Judgment :- Arunachalam, J. Petitioner Thangam alias Thangaraj alias Kumar has been detained as a goonda under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 in pursuance of an order of detention dated 5. 1993 passed by the second respondent Commissioner of Police, Madras City, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. .2. Petitioner had come to adverse notice in six prior crimes registered by J-7, Velachery Police Station under Secs. 379 and 392, I.P.C., crime period ranging between March, 1991 and April, 1993. It is in this background that the petitioner got himself involved in the ground crime which had occurred at or about 4.30 p.m. on 5. 1993. One Thulukkanam was proceeding to Vijayanagaram bus stand in Velachery Area, to go over to the house of his friend. On the way, petitioner way laid him at knife point and threatened him with harm if he did not part with money in his possession. When Thulukkanam stated that he did not possess any money, petitioner while administering further threats, directed him rashly to remove his gold ring and offer it to him. While so saying, he attempted to stab Thulukkanam. Out of fear, victim handed over the gold ring to the petitioner. Soon thereafter, detenu snatched away the citizen wrist watch worn by Thulukkanam, apart from relieving the victim of Rs.27 in cash, kept in his shirt pocket. Thulukkanam raised a hue and cry. immediately, petitioner attempted to stab the victim over gain. But, the latter moved away and escaped from sustaining any further injury. However, in the process, he fell down. Petitioner commenced running away from the scene. However, victim attempted to catch hold of him by following him in which process he was raising an alarm as well. Two members of the public came to the rescue of Thulukkanam. They were also threatened with dire consequences by the petitioner who picked jelly stones from the road side and started pelting them against the members of the public indiscriminately. One of the stones hit Thulukkanam on his right leg and right forearm. These atrocious activities of the petitioner led to shopkeepers at the bus stand closing down their shutters in fear of danger to their lives and properties. Passengers waiting for buses ran away for safer places. One of the stones hit Thulukkanam on his right leg and right forearm. These atrocious activities of the petitioner led to shopkeepers at the bus stand closing down their shutters in fear of danger to their lives and properties. Passengers waiting for buses ran away for safer places. Womenfolk, out of fright, took refuse behind the buses, At or about that time, Boopalan, Inspector of Police, J-7 Velachery Police Station, who was on his rounds with his police party, was able to surround and apprehend the petitioner. The weapon of offence and stolen property were seized from him. Petitioner was arrested. Complaint preferred by Thulukkanam was registered. Petitioner was produced before the 9th Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, and remand obtained. After follow up action, impugned order of detention was passed. 3. Mr.M. Bhaskar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, urged two contentions, to have the impugned order set aside. The first contention was, that there was non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority, since in the grounds of detention, he has stated that “womenfolk who were at that place also feared danger to their lives and ran behind the halted buses an took shelter”, whereas averments in the complaint and the statements of witnesses show that “the women folk who were there, took shelter behind the buses.” The next contention was, that family members of the detenu had not been informed about this preventive order and the place where the detenu stood incarcerated. 4. On these two grounds, we have heard initially Mr. S. Shanmughavelayutham, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, and Mr.B. Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor, at a later point of time. 5. On the second ground, we invited the members of the Bar to advance arguments if they were desirous, Mr. Ramesh, Advocate, alone made his submissions, which we will refer to presently after recording the submissions made on behalf of the State. .6. On the first ground, the contention of the State was that there was practically no worth while divergence between the statement in the grounds and the statements of witnesses, be it during investigation or in the First Information Report. It will be odd to allege non-application of mind. 7. On the second ground, it was strenuously contended, that the relations of the detenu, had visited him imprison on 15. It will be odd to allege non-application of mind. 7. On the second ground, it was strenuously contended, that the relations of the detenu, had visited him imprison on 15. 1993, and hence they were aware not only about this preventive order, but also the place where the detenu stood lodged. Further, in the instant case, detenu had not forwarded any representation and hence he had not been prejudiced in any manner. The object and purpose behind the Act should not be lost sight of, for no time limit has been prescribed to make a representation, while a time-frame has been fixed for service of grounds, approval of order, placing of the order of detention before the Advisory Board for offering its opinion,and for confirmation of the order of detention. The underlying idea is that relatives of the detenu should not be kept in the dark. In the present case, the imperative prescribed by the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy v. Union of India, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982)1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, stands complied with. 8. Mr. Ramesh, learned counsel appearing as amicus curiae, submitted, that the prescription contemplated by Supreme Court in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68; was forwarding of intimation in writing and that too immediately, to the near relations of the detenu. The purpose behind such a prosecution was that procedure adopted should be fair and reasonable. He contended that the observations of the Supreme Court in Union of Indiav. Vasanbharthi, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1216, expatiating the dicta laid down in A.K. Roy’s case, cannot help the state, on the insant facts, since no attempt was made to serve any intimation in writing and mere so immediately. Knowledge obtained by the relations of the detenu on 15. 1993 cannot be a substitute for intimation prescribed by the Supreme Court. Mr. Ramesh and Mr.B. Sriramulu placed for our scrutiny certain decided cases, which we will refer to, soon after disposing of the first contention. 9. With care and concern, we have evaluated the inherent merits of the divergent contentions. On the first ground, there is no strength whatever. 1993 cannot be a substitute for intimation prescribed by the Supreme Court. Mr. Ramesh and Mr.B. Sriramulu placed for our scrutiny certain decided cases, which we will refer to, soon after disposing of the first contention. 9. With care and concern, we have evaluated the inherent merits of the divergent contentions. On the first ground, there is no strength whatever. As rightly pointed out by counsel representing the state there is no vital difference between the statement made in the grounds and the versions of witnesses, which form part of the paper book supplied to the detenu. There appears to be no scope, whatever, for any ambiguity. The fact sought to be conveyed through the grounds, based on the statements of witnesses, is that women folk in that area, out of fight to their lives, took shelter behind the buses. That the activity of the petitioner, had a reach on the members of the public, is the fact brought to the notice, of the detenu, not only through the grounds of detention, but also through the statements of witnesses supplied to him. We are unable to. notice any lack of application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. This ground, which has no merit, shall stand rejected. 10. The second ground assumes some importance since it is urged quite often, some times very mechanically, even though it had been taken in the memorandum. Right to intimation to the close relations of the detenu, about passing of the preventive order and the place of detention, was held to be a necessary attendant upon detentions, which should conform to the mandate of Art. 21 of the Constitution, in the matter of fairness, justness and reasonableness. In that context, Supreme Court in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, considered it an imperative, that immediately after a person was taken into custody in pursuance of an order of detention, the members of his household, preferably the parent, the child or the spouse, must be informed in writing of the passing of the order of detention and of the fact that the detenu has been taken into custody. Intimation must also be given as to the place of detention, including the place where the detenu was transferred from time to time. Intimation must also be given as to the place of detention, including the place where the detenu was transferred from time to time. Supreme Court further observed, that it had said, time and again, that the person who is taken in custody does not forfeit, by reason of his arrest, all and every one of his fundamental rights and it was therefore necessary to treat the detenu with human dignity and civilised norms of behaviour. 11. The meaning that should be attached to the word “immediately” used by the Supreme Court in its prescription, may have to be axiomatically considered, which, of course, in our view, can be reserved to be scrutinised a little later. However, it is not the law laid down by the Supreme Court, that in the event of lack of immediate service of intimation, the preventive order loses all its value, leading to the only course of quashing it. These observations of the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982)1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, were sought to be explained by Ratnavel Pandian, J., speaking on behalf of the Division Bench in Union of India v. Vasanbharthi, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1216. In that case, the argument was that the relatives of the detenu had not been informed and even if it were to be found from the records that the relatives had come to know about it from some source, the order of detention would most certainly be invalid. This plea of the detenu found favour with Gujarat High Court, but was set aside by the Supreme, Court. Union of India represented through its counsel submitted, that the detenu concerned, was already an undertrial prisoner and his relatives inclusive of his maternal uncle had visited him in jail within two days there after and, therefore, non-communication of a written intimation about the fact of passing of the order of detention and the place of detention in pursuance of detention order, could have no significance and as such the observation made in A.K. Roy’s case, can hardly be availed by the detenu, and the order cannot be said to be invalid on that ground. 12. On the contrary contentions, placed for its assessment. 12. On the contrary contentions, placed for its assessment. Supreme Court in Vasanbharthis case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1216, stated as hereunder.: “The object and purpose of the above observation in our view seem to be that the, family members of the detenu should not be kept in darkness by withholding the information about the passing of the order of detention and the place of detention thereby preventing them from having any access and from rendering any help or assistance to the detenu and similarly the detenu should not be deprived of the privilege of meeting their relations and getting any help or assistance.” “Coming to the present case, we are satisfied that the family members had sufficient knowledge about the detention of the detenu by virtue of the mittimus issued as well as the place of detention. Therefore, no legitimate grievance can be made that there is contravention to the observation in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J.,(Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68.” 13. In the instant case as well, petitioner who was arrested on 5. 1993, was in remand on 5. 1993, when the impugned order was passed. Records produced before us from Central Prison, Madras, clearly show, that relations of the detenu had visited him in Jail on 15. 1993. The order of detention was served on the detenu on 5. 1993 and the grounds of detention stood served on 15. 1993. In about a week after service of grounds on the detenu relations of the detenu had visited him in jail. We have to recapitulate the submission made by the learned Public Prosecutor, that the detenu had not chosen to forward any representation challenging the impugned order of detention. As observed by the Supreme Court in Vasanbharthi’s case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1216, if non-intimation had prevented access to the relations of the detenu, from rendering any help or assistance to him and similarly the detenu stood deprived of the privilege of meeting his relations and getting any help or assistance, the matter might have been different. Such a contingency does not arise, since admittedly no representation was ever forwarded. There was no bar for meetings between the detenu and his relations and that such meetings had taken place is a matter of record. Mr. Such a contingency does not arise, since admittedly no representation was ever forwarded. There was no bar for meetings between the detenu and his relations and that such meetings had taken place is a matter of record. Mr. Ramesh, learned counsel, contended that once it becomes evident, that no communication had been served on the relations of the detenu, as prescribed by Supreme Court and that too immediately, the question of prejudice can have no place whatever, and the impugned order is bound to be struck down on the basis, of that sole infirmity. He referred to paragraph 74 of the judgment in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68 and stated, that the object behind the prescription was, that the detenu must be kept usually in a place where he habitually resides so that it will be possible for his friends and relatives to meet him or help the detenu to claim the advantage of facilities like having his own food. These observations, according to Mr. Ramesh, tend to emphasise the need for the prescribed “immediate” intimation. This argument overlooks the next sentence which reads as follows: “The requirements of administrative convenience, safety and security may justify in a given case the transfer of a detenu to a place other than that where he ordinarily resides, but that can only be by way of an exception and not as a matter of general rule”. This consideration does not arise in the present H.C.P., for the petitioner is a resident of Mylapore, Madras and in pursuance of the impugned order, he stands incarcerated in Central Prison, Madras. It was again argued by Mr. Ramesh, that the question of prejudice, does not come into the arena of preventive law and therefore the argument of learned Public Prosecutor, that the detenu had not been prejudiced should be outright rejected. For that proposition, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Tsering Dolkar v. Administrator, U.T. Delhi, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1192. Ramesh, that the question of prejudice, does not come into the arena of preventive law and therefore the argument of learned Public Prosecutor, that the detenu had not been prejudiced should be outright rejected. For that proposition, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Tsering Dolkar v. Administrator, U.T. Delhi, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1192. In that case, the detenu complained, that he had been denied a fair and adequate opportunity of representing against his detention, inasmuch as the grounds of detention and copies of documents accompanying the grounds were not in English language and copies there of have been furnished in Tibetan language, while the detenu knew only Ladakhi. Further copies of all the material documents shown in Annexure “C” were not supplied to him. The case of the opposite side was, that the wife of the petitioner therein knew both English and Tibetan languages and an effective representation as a fact had been made. In that context, Supreme Court stated as follows: “There can be two opinions that the requirement of law within the provisions of Art.22(5) of the Constitution is that the detenu has to be informed about the grounds of detention in a language which he understands. The fact that detenu’s wife knew the language in which the grounds were framed does not satisfy the legal requirement...We must make it clear that the law as laid down by this Court, clearly indicates that in the matter of preventive detention, the best is not one of prejudice but one of strict compliance with the provisions of the Act and when there is a failure to comply with those requirements it becomes difficult to sustain the order.” The law laid down by the Supreme Court, makes it abundantly clear, that the man date of Art.22(5)of the Constitution had been violated in that case decided by it. Communication of the grounds of detention to the detenu, must be in the language known to him. In other words, he must be made aware of the grounds on which, he was detained. Only from that procedure of effective communication, the detenu will be able to exercise his right of making an effective and purposeful representation. There cannot be any discordance with the need for strict compliance, with the provisions of the Act. In other words, he must be made aware of the grounds on which, he was detained. Only from that procedure of effective communication, the detenu will be able to exercise his right of making an effective and purposeful representation. There cannot be any discordance with the need for strict compliance, with the provisions of the Act. The imperative on intention prescribed by the Supreme Court, is not on the basis of the provisions of any Act, but is the outcome of mandated fairness, justness and reasonableness, which flow from the provisions of Art. 21. In preventive law, there is a clear demarcation, where tests of prejudice could be applied and where such application cannot be resorted to. 14. When a prescription has been laid down by the Supreme Court, that there was a need for intimation in writing, immediately, to the relations of the person taken into custody, conveying the twin facts, of order of detention and the place of detention, such imperative will have to be obeyed and strictly adhered to. However, the question now we are concerned, is the effect of non-following of such prescription, on the peculiarity of facts unfurled in the instant case. There cannot be a second opinion that a person in detention does not lose his fundamental rights, merely because of his incarceration. But, that does not mean, that even if the relations were aware of his detention preventively, and the place of detention, merely because an intimation in writing had not been sent, the impugned order had to be necessarily quashed. It is possible to visualise, that non-following of this imperative prescription, in a given set of circumstances, could have very well affected the rights and liberties of detenus, in which event, the preventive order could not at all be allowed to survive. There may be cases like the instant habeas corpus petition, where no prejudice had occasioned to the detenu, due to non-service of intimation in writing, coupled with the fact that within a week of service of grounds of detention, close relations were aware not only about this preventive order, but the place of detention as well. That the question of prejudice, is not totally, a concept which cannot enter into the arena of preventive detention, can be deduced from certain judgments of the Supreme Court. That the question of prejudice, is not totally, a concept which cannot enter into the arena of preventive detention, can be deduced from certain judgments of the Supreme Court. In A. Alangarasamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1725, Supreme Court, while answering the challenge, that due to variation between Tamil and English versions of grounds served on the detenu, detenu knowing only Tamil, the impugned order therein had to be set aside, held as hereunder: “The order of detention and grounds accompanied clearly spelt out why the detenu was being detained. We are not persuaded to hold that the two versions are so different as to cause any prejudice to the detenu.” These observations of the Supreme Court give an insight, that if the procedural mandate has some lacuna, it will be open to the Court to ponder if such infirmity had in fact resulted in prejudice to the detenu. In Asha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 283, in answer to an argument, that intelligence report relied on, had not been supplied and therefore the detention stood vitiated, Supreme Court stated: “..the order of detention could not be challenged on the ground that the grounds of detention disclosed that the detaining authority had relied upon contact between the detenu and the employee and the source of information for ascertaining the existence of relationship was described as intelligence report but the same had not been furnished to the detenu when adequate material had been disclosed and no prejudice had been caused for want of further disclosure. It may be that the exact information received from the intelligence source had not been made available to the petitioner or placed on record but sufficient material with reference to the intelligence report had been made available.” Again, these observations of the Supreme Court, in relation to communication of grounds to the detenu, which arises out of the Constitutional obligation, tend to show, that the concept of prejudice is not totally outside the pale of preventive law. 15. 15. In Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1640, while considering, sustainability of a preventive order under the COFEPOSA Act, Supreme Court stated as hereunder: “In the present case, except stating that the documents were not supplied before the meeting of the Advisory Board, there is no pleading that it had resulted in the impairment of his right nor could counsel for the petitioners point out any such prejudice.” In Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2261.1991 Crl.L.J. 3291: J.T. (1991) 4 S.C. 103.A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2603, Supreme Court observed as hereunder: “Likewise, the failure to supply the bail application and the order refusing bail, does not in any manner prejudice the detenu from making a representation, particularly when he was fully aware of the contents of application made by himself and also the refusal order. However, when they are not referred to or relied upon, the non-supply does not affect the detention.” There will be no need to multiply the case law, to show that the concept of prejudice has certainly made an entry into the threshold of preventive law. However, its application in favour of either party, will depend upon the conspectus of facts, placed in a given case. 16. Now, we have to divert our attention to the meaning that could be attributed to the word “immediately” used by the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, while prescribing the intimation imperative. In Tulsiram v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 299: 1984 Crl.L.J. 1731: 1985 F.A.J. 50: (1984) 4 S.C.C. 487 : (1984) 2 F.A.C. 146: (1985) 1 S.C.R. 949 : 1985 S.C.C. (Crl.) 4: (1985) 2 S.C.W.R. 24, while considering the expression ‘immediately’ in Rule 9-A of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, Supreme Court stated “that the expression”immediately“in that Rule, was intended to convey a sense of continuity, rather than urgency. What must be done was to forward the report (of the Analyst) to the person from whom the sample was taken at the earliest opportunity so as to facilitate exercise of the statutory right under Sec.13(2) in good and sufficient time before prosecution commences leading evidence. Non-compliance with Rule 9-A is not fatal. It is a question of prejudice. What must be done was to forward the report (of the Analyst) to the person from whom the sample was taken at the earliest opportunity so as to facilitate exercise of the statutory right under Sec.13(2) in good and sufficient time before prosecution commences leading evidence. Non-compliance with Rule 9-A is not fatal. It is a question of prejudice. While observing so, Supreme Court took note of the legislation having departed from the previous rule by refraining from making a definite period of time as was done in the old Rules. Supreme Court further expatiated by stating that the word”immediately“should not be understood to mean the very next instant, the very next hour, that every day, or the very next day. It must be construed in its setting. It is no use turning to Dictionaries. Dictionaries give variegated meanings to words. What meaning is to be adopted depends on the context ...The idea is to avoid dilatoriness on the part of officialdom and prevention of unnecessary harassment to the accused. But the idea is not to penalise the prosecution and to provide a technical defect.” It is thus apparent, that the word “immediately” mentioned in the judgment of the Supreme Court, will have to be understood and construed in that context, while keeping in view the purpose intended, as has been expatiated by Supreme Court in Vasanbharthi’s case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1216. As we have referred to earlier, a time schedule has been prescribed in preventive enactments, to facilitate the detenus to exercise their rights, as early as possible, to get themselves relieved from preventive incarceration. To facilitate such an exerciser forwarding of intimation, to the close relations of the detenu, naturally stands in the position of a passport, to help the detenu to exercise his rights as quickly as possible. If exercising of such rights by the detenus, stands hampered, due to non-service of intimation, prescribed by the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68 and prejudice is the natural outcome, on the ground of violation of procedural mandates, detenu is bound to succeed. But, if the fact of detention and the place of detention are known to the relations of the detenu even sans intimation, merely on the ground of non-service of intimation, detenu cannot expect to succeed, unless prejudice is shown. 17. We had occassion to consider, the effect of non-information of arrest to the accused vis-a-vis violation of Art.22(1) and (2) of the Constitution as well Sec. 50(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Mrs.Ita D’Monte and another v. State, H.C.P.Nos. 2257 and 2258 of 1993 where in we have stated in our order dated 2. 1994, as hereunder: “Of course, knowledge of the petitioners cannot be equated to information or communication of grounds, to the detenus concerned, at the time of arrest. We cannot overlook, that this requirement of information to the arrested person or the reason why he was so seized, cannot naturally exist, if circumstances are such, that he must know the general nature of the alleged offence for which he stood detained. In other words, if an offender is caught red-handed and the crime is so patent, it will be odd to except the arresting officer to explain the reasons for such arrest.” We have also quoted therein, illustration given by Lord Simonds, of the circumstances, where the accused must know, why he was being arrested: “There is no need to explain the reasons of arrest if the arrested man is caught red-handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven.” 18. When it is clear, that the close relations of the detenu herein were fully aware of the twin facts, and inspite of it either they or the detenu did not choose to make any representation to the detaining authority or in any event show any prejudice resultant on non-service of intimation, on this ground alone, detenu cannot succeed. 19. A few decided cases, on this issue, were placed for our scrutiny by counsel on either side. 19. A few decided cases, on this issue, were placed for our scrutiny by counsel on either side. In Maria v. District Magistrate and Collector of South Arcot, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 633, while considering a similar question, we stated as follows: “Again, the Supreme Court, has observed in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, that in order that the procedure attendant upon detentions should confirm to the mandate of Art. 21 in the matter of fairness, justness and reasonableness, they considered it imperative that immediately after a person is taken in custody in pursuance of an order of detention, the members of his household, preferably the parent, the child or the spouse, must be informed in writing of the passing of the order of detention and of the fact, that the detenu had been taken into custody. Intimation must also be given as to the place of detention. However, in the instant case, communication informing the household members of the detenu was prepared only on 16. 1993 and served on 16. 1993. We have to recapitulate, that the impugned order of detention was executed on 6. 1993. Only after 12 days, authorities thought it fit, to forward a communication to the members of the household of the detenu, which by no stretch of reasoning, can fall within the imperative immediately, mandated by the Supreme Court. We can always allow a reasonable time for intimation being served on the members of the household of the detenu, but unreasonableness, especially when time appears to be essence, cannot be just condoned.” Our observation extracted above, clearly spell out, that a reasonable time for intimation being served, on members of the household can always be comprehended. But unreasonableness cannot be just condoned. That was a case where the detenu had sent a representation and that was almost put in a cold storage.. It was in that context, we have made those observations, which will be very relevant while appreciating the instant facts. 20. Again, we had dealt with this question in Ponnangatti v. District Magistrate and Collector of Tiruvannamalai Sambuvarayar District, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 631, wherein we stated as hereunder: “Let us have a quick look into the law on this subject. It was in that context, we have made those observations, which will be very relevant while appreciating the instant facts. 20. Again, we had dealt with this question in Ponnangatti v. District Magistrate and Collector of Tiruvannamalai Sambuvarayar District, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 631, wherein we stated as hereunder: “Let us have a quick look into the law on this subject. In A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, Supreme Court stated that there was one more observations which it would like to make and which it considered of great importance in matters of preventive detention. The following observations are relevant: "In order that the procedure attendant upon detentions should conform to the mandate of Art.21 in the matter of fairness, justness and reasonableness, we consider it imperative that immediately after a person is taken into custody in pursuance of an order of detention, the members of his household, preferably the parent, the child and the spouse must be informed in writing of the passing of the order of detention, including the place where the detenu is transferred from time to time. This Court has stated time and again that the person who is taken in custody does not forfeit, by reason of his arrest, all and every one of his fundamental rights. It is, therefore, necessary to treat the detenu consistently with human dignity and civilized norms of behaviour." The imperative need of immediate intimation was emphasised by the Supreme Court as that alone would fall within the mandate of Art.21 in the matter of fairness, justness and reasonableness. It is, therefore, necessary to treat the detenu consistently with human dignity and civilized norms of behaviour." The imperative need of immediate intimation was emphasised by the Supreme Court as that alone would fall within the mandate of Art.21 in the matter of fairness, justness and reasonableness. Explaining these observations of the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, RatnavelPandian,J.,speaking for the Division Bench in Union of India v. Vasanbharthi, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1216, stated as follows: "The object and purpose of the above observation in our view seem to be that the family members of the detenu should not be kept in darkness by withholding the information about the passing of the order of detention and the place of detention thereby preventing them from having any access and from rendering any help or assistance to the detenu and similarly the detenu should not be deprived of the privilege of meeting their relations and getting any help or assistance. Coming to the present case, we are satisfied that the family members had sufficient knowledge about the detention of the detenu by virtue of the mittimus issued as well the place of detention. Therefore, no legitimate grievance can be made that there is contravention to the observation in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68. In that case, decided by (he Division Bench headed by Ratnavel Pandian, J., the detenu was already an undertrial prisoner and his relatives, including his maternal uncle, had visited him at the jail within two days. It was, therefore, contended that non-communication of written intimation there after would have no significance and as such the observation made in A.K. Roy’s case can hardly be availed of by the detenu and on that score the order of detention cannot be invalidated. Further, in that case, the factual finding is clear, that the family members had sufficient knowledge about the detention of the detenu by virtue of the mittimus issued, as well as the place of detention. Now that, in the instant case, it is conceded, that no such intimation was even attempted to be despatched, facts are clearly distinguishable. Further, in that case, the factual finding is clear, that the family members had sufficient knowledge about the detention of the detenu by virtue of the mittimus issued, as well as the place of detention. Now that, in the instant case, it is conceded, that no such intimation was even attempted to be despatched, facts are clearly distinguishable. Once the Supreme Court has mandated as an imperative, that immediate intimation should be forwarded to the members of the household of the detenu about the preventive order and the place of detention, it can easily be visualised that within a reasonable time such intimation will have to be forwarded that further it will always be better that acknowledgments of such intimation are also made available for scrutiny by courts. We do not want to state that, with arithmetical prediction, this question of immediate service of intimation will have to be gauged. Under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution, it is clear that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. In preventive orders, that time should be the essence, is made very clear by this provision. Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 also provides, that the grounds of detention will have to be served, not later than five days from the date of detention. The time imperative cannot be lost sight of, but at the same time it need not have to be given an over-riding importance, if, on a particular set of facts, it becomes evident that intimation to the members of the household of the detenu had been communicated within a reasonable time. What exactly would be the reasonable time would certainly depend upon the facts placed for scrutiny. But while arriving at a decision, the mandate under Art.22 of the Constitution, as well as the time fixed under the Act to serve the grounds cannot be lost sight of." We have again emphasised, that intimation to the members of the household of the detenu will have to be communicated within a reasonable time and what exactly would be such reasonable time would certainly depend upon the facts placed for ‘our scrutiny. We have further stated that while arriving at a decision, the mandate under Art.22 of the Constitution as well as the time fixed under the Act to serve the grounds, cannot be lost sight of. In the aforestated case, we have taken note of the decision of another Division Bench of this Court on this very question, wherein it was held that the law laid down by Vasanbharathi’s case, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1216, expatiating A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, stood attracted on those facts where the order of detention was passed on 1. 1993 and it was evident that even on the 4th day father of the detenu had visited knowing fully well that his son had been detained. In Ponnagatti’s case, 1993 L.W. (Crl.) 631, an intimation was not even attempted to be despatched to the house hold of the detenu. We called for the records and perused the same. We found, that a representation was forwarded in that ease. On the facts of that case, we were satisfied, that the principle laid down in A.K. Roy’s case, had to be applied. 21. In Malarmannan alias Mannar alias Manickam v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, H.C.P.No. 1228 of 1993 dated 13th December, 1993, we stated as follows: "In the instant case, it is fairly admitted, that no intimation was even sought to be forwarded to the relations of the detenu. We are asked to infer, from the fact of visits by the relations of the petitioner, from 24. 1993, that they had knowledge not only about the preventive order, but also of the place of detention. When the Supreme Court considered the mandate of Art. 21, it had chosen to observe "that it considered imperative that immediately after a person is taken into custody in pursuance of an order of detention, the members of his household, preferably present, child or spouse, must be informed in writing, of passing of the order of detention and of the fact that the detenu had been taken into custody." Intimation must also be given as to the place of detention. The words "imperative" and "immediate" do have a special significance. The words "imperative" and "immediate" do have a special significance. If an intimation had, in fact, been given, and if there was some delay in service, depending upon the facts, we may not be able to fault the detaining authority. In a case of admitted non-intimation, when we are asked to infer, possible knowledge, of the relations of the petitioner, about these two facts, the time gap should be reasonable and fair, which could be brought within the contemplation "immediate". In the instant case, the earliest point of time, that the relations of the petitioner had visited him in the prison, is after eleven days, though the relations are also stationed at Madras. This time gap appears to be quite huge, more so, in the background of lack of attempt on the part of the detaining authority to serve intimation on the family members of the petitioner. Fairness, justness and reasonableness contemplated in Art. 21 of the Constitution, to our mind, do stand thwarted in the instant case. On that sole ground, the detenu is bound to succeed". From a perusal of record, in that case, we wereable to notice, that a representation could be forwarded by the detenu, only belatedly, due to non-service of intimation. It was in that context, the aforestated observations were made. 22. Another Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Arunachalam, J.) was a party, in Rajendran alias Kulla Rajendran v. State, H.C.P.No. 1363 of 1993, dated 11. 1994, stated as follows: "The next ground urged was that the close relations of the detenu had not been informed about the order of detention and the place of incarceration of the detenu. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has placed before us the visitor’s register in Central Prison, Madras, which shows that the wife of detenu had visited him in person on 16. 1993. The impugned order was passed on 6. 1993, and within a short period, obviously being aware of the order of detention and the place of detention, petitioner’s wife had visited him. The imperative contemplated in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, stands complied with. 1993, and within a short period, obviously being aware of the order of detention and the place of detention, petitioner’s wife had visited him. The imperative contemplated in A.K. Roy’s case, 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 524: A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710: 1982 Crl.L.J. 340: (1982) 1 S.C.C. 272: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 152: (1982) 2 S.C.J. 68, stands complied with. This ground has no strength." Case law above referred to, clearly point out, that facts available in each case, would be the decisive factor, to consider the effect of non-intimation of the twin facts, to the close relations of the detenu. We are firm in our view, that the concept of prejudice certainly has a role to play, in arriving at a decision, on this aspect. To reiterate, this question was neither raised in the memorandum of grounds, nor prejudice pleaded in writing or orally. We are of the opinion, that by merely stating that intimation had not been served "immediately, detenu cannot succeed, unless prejudice is either shows or could be inferred. From the facts unfurled, the second ground also has no strength, in the instant habeas corpus petition. 23. This habeas corpus petition, which has no merit, shall stand dismissed. 24. We place on record the useful assistance rendered by learned Advocate Mr. Ramesh.