KAMLESH KHANNA v. RUPWANTI — 1994 DIGILAW 19 (HP)

JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—This revision petition under section 24 (5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act) is directed against the judgment dated 6-7-1993 passed by the Appellate Authority (District Judge), Shimla whereby the appeal of the respondent-landlady was accepted, the order dated 30-12-1988 of Rent Control (2), Shimla was set aside and eviction order was passed against the petitioner-tenant on the ground that the premises in her occupation are bona fide required by the respondent-landlady "in order to adjust the family of Kartar Singh" one or her sons. 2. This case has a chequered history. The premises in dispute are a residential set consisting of one room, one small room, one store, Kitchen and both room in building No 9, Lower Bazar, Shimla. The building was evacuee property and Shri Hans Raj Khanna, the father of petitioner-tenant, was inducted as a tenant in the premises in dispute by the authorities managing evacuee properties. Lateron the building was transferred to Shri Chattar Singh, the husband of the respondent-landlady, and Shri Hans Raj Khanna attorned him as his landlord. Shri Hans Raj Khanna was not heard since October, 1969 and on the expiry of seven years, he was presumed to be dead. In the meantime, Shri Chattar Singh died and the building in question was inherited by his widow Rupwanti, sons and daughters in equal shares. All the sons and daughters have transferred their share in favour of their mother, widow of Shri Chattar Singh, as such she became the sole owner and landlady of the building including the premises in dispute. 3. The respondent-landlay filed petition No. 18/2 of 1975 for eviction of Shri Hans Raj Khanna and obtained ex parte order on 30-11-1976. Oncoming to know of ex parte order of eviction, the petitioner-tenant claiming herself to be in occupation of the premises in dispute and entitled to inherit the tenancy rights of Shri Hans Raj Khanna being his unmarried daughter, filed civil suit No. 61/1 of 1977 for declaration that ex parte eviction order dated 30 11-1976 is a nullity and is not executable. The suit was contested by the respondent-landlady but ultimately it was decreed on 31-8-1979 by the Senior Sub-Judge, Shimla. The suit was contested by the respondent-landlady but ultimately it was decreed on 31-8-1979 by the Senior Sub-Judge, Shimla. Thereafter, again the petitioner-tenant was compelled to file civil suit No. 41/1 of 1981 against the respondent-landlady to restrain her from removing the floors and walls of the premises in dispute, and causing damage to it, which was decided by the Senior Sub-Judge, Shimla on 4-8-1981 on the statement made on behalf of respondent-landlady. 4. The eviction petition out of which the present revision petition arises, was filed by the respondent-landlady on 10-5-1984 on the following grounds as stated in para 18 (a) of the petition :— "18 (a) The grounds on which the eviction of the tenant is sought : (1) That the premises in question are bonafide required by the landlady for the use and occupation of the same by her married son Shri Kartar Singh, his wife and two children. Shri Kartar Singh is at present residing in a tenanted house in Sital Niwas, Sanjauli. (2) That the landlady/petitioner is occupying one set owned by her in the aforementioned building comprising three rooms where she resides alongwith two married sons, their wives and grand children alongwith one unmarried son. She has not vacated any building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of this petition in the Urban area of Shimla. (3) The eviction of tenant is sought on the ground on arrears of rent front." Further information supplied in para 19 is :— "The son of the petitioner/landlady, Kartar Singh is engaged and carries on business of Dhaba at Chhaila. His wife and child have to live independently at Shimla. As such, his wife and child need the help of immediate family members such as the present landlady and her sons who reside in Shimla. Moreover, the children of Kartar Singh are aged 5 years and 3 years goes to School since no proper educational facilities are available at Chhaila." 5. In reply to the eviction petition, the petitioner-tenant took preliminary objection that the petition was bad for non-joinder of other co-owners of the premises in dispute. On merits, it was denied that the premises in dispute are bonafide required by the respondent-landlady for the use and occupation of her married son Kartar Singh. In reply to the eviction petition, the petitioner-tenant took preliminary objection that the petition was bad for non-joinder of other co-owners of the premises in dispute. On merits, it was denied that the premises in dispute are bonafide required by the respondent-landlady for the use and occupation of her married son Kartar Singh. It was alleged that Kartar Singh was carrying on his business at Chhaila and was comfortably residing at his premises located at Sanjauli, Shimla. According to the petitioner-tenant, the eviction petition filed against her was mala fide as earlier also an eviction petition was filed against her father Shri Hans Raj Khanna that the premises in dispute were required for use and occupation of another married son Rabel Singh. It was specifically alleged that material particulars as are required to be pleaded under law, have not been pleaded owing to which the eviction petition is liable to be dismissed. It is also denied that the respondent-landlady has not vacated any building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the eviction petition in the urban area of Shimla, as one of the residential sets located in the ground floor of the building, which was in occupation of Shri Surender Mehra, had fallen vacant, which has been converted into Video Parlour known as "Chaudhrie Videos". The petitioner-tenant further clarified that a residential set consisting of three rooms along with accessories is in occupation of the respondent-landlady besides one residential set located in the third floor, which is in occupation of one of her sons Gurdial Singh and another residential set which is in occupation of her widowed daughter Smt. Bishan Devi. As per the petitioner-tenant, the eviction petition has been filed to unnecessarily harass her and compel her either to increase the rent or to vacate the premises so that the respondent-landlady may convert it into commercial premises and let it out on much higher rent and premium. No rejoinder was filed by the respondent-landlady. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :— 1. Whether the demised premises are required bonafide of petitioner for the use and occupation of her married son ? OPP. 2. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder ? OPR. 3. Relief. 7. No rejoinder was filed by the respondent-landlady. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :— 1. Whether the demised premises are required bonafide of petitioner for the use and occupation of her married son ? OPP. 2. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder ? OPR. 3. Relief. 7. When the parties completed their evidence, addressed arguments and the petition was fixed for orders, the respondent-landlady filed two applications for amendment of the eviction petition under Order 6, Rule 17 read with section 151, C.P.C, which were dismissed by the Rent Controller on 9-1-1987 and 24-8-1987. But in appeal the order dated 24-8-1987 was set aside and the amendment was allowed. Accordingly, respondent-landlady filed amended eviction petition on 27-12-1986 by adding following lines to para 18 (a) of the eviction petition :— "The said Sheetal Niwas is situated in Shimla, within the urban area of Shimla on its outskirts. Kartar Singh and his family is still residing in residential set in Sheetal Niwas and they have not vacated the same after the commencement of this Act. It may further be submitted that prior to taking up residence in Sheetal Niwas, Sanjauli, Shimla-6, the said Kartar Singh and his family were residing along with his mother in the two room and kitchen residential set which is presently also in her occupation and also of the other members of the family. However, due to paucity of accommodation and divergent view-points to various aspects of life the petitioner and the wife of Kartar Singh could not live together and therefore, Kartar Singh was forced to rent out accommodation of the aforementioned Sheetal Niwas at Sanjauli. The said accommodation was taken by Kartar Singh approximately some time in the year 1981." 8. In reply to the amended petition, the petitioner-tenant denied that Kartar Singh and his family were residing in a tenanted house in Sheetal Niwas, Sanjauli, Shimla at that time and they had not vacated the same after the commencement of the Act. It was also denied that Kartar Singh had left the premises of respondent-landlady where he was earlier residing with her due to paucity of accommodation and divergent view-points to various aspects of life between the respondent landlady and the wife of Kartar Singh. No rejoinder to the reply to amended petition was filed by the respondent-landlady. It was also denied that Kartar Singh had left the premises of respondent-landlady where he was earlier residing with her due to paucity of accommodation and divergent view-points to various aspects of life between the respondent landlady and the wife of Kartar Singh. No rejoinder to the reply to amended petition was filed by the respondent-landlady. It may be pointed out that the allegations made in the reply that one of the residential sets consisting of three rooms and accessories, which was in occupation of Shri Surender Mehra, had fallen vacant and has been converted into Video Parlour, have not been explained in the amended petition. 9. On the amended pleadings no farther issue was either claimed or framed. Only Kartar Singh PW-4 was recalled and his further statement was recorded. The petitioner-tenant did not adduce any evidence in rebuttal thereof. On the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties, the Rent Controller did not find the requirement of the respondent-landlady for the residence of her married son Kartar Singh as bona fide and dismissed the eviction petition. In appeal filed by the respondent-landlady, the findings of the Rent Controller did not find favour with the Appellate Authority and these have been set aside, and eviction order has been passed. 10. During the pendency of appeal counter applications were filed by the parties for adducing additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. In the application filed by the petitioner-tenant, she claimed that number of subsequent developments had taken place after the order dated 30-12-1988 of Rent Controller, which deserve to be taken note of while disposing of the appeal. These subsequent developments are that one residential set consisting of three rooms, kitchen, bathroom and laterine located in the third floor was vacated by one Shri Ramesh Handa, who had been occupying it as a tenant. Another residential set consisting of one room and kitchen located in the third floor, which was in possession of one Shri Bhola Ram, who was working as Priest in Kaliwari, Shimla, was vacated by him on 4-12-1991. According to the petitioner-tenant, on vacation of these two sets in the third floor where the premises in dispute are located, the requirement of the respondent-landlady, if any, stood satisfied, 11. According to the petitioner-tenant, on vacation of these two sets in the third floor where the premises in dispute are located, the requirement of the respondent-landlady, if any, stood satisfied, 11. In reply to this application it was admitted that the residential set consisting of three rooms was vacated by Shri Ramesh Handa but it was occupied by another son of the respondent-landlady Shri Mahinder Singh, who along with his wife and three children was residing with the respondent landlady. It is also admitted that one room in occupation of Shri Bhola Ram was vacated by him but since it is adjacent to one room already in occupation of another son of respondent-landlady Shri Gurdial Singh, it has been occupied by him. It is further stated that this room was neither sufficient nor suitable for accommodation of Kartar Singh. Arguments were heard on this application and orders were passed on 6-7-1993 on the same day when the appeal was decided. While allowing the application, it is stated that learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-tenant had given statement that he did not intended to lead any additional evidence and prayed that subsequent events may be taken into consideration while deciding the appeal. 12. In the application for additional evidence filed on behalf of respondent-landlady, it was alleged that after passing of the order dated 50-12-1988 by the Rent Controller, Smt. Induwala had developed acute asthamatic trouble for which she took treatment in various institutions, such as, Christian Medical College, Ludhiana, C.M.C. Chandigarh, Civil Dispensary, Sanjauli, Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla etc. etc. and permission was sought to produce prescription slips by way of additional evidence. Prayer for appointment of local commissioner was also made to ascertain the condition of Sheetal Niwas and its suitability for the residence of Smt. Induwala, an asthatnatic patient. The application was resisted and it was denied that Smt. Induwala is patient of Asthama, as alleged. But the application was allowed by the same order dated 6-7-1993 and it was decided that the fact that Smt. Induwala developed acute asthamatic trouble and the accommodation where she is residing at Sanjauli is not worth living, will be taken into consideration for deciding the appeal without recording additional evidence as stated by learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-landlady. But the application was allowed by the same order dated 6-7-1993 and it was decided that the fact that Smt. Induwala developed acute asthamatic trouble and the accommodation where she is residing at Sanjauli is not worth living, will be taken into consideration for deciding the appeal without recording additional evidence as stated by learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-landlady. But learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant was not afforded an opportunity to give evidence in rebuttal, though these additional facts were denied by her in reply to the application. 13. This Court has heard learned Counsel for parties and gone through the record. Before dealing with the respective contentions raised by the counsel for parties, the relevant provisions of the Act need to be noticed. Section 14 (3) (d) of the Act is as under :— 14. (1)............ (2) ............ (3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession-— (a) ............ (b) ............ (c) ............ (d) in the case of any residential building, if he requires it for use as an office, or consulting room by his son who intends to start practice as a lawyer, an architect, a dentist, an engineer, a veterinary surgeon or a medical practitioner, including a practitioner of Ayurvedic, Unani or Homoeopathic system of Medicine or for the residence of his son who is married, if— (i) his son as aforesaid is not occupying in the urban area concerned any other building for use as office, consulting room or residence, as the case may be ; and (ii) his son as aforesaid has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause, after commencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned : The first point raised by Shri Bhupender Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant, is that the eviction petition is not maintainable as the married son Kartar Singh for whose use and occupation the premises in dispute are allegedly required, is admittedly occupying a residential sit in the urban area of Shimla i.e. Sheetal Niwas, Sanjauli, Shimla According to Shri Gupta, the fact that residential set occupied by Kartar Singh is tenanted and is not owned by him has no bearing because it is not the requirement of section 13 (3) (d) of the Act. By not using the words owned by him in section 13 (3) (d) of the Act, whereas, these words have been used in section 14 (3) (a) (i) of the Act, which provides for eviction of residential building if it is required by the landlord for his own occupation, the legislators have made a clear distinction between two categories of cases. Section 14 (3) (a) of the Act is :— 14. (1)............ (2) ............ (3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession— (a) in the case of a residential building, if— (i) he requires it for his own occupation : Provided that he is not occupying another residential building owned by him, in the urban area concerned : Provided further that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application, in the said urban area ; or (ii) ............ Explanation.—(1)............ (2) "family" means parents and such relation of the landlord as ordinarily reside with him and are dependent upon him. 14. In reply to this argument Shri R. L. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent-landlady, has pointed out that word and in between the provisions (i) and (ii) of Clause (d) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act is connective and not decongestive and besides occupying a residential set in an urban area concerned, further requirement is that he has not vacated such a set without sufficient cause. Shri Sood has further pointed out that since the residential set in occupation of Kartar Singh is not fit for the residence of his wife, who is a asthamatic patient, he has a sufficient cause to vacate it and shift to the premises in dispute. 15. In the opinion of this Court sub-clause (i) and (ii) of Clause (d) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act put two riders on the right of landlord to get a building vacated for the residence of his married son ; firstly, the married son must not occupy in the urban area concerned any building, may be his own or tenanted, and secondly, he must not have vacated in the urban area concerned any building, may be his own or tenanted, without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act. These riders will apply jointly or separately depending upon the facts of each case. This interpretation is conformity with the objects of the Act to give protection to the tenant from eviction if the married son of the landlord is already in occupation of a building and/or he has vacated such a building after coming into force of the Act. The married son does not come within the definition of family as per explanation (2) given under Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act, if he does not ordinarily reside with the landlord and is not dependent upon him. The requirement for the residence of married son is not equivalent to the requirement of landlord himself for which the restrictions are less stringent, as put by first and second provisos to sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act. The landlord can seek eviction for his personal requirement if he is occupying a tenanted building but not for the residence of his married son if the married son is in occupation of tenanted or any sort of building in the urban area concerned. Similarly, landlord can seek eviction for his personal use if he has not vacated the building owned by him without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application in the urban area concerned, whereas, for the requirement of residence of married son, the married son must not have vacated any sort of building without sufficient cause after commencement of the Act in the urban area concerned. 16 Applying this interpretation to the facts of the present case, admittedly, married son of the respondent-landlady, namely, Kartar Singh, for whose residence the eviction petition has been filed, is occupying a building in the urban area of Shimla, therefore, the eviction petition is not maintainable. It is correct that he has not vacated any building after the commencement of the Act except the building where he was residing jointly with the respondent-landlady but vacation of such a building may not come under the purview of sub-clause (ii) of Clause (d) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act because he was not occupying it in his individual capacity. However, if the case, which the respondent-landlady has tried to set up, is accepted that the building in occupation of her married son Kartar Singh is not suitable for the residence of his family as his wife is a patient of Asthama, it may be said that there is sufficient cause to vacate this building by Kartar Singh. If vacation of building in the past after commencement of the Act is saved, if it was for sufficient cause, the case like the present one is also covered provided the sufficient cause to vacate the building already in occupation is established on the record. Therefore, the next question is whether from the pleadings and evidence on record it is proved by the respondent-landlady that there exists a sufficient cause for her married son Kartar Singh to vacate the building already occupied by him in Shimla. 17. In the petition, originally filed, the case set up by respondent-landlady is that though Kartar Singh is running a Dhaba at Chhaila yet residence of his family in Shimla is necessary for the education of his children. By way of amendment to the petition it is explained under what circumstances Kartar Singh had left the building where he was jointly residing with the respondent-landlady but it is not stated why does he intend to vacate the building already occupied by him. Even in their statements Gurdial Singh PW-1 general attorney c 18. Second argument raised by Mr. Gupta is that the eviction petition is not maintainable for the reasons that it is not consistent with the requirement of statute inasmuch as the ingredients contemplated by section 14 (3) (d) of the Act have not been impleaded. For making this submission he has relied upon Supreme Court judgment in Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas, ILR 1979 H. P. (Supreme Court Section) page 1 as well as judgments of this Court in Smt. Mastu Devi v. Shri Harish Chander, 1980 Sim LC 376 and Tara Chand Sharma v. Baij Nath and others, 1992 (2) RCR 647. 19. This Court finds substance in this submission. 19. This Court finds substance in this submission. As already discussed above, though by amending the petition the ingredients as required under sub-clause (i) of Clause (d) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act were incorporated that Kartar Singh and his family are occupying in the urban area of Shimla a building for their residence, yet it was not stated that the said building is full of dampness and not fit for the occupation of his family, his wife being asthamatic patient, to fulfil the requirements of sub-clause (ii) of Clause (d) of sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act. Law in this regard is well settled by now, as held by Supreme Court in Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas (supra) in which the learned Judges of Supreme Court were interpreting the provisions of section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Last Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 which is pari materia to section 14 (3) (a) (i) of the Act, which is similar to section 14 (3) (d) of the Act. The Supreme Court has said that :— "It is common ground that there are three requirements to make out a cause of action for eviction under that provision, and indeed that is apparent from a bare reading of the sub-section. In the present case the finding is to the effect that the landlord requires the residential building for his own occupation. But the legislation has taken care to insist upon two more conditions, namely ; (a) that the landlord is not occupying any other residential building in the area concerned ; and (b) that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. But the legislation has taken care to insist upon two more conditions, namely ; (a) that the landlord is not occupying any other residential building in the area concerned ; and (b) that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. There is not a scintilla of evidence nor indeed there is any averment in compliance with these latter conditions The necessary consequence follows that not merely is there inadequacy of pleadings sufficient to make out a cause of action but total absence of proof of two vital requirements......" The Supreme Court further said that :— "........The statute benignly designed to protect tenants from unreasonable evictions has taken care to put restrictions which must be rigorously constructed to fulfil the purpose of the statute." (Emphasis supplied) Following the ratio of this judgment of Supreme Court number of cases have been decided by this Court including Smt. Mastu Devi v. Shri Harish Chander and Tara Chand Sharma v. Baij Nath and others (supra). 20. Third argument raised by Mr. Gupta is that while deciding the appeal the Appellate Authority has adopted wrong approach as if the eviction petition has been filed on the ground of personal requirement of the respondent-landlady and not the requirement for the residence of her married son. It is not denied by Mr. R.L. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent-landlady, that the eviction petition has been filed for the residence of the married son of respondent-landlady, namely, Kartar Singh. The perusal of judgment from paras 17 to 23, supports the submission made by Mr. Gupta. The Appellate Authority has started discussion in para 17 with the following words, which clearly show that he was considering the requirement of landlady for her own occupation which includes requirement of members of her family also under section 14 (3) (a) of the Act and not requirement for separate residence of a married son under section 14 (3) (d) of the Act :— "To judge the bona fide of the petitioner-landlady, it is to be seen whether the accommodation with the petitioner-landlady is sufficient for all times to come. The petitioner-landlady is entitled to additional accommodation for her married sons and keeping in view the large family of Gur dial and Kartar Singh the accommodation with the petitioner-landlady, which is at present with her is not sufficient to adjust entire family of her two sons what to talk of the divorced daughter and children who are also living with the petitioner-landlady........." Thereafter upto paragraph 21 the Appellate Authority has referred to authorities in respect of bona fide requirement of the landlord for his own occupation. Further, in paras 22 and 23 the Appellate Authority has referred to the evidence on record as if he is deciding that the premises presently in the occupation of respondent landlady are not sufficient to accommodate all the members of her family including her married son Kartar Singh, who is presently residing in a tenanted premises in building Sheetal Niwas, Sanjauli, Shimla. Had it been the case of bona fide requirement of respondent-landlady for her own occupation, altogether different pleadings, evidence as well as approach for decision would have been required. Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Authority cannot be upheld, as it does not stand scrutiny of this Court. 21. Lastly, Mr. Gupta has urged that from the pleadings as well as evidence on record it is not proved that the requirement of respondent-landlady for the residence of her married son Kartar Singh is bona fide. According to him, the respondent-landlady is bent upon harassing the petitioner-tenant by involving her in litigation since 1976-77 to compel her to vacate the premises in dispute so that she may convert it into commercial one to let it out on exorbitant rent and premium. Mr. Gupta further states that had the requirement of respondent-landlady for the residence of Kartar Singh been bona fide, she would not have converted the residential premises consisting of three rooms and accessories in the year 1979-80 into Video Parlour and thereafter let it out to Him Federation, after getting it vacated from another tenant Shri Surinder Mehra. Besides this, two more sets, one consisting of three rooms and accessories, and another consisting of one rooms and a kitchen, which fell vacant during the pendency of appeal before the Appellate Authority, have also been given to other married sons instead of accommodating Kartar Singh. 22. In reply to this argument Mr. Besides this, two more sets, one consisting of three rooms and accessories, and another consisting of one rooms and a kitchen, which fell vacant during the pendency of appeal before the Appellate Authority, have also been given to other married sons instead of accommodating Kartar Singh. 22. In reply to this argument Mr. R.L. Sood has tried to justify the conduct of respondent-landlady by stating that she was within ner right to convert the residential set which was got vacated from Shri Surinder Mehra, into non-residential and use it or let it out to augment her income by taking support from the judgment of Delhi High Court in Shri Narain Doss v. Shri Krishan Lal Longani, 1980 (2) RCR 537. But this Court does not find this explanation satisfactory. In the judgment of Delhi High Court the premises which had fallen vacant were not found suitable for the requirement of the landlord, therefore, his conduct to let them out on higher rent was not considered mala fide. In the present case it has not been the case of the respondent-landlady that those premises were not suitable for the residence of her married son Kartar Son The fact of the matter is that she did not disclose this fact in her original petition and did not explain it even in her amended petition, though in reply to the original petition, the petitioner-tenant had pointed it out. Shri Gurdial Singh the eldest son of respondent-landlady, who is also her general attorney, appeared as PW 1 and denied that these premises were residential and these were got vacated by filing eviction petition on the ground of requirement of respondent-landlady for her own occupation and also of her family besides other grounds, which was allowed ; unless he was confronted with certified copies of petition, his statement dated 24-12-1976 and eviction order dated 30-12-1976 (Exts R-3, R-4 and R-12). He has also denied many more facts unless he was confronted with documents in respect thereof which clearly shows that his statement is not worthy of credence. 23. So far other two sets which have admittedly fallen vacant during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority, are concerned, no explanation has been tendered except that these have been given to Mahinder Singh who was already residing with the respondent-landlady and Rabel Singh, who was already occupying one room for his residence. 23. So far other two sets which have admittedly fallen vacant during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority, are concerned, no explanation has been tendered except that these have been given to Mahinder Singh who was already residing with the respondent-landlady and Rabel Singh, who was already occupying one room for his residence. Had the requirement of these two sons of the respondent-landlady been bonafide, she would have filed eviction petition against those tenants also who were in occupation of these sets as she has done in the case of the petitioner-tenant. It is admitted by Gurdial Singh in his cross-examination that his brother Mahinder Singh has been working with Kartar Singh jointly at Chhaila. As such, requirement for the residence of his family who was already residing with respondent-landlady could not take preference over the alleged requirement of Kartar Singh, for which the eviction petition was filed. This Court needs not discuss the evidence whether the premises presently in occupation of respondent-landlady are sufficient to accommodate her other sons and daughters as it is not relevant for the present controversy, which pertains to the requirement of separate premises for the residence of a married son, namely, Kartar Singh. Therefore, from the totality of facts and circumstances on record, this Court is satisfied that the requirement of respondent-landlady for the residence of her married son Kartar Singh is not bona fide. 24. The result of above discussion is that there is merit in this revision petition and it is allowed. The judgment dated 6-7-1993 of the Appellate Authority is set aside and the eviction petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Revision petition allowed.