Judgement ORDER:-Civil Rule No. 455 of 1987 has been filed by South Kamrup (Meghalaya) Timber Merchant Association, Mirza. It is a registered body under the Societies Registration Act, having its registered office at Mirza. It was registered in the year, 1986. The members of the petitioner Association are detailed in Annexure-II to the writ application and 71 in numbers as follows : 1. Sri Prasanna Kalita 2. " Radhika Prasad Choudhury 3. " Gobinda Kalita 4. " Bishnu Kalita 5. " Prabin Das 6. " Dambaru Chetry 7. " Ram Kumar Chetry 8. " Bilash Mohanta 9. " Umesh Baruah 10." Subodh Das 11." Amulya Kalita 12." Gopinath Das 13." Atul Choudhury 14." Jatin Kalita 15." Pradip Goswami 16." Uday Medhi 17." Bhumidhar Kumar 18." Jogen Kalita 19." Binandi Majumdar 20. Sri Basan Thakuria 21. " Bharat Kalita 22. " Bishoy Kumar 23. " Ballen Khataniyar 24. " Pulin Majumdar 25. " Rajen Nath 26. " Dinesh Choudhury 27. " Umesh Choudhury 28. " Hiren Das 29. " Gopal Kalita 30. " Bhuban Kalita 31. " Krishna Baruah 32. " Putul Sadagar 33. " Tahar Ali 34. " Ananta Daimari 35. " Mati Ram Boro 36. " Thampa Singh 37. " Amiya Kumar 38. " Satya Ram Daloi 39. " Subaneswar Thakuria 40. " Suren Kumar 41. " Mantu Thakuria 42. " Rabin Kumar 43. " Akhil Kalita 44. " Chabin Kalita 45. " Ratna Kanta Das 46. " Basanta Rajbangsi 47. " Monohar Kalita 48. " Bhusan Choudhury 49. " Pradip Kr. Das 50. " Kamleswar Kalita 51. " Dharani Kalita 52. " Hari Charan Das 53. " Sarma Boro 54. " Jogen Das 55. " Girish Choudhury 56. " Madan Kumar 57. " Bipul Kumar Das 58. " Niranjan Kr. Das 59. " Khargeswar Talukdar 60. " Ananta Ram Das 61. " Nilo Ali 62. " Ramesh Ch. Nath 63. " Nipen Choudhury 64. " Naren Ch. Kalita 65. " Niklosh Sangma 66. " Siraj Ali 67. " Dipen Rava 68. " Bizoy Kalita 69. " Dinesh Das 70. " Hareswar Das 71. " Anli Kalita. The members of the petitioner Association are intermediary purchasers of timbers obtained from the neighbouring State of Meghalaya and the same is brought to Palashbari where it is sold either in log form or in sawn form after conversion in the local Saw Mills. These persons do not fell timber. " Hareswar Das 71. " Anli Kalita. The members of the petitioner Association are intermediary purchasers of timbers obtained from the neighbouring State of Meghalaya and the same is brought to Palashbari where it is sold either in log form or in sawn form after conversion in the local Saw Mills. These persons do not fell timber. Unlike other States, forests in the State of Meghalaya are largely privately owned. Under the provisions of the 6th Schedule, the control and the management of all such private forests in the State have been vested in the District Council Authorities leaving the jurisdiction and control of only reserved forests to the State of Meghalaya. On 24-3-1987 an order was passed by the respondent No. 2 i.e. Conservator of Forests, Central Assam Circle prohibiting the movement of timber from Meghalaya through the State of Assam without transit passes issued by the Forest Department of the Government of Meghalaya. This is Annexure-III to the writ application at page 38 of the writ application. This order is quoted below : "It has been observed that illegal timbers are being carried from Meghalaya Forest through our areas without mention of the species, piece marking, sale marking and property hammer in the T.P. issued from the District Council of Garo Hills and K. and J. Hills. To make a check of movement of illegal timbers, it is decided that timbers coming from Meghalaya without T.P. issued by the Govt. of Meghalaya, Forest Department mentioning the details as described above will not be allowed to carry through our State and this will take effect from 20th April, 1987. Timber without T.P. from Meghalaya Govt. of Forest Deptt. will be seized at our checkgate. Kindly extend your kind co-operation on the matter." On 8-4-1987 the Chief Forest Officer, Khasi Hills Distt. Council by letter dated 8-4-1987 requested for cancellation/withdrawal of order dated 24-3-1987 mentioning in details the scheme of administration of forests in the State of Meghalaya under the Sixth Schedule and also the fact that the State of Meghalaya had no jurisdiction in the matter of issue of transit passes. This is Annexure-IV to the writ application. Council by letter dated 8-4-1987 requested for cancellation/withdrawal of order dated 24-3-1987 mentioning in details the scheme of administration of forests in the State of Meghalaya under the Sixth Schedule and also the fact that the State of Meghalaya had no jurisdiction in the matter of issue of transit passes. This is Annexure-IV to the writ application. Annexure-IV inter alia states as follows : "(i) Under Article 244(2) of the Constitution of India the administration and control of the Tribal Areas is to be made in accordance with the provisions of the 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India. (ii) The Government of Meghalaya has adopted the Assam Forest Manual with regard to the reserve forest and not other forest which comes under the District Council. The District Council did not adopt the Assam Forest Manual, but it has legislated and Act and Rules framed thereunder to govern/manage/control the forest which comes under it according to the provision of its Act and Rules and thus the Govt. of Meghalaya has no hands over the forest/ T.P. of the District Council. (iii) The Govt. of Meghalaya has no control over any forest other than the Reserve Forest unlike Assam. The District Council of North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anglong has also similar power over land and forest. (iv) In the Khasi Hills District, "The United Khasi Jaintia Autonomous District (Management and Control) of Forests Act, 1958 duly received the assent of the then Governor of Assam on 22-1-1959 and similarly the Garo Hills (District Forest) Act, 1958 received assent of the governor of Assam on 3-4-1958. (v) That under the aforesaid Act the District Council has been empowered to frame Rules under S. 34 of the aforesaid Act, 1959. (vi) That accordingly, the District Council framed Rules on 22-8-1960 under the name and style "The United Khasi Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Management and Control of Forest) Rules, 1960. Rule 54 inter alia deals with transit Rules under Chapter IV of the said Rules which is quoted as follows : "54(iii) a transit pass in the form prescribed in Appendix VIII issued by a Forest Officer authorised by the Chief Forest Officer in token of full payment of all amounts due to the District Council on account of the forest produce covered by it. In special cases, the Chief Forest Officer may permit for issue of transit passes by any person duly authorised by him. The prescribed form of the Appendix VIII is as follows : APPENDIX VIII 55 (iii) Transit Pass United Khasi Jaintia Hills District Forest Department, United Khasi Jaintia Hills District Council. Book No. Permission is hereby granted to --for the removal of the following forest produce from ----- to ----- by (1) locality where collected. (2) Number and date of permit of certificate of origin on which the pass is granted. Kind of produce Number of Places packages or bundles Measurements cubic contents or weight Manner or other marks Rate Amount paid STATION Date of issue Issuing Officer Date of expiry Designation Note :- Any person removing timber or other forest produce without transit pass in this form in contravention of any rules made under S. 5, United Khasi Jaintia Hills Forest Act 1 of 1959 is liable to a fine of Rs. 200 and in default of payment of the fine to imprisonment up to two months." (v) That it is not correct that the TP issued by the District Council do not mention the species, piece marking, sale marking and property hammer mark. (vi) That the Govt. of Meghalaya has no power over the Forest other than Reserve Forest and as such Govt. of Meghalaya is not competent nor can it issue any T. P. in respect of the other forest, which is managed by the District Council in accordance with the provisions of the 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India and the District Council Forest Act, and Rules framed thereunder. (vii) That the transit pass issued by the District Council shall have to be regarded as valid, legal and just. 2. That on 7-4-1987 the Conservator of Forests, Central Assam Circle issued the following order which is Annexure-V to the writ application i.e. quoted below : "In order to check illegality across Assam Meghalaya border, the following regulations have been introduced in the interest of preserving forest wealth and environment. The timber traders/transporters of forest produce are required to apply to the respective Divisional Forest Offices for transportation of timbers by furnishing the following documents. The timber traders/transporters of forest produce are required to apply to the respective Divisional Forest Offices for transportation of timbers by furnishing the following documents. No timber would be allowed to be transported through the Divisions under this circle unless a formal permission from the respective Divisional Forest Officers are obtained by fulfilling the conditions by furnishing documents mentioned below. This order will be effective from 16-4-1987. (i) Agreement of timber operation with the District Council for the operation. (ii) Trade permit of District Council of Meghalaya Govt. (iii) Registration certificate of property hammer and G.D.C. hammer from competent authority. (iv) A sketch map of the area of operation showing the route of transportation. The species of timber to be mentioned. (v) T.P. should be obtained from Meghalaya Forest Department and not for District Council. (vi) The Registration No. of vehicle to be used for transportation of timber. " Hence, this writ application challenging the legality and validity of the orders dated 24-3-1987 and 7-4-1987 on the ground that these orders have the effect of prohibiting movement of timbers from Meghalaya to Assam and the conditions insisted upon by the respondent No. 2 for movement of timber through Assam are impossible of performance both in law and in facts. 3. Civil Rule No. 456 of 1987 has been filed by one Radhika Prasad Choudhury challenging the legality and validity of the aforesaid two orders on the same set of facts. On 12-3-1987 this court passed the following stay order : "As these conditions are clearly inapplicable in the case of petitioner and insisting on such transit pass has the effect of imposing a complete ban on inter-State movement of timber which will be against the constitutional mandate, we consider it just and expedient to stay the operation of the impugned orders, namely, order dated 24-3-1987 and the order dated 7-4-1987. However, as one of the reasons suggested is to prevent illegal and improper movement of timbers into Assam, we direct both the petitioner as well as respondents to keep accurate and true accounts. Subject to this condition, we stay the operation of both the aforesaid orders." 4. However, as one of the reasons suggested is to prevent illegal and improper movement of timbers into Assam, we direct both the petitioner as well as respondents to keep accurate and true accounts. Subject to this condition, we stay the operation of both the aforesaid orders." 4. An affidavit-in-opposition has been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Forests and Environment Department where it is contended that under the provisions of "Meghalaya Forest (Removalof Timber) (Regulation) Act, 1981 and the Rules framed thereunder, an export transit pass has to be obtained from the Forest Department, Government of Meghalaya for removal of timber outside the State of Meghalaya. It is further contended that under the provisions of Rule 5 of the Meghalaya Forests (Removal of Timber) Regulation Rules 1982, removal of timber of certain sizes outside the State of Meghalaya is totally prohibited. In paragraph 7 of the affidavit-inopposition, it is stated as follows : "That with regard to the statements made in paragrah 16 of the petition, I say that the transit passes for removal of timber outside the State of Meghalaya issued by the District Council only. " This affidavit-in-opposition has been filed in Civil Rule No. 455/87. In Civil Rule No. 456/ 87 affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by any of the parties. 5. I have heard Sri R. Gogoi, learned Advocate for the petitioner in both the Civil Rules and Sri B. B. Narzary, learned Advocate for the District Council and Sri A. Sarma, learned Sr. Govt. Advocate for the State of Maghalaya. 6. The main thrust of argument of Sri Sarma is that in view of clause 12A of Sixth Schedule, the subsequent Act made by the State of Meghalaya shall apply and thus the whole matter has now become academic as under the Rule 5 of the Meghalaya Forest (Removal of Timber) (Regulation) Rules, 1982 without issue of licences by the authority, but no timber can be removed outside the State of Meghalaya. Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules is quoted below : "3. Application for licences - (i) Application for removal of timbers outside the State shall be submitted in Form No. 1 to the competent authority under whose territorial jurisdiction the forests from where the timbers are proposed to be removed are situated." 7. Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules is quoted below : "3. Application for licences - (i) Application for removal of timbers outside the State shall be submitted in Form No. 1 to the competent authority under whose territorial jurisdiction the forests from where the timbers are proposed to be removed are situated." 7. Clause 12A of the Sixth Schedule is quoted below : "12-A. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya to autonomous districts and autonomous regions in the State of Meghalaya - Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution -- (a) if any Provision of a law made by a District or Regional Council in the State of Meghalaya with respect to any matter specified in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 of this Schedule or if any provision of any regulation made by a District Council or a Regional Council in that State under paragraph 8 or paragraph 10 of this Schedule is repugnant to any provision of a law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya with respect to that matter, then, the law or regulation made by the District Council or, as the case may be, the Regional Council whether made before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya, shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be void and the law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya shall prevail; (b) the President may, with respect to any Act of Parliament, by notification, direct that it shall not apply to the autonomous district or an autonomous region in the State of Tripura, or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modifications as he may specify in the notification and any such direction may be given so as to have retrospective effect. 8. Clause 3 of the Sixth Schedule provides for powers of the District Councils and Regional Councils to make laws. Clause 3(1)(b) provides for laws for the management of any forest not being a reserved forest. 8. Clause 3 of the Sixth Schedule provides for powers of the District Councils and Regional Councils to make laws. Clause 3(1)(b) provides for laws for the management of any forest not being a reserved forest. Clause 12.AA provides for that if any law made by the District Council is repugnant to any provision of a law made by the Legislature of the State of Maghalaya with respect to that matter, then, the law or regulation made by the District Council or, as the case may be, the Regional council whether made before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya, shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be void and the law made by the Legislature of the State of Meghalaya shall prevail. 9. So, it is found that the law i.e. Meghalaya Forest (Removal of Timber) (Regulation) Act, 1981 has on perused (sic) the laws made by the District Council. This Act of 1981 was enacted to regulate and control of removal of timbers outside the State for the preservation of forests and to prevent their indiscriminate destruction and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. Section 3(1) provides as follows : "3(1). No person shall remove or cause to be removed for the purpose of trade or otherwise, any timber outside the State, and no Trading Depot shall be set up or established at any place without a licence from the competent authority. " Section 4(2) proviso provides that a licence shall be refused if the applicant - (a) is not a citizen of India, or (b) has been convicted by a competent Court of an offence involving moral turpitude unless a period of five years, or such less period as the Government may allow in any particular case, has elapsed since his release, or (c) has violated any provision of any Act, Regulation or Rule made by the State or any District Council, or as a defaulter in the payment of any tax or revenue of the State or any District Council, or (d) has been debarred from taking up any business transaction or contract work by any Government, or any Company or Corporation, owned, controlled or managed by any Government. Section 4 provides as follows : "Every application for licence under this Act shall be disposed of by the competent authority as early as possible and not later than six months from the date of receipt of the application by the competent authority unless the competent authority for reasons to be recorded in writing extends the period by such further period or periods as it may consider necessary and if no order is passed within the period or periods so extended it shall be deemed that licence has been granted. Rule 5 of the Rules, 1982 provides as follows : "Licences not to be granted--- Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules the competent authority shall not grant any licence for removal outside the State in respect of timbers of the following sizes, viz. : (i) all timbers in round form which are less than 30 cm. in diameter. (ii) all rough square timbers which are less than (20 x 20) sq. cm. in cross sectional area. provided that in case of Garpinus Vaminea no licence shall be granted where timbers in the round form are less than 20 cm. in diameter and where in sawn form less than (15 x15) sq. cm. in the base area. 10. In the order dated 24-3-1987 it is stated that the timbers which are carried from Meghalaya Forest through Assam areas without mention of the species, piece marking, sale marking and property hammer in the T. P. issued from the District Council of Garo Hills and K. and J. Hills. In Annexure-IV it is stated that it is not correct that the T. P. issued by the District Council do not mention pieces, piece marking, sale marking and property hammer mark. So, there is an agreement on both the sides that the T. Ps. issued by the District Council should contain all these things mentioned above. So, if timbers do not contain these requirements, certainly they may not be allowed to be carried from Meghalaya through Assam. There is no dispute with regard to that. The next question is that whether these timbers should be covered by export transit pass as understood under the Rules of 1982 as mentioned above. 11. So, if timbers do not contain these requirements, certainly they may not be allowed to be carried from Meghalaya through Assam. There is no dispute with regard to that. The next question is that whether these timbers should be covered by export transit pass as understood under the Rules of 1982 as mentioned above. 11. The contention of Sri Gogoi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the conditions which are imposed vide Annexure-V, order dated 7-4-1987 are not applicable in the case of the petitioner and insisting on such export transit pass, will have the imposing a complete ban on removal of timbers from a State that will be against the constitutional mandate. In this connection, Sri Gogoi places reliance on the following decisions : (i) AIR 1967 SC 1189 (State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah). That was a case under the Mysore Forest Act. By S. 37 of the Act the State Govt. was authorised to make Rules to regulate the transit of forest produces. By Rule 2 framed on October 13, 1952 it was provided that no person shall import forest produce into, export forest produce from, or move forest produce within, any of the areas specified in Schedule A, unless such forest produce is accompanied by a permit prescribed in Rule 3. on April 15, 1959 the State of Mysore issued a notification adding a proviso to Rule 2 which reads as follows : "Provided that no such permit shall authorise any person to transport forest produce between sun-set and sun-rise in any of the areas specified in Schedule A." It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that Rule 2 which was framed in exercise of power under S. 37(2)(b), a person intending to transport forest produce must, obtain a pass from an authorised officer. It was held by the Supreme Court that the Rule so made is clearly regulatory of the right to transport forest produce. But a restriction is imposed on the right to transport forest produce by the two provisos incorporated in the Rules in 1959 and 1960. It was held by the Supreme Court that the Rule so made is clearly regulatory of the right to transport forest produce. But a restriction is imposed on the right to transport forest produce by the two provisos incorporated in the Rules in 1959 and 1960. By terms of the two provisos there is absolute prohibition against the transportation of forest produce between hours of 10 p.m. and sun rise if the person wishes to avail of the concession of sun-rise and 10 p.m. It was contended before the Supreme Court on behalf of the State that the two provisos were regulatory and not prohibitory. The Supreme Court pointed out that the power which the State Government may exercise is the power to regulate the transportation of forest produce and not the power to prohibit or restrict the transportation. The Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of the judgment in the facts and circumstances of that case laid down the law as follows : "Article 301 in terms prohibits the imposition of any restriction on trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India, and by the enactment of the two provisos clearly a restriction is imposed upon the freedom of trade. The provisos to the rule enacted by the State Government must therefore be deemed to be invalid as infringing the guarantee under Art. 301 on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. " (ii) In AIR 1970 SC 1275 (The District Collector of Hyderabad v. M/s. Ibrahim and Co.) the Supreme Court in paragraph 12 of the judgment pointed out as follows (at page 1278) : "Again it may be pointed out that under Art. 301 the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India is declared free. That freedom is declared in the widest terms and applies to all forms of trade, commerce and intercourse. But it is subject to certain restrictions of which Articles 304 and 305 are relevant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " Our Constituent Assembly borrowed the concept of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse from the Australian Constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " Our Constituent Assembly borrowed the concept of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse from the Australian Constitution. It is true that the limitations upon the amplitude of the guarantee are not expressed in S. 92 of the Australian Constitution, as are to be found in our Constitution. Again, there is no guarantee in the Australian Constitution of a fundamental right to carry on trade. But this departure from the scheme of the Australian Constitution does not alter the true character of the guarantee and it cannot be inferred that the Constitution imposed restrictions upon Legislative power, but denied to the individuals affected by unauthorised assumption of executive power the right to challenge the exercise of that power. A vital constitutional provision cannot be so construed as to make a mockery of the declared guarantee and the constitutional restrictions on the power of the Legislature. If the power of the State Legislature is restricted in the manner provided by Art. 301, but within limits provided by Arts. 303 to 305, it would be impossible to hold that the State by executive order can do something which it is incompetent to do by legislation. " (iii) (1986) 1 GLR 1 (M/s. India Paint and Commercial Co. Ltd. v. The State of Manipur) where a Division Bench of this court laid down the law as follows : "The State Legislatures have the power under clause (b) to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse; but under the proviso no Bill or Amendment for the purpose may be introduced in the State Legislature without the previous assent of the President. It is, however, firmly established that even apart from the provisions in Art. 304, the Legislature of a State has the power to exercise regulatory control over the freedom of trade and commerce which does not amount to restriction on the freedom of trade declared by Art. 301. Restrictions obstruct the freedom of movement of inter-State transactions but regulations promote it. Restrictions obstruct the freedom of movement of inter-State transactions but regulations promote it. " The order which was challenged in that case is quoted below : "I am dedicated to refer to your letter No. 8/1(a)/84/Forest/8467 dated 18th March, 1985 and to say that the Govt. of Manipur is active (sic) examining the question of imposing complete ban on export of timber outside the State of Manipur in order to ensure protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forest and wildlife in pursuance of Art. 48A of the Constitution of India and to inform you that the State Government of Manipur has decided to impose temporary and complete ban on export of timber outside the State either departmentally or through Forest Contractors until further orders, pending final decision on the subject matter. You are, therefore, requested to take immediate action for enforcing temporary ban on export of all kinds of timber outside the State under intimation to this Govt." The Division Bench of this court quashed that order and laid down the law as follows : "It is manifestly clear from a reading of the order that the Government of Manipur imposed complete ban on export of timber outside the State of Manipur. It is admitted in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Government that the practice of giving exclusive right for extraction of teak timbers and Agarwood on payment of monopoly fees, royalties, etc, was prevailing in the past. It is also stated that the impugned order was passed by the Government as a temporary regulatory measure to ensure environmental protection and conservation of the fast diminishing forest of Manipur. It is undoubtedly not a regulatory measure. It is clearly a restriction on the freedom of trade declared and assured by Article 301 of the Constitution. It is not a regulatory measure. The executive action undoubtedly suppresses free lawful trading activities and is violative of Art. 301 of the Constitution." (iv) AIR 1993 SC 237 (State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Sanjeetha Trading Co.). There also clause 3 of the Tamil Nadu Timber (Movement Control) Order, 1982, was challenged. It is not a regulatory measure. The executive action undoubtedly suppresses free lawful trading activities and is violative of Art. 301 of the Constitution." (iv) AIR 1993 SC 237 (State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Sanjeetha Trading Co.). There also clause 3 of the Tamil Nadu Timber (Movement Control) Order, 1982, was challenged. Clause 3 of that Order is quoted below : "In view of this clause 3 no person was entitled to transport timber from any place outside the State except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a permit issued under the Tamil Nadu Transit Rules." Subsequently in September, 1983 the expression - "except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a permit issued under the Tamil Nadu Timber Rules, 1968 "were omitted." The effect of the amendment is that the clause 3 of the movement control order prohibited transport and movement of timber from any place within the State of Tamil Nadu to any place outside the State. By that very notification certain articles were excluded from the definition of timber. The consequent amendment was questioned by the writ petitioner before the High Court on the ground that it was total ban on the movement of timber from the State of Tamil Nadu to any other States and it was not only violative of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, but also violative of Art. 301 of the Constitution. The court quashed the amendment and there was an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered the earlier judgment of AIR 1967 SC 1189 (supra) and AIR 1985 SC 660 (K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu) which considered the word "regulation" and the law was laid down in paragraph 17 as follows : "Any prohibition on movement of any article from one State to another has to be examined with reference to the facts and circumstances of that particular case whether it amounts to regulation only, taking into consideration the local conditions prevailing, the necessity for such prohibition and what public interest is sought to be served by imposition thereof. Privy Council in Hughes and Vale Proprietory Ld. Privy Council in Hughes and Vale Proprietory Ld. v. State of New South Wales, (1956) AC 241 said :- "every case must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting of time and circumstance, and it may be that in regard to some economic activities and at some stage of social development it might be maintained that prohibition with a view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable manner of regulation, and that inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse thus prohibited and thus monopolized remained absolutely free. " Whenever such prohibitions are introduced in exercise of the powers, conferred by the Essential Commodities Act or any parallel or similar Act including the Act with which we are concerned in the present case, the scope of enquiry or scrutiny can only be to a limited extent because such Acts exist for maintaining, increasing or securing supplies of essential articles and for arranging equitable distribution and availability thereof at fair prices to the common man under emergent situations. The Essential Commodities Act conceives the larger welfare of the largest numbers and contemplates measures to control the essential commodities or articles which are vital to human existence in the society. With that object in view, framers of the Act vested wide powers of control over the essential articles in the State Governments. The situations prevailing in any particular State may require complete prohibition on the movement of any essential article or commodity outside the State. That is why in the context of the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, it has been said by this Court that imposition of complete prohibition on the movement of the essential commodities from one State to another may in some circumstances amount to regulation of trade in such commodities and it need not always amount to restriction. " In paragraph 18, the Supreme Court pointed out as follows: "The matter may be different where total prohibition has been imposed on the movement of goods or articles from one State to another which have not been declared to be essential commodities or articles. " In paragraph 18, the Supreme Court pointed out as follows: "The matter may be different where total prohibition has been imposed on the movement of goods or articles from one State to another which have not been declared to be essential commodities or articles. In those cases the State, which has imposed such ban, has to satisfy the Court that in spite of total prohibition it amounts only to regulation of the trade in such articles or that even if it was a restriction it was reasonable within the meaning of Art. 304(b) of the Constitution and has been imposed by law as required by Art. 304(b). Sometimes it is being said that many artificial barriers on movement of produce of a particular State are being contemplated or imposed only on the consideration of "My-State-My-People". This will only amount to the protection of regional interests for political end and not of public interest. This was not conceived by Chapter XIII of the Constitution. In Charles H. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seeling, Inc., (1934) 294 US 511, while dealing with the commerce clause in the American Constitution, Cardozo, J. observed :-- "This part of the Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim together and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." The Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of that case held that the prohibition imposed must be held to be regulatory in nature and not restrictive so as to attract Art. 301 or 304 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In the instant case, there is no denial of the fact that the prohibition which is sought to be imposed by Act of 1981 and the Rules of 1982 are absolutely regulatory in nature. The Act and the Rules of 1981 and 1982 provides for export transit passes in accordance with the law and in the absence of those export transit passes, the petitioners are not entitled to removal of timbers Meghalaya, but certain conditions which are there in the order dated 24-3-87 and the 7-4-87 are not tenable and the Conservator of Forests, Central Assam Circle, Guwahati are not entitled to insist on all those things. The only thing which he can insist for is regarding the export transit passes as provided in the Rules of 1982 i.e. The Meghalaya Forests (Removal of Timber) (Regulation) Rules, 1982 and if export transit passes are there, in conformity to Rule 3(1) issued by the authority, the respondent No. 2 shall be bound to allowed transportation of timber. 12. For the reasons stated above, these writ applications are disposed of with the direction that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 shall allow transportation of timber from Meghalaya if there is necessary transit passes issued by the District Council and necessary export transit passes are issued by the State of Meghalaya in accordance with the Meghalaya Forests (Removal of Timber) (Regulation) Rules, 1982. It is also directed that the respondent No. 2 shall not insist regarding the other documents and other conditions mentioned above in the order dated 7-4-87 as it is not his lookout to decide the other things. 13. With the above directions, the writ applications are disposed of. I make no order as to costs. Order accordingly.