consideration as to whether what has been committed is misconduct and whether there was reasonable cause for dismissal. 7. The Appellate Authority confirmed the finding that the charges were proved. But set aside the penalty on the ground that the acts of which the employee was held guilty did not amount to misconduct but were mere mistakes. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the meaning of misconduct. In Agnani (WFM) v. Badri Das & Others 1963 (1) L.LJ. 684 and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd. & Others v. Its Workmen 1969 (2) L.L.J. 765 the Supreme Court dealt with cases where standing orders of the employers enumerated the acts of misconduct. Since there are no standing orders or written instructions in this case, the meaning of misconduct has to be considered in general principles. 8. Misconduct cannot be defined in universally applicable terms. What constitutes misconduct depends upon circumstances of each case. Generally speaking, acts subversive of discipline or detrimental to the interests of the employer may be considered as misconduct. In other words, discreditable acts which render an employee unworthy of employment constitute misconduct. 9. The Appellate Authority is called upon to consider whether the acts which the employee has committed are discreditable acts rendering him unworthy for the job. This cannot be done without considering the nature of the acts committed. There may be acts which are so trivial that they do not partake the character of unworthy or discreditable behavior. Bad handwriting, scoring out ' entries and untidy work are not desirable qualities. But such acts committed innocently do not have the element of bad behaviour which is another name for misconduct. The word "misconduct" employed in sub-s.(1) and (2) of S.18, excludes acts and errors which fall short of unworthy and discreditable behaviour. 10. Learned counsel referred to the judgments in M.A.K. Sons, Trivandrum v. Kumara Pillai P. and Another 1966 (2) L.L.J. 628, President, Eraveli Coop. The word "misconduct" employed in sub-s.(1) and (2) of S.18, excludes acts and errors which fall short of unworthy and discreditable behaviour. 10. Learned counsel referred to the judgments in M.A.K. Sons, Trivandrum v. Kumara Pillai P. and Another 1966 (2) L.L.J. 628, President, Eraveli Coop. Consumers Stores Ltd. v. Dy. Labour Commissioner and Others 1978 (1) L.L.J. 265 and Kavitha Movies, Ernakulam v. M.A. Abdul Khader 1980 (2) L.L.J. 24 and some other cases. None of these have a direct bearing on the question urged in this petition. 11. I am therefore of the opinion that the Appellate Authority possesses the jurisdiction to consider whether acts committed by an employee even if proved, in a valid enquiry, amount to misconduct. In this case, the Appellate Authority has considered all the charges proved against the Respondent No. 1. The substance of his conclusion is that acts like striking off certain entries, cancelling certain entries,- and making corrections in the entries were mistakes. They have been held to be mistakes because the employee who did not derive any benefit from those entries, acted honestly. Mistakes can be innocent. They may be result of lack of experience or ignorance about the nature of the entries. Since mistakes committed by the Respondent No. 1 were not acts of misconduct, the Appellate Authority was justified in concluding that the penalty imposed was not unjustified. As I understand, the judgment of the Appellate Authority, what he means is that having regard to the nature of the mistakes, there was no reasonable cause for imposing the punishment. The appellate authority was right in his conclusions. 12. The next question is whether the Appellate Authority has the jurisdiction to award compensation in addition to back wages. In Hydrose Haji v. Bava and Others, 1977 KLT 411 dealing with a similar question, a Division Bench of this court, notwithstanding the language of sub-s.(3) of S.18, laid down two propositions. (i) The Appellate Authority has the authority to consider back wages as a component of the compensation. (ii) In awarding backwages in addition to compensation the Appellate Authority does not act without jurisdiction. I may add that the last clause of sub-section (3) of S.18 empowers the Appellate Authority to "grant such other relief as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case". (ii) In awarding backwages in addition to compensation the Appellate Authority does not act without jurisdiction. I may add that the last clause of sub-section (3) of S.18 empowers the Appellate Authority to "grant such other relief as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case". This clause is wide enough to take in its sweep the jurisdiction to award back wages in addition to compensation if circumstance so demand. 13. The Appellate Authority considered the circumstances of this case. They are: (a) The acts were old and stale. (b) The management treated the Respondent No. 1 as a dismissed employee even before the inquiry concluded. (c) The triviality of the charges. These circumstances entered the decision of the Appellate Authority to set aside the punishment and reinstate the Respondent No. 1. The decision of the Appellate Authority is therefore well within his powers under sub-s.(3) of S.18 of the Act. 14. For the reasons stated above, the Original petition is dismissed. No costs.