JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:-A most curious and unusual situation has arisen in this case where the appellant who appears in person is virtually asking for a relief that has not been specifically prayed for. Further more, the other complicated aspect of the matter is that effectively the appellant seeks a declaration that his termination from service by the respondent-board is non-est, without having specifically agitated and contested this issue. Whether it is permissible for the Court to grant such reliefs is a moot point that has been vigorously agitated by the two learned Counsel in this proceeding. I must prefix this judgment by expressing my profound appreciation to Mr. Kumbhkoni, learned Counsel, who was requested by me to study the record, take instructions from the appellant who incidentally has appeared in person from the trial Court upto this Court because it did appear that the case required some research and skilled presentation. Mr. Kumbhkoni, not only readily agreed at short notice, but has done an admirable job. 2. The appellant Vijay Indolikar, was originally employed by the Environmental Engineering Department of the State Government and his services were thereafter transferred to the Maharashtra Water Supply and Sewerage Board with effect from 1-11-1979. It transpired that pursuant to certain misconduct alleged against the appellant, which to my mind is not of a very grave nature in so far as he is alleged to have remained absent, without permission, tampered with the office record etc. a disciplinary proceeding was instituted against him and he was removed from the services of the Board with effect from 15-1-1983, having been under suspension from 8-8-1982. Admittedly, the orders in question were passed by the Superintending Engineer of the Board. The present proceeding had been preceded by an earlier one because the appellant appears to have made a grievance that he was not being allowed to work and that he was not being allotted work and that he was not receiving his emoluments etc. as a result of which the trial Court after hearing him passed an order in his favour in respect of the dues payable. That proceeding is of no consequences. After his removal from services, the applicant filed a suit, whereby he contended that the emoluments for the period September, 1982 to November, 1983 as also his special pay for the period April, 1976 to August, 1984 totally amounting to Rs. That proceeding is of no consequences. After his removal from services, the applicant filed a suit, whereby he contended that the emoluments for the period September, 1982 to November, 1983 as also his special pay for the period April, 1976 to August, 1984 totally amounting to Rs. 27,500/- have been wrongfully withheld. It is material for me to point out that the appellant had contended in the plaint that the order of removal is a nullity in so far as according to him the Superintending Engineer had no jurisdiction to remove him from service and on that basis he contended that the various dues had accrued, in other words, the case being that the Court should ignore the removal order and direct the defendant board to pay his dues on the assumption that he continued to be in service. 3. The suit in question was contested. The simple plea of the defendant-board was that there was no question of paying any emoluments since in the first instance the plaintiff had not physically worked and secondly, since there was an order removing him from service, which had not been challenged and that consequently he was not entitled to any reliefs. The trial Court framed certain issues within the limited parameters of these pleadings and by a short judgment dismissed the said suit holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any dues. The matter was carried in appeal and the Appellate Court also took the same view. Thereafter at the stage when the second appeal was filed before this Court one of the points agitated was that the courts were wrong in having mechanically accepted the defence principally because admittedly for the period during which the appellant was under suspension, his subsistence allowance had not been paid. When the appeal was argued for admission it did appear to this Court that prima facie the appellate order was unsustainable in law and having regard to the age of the appellant and his economic condition as pointed out by him to the Court, the matter was admitted and set down for hearing after three weeks. As indicated by me, since the case required serious arguments on both sides, I had requested Mr. Kumbhkoni, to appear on behalf of the appellant as amicus curise. 4. Mr. Kumbhkoni, has seriously assailed the legal validity of both the orders of the lower courts. As indicated by me, since the case required serious arguments on both sides, I had requested Mr. Kumbhkoni, to appear on behalf of the appellant as amicus curise. 4. Mr. Kumbhkoni, has seriously assailed the legal validity of both the orders of the lower courts. In the first instance, he has taken me through the provisions of the Maharashtra Water Supply and Sewerage Board Act, and he has pointed out to me that the appellant who was a full-fledged employee of the Board could only have been removed from service by an order of the board having regard to the provisions of section 8. The Board in question is a creature of statute and the statute very clearly embodies that the powers of appointment, removal etc. are vested in the Board. Mr. Kumbhkoni has also relied on the provisions of section 11, which reads as follows: "11. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board may, by general or special order, delegate, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions, including the condition of review by itself, as may be specified in the order to any committee appointed by it or to the Chairman or the Member-Secretary or any other Officer of the Board such of its powers, duties and functions under this Act as it deams fit, not being its powers, duties and functions under sections 34, 66 and 67." 5. By virtue of the powers vested in the board under section 11, it is true that the powers of the Board can be delegated in all except three instances. As far this aspect of the matter is concerned, it is the condition of the learned Counsel that if at all the defendants desire to contend that the power of terminating the appellants service vested in the Superintending Engineer, then it was necessary for them to produce either a Rule, Regulation or an order legally delegating those powers. Mr. Kumbhkoni submitted that in the absence of any such material which one does not find on record, the order of termination is ipso facto bad-in-law for want of jurisdiction. Under those circumstances, Mr. Mr. Kumbhkoni submitted that in the absence of any such material which one does not find on record, the order of termination is ipso facto bad-in-law for want of jurisdiction. Under those circumstances, Mr. Kumbhkoni submits that it is wholly irrelevant as to whether or not the enquiry was justified, or even whether it was rightly conducted because the ultimate discretion of imposing a punishment and passing a valid order such as one of termination must necessarily flow from a legally designated authority. He contends that such power under section 8 vests only in the board and there is nothing on record to indicate that the powers had been delegated. In these circumstances, Mr. Kumbhkoni submitted that if the order of termination goes ipso facto, the Board would be liable to pay to the present appellant his normal allowances as though he were continued in service right through. 6. Mr. Bhosale, learned Counsel who represents the board has very seriously contested this position. He submits that in the first instance, there are no pleadings to this effect and that more importantly, there is not even a prayer in the plaint that the order of termination be quashed or set aside or for that matter that the Court should declare that the appellant original plaintiff continued to be in service. Mr. Bhosale submits that he has been virtually taken by the surprise at the third stage of the proceeding when such submissions are put forward and he further makes a very serious grievance of the fact that the Board cannot be visited with the consequences of such a situation without having been afforded any opportunity whatsoever to meet this case either before the trial Court or the appeal Court. 7. As regards this particular aspect of the matter, it is necessary for me to record that the appellant was appearing in person before the trial Court and to this extent therefore, a certain degree of latitude will have to be shown to him. It is not really correct as sought to be submitted by Mr. Bhosale that the Board has been taken by surprise. The applicant has very clearly in the course of his pleadings taken up the contention that the termination order is a nullity in law and he has also pleaded that it has not been passed by the designated authority. It is not really correct as sought to be submitted by Mr. Bhosale that the Board has been taken by surprise. The applicant has very clearly in the course of his pleadings taken up the contention that the termination order is a nullity in law and he has also pleaded that it has not been passed by the designated authority. The trial Court has also framed an issue with regard to the legality of the termination order. It is in the light of these circumstances, that Mr. Kumbhkoni has submitted, and to my mind, quite rightly, that the Board was aware of the case made out by the appellant and had every opportunity to meet it. Mr. Kumbhkoni has also advanced an allied submission, which I am inclined to agree with completely, namely that in sum and substance when the plaintiff before the trial Court had contended that he continued to be in service on the ground that the order of termination is non-est, that the burden shifted in law to the board to satisfy the trial Court that the termination was in order. Learned Counsel submits that the validity of the action pre-supposes the fact that the procedure prescribed by law has been complied with namely that all aspects starting with the properly designated authority holding the enquiry in the manner as is required and the disciplinary orders being passed by the authority who had jurisdiction to do so are implicit. It was not for the plaintiff to put the defendants on guard or to insist on their establishing to the satisfaction of the trial Court that their action was valid. One of the grievances of the plaintiff before the trial Court was that even though the so called order of removal from service had no legal effect, that he was not permitted to work. In these circumstances, to my mind, the board was sufficiently on notice and was required to justify their action. Undoubtedly there was no specific prayer or formal prayer either for a declaration that the plaintiff continued in service or that the order was bad but as indicated by me, while doing substantial justice, there may be occasions when courts will be required to make allowances with regard to these formal procedures. Undoubtedly there was no specific prayer or formal prayer either for a declaration that the plaintiff continued in service or that the order was bad but as indicated by me, while doing substantial justice, there may be occasions when courts will be required to make allowances with regard to these formal procedures. This case undoubtedly was one of them where a lowly paid employee who approached a Court of law for justice was unable to avail of any legal assistance and therefore prosecuted his case undoubtedly in a rather faulty manner. Section 151 of C.P.C. was enacted for cases of this class. 8. Mr. Bhosale advanced another contention that the Board would be seriously prejudiced if this aspect of the matter which has not really been vigorously canvassed before the two lower courts were agitated and decided without the Board having an opportunity to produce the requisite material. Mr. Bhosale advanced the contention that the Board is a public authority and therefore there is a presumption of legality with regard to its actions. Under these circumstances, he pointed out that if for whatever reason the order delegating the powers to the Superintending Engineer was not produced or the requisite rules, orders or notifications were not produced, that the matter must be remanded to the trial Court for amendment of the plaint, written statement, framing of additional issues, recording of the additional evidence and fresh decision. Having already held that to my mind the plaintiff had substantially made out his case and that the defendants in their written statement have denied it, if the board thereafter chose not to adduce formal evidence for whatever reasons the entire proceeding cannot be re-opened at this point of time. As far as the Board is concerned, it is a public authority and therefore, it is an impersonal body but as far as the appellant is concerned, he is a small person who has been fighting with his back to the wall for the last decade or more than that and that too without any source of livelihood and in these circumstances, a Court would be doing great injustice by remanding the matter to the trial Court at this belated stage and re-opening the entire issue. The trial has assumed finality when the matter was disposed of before the trial Court. The trial has assumed finality when the matter was disposed of before the trial Court. There are situations in which additional evidence is permitted even at an appellate stage and in the interests of justice, there are occasions when a Court does look into such evidence even at a subsequent point of time. That procedure was also not complied with and under these circumstances, there is no warrant or justification whatsoever for remanding the matter. 9. In this regard, Mr. Kumbhkoni has advanced a submission on a point of law whereby he contends that it is now well settled that if an order is a nullity, then there is no requirement of having it set aside. A Full Bench of this Court, in the decision reported in 44 Bom.L.R. page 577, in the case of (Abdulmiyan Abdulrahman v. Government of Bombay)1, after considering the law on the point in some detail held that it is open to the party concerned to rely on its invalidity and since no rights whatsoever can flow from an invalid order, that it cannot even be contended that the affected party must have the same set aside in an appeal. The Division Bench of this Court, in the case of (Husen Miya v. Chandubhai)2, reported in 55 Bom.L.R. page 946, laid down the proposition in a case under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, that where the order passed by the Mamlatdar was ultra-vires, that it was open to the party to approach a Civil Court for reliefs without exhausting the appellate remedy since that procedure was unnecessary. 10. On the basis of these propositions, Mr. Kumbhkoni advances a submission that on the facts of the present case, where there can be little dispute about the fact that the power of removal of an employee vested only in the Board under section 8 of the Act and where there is nothing to indicate that this power was delegated to the Superintending Engineer, that the impugned order is one wholly without jurisdiction and will therefore have to be treated as a nullity. In this regard Mr. Kumbhkoni relied on an interesting decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, reported in A.I.R. 1966 M.P. page 193, in the case of (Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh)3. In this regard Mr. Kumbhkoni relied on an interesting decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, reported in A.I.R. 1966 M.P. page 193, in the case of (Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh)3. That case related to disciplinary proceedings and the disciplinary order was sought to be defended on the ground that the designated authority had delegated the powers to the one who had passed the order. The Court struck down the order on the ground that in the absence of statutory provision such delegation was not permissible. Relying on this decision, Mr. Kumbhkoni submits that even though there is some provision made in section 11, since the record of this case does not support the view that the power had been delegated, the impugned order will have to be set aside. I need to record in this context that the courts cannot lose sight of one very important aspect of law particularly while dealing with disciplinary proceedings. There are two aspects that are paramount in these proceedings, the first being whether or not the charge is held to be proved as disciplinary proceedings often emanate due to petty problems within organisations or for several extraneous reasons or where the so called act of misconduct is blown up out of all proportion. The evidence that is produced at a late point of time is often times extremely patchy and merely because the Enquiry Officer contends that the charges are proved, it does not mean that a punishment must mechanically follow. The disciplinary powers are therefore confined to authorities of sufficiently high rank from whom a sense of responsibility is expected to the extent that the record will be fairly, independently, correctly and judiciously assessed before deciding that the charges are proved and the punishment is warranted. The consequences of such a finding are often irreparable. Secondly, the punishment be it reduction, removal or dismissal again has very grave consequences and it is therefore essential for an authority of sufficiently high status to carefully assess the nexus between the quantum of punishment and the gravity of the mis-conduct alleged. Having regard to these well-defined principles, Mr. Kumbhkoni submits that even if for the day to day running of a department the powers are losely delegated, that a Court would not sanction disciplinary powers being indiscriminately delegated to all or any of the subordinate authorities. Having regard to these well-defined principles, Mr. Kumbhkoni submits that even if for the day to day running of a department the powers are losely delegated, that a Court would not sanction disciplinary powers being indiscriminately delegated to all or any of the subordinate authorities. The intention of the legislature is quite clear when the power is initially vested in a particular authority and there should be sufficient justification for delegation and if that exists, the delegation must be confined to an officer of more or less equal status in these cases. To my mind, there is considerable force in this contention because even if the Superintending Engineer is well qualified in his job, I do not share the view that he would necessarily be able to perform quasi-legal functions of a disciplinary authority. Apart from these principles or rules of caution, the fact remains on the present record, that it must be held that the powers were not delegated and admittedly the powers were not exercised by or on behalf of the Board. Under these circumstances, the impugned order will have to be treated as being one without jurisdiction and will necessarily have to be ignored. As a consequence, the respondent Board will be required to treat the present appellant original-plaintiff as though he were in normal service and his suit would have to be decreed. The actual computation however with regard to the various heads of dues would have to be made by the department in keeping with the records and at the scales applicable to the appellant. Mr. Kumbhkoni has pointed out to me and right so, that the appellant admittedly was not paid the subsistence allowance for the period while he was under suspension and this amount would therefore be due to him. 11. Mr. Bhosale has submitted that there are certain consequences which would automatically flow from the decision in this second appeal and that the reliefs must be confined to decreeing the claim of the plaintiff as was put forward before the trial Court. In other words, Mr. Bhosale submitted that since there is no specific prayer for setting aside the order of removal nor is there any specific prayer for reinstatement, backwages etc., that none of these reliefs can be or ought to be granted. Mr. In other words, Mr. Bhosale submitted that since there is no specific prayer for setting aside the order of removal nor is there any specific prayer for reinstatement, backwages etc., that none of these reliefs can be or ought to be granted. Mr. Kumbhkoni has seriously objected to this submission because he contends that every Civil Court is invested under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the power to pass orders that are in consonance with the ends of justice and he, therefore, submits that it would be virtually atrocity when the appellant has succeeded on all points, on technicalities to confine him to a limited relief and drive him to the exercise of having to approach a Court of law probably for the third or fourth time to recover what is due to him and be permitted to rejoin his services. I am in agreement with this contention because a relief granted by the Court has got to be complete and correct and such relief ought, should and can never put a party in such a position as would require the institution of further litigation which is unnecessary and is in fact contra indicated. It is therefore, clarified that while setting aside the appellate order and the trial Courts order, whereby the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed, subject to the correct computation as indicated by me above, that the relief proceeds on the footing that the order of termination or removal as the case may be is bad-in-law and will therefore, have to be treated as non-existent. The legal consequences of this situation would naturally mean that the appellant would have to be deemed to have been continued in service and will have to be permitted to rejoin his services. The respondent-Board shall compute the dues payable to him within the shortest period, but in any event before 31-8-1994 and shall ensure that the same are in fact received by him. In the event of any breach being committed by the respondent-Board, it shall be open to the appellant to institute appropriate contempt proceedings. 12. Mr. Bhosale has prayed for stay of the operation of this order, which application is rejected having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. In the event of any breach being committed by the respondent-Board, it shall be open to the appellant to institute appropriate contempt proceedings. 12. Mr. Bhosale has prayed for stay of the operation of this order, which application is rejected having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is further clarified that having regard to the economic condition of the appellant and his status in life, that in the event of the respondent-Board desiring to adopt any further proceedings before a higher Court, that four weeks written notice of the same alongwith a copy of the petition shall be served on him. It is also condition precedent even in that event, the respondent Board shall pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 25,000/- on account so that the appellant is in a position to contest any further proceedings that may be taken out against him. The appeal accordingly succeeds. In the circumstances of the case, the respondent shall be liable to pay the costs of the appellant. Certified copy expedited. Appeal succeeds. *****