M. RAMAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of the judgment and award made in m. v. c. no. 181 of 1986 disposed of on 15th april, 1989 by the additional district judge and m. a. c. t. ii, Bangalore rural district, bangalore, by which the learned member of the tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as the compensation payable under section 92-a of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' ). ( 2 ) THE appellant has taken a number of grounds to assail the conclusion of the tribunal, the main grounds of them being (1) rejection of the claims of wife and mother, who died during the pendency of the petition, of the deceased ramegowda, on the ground that the petition did not survive on their death, they being only l. rs. And dependants of the deceased, was wrong and (2) the finding of the tribunal that the appellant being not the dependant of the deceased was not entitled to compensation for loss of dependency, was also unsustainable. ( 3 ) WE have heard the learned counsel on both sides. ( 4 ) SRI chinnappa, learned counsel appearing for the insurer, contended that on the death of claimants 1 and 2, dependants of the deceased referred to above, the court below was right in having rejected the claim of puttaswamy gouda, the appellant herein, on the ground that, he was not the dependant of the deceased as he was residing separately with his family having his own independent income. ( 5 ) RULE 360 under clause vii, providing for motor accidents claims tribunal Rules of the Karnataka motor vehicles rules, 1963 provides:"360. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases. the following provisions of the first schedule to the code of civil procedure, 1908, shall so far as may be, apply to proceedings before the claims tribunals namely, order v, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30, order dc, order xiii, Rules 3 to 10, order xvi, Rules 2 to 21, order xvii, order xxiii, Rules 1 to 3 and order xli, rule 5, sub-rules (2) to (5 ). " ( 6 ) EVEN though order 22, cpc, which deals with death, marriage and insolvency of parties and consequential right to sue is excluded from application to cases coming before thetribunal, sub-rule (2) of rule 342 thereof provides that 'legal representative' shall have the meaning assigned to it under clause (ii) of section 2 of the cpc. Section 2 (ii), cpc, reads thus: "legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character, the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. " therefore, in the face of the above provisions, we will have to see whether the finding of the tribunal that the appellant was not entitled to any compensation for loss of dependency, being not the dependant of the deceased and once the dependants-claimants 1 and 2 died, is correct or not. ( 7 ) REFERRING to the right of the l. rs. To seek compensation, the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with this question in Gujarat state road transport corporation, Ahmedabad hmedabad v ramanbhai prabhatbhai and another. Considering the question arising under section 1-a of the fatal accidents Act, to bring a person on record as l. r. , of the deceased, Supreme Court held as follows:"the expression 'legal representative' has not been defined in the act. However, a legal representative ordinarily means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 110-a of the motor vehicles act appears to be of some significance. It provides that the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of All the legal representatives of the deceased. Section 110-a (1) thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent, and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of All the legal representatives. Section 110-a (1) thus expressly states that (i) an application for compensation may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent, and (ii) that such application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of All the legal representatives. Both the person or persons who can make an application for compensation and the persons for whose benefit such application can be made are thus indicated in section 110-a. " their lordships have further concluded as follows:"these provisions are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. As the right of action created by the fatal accidents Act, 1855 was "new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new" the right given to the legal representatives under the act to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is equally new and an enlarged one. This new right cannot be hedged in by All the limitations of an action under the fatal accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. " (see para 9 of the judgment) a division bench of the Kerala High Court had also an occasion to deal with this question in Smt. Kochupennu lakshmi v the chairman, Kerala state road transport corporation, trivandrum. Referring to the provisions of the fatal accidents act (13 of 1855), the division bench held as follows:"the assumption that a succession certificate is necessary for payment of compensation to the dependants of a person who dies on account of accident is evidently not correct. The claim by the dependants is not as legal representatives of the deceased but in their own statutory right under section 1-a, fatal accidents act. The compensation represented what would have been obtained by them during the lifetime of the deceased i. e. , what he would have provided them in case he had not died as a result of the accident. Section 2, fatal accidents act provides for the claim by the estate of any pecuniary loss to the estate. Barring cases of difficulty, in All matters where the accountable party is satisfied that All the dependants are before it and are agreed on the receipt of the amount there should be no objection to the payment of the compensation to them in the proportion they are entitled to. Barring cases of difficulty, in All matters where the accountable party is satisfied that All the dependants are before it and are agreed on the receipt of the amount there should be no objection to the payment of the compensation to them in the proportion they are entitled to. " in view of the foregoing, we are clearly of the view that the contention of Sri chinnappa has to be rejected. Not only that, the conclusion of the learned member of the tribunal in the instant case that on account of the death of claimants 1 and 2 during the pendency of the claim petition, the third claimant puttaswamy gouda, appellant herein would be entitled only to compensation payable under section 92-a of the act for "no fault liability" and not for compensation for "loss of dependancy" is wholly incorrect and unsustainable. The learned member of the tribunal failed to apply his mind to the several provisions of the act before he came to that conclusion. In other words, on the death of claimants 1 and 2, viz. , Smt. Siddamma wife and Smt. Malavamma, mother of deceased ramegowda, the appellant puttaswamy gouda, the third claimant being the son of the deceased ramegowda is certainly entitled to the compensation payable not only to him as the dependant of, the deceased but also to the deceased claimants 1 and 2 who would have been entitled to it had they been alive. ( 8 ) NOW, we proceed to quantify the 'compensation' payable in this case. It is not in dispute that on 4th january, 1986 at 7. 30 a. m. ramegowda died at the spot of the injuries sustained by him in the accident involving the bus and the lorry stated above on bangalore-mysore road near manchanaikanahalli, resulting in a claim petition filed under section 110-a of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 jointly by claimants 1, 2 and 3 referred to above seeking compensation in a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs. This claim petition was opposed by the insurer and the insured of both the vehicles involved in the accident. The tribunal recorded the evidence of puttaswamy gouda-third claimant, the appellant herein on 6-12-1988 on the question of quantification of the compensation. He has stated on oath that his father deceased ramegowda was working as an agriculturist having his own lands, besides he was also earning by sericulture. The tribunal recorded the evidence of puttaswamy gouda-third claimant, the appellant herein on 6-12-1988 on the question of quantification of the compensation. He has stated on oath that his father deceased ramegowda was working as an agriculturist having his own lands, besides he was also earning by sericulture. In his cross-examination, nothing is elicited to disbelieve his claim that his father was the only earning member and the source of earning was agriculture and business of sericulture. But no acceptable evidence is produced to show that deceased ramegouda was earning enough by sericulture business except producing c-form ex. P. 6 in triplicate to show that he was one of the distributors of sericulture products. It shows that a sum of Rs. 1,984. 50 was paid to ramegouda for having supplied certain products of sericulture. Therefore, in the absence of acceptable evidence, we quantify the income of deceased ramegouda as Rs. 4,000/- from agriculture and Rs. 5,000/- from sericulture business per year, in All Rs. 9,000/- p. a. this isexclusive of the amount to be spent for personal expenses. He was aged 55 years at the time of his death. Therefore, the proper multiplier to be adopted in this case is 9. Thus the total loss of dependancy works out to Rs. 81,000/- to which we add Rs. 5,000/-towards loss of estate and Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses. Thus, in All the appellant would be entitled to total sum of Rs. 88,000/ -. ( 9 ) IT is now brought to the notice of the court that the appellant has a sister surviving. Sri markande gowda, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the appellant would pay out of the amount of award a lumpsum of Rs. 25,000/- to his sister who is also entitled for a share in the estate of the deceased. ( 10 ) FOR the above reasons, this appeal succeeds. The order under appeal made in m. v. c. no. 181 of 1986 on 15th april, 1989 by the member of the tribunal stands modified. In place of the award made by the court below we award a sum of Rs. 88,000/- as compensation payable to the appellant with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from today till payment along with the costs. ( 11 ) A direction shall issue that out of the total amount of Rs. In place of the award made by the court below we award a sum of Rs. 88,000/- as compensation payable to the appellant with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from today till payment along with the costs. ( 11 ) A direction shall issue that out of the total amount of Rs. 88,000/- awarded by way of compensation the appellant shall pay a sum of Rs. 25,000/- in lumpsum to his sister. Ordered accordingly. --- *** --- .