B. PANIGRAHI, J. ( 1 ) IN this revision the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a Rule to quash the proceeding pending before the Special Court (Sadar) Midnapore in D. E. B. G. R. Case No. 4 of 1987 under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter referred to as Act ). ( 2 ) FACTS leading to the prosecution against the petitioner are stated in brief : a police party raided the place of business and also the residential house on 15. 1. 87 between 13. 00 to 17. 00 hours of the principal accused Bishnupada Dey of Kumarhati, Keshiary, District-Midnapore. The accused Bishnupada Dey is said to have defaulted in producing books of accounts before the raiding party. They seized 14 bags of Atap Rice from a room and 15 bags boiled rice in another room. It is further alleged that 16 bags of common rice was seized from eastern side kept in a tile shed room of the courtyard. Inspector of police Sri R. N. Roy, Enforcement Branch, West Bengal who was heading the raiding party also seized 7 bags of sugar from another tile shed situated just adjacent to the house of the principal accused Bishnupada. Charge-sheet was submitted against the principal accused Bishnupada and this petitioner on 17. 9. 87 under Section 7 (1) (a) (ii) of the Act for violation of para 3 (2) of the West Bengal Declaration of Stocks Prices of Essential Commodities order, 1977 read with item No. 1 + 6 of the first schedule of the said order and para 3 (a) of the West Bengal Rice and Paddy (Licensing and Control) Order, 1967 and para 3 (a) of the West Bengal Rice and Paddy (Storage by consumers) Order, 1967. After submission of the charge-sheet it appears that the learned Special Judge has explained the accusations for violation of the above provisions and accordingly fixed another date for evidence of the prosecution witness. It is against this order the present petitioner has approached this Court for quashing of the proceeding pending in the Special Court. ( 3 ) THE petitioner has further stated that a separate confiscation proceeding is pending before the authority which is not yet disposed of. 4a. It is against this order the present petitioner has approached this Court for quashing of the proceeding pending in the Special Court. ( 3 ) THE petitioner has further stated that a separate confiscation proceeding is pending before the authority which is not yet disposed of. 4a. Law is too well settled that the confiscation proceeding and the prosecution lodged against the accused for violation of any orders punishable under Section 7 of the Act are two mutually exclusive proceedings and the result of one does not in any way influence on the other, in such premises, the pendency or finalisation of confiscation proceeding has least bearing on this case. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Mr. Talukdar, has highlighted mainly on three grounds : (i) that the prosecution for violation of sugar control order against this petitioner even on its face value is untenable; (ii) the possession of rice even though it exceeded the permissible of limits, yet petitioner having claimed this paddy to have obtained from his agricultural land, as such, no offence can be said to have been committed by him ; (iii) the prosecution having failed to submit the charge-sheet within six months from the date of arrest of the petitioner. The case against him is not maintainable under Section 167 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for convenience be called as Code) and, thus, the same is to be dropped. ( 5 ) LET me advert to the contention raised by Mr. Talukdar in seriatim. While appreciating the first contention of the petitioner a reference need be made to the defination of 'consumer' as stated in West Bengal Sugar Controllers Licensing Order 1980. On a plain reading of the defination it does not lead to an impression that possession of sugar meant for personal use of the consumer amounts to an offence. But while examining such contention, I may confident that whether can a consumer possess underlimited quantity of sugar or if any ceiling is prescribed under the order. "bulk consumer" means an establishment or an institution purchasing or storing in sugar quantities exceeding 10 quintals at any one time either for consumption in the establishment or for manufacturing purpose not for the purpose of sale. Licensing Order prescribed that a person claiming to be "bulk consumer" should possess a licensing for such sugar. "bulk consumer" means an establishment or an institution purchasing or storing in sugar quantities exceeding 10 quintals at any one time either for consumption in the establishment or for manufacturing purpose not for the purpose of sale. Licensing Order prescribed that a person claiming to be "bulk consumer" should possess a licensing for such sugar. If defination of "bulk consumer" and 'consumer' read in juxtaposition, it is emerged that a person can purchase not exceeding 10 quintals of sugar for his personal consumption and such possession of less than 10 quintals does not amount to an offence. In the instant case, the petitioner is alleged to have claimed 7 quintals of sugar which have been seized by the raiding party. Thereby because he claimed such articles, the petitioner cannot be said to have violated the sugar control order. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel, appearing for the opposite party-State has fairly conceded that possession below 10 quintals of sugar does not amount to an offence, so, therefore, I find there is substantial force in the contention of the petitioner that the prosecution against him under Clause 2 (a) and (e) of the West Bengal Sugar Controllers Licensing Order, 1980 is untenable. ( 7 ) WHILE examining the correctness of the second contention as to whether the petitioner can be said to have violated the provisions are 3 (1) and 18 (1) (2) of the West Bengal Rice and Paddy (Licensing and Control) Orders, 1967 the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has strongly urged that since the petitioner claimed 14 quintals 70 kilos of boiled rice was his agricultural produce, no prosecution can be lodged. I am afraid that such contention can now be discussed in this application. On his own showing the petitioner admits the possession beyond the permissible limits of rice, it is for the Special Court to consider under which circumstances the petitioner possessed such quantity. Any further discussion on the point may either prejudice the petitioner or the prosecution. Therefore, I refrain from making further discussion on this point inasmuch as the hearing of the case is yet to be concluded. It is unnecessary to examine the contention of the petitioner at present which is left open to be agitated before the Court below at an appropriate time. ( 8 ) MR. Therefore, I refrain from making further discussion on this point inasmuch as the hearing of the case is yet to be concluded. It is unnecessary to examine the contention of the petitioner at present which is left open to be agitated before the Court below at an appropriate time. ( 8 ) MR. Talukder intends to make a formidable point that the prosecution having failed to submit the charge-sheet within six months from the date of arrest of the petitioner. Therefore, the proceeding against him should be quashed. In support of his contention he placed strong reliance on Section 167 (5) of the Code which is extracted. 167 (5) to be quoted :-"if any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons-case the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary". ( 9 ) THERE is a State Amendment to Section 167 (5) of the Code. It is admitted at the bar that such amendments cannot be attracted to the present case. In view of the fact that the incident had taken place before such amendments. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly placed reliance only on Sub-Section 5 of Section 167 of the Code and not under the State Amendment. On a plait reading of the revision petition it appears that he has not taken such grounds in this case, but the counsel further argued that since this contention is a question of law, notwithstanding such plea be taken in the revision-petition, he should be allowed to argue on the said question. Suffice it to say, that in order to attract the application of Section 167 (5) of the Code, the facts needed to be examined at the revisional stage. Without further material, it would be hazardous to hold that the charge sheet was submitted beyond six month of the arrest of the petitioner. ( 10 ) IT is no longer res-integra that the summons procedure shall be taken recourse to while deciding the validity of the prosecution about the case of like nature. Without further material, it would be hazardous to hold that the charge sheet was submitted beyond six month of the arrest of the petitioner. ( 10 ) IT is no longer res-integra that the summons procedure shall be taken recourse to while deciding the validity of the prosecution about the case of like nature. A Division Bench of this Court (Jnan Prakesh Agarwalla v. The State of West Bengal) reported in 1992 C. Cr. LR (Cal) 28 placing reliance on the provisions of 167 (5) of the Code quashed the proceeding. On the failure of submission of charge-sheet within six month of arrest of the accused. The validity of the decision cited supra was examined in the case of State of West Bengal v. Fulguni Dutta by the Apex Court in 1993 C. Cr. LR (SC) 123. ( 11 ) THE Supreme Court while approving of the decision of this Court cited supra held that regardless of submission of the charge sheet six months after the date of arrest of the accused, the Special Court has to notice materials within six months of the arrest of accused are sufficient to proceed with the case. On the contrary, if no sufficient materials are placed before the Court against the accused then the Court can direct prosecution to stop the proceeding as envisaged under Section 167 (5) of the Code. There is no room to doubt that in the instant case the Special Judge has to proceed by adopting the summons procedure. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, in the above exigency if the petitioner moves the Special Court to consider about the applicability of the provisions of Section 167 of the Code such contention can be examined by the Court below. As per the above discussion the revision is partly allowed. Appeal allowed.