B. N. KIRPAL, J. ( 1 ) WE have heard the scounsel for the parties on the point in issue, viz. , the validity of Sec. 14 (3) of the Gujarat Affiliated College Services Tribunals Act, 1982. Section 14 deals with the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of college employees. It, inter alia, provides for an enquiry to be held and opportunity of hearing being granted. It further stipulates that any action, which is proposed to be taken, should be approved by the Vice-Chancellor of the relevant University. Sub-sec. (3) thereof states that if the Vice-Chancellor fails to communicate either approval or disapproval within the period of forty-five days, then the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the Chancellor. ( 2 ) IT is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this provision is ultra vires Airs. 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the said provision confers unbridled power to the Vice-Chancellor to exercise the power or not to exercise the power and the said provision is arbitrary. ( 3 ) WE are unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is a matter of policy as to what power should be entrusted on the Vice-Chancellor. A Court would not, normally, interfere in this behalf. It will be seen that the approval of the Vice-Chancellor is to be obtained only after an enquiry has been held. Recognising that there may be administrative delays and it may not be possible for the Vice-Chancellor to pass an order within the stipulated time of 45 days, the Legislature has thought fit to provide that not passing of an order would amount to automatic grant of approval. The Legislature could well, as a matter of policy, provide that not passing of an order would amount to the rejection of the approval. That the Legislature has preferred one option to the other, is best left to the wisdom of the Legislature and we do not see how the provisions of Arts. 14 and 21 would come into play. ( 4 ) THERE is, perhaps, a reason why Sec. 14 (3) has been so framed. If no order is passed within a period of 45 days, the order of punishment would take effect. 14 and 21 would come into play. ( 4 ) THERE is, perhaps, a reason why Sec. 14 (3) has been so framed. If no order is passed within a period of 45 days, the order of punishment would take effect. But, then this order, which is passed, is subject to appeal, which may be preferred by the aggrieved person. If the appeal succeeds, then the person would have no grievance, because he would be entitled to get all the benefits, which he would have got as if he had not been dismissed or punished. On the other hand, if deemed acceptance, as contained in Sec. 14 (3) was not there, and the section had provided for deemed rejection, then that would have meant that the person concerned would continue to remain unpunished, despite an enquiry, which may have been held, and if, in appeal filed by the institution, the imposition of punishment is upheld, the effect would be that the person would have continued to be in service, in case of dismissal, even though he was not entitled to. In view of the above two results, which would follow, if the deeming provision was to be otherwise, the Legislature has chosen to adopt the former course, viz. , of providing that there will be deemed acceptance in the event of no order being passed within a period of 45 days. ( 5 ) SECTION 14 (3) is in pari materia with Sec. 36 of the Gujarat Secondary education Act, 1972. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education act, 1972. inter alia, provides that no employee of a private secondary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank unless an enquiry against him has been held and the action against him has been approved by the Board. Subsec. (2) of Sec. 36 provides that the decision shall be communicated by the Board within a period of 45 days of the receipt of the proposal and if no decision is communicated within the said period, then the proposed action shall be deemed to have been approved by the Board. Validity of this Sec. 36 was specifically upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Seva Ashram v. Stale of gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 494 : [1987 (1) GLR 57 (SC)]. Validity of this Sec. 36 was specifically upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Seva Ashram v. Stale of gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 494 : [1987 (1) GLR 57 (SC)]. To our mind, therefore, the matter, more or less, stands concluded by the aforesaid judgment. ( 6 ) WE, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 7 ) AS regards merits of the order imposing punishment are concerned, the same can be agitated before the Tribunal. ( 8 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this petition is dismissed. Interim order stands vacated. .