RK Manisana, J.— This is an appeal under section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, from a decree dated 1.4.93 passed by learned Assistant District Judge (1) Guwahati in TS (Arb) No. 105 of 1992 upholding the award dated 31.1.92 made by the Arbitrators. 2. Sri PC Markanda, learned counsel for the respondent, has questioned the maintainability of the appeal. Learned counsel has submitted that the respondent is a small scale industrial undertaking and therefore, under section 7 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 ('Act' for short), an appeal shall not be entertained unless the appellant deposits with the Court 75% of the amount in terms of the decree or award. Mr. SK Kapur, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that provision of section 7 of the Act is not applicable-to the present case; and that the right of the appellant to prefer appeal under section 39 of the Arbitration Act cannot be restricted by section 7. 3. The Act is an Act to provide for and regulate the payment of interest on delayed payments to small scale and ancillary industrial undertakings and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The scheme of the Act is as follows. Section 1(3) provides that it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 23rd day of September, 1992. Section 2 (c) defines buyer to mean whoever buys any goods or receives any services from a supplier for consideration. Under section 2 (e), small scale industrial undertaking has the meaning assigned to it by clause (j) of section 3 of the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. Under section 2 (f), supplier means an ancillary industrial undertaking or a small scale industrial undertaking holding a permanent registration certificate issued by the Directorate of Industries of a State or Union Territory. Section 3 provides that where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf before the appointed day. Section 3 provides that where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf before the appointed day. The expression appointed day means the day following immediately after the expiry of the period of thirty days from the date of acceptance, or, the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier [see section 2 (b)]. Under section 4, where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to supplier, as required under section 3, the buyer shall be liable to pay interest to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, as the case may be, at such rate which is five percent points above the floonrate for comparable lending. The expression floor rate for comparable lending means the highest of the minimum lending rates charged by scheduled banks, other than co-operative banks, on credit limits in accordance with the directions of the Reserve Bank of India to the banking companies (see explanation to section 4). Section 5 imposes liability on the buyer to pay compound interest (with monthly rests) at the rate mentioned in section 4 on the amount due to the supplier/Under section 6, the amount due from a buyer, together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of sections 4 and 5, shall be recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force. Section 7 provides that no appeal against any decree, award or other order shall be entertained by any Court or other authority unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy five percent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, other order in the manner directed by such Court or, as the case may be, such authority. Section 10 provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. 4. Section 10 provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. 4. The object of the Act is that prompt payments of money by buyers should be statutorily ensured and the mandatory provisions for payment of interest on the outstanding money, in case of default, should be made. The buyers, if required to pay interest under the law, would refrain from withholding payment to the small scale and ancillary industrial undertakings. The statutory provisions are under sections 4 and 5 of the Act. It has already been stated that the supplier (small scale industrial undertaking or an ancillary industrial undertaking) has right, under section 6, to recover from the buyer the amount due from him together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of sections 4 and 5, in a suit or proceeding; and that, under section 7, an appeal from any decree, award or order made in a suit or other proceeding shall not be entertained by a Court of appeal or the appellate authority unless the appellant, other than supplier, has deposited with it 75% of the amount in terms of decree, award or order. But the condition imposed under section 7 does not apply to an appeal intended to be filed by the supplier. Lis contemplated under section 6 is one between supplier and buyer, as defined under the Act, in respect of the amount due from the buyer and the amount of interest provided under sections 4 and 5. It may be stated here that there may be a lis between such supplier and buyer under the general law of the country, not falling under section 6. Therefore, the provision under section 6 has a purpose. In that view of the matter, section 7 is applicable to a decree or award in a lis between supplier and buyer, as defined under the Act, in respect of recovery from the buyer the amount due from him and the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 4 and 5, as provided under section 6, otherwise not. 5. Before dealing with the rival contentions, it will be pertinent to state the relevant facts for decision of the question raised. Award was made by the Arbitrators on 31.1.92. 5. Before dealing with the rival contentions, it will be pertinent to state the relevant facts for decision of the question raised. Award was made by the Arbitrators on 31.1.92. The Court passed the decree on 1.4.93 and appeal against the decree was filed on 30.6.93. As already stated, the Act came into force on 23.9.92. Therefore, the arbitration proceeding commenced and award was made by Arbitrators before the Act came into force, and the decree was passed and appeal against the decree was filed after commencement of the Act. The proceedings before the Arbitrators and the Court, the award of the Arbitrators and the decree of the Court, do not indicate that the respondent is a small scale industrial undertaking. The respondent also did not claim the amount as provided under section 6. The respondent filed photo copy of certificate issued by the d District Industries Centre, Kota, Rajasthan, to show that respondent is a small scale industrial undertaking. Much argument was made as to whether the respondent is a small scale industrial undertaking and as to whether claims made are price of the goods supplied. Questions, whether the respondent is small scale industrial undertaking and whether claims are price of the goods are left open. We proceed with the case assuming that the respondent is a small scale industrial e undertaking and the claims are price or connected with price of the goods. 6. Question then is - Whether section 7 of the Act will be applicable to the instant case, as contended by Mr. Kapur. It has already been stated that in the proceedings before the Arbitrators as well as the Court do not indicate that the respondent is a small scale industrial undertaking, and the respondent did not claim the amount due from the appellant, together with interest calculated under section 4 and 5, as provided under section 6 of the Act. Therefore, the proceeding before the Arbitrators was not one in terms of section 6 of the Act and, as such, section 7 shall not be attracted. 7. Next question which arises for consideration is whether section 7 of the Act can impose restriction on the right of appeal under the law existing before the commencement of the Act. Therefore, the proceeding before the Arbitrators was not one in terms of section 6 of the Act and, as such, section 7 shall not be attracted. 7. Next question which arises for consideration is whether section 7 of the Act can impose restriction on the right of appeal under the law existing before the commencement of the Act. In Garikapati vs. Subbiah, AIR 1957 SC 540 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, after considering the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, Privy Council and High Courts, held : "From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge: (i)That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise." (emphasis added) The above decision of the Supreme Court indicates that imposition of restriction by subsequent legislation cannot affect one's right of appeal from a decision in a proceeding which commenced prior to such legislation for the right of appeal will be governed by the law as it stood at the time of the commencement of proceeding even if appeal is filed after the legislation imposing restriction. 8. The arbitration proceeding, in the present case, commenced and award was made by the Arbitrators before the Act came into force. 8. The arbitration proceeding, in the present case, commenced and award was made by the Arbitrators before the Act came into force. After commencement of the Act the Court passed the decree and appeal was filed. Therefore, the instant case falls within the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court cited above. This being the position, restriction imposed on the right of appeal under section 7 of the Act cannot take away the right of the appellant under the law as it stood at the time of proceeding even though the appeal was filed after commencement of the Act. 9. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is maintainable, and it shall be listed on 15.11.93 for admission.