JUDGMENT S. N Phukan, J.— This appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 30-11-1985 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (2), Shimla in appeal C. A. No. 151-S/13 of 1983/I23-S/13 of 1985. By the impugned judgment and decree, the learned lower Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Sub-Judge, Rampur on the Civil Suit No. 12/1 of 1980. 2. The facts are as follows. Two appellants herein filed a Civil Suit against the three respondents for perpetual injunction as well as mandatory injunction. According to the plaintiffs-appellants, their house is situated on the land covered by Khasra No. 510 and to the West of their house, there is a Khasra No. 511 owned by them and ahead of Khasra No. 511, there is a Khasra No. 1088/506, which is owned by the defendants-respondents. This land comprised under the above Khasra number is on the West of the house of the plaintiffs situated within Khasra No. 510. Ahead of Khasra No. 1088/506 of the defendants/respondents towards West, there is a public road known as Kalpa-link road. According to the plaintiffs, the approach to the above road from the house is through their land cover ed by Khasra No. 511 and also land of the defendants covered by Khasra No. 1088/506 and they are using this path for the last 60 years, thereby they have acquired right of easement by way of prescription. The plaintiffs further alleged that there is a water tank for irrigation of the land of the plaintiffs covered by Khasra Nos. 512, 514, 511 and also some of the land of the plaintiffs The said water tank is located partly on the land of the plaintiffs covered by Khasra No. 511 and partly on the land of the defendants covered by Khasra No. 1088/506. The portion of the tank, which fell on the land of the defendants measured 4 Karam x 1 Karam and the tank has been shown in the site plan marked as Ex. PJ annexed with the plaint. The plaintiffs have averred that this tank is in-existence for more than 20 years and the water from the tank was being used by the plaintiffs as of right and uninterruptedly for 20 years. PJ annexed with the plaint. The plaintiffs have averred that this tank is in-existence for more than 20 years and the water from the tank was being used by the plaintiffs as of right and uninterruptedly for 20 years. The grievance of the plaintiffs is that in the year 1980, the defendants obstructed the above passage by constructing a wall of 8 feet high on the boundary of the land between Khasra No. 511 and Khasra No. 1088/506. It has further been alleged that in the year 1980, defendant-respondent No. 1 had demolished the tank and a criminal proceeding was also started between them before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kinnaur and he was convicted and this conviction was confirmed both by the learned Sessions Judge and also by this Court. 3. According to the defendants, there was no passage, as alleged by the plaintiffs through Khasra No 1088/506. They have stated that initially this land was under cultivation, but from the year 1962 it remained uncultivated. The plaintiffs and other residents of the village started passing through the land, as it was lying uncultivated. According to the defendants, they again brought this land under cultivation in 1976 and raised the wall in question on the boundary of the lands covered under Khasra No. 511 and Khasra No. 1088/506. It has been denied that the plaintiffs have been passing through the land continuously for 20 years and did not exercise any right of way through the land, as alleged. It has also been denied that there was a tank or portion of the tank on the land, as claimed by the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, defendant No. I never demolished the tank. 4. The learned trial Court framed as many as seven issues, namely : 1. Whether the plaintiffs have got a right of way through Khasra No. 1088/506 belonging to defendants by way of easement ? 2. Whether the plaintiffs have not used the alleged path within two years from the date of institution of the suit and suit is time barred ? 3. Whether the earthen tank situated at Khasra No. 511 and 1088/ 506 village Khawangi was in exclusive use of the plaintiffs for irrigation purposes for the last 29 years ? 4. Whether defendant No. 1 destroyed the earthen tank on 29-4-1980, as alleged ? 5. 3. Whether the earthen tank situated at Khasra No. 511 and 1088/ 506 village Khawangi was in exclusive use of the plaintiffs for irrigation purposes for the last 29 years ? 4. Whether defendant No. 1 destroyed the earthen tank on 29-4-1980, as alleged ? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of injunction claimed ? 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction ? 7. Relief. 5. The learned lower Appellate Court framed the following points for determination in the appeal, namely: 1. Whether the appellants-defendants deserve to be afforded an opportunity of leading additional evidence? 2. Whether the appellants can be allowed to raise the objection of non-joinder of parties at this stage? 3. Whether the trial Court has wrongly held that the plaintiffs have a right of passage through Khasra Number 1088/506 owned by the defendants? 4. Whether the finding of the learned Sub-Judge that a part of the plaintiffs tank existed on the land of the defendants comprised in Khasra number 1088/506 is not substantiated by the evidence on record. 5. Final order. 6. The learned lower Appellate Court held that the appellants/defendants cannot be afforded an opportunity of leading additional evidence, that the question of non-joinder of parties could not be raised, that the trial Court wrongly held that the plaintiffs have right of passage through Khasra No. 1088/506 owned by the defendants and that the finding of the learned Sub-Judge that part of the plaintiffs tank existed on the land of the defendants comprised in Khasra No. 1088/506 is correct. The appeal was partly allowed, inasmuch as the relief claimed by the plaintiffs relating to the water tank as decided by the learned trial Court was affirmed but the finding of the learned trial Court that the plaintiffs have acquired right of easement for passing through the land of the defendants was set aside. 7. The cross-objection has been filed in view of the finding of the learned lower Appellate Court giving right to the plaintiff-appellants regarding the water tank. 8. Heard Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellants and Mr. Sanjiv Kuthiala vice Mr. K. D. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondents. 9. 7. The cross-objection has been filed in view of the finding of the learned lower Appellate Court giving right to the plaintiff-appellants regarding the water tank. 8. Heard Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellants and Mr. Sanjiv Kuthiala vice Mr. K. D. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondents. 9. From the judgment of the learned trial Court, I find that the learned trial Court held that there existed a path in the suit land and the plaintiffs used to pass through the path for the last more than 30 to 40 years. That during his local inspection, he also found that the path was used as a right, that the defendants obstructed using the path by the plaintiffs in 1980; that there was a well in the disputed land, as alleged by the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs had been utilising the water from the said well for irrigation of the land. 10. The learned lower Appellate Court also accepted the above findings of the learned trial Court, but rejected a part of the prayer of the plaintiffs on the ground that the plaintiffs cannot succeed in their claim, regarding easement of right of way without pleading that they have been using the right of way as of right and without interruption The learned Counsel for the appellants has urged that in the plaint it was so pleaded that the facts to prove the claim of the plaintiffs under the Easement Act have been clearly made 6ut It has also been urged that the pleadings in Mofussil Court has to be construed liberally and in this connection, the learned Counsel has placed reliance on various decisions of the apex Court and other Courts. It has also been urged that the pleadings have to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. 11. In Vdhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, AIR 1976 SC 744, it was held that a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import, and it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Their Lordships held that although it is substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or substraction of words, or change of its apparent grammatical sense. 12. Their Lordships held that although it is substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or substraction of words, or change of its apparent grammatical sense. 12. In Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) v. Bishun Narain Inter College and others, AIR 1987 SC 1242, it was held that it is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered and it is also equally settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set out by it. According to their Lordships, the object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet and that in order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. It has further been laid down by the apex Court that pleadings should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. 13. In Kedar Lal Seal and another v. Heri Lal Seal, AIR 1952 SC 47, , it was held that the Court would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleading when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side, however, clumsily or inartistically the plaint may be worded. According to their Lordships in any event, it is always open to a Court to give a plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided that occasions no prejudice to the other side beyond what can be compensated for in costs. 14. This Court in Avtar Singh and others v Suram Chand and another, 1972 SLJ HP 10, held that pleadings in Mofussil are notoriously vague and imperfect. Therefore, the rule has been adopted by courts that pleadings should be liberally construed. 14. This Court in Avtar Singh and others v Suram Chand and another, 1972 SLJ HP 10, held that pleadings in Mofussil are notoriously vague and imperfect. Therefore, the rule has been adopted by courts that pleadings should be liberally construed. It has further been held that it is only the material facts which have to be set out and it is for the Courts to apply the correct law and the parties are not estopped from urging a pure question of law even for the first time in second appeal. Keeping in view the above law, the present plaint may be perused. After the cause title, the following has been stated in the plaint: "Suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering and obstructing the path which passes through Khasra No 1088/506 and leads to the link road and to the lands of the plaintiffs and further restraining the defendants from interfering in the use of the earthen tank situate on K. No. 511 and 1088/506 situate in village Khowangi for irrigating the fields of plaintiffs." 15. From a reading of other paragraphs of the plaint, it is absolutely clear that the defendants were quite aware of the claim of the plaintiffs. From reading the plaint including the above quoted portion, it appears that the plaintiffs were claiming the right of way through the land of the defendants for going to the link road and further lands of the plaintiffs and also for using the earthen tank for irrigation of the lands of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the plaint if it is read as a whole, it is sufficient, in my opinion, to bring the relevant provisions of the Easement Act and that apart both the parties went to the trial knowing the case of each other. I have also perused the written statement, from which it appears that the defendants also denied the allegations made in the plaint including the allegation that the plaintiffs ever used the path for going to link road and the construction of the tank for storage of water for the purpose of irrigation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the defendants did not know the claim of the plaintiffs 16. Therefore, it cannot be said that the defendants did not know the claim of the plaintiffs 16. In the impugned judgment, the learned lower Appellate Court was of the view that though the pleadings in the plaint have stated that they have acquired easement right of use of the path by prescription but the requirement of law is to plead the ingredients constituting such an easementary right and that mere pleading that the plaintiffs have acquired easementary right cannot be said to be the pleading of facts. According to the learned lower Appellate Court, as the plaintiffs have not pleaded that they have been passing through the land of the defendants as of right and uninterruptedly, their evidence on those points is simply to be ignored inasmuch as no amount of evidence can be a substitute for the pleadings. 17. In the case in hand, the plaintiffs claim is for right of way on the ground that path has been used peaceably and openly by them for more than 20 years as an easement and as of right without interruption. From the judgment of the learned trial Court, it is clear that this fact has been proved by the plaintiffs. This finding of the learned trial Court has not been set aside by the learned lower Appellate Court. I have already held that from the pleadings, a case for easement has been made out by the plaintiffs, more particularly, keeping in view the law laid down by the apex Court as well as this Court that the pleadings have to be liberally construed, more particularly, the pleadings of Mofussil Court. I, therefore, hold that the findings of the learned lower Appellate Court on this point is erroneous and liable to be set aside, which I hereby do. 18. The attention of this Court having been drawn to a decision of this Court in Suresh Chand v. Hindu Mai and others, AIR 1994 HP 56, wherein this Court held that the true meaning of the expression as of right is that the enjoyment of the right should not be secret or by stealth or by sufferance or the leave and licence of another person. Therefore^ the animus of the person exercising the right, which is a question of feet, is required to be determined from the circumstances proved on record of each case. Therefore^ the animus of the person exercising the right, which is a question of feet, is required to be determined from the circumstances proved on record of each case. If positive evidence to prove this fact is not available, the Court is within its rights to draw a presumption from long continuous user of a right that such user which was open, peaceable and unobstructed must be in conscious exercise of the right Cuffing to the case in hand, it has been proved and both the Courts below have also come to the finding that the plaintiffs used the path peaceably, openly and without any interruption. Therefore, merely because on a technical point, the learned lower Appellate Court set aside the judgment is not sustainable in law. 19. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Phookhand Narayandas and another v. Murarilal Nathulal, AIR 1951 MP 89, held that unless the following ingredients are proved, no right of easement can accrue to the owner of a dominant heritage. The said ingredients are: (1) there has been an actual enjoyment of the right; (2) that the enjoyment has been open ; (3) that the enjoyment has been peaceable (4) that the enjoyment has been as of right ; (5) that it has been enjoyed as an easement ; (6) that it has been enjoyed without interruption and that (7) it has been enjoyed for twenty years. 20. It was also held that long user of the right of way raises a presumption in favour of the plaintiff that the enjoyment has been as of right. 21. In the case in hand, both the Courts below have found that the plaintiffs have proved all the ingredients That apart, the plaintiffs have also been using that right of way for a long period and, therefore, have acquired a right of easement. 22. The learned Counsel for the respondents in support of the claim of the defendants also in respect of the cross-objections has urged that a right is a right in gross and not an easement when it is enjoyed independently and not for the beneficial enjoyment of any land belonging to the persons, who claim it. In support, the learned Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to Ramchandra Barik and others v. Dibakar Das, AIR 1944 Pat 278. 23. In support, the learned Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to Ramchandra Barik and others v. Dibakar Das, AIR 1944 Pat 278. 23. I am afraid that the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is not tenable in the case in hand inasmuch as the plaintiffs have claimed the right of way not only for going to link road but also for going to their own land. » Therefore, this is not a case of right in gross but it is a case of easement. 24. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that the plaintiffs have an alternative road to the link road and, therefore, there is no easement of necessity. In support, the learned Counsel has placed reliance in a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Rameshchandra bhikhabhai Patel v. Maneklal Maganlal Patel and another, AIR 1978 Guj 62, The Gujarat High Court has held that easement of necessity would no longer be available when alternative way is available to the claimant of that right. But in the case in hand, it is not a question of easement of necessity because the plaintiffs have claimed the right for going to their land through the land of the defendants. Therefore, I hold that the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents has no merit. 25. The learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance In a decision of Patna High Court in Nasiruddin and another v. Deokali and others, AIR 1929 Pat 124. I have perused the facts of that case and I find that the right of way was claimed for a limited and special purpose. Therefore, on this fact, it was held that there was no right of easement, but in the case in hand, it is not so. Therefore, this ratio is not applicable to the present case. 26. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, it is common in India for a person to go to the land of another person in an agricultural field. In support, the learned Counsel has placed reliance in a decision of Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court in Vidya Sagar and another v. Ram Das and another, AIR 1976 All 415 (Lucknow Bench). In support, the learned Counsel has placed reliance in a decision of Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court in Vidya Sagar and another v. Ram Das and another, AIR 1976 All 415 (Lucknow Bench). It was held in that case that it is common, for one cultivator to pass over the Mend of another cultivator as a means of access to his own field and such user of the Mend for agricultural purposes is, generally speaking, never objected to and is, therefore, nothing but permissive. But in the case in hand, it is not so inasmuch as this right of easement has been acquired as held by the Courts below as a matter of right. 27. In support of the above contention, the learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance in another decision of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Bailey and another v. Rama Shanker Lal and others, AIR 1975 All 461. It was held that the owner of land using the ridges between adjoining fields of his neighbour, for reaching the road cannot be presumed to have used it as of right. The user can be presumed only to be permissive, and no right of easement can be claimed on the basis of such Use. It was also held that it is a common feature in Indian villages that people generally pass over the ridges between two cultivated lands and by habit no agriculturist ever objects to it. As stated above, in the case in hand, it is not so inasmuch as there is definite evidence to show that the plaintiffs have been using the path as a matter of right not only for going to the fields, but also for the purpose of drawing water from the tank for irrigating the land. 28. For the reasons stated above, the present appeal is allowed. In other words, the decree of the learned trial Court is restored The plaintiffs shall be entitled to get a decree, as claimed. The cross-objections are rejected. The parties to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.