JUDGMENT This is an appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, against the award dated 17.2.92 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation and Labour Court No.2, Gwalior, in case No. 7/1987 WCA (PD). The facts leading to the appeal are not much in dispute. It is not disputed that the appellant was a fitter in the oil mill run by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. When he was on duty he met with an accident as a result of which his right hand had to be amputated. The dispute centres round the fact whether the appellant was getting Rs. 22/- or Rs. 17/- per day as contended by the opposite party. The learned Commissioner after recording evidence and considering the material on record accepted the claim of the opposite party that wages of the appellant were Rs. 17/- per day and calculated the compensation accordingly. A sum of Rs. 25,924/- was calculated which was disputed by the Insurance Company and has been taken by the appellant. Consequently, the learned Commissioner has rejected the application of the present appellant against which the present appeal has been preferred. The learned counsel for the appellant raised two points before me. Firstly, he submitted that the learned Commissioner committed an error in placing reliance upon the attendance register which was not proved according to law. The next contention of the learned counsel is that the statement of the Doctor, who was examined as P. W. 4, was also not considered. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that in this Court re-appraisal of evidence is not permitted under law. In an appeal under section 30 a substantial question of law can be considered and no substantial question of law has been raised, the appeal itself is not maintainable. The learned counsel further contended that it is incorrect to say that the attendance register has not been proved. He referred to the statement of Rathi, D. W. 1, and pointed out that he has specifically proved that thumb impression of the appellant had been put before him. The contention of the learned counsel is not correct. As regards the Doctor's statement, the learned counsel contended that it was not relevant inasmuch as the case is covered under item No.4 of Schedule I Part II of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923. The contention of the learned counsel is not correct. As regards the Doctor's statement, the learned counsel contended that it was not relevant inasmuch as the case is covered under item No.4 of Schedule I Part II of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923. According to this provision only 60% has been taken in case of loss of a hand or of the thumb and four fingers of one hand or amputation from 4 1/2" below tip of olecranon. The learned Commissioner has calculated the compensation accordingly. Thus there is no merit in the appeal. I have considered the contentions raised before me by the learned counsel for the parties. It cannot be disputed that under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act no appeal lies against an order unless a substantial question of law is involved. To my mind, no substantial question of law is involved and the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is correct. The only point raised in this regard by the learned counsel for the appellant, as pointed out above, is that the document D-2 has not been proved according to law but this contention cannot be accepted in view of the specific statement of Rathi. The other argument relating to the fact that Doctor's evidence was not considered too cannot be said to be covered within the meaning of 'substantial question of law. The provisions contained in item No.4 of Schedule I Part II show that 60% of loss has to be taken into consideration and that has been done by the learned Commissioner. Consequently, I agree with the learned counsel for the respondents on this point as well that non-consideration of the statement of Doctor is not material and does not involve any substantial question of law. In view of what has been said above, I find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed. Costs shall be borne by the parties.