JUDGMENT 1. - Although order dated September 17, 1992 (Annexure 5), order dated November 26, 1992 (annexure 8), and order dated September 8, 1993 all of which have been passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Kota, in the proceedings arising out of an application filed by the petitioner under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in my opinion, adjudication of the legality of the order dated September 8, 1993 will decide the controversy in so far as this writ petition is concerned. 2. The facts which are necessary for deciding the legality of the impugned orders are that the workman, Guman Singh, had been initially appointed in J.K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota, in the year 1970 and on November 1, 1971, he was transferred to J.K. Tyres Cord, Kota, which is a division of J.K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota. The services of a large number of workmen had been terminated by the employer which ultimately became the subject-matter of reference before the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, and on the basis of an award made by the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, the workman was reinstated in service. The workman, Guman Singh, was re-posted in J.K. Tyres Cord. He was served with a memorandum dated July 25, 1990, for holding a domestic enquiry against him in respect of misconduct levelled against him. After the domestic enquiry was held, the employer decided to dismiss him from service. Order dated September 22, 1990 was passed by the employer dismissing the workman from service. Since Guman Singh was a concerned workman in a dispute which was pending adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal, Kota, being Case No. 30 of 1985, an application was filed before the Industrial Tribunal, Kota, under Section 33(2)(b) of the 1947 Act for grant of approval of the action of the employer in dismissing the workman from service. One month's wages were also paid to the workman simultaneously with his dismissal from service. 3. The workman contested the application filed by the employer and one of the objections raised was that he was not an employee of J.K. Tyres Cord but he was an employee of the J.K. Synthetics Ltd. and that J.K. Tyres Cord had no jurisdiction to dispense with his service or to seek approval of the action taken by it against the workman. He pleaded that he was on deputation with J.K. Tyres Cord in air-conditioning department. He pleaded that he was on deputation with J.K. Tyres Cord in air-conditioning department. The petitioner submitted a rejoinder and reiterated its plea that action taken by the employer against the employee is in accordance with law. 4. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal an application was made by the employer on September 28, 1992 (Sic) seeking its leave to lead evidence on the question as to who was the employer. This application was rejected by the Industrial Tribunal by its order dated September 17, 1992 on the ground that a specific plea had not been raised by the employer controverting the objection raised by the workman in his reply. Thereafter, an application dated November 14, 1992 was filed by the employer for leave to amend the rejoinder. This application was once again contested by the workman and the Tribunal, vide its order dated November 26, 1992 dismissed the same on the ground that the amendment sought for by the employer was belated and was not justified. This was followed by a final adjudication of the application filed by the employer under Section 33(2)(b). In its order dated September 8, 1993 the Industrial Tribunal held that the workman had been appointed originally by J.K. Synthetics Ltd. and he was merely on deputation with J.K. Tyres Cord. In this fact situation J.K. Tyres Cord had no jurisdiction to hold a domestic enquiry against the workman or to make an order of dismissal of the workman from service. On this premise, the learned Tribunal dismissed the application filed by the employer. 5. In support of the writ petition, Shri Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner, has argued that J.K. Tyres Cord is an integral part of M/s. J.K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota, being one of the divisions of M/s. J.K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota. He argued that M/s. J.K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota, is an industrial establishment and the application had been filed by the employer clearly indicating that J.K. Tyres Cord Ltd. was a division of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. and, therefore, the learned Judge, Industrial Tribunal, was not correct in completely overlooking the fact that in fact the action had been taken by the employer. By inviting the court's attention to the order of dismissal dated September 22, 1990 Shri Kuhad submitted that J.K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota, had in fact taken action for dismissal of the workman from service. By inviting the court's attention to the order of dismissal dated September 22, 1990 Shri Kuhad submitted that J.K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota, had in fact taken action for dismissal of the workman from service. In the alternative, Shri Kuhad argued that even as per his own admission, the workman had been transferred with his consent from J.K. Synthetics Ltd. to J.K. Tyres Cord. Kota, in the air conditioning department and, therefore, with effect from November 1, 1971, J.K. Tyres Cord will be deemed to be his employer for the purpose of taking disciplinary action. Shri Kuhad submitted that with his voluntary transfer from J.K. Synthetics Ltd. to J.K. Tyres Cord, the workman became an employee of J .K. Tyres Cord and, therefore, he was not justified in raising an objection to the maintainability of the application filed under Section 33(2)(b) on the ground that action had not been taken against him by the employer. Shri Kuhad has argued that the learned Tribunal has totally ignored the fact that transfer of the workman to M/s. J.K. Tyres Cord was with his consent and such transfer cannot be treated as deputation. According to learned counsel, the Tribunal has completely misdirected itself in holding that termination of the service of the workman has been brought about by J.K. Tyres Cord without legal authority. In respect of other two orders, Shri Kuhad argued that the learned Judge, Industrial Tribunal, has, in the first instance, rejected the application filed by the employer for permission to lead evidence on the ground that a specific plea has not been raised by the employer and then rejected the application filed by the employer under Order 6, Rule 17, for amendment of the pleadings and in adopting this approach, the learned Judge, Industrial Tribunal, has committed a serious illegality. 6. Shri Kashyap, learned counsel for the workman, has argued that the employer was guilty of delaying adjudication on the application filed by it under Section 33(2)(b). He pointed out that application was filed on September 22, 1990. Its reply was submitted on October 16, 1990. However, rejoinder was filed after two years and this shows that the employer was never interested in prosecuting the application filed by it under Section 33(2)(b). He pointed out that application was filed on September 22, 1990. Its reply was submitted on October 16, 1990. However, rejoinder was filed after two years and this shows that the employer was never interested in prosecuting the application filed by it under Section 33(2)(b). Shri Kashyap made reference to Section 33 of the Act and submitted that the Tribunal was required to make adjudication within three months of the submission of the application and since the employer had made applications for leading evidence and amendment of pleadings after a great delay, the Tribunal was fully justified in rejecting the same. Shri Kashyap submitted that J.K. Synthetics Ltd. and J.K. Tyres Cord are two different establishments for the purpose of Section 2(kk) of the 1947 Act and since the workman was employed with J.K. Synthetics Ltd., it was not within the competence of J.K. Tyres Cord to pass an order of his dismissal from service. Shri Kashyap made reference to the Model Standing Orders of 1946 and stated that a provision for transfer of employee from one establishment to another establishment has been inserted in these standing orders only in the year 1973 and, therefore, incorporation of a clause in the standing orders framed by the J.K. Synthetics Ltd. providing for transfer of employee from one division to another is ultra vires. The Model Standing Orders and the action taken by the employer for transferring the workman on November 1, 1971 from J.K. Synthetics Ltd. to J.K. Tyres Cord must be considered as void. 7. After having given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions, I am of the view that it is not necessary for this court to make an adjudication on the issue as to whether J.K. Tyres Cord can be treated as separate industrial establishment or not. From the pleadings of the parties as well as the contents of the order dated September 8, 1993 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, it is transparently clear that on November 1, 1971, workman, Guman Singh, had been transferred with his consent from J.K. Synthetics Ltd. to J.K. Tyres Cord Division. Therefore, even if for a moment it is assumed that J.K. Synthetics Ltd. and J.K. Tyres Cord are two separate industrial establishments, the workman had voluntarily accepted his transfer from J.K. Synthetics Ltd. to J.K. Tyres Cord. Therefore, even if for a moment it is assumed that J.K. Synthetics Ltd. and J.K. Tyres Cord are two separate industrial establishments, the workman had voluntarily accepted his transfer from J.K. Synthetics Ltd. to J.K. Tyres Cord. Right to hold a membership in J.K. Synthetics Ltd., if any, possessed by the workman was lost to him with effect from November 1, 1971 and from that day he became an employee of J.K. Tyres Cord for all purposes. The action for dismissal of the service of the petitioner has been taken by J.K. Synthetics Ltd., (Tyres Cord Division); therefore, even if the petitioner had been originally employed in J.K. Synthetics Ltd., the decision taken by the management of J.K. Tyres Cord on September 22, 1990 cannot be treated as without jurisdiction. Learned Judge, Industrial Tribunal, has made reference to the principle of law laid down by the apex court in Pyarchand Kesarimal Porwal Bidi Factory v. Onkar Laxman Thenge, 1970 - I L.L.J. 492 : AIR 1970 S.C. 823 , but has completely misdirected itself in applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court. There can be no manner of doubt that if an employee is sent on deputation then the jurisdiction to pass an order of termination of service by way of disciplinary action or otherwise continues with the parent employer. However, where transfer from one employer to another employer of from one establishment to another establishment has taken place with the consent of the employee, it cannot be equated with the case of deputation of the employee and the transferee employer gets jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against the employee with effect from the date of transfer. In my view, the Tribunal has ignored the facts and circumstances which were brought before it and has thus committed a serious error which is apparent on the face of the record. Thus, there is sufficient justification in the grievance of the petitioner that while rejecting its application filed under Section 33(2)(b), the Tribunal has committed an illegality which deserves to be corrected by this court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 8. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. Order dated September 8, 1993 is declared illegal and it is hereby quashed. 8. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. Order dated September 8, 1993 is declared illegal and it is hereby quashed. The Industrial Tribunal, Kota, is directed to consider the application filed by the employer under Section 33(2)(b) on merits after hearing both the parties and taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties. Since the matter has already been delayed considerably, the Tribunal is expected to decide the application as early as possible after submission of a certified copy of this order by either of the parties and in any case, such decision shall be taken within a period of four months. 9. This court had directed that the employer should deposit a sum of Rs. 25,000 in the savings bank account of the workman in the Punjab National Bank, Industrial Area, Kota. If the workman has till this day not withdrawn the amount, this amount shall now be kept by him in fixed deposit and the Industrial Tribunal shall make an appropriate order while deciding application filed by the employer under Section 33(2)(b) of the 1947 Act. *******