K. SHIVASHANKAR BHAT ( 1 ) THE appeal is by the first defendant. The plaintiff sought possession of a corner of the plot described in the plaint from the first defendant. The plaintiff also sought mesne profits. There was also a prayer against the first defendant, from encroaching upon any other part of the plot of land. The suit is filed in the name of the plaintiff company by the person in whom the management of the company was vested by virtue of a notification issued under Section 18-A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, (hereinafter referred as the Act ). The plaint states that the land measuring about 437. 77 sq. yds. vested in the Government of India and was placed at the disposal of the Delhi Improvement Trust which was later granted on lease to the plaintiff company. The company deposited with Delhi Improvement Trust the requisite amount as premium. The possession of the land was given to the plaintiff company. On 4. 12. 1954 a certificate was issued on behalf of the company certifying that the possession had been taken over. In April 1956 an agreement was entered into between the aforesaid Trust and the plaintiff company under which the Trust covenanted to grant a perpetual lease of the plot of land to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had been in possession of the entire land eversince the lease; but in or about the year 1957 the first defendant illegally entered land and started a tea stall in a corner of the said land. Since the first defendant had been wrongfully retaining possession of the said corner of the land and built a chappar over it for which the present suit for possession is filed. The second defendant is the successor of the aforesaid Trust. The plaint also states that the plaintiff put up boundary wall on the other two sides of the plot but the defendant No. 1 broke the wall at two places. It is unnecessary to refer to other averments in the plaint. ( 2 ) THE first defendant contested the suit asserting that he has been in possession of the entire plot of land since about the year 1948. The representative capacity of the person suing in the name of the company was also questioned. The second defendant supported the case of the plaintiff substantially. ( 2 ) THE first defendant contested the suit asserting that he has been in possession of the entire plot of land since about the year 1948. The representative capacity of the person suing in the name of the company was also questioned. The second defendant supported the case of the plaintiff substantially. ( 3 ) THE trial court framed the following issues:- (1) Whether the suit has been filed by a duly authorised person and the plaint in the suit has been signed and verified by a duly authorised person? (2) Whether the Delhi Improvement Trust has leased out the plot in dispute to the plaintiff and has delivered possession to him? (3) Whether defendant No. 1 has become the owner of the plot in dispute by adverse possession for more than 12 years? (4) In case Issue No. 3 is held against defendant No. l, whether he is liable to pay mesne profits and if so, how much? (5) Whether the suit is barred by time? (6) Whether defendant No. l is a displaced person and what is its effect on the present suit? (7) Relief. All the issues were found in favour of the plaintiff and the suit was decreed by the trial court. Hence the present appeal. ( 4 ) HAVING regard to the contentions raised in the appeal broadly 2 questions arise for consideration - (i) Whether the suit was filed on behalf of the company by a competent person? ; and (ii) Whether the appellant/first defendant had acquired title over the land by adverse possession? RE: QUESTION NO. (i); ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant contended that under Section 18-A of the Act the assets of the company do not vest in the Central Government or in the Authorised Controller. It was contended that the Authorised Controller displaced the Board of Directors to the extent of the undertaking of the Company. In other respects the Board of Directors continued to function and only the Board of Directors or the Managing Director could have sued to recover the plot of land from the first defendant. ( 6 ) UNDER Section 18-A of the Act the management of the Undertaking known as the Indian Electronic Works Limited, Calcutta was taken over and continued to be managed by the Authorised Controller. ( 6 ) UNDER Section 18-A of the Act the management of the Undertaking known as the Indian Electronic Works Limited, Calcutta was taken over and continued to be managed by the Authorised Controller. The learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out the particular aspect of the Company s assets or activity which could be described as the undertaking which was taken over, as against the management of the company as such. The notification is quite clear when it states that the management of the Undertaking known as the Indian Electric Works Limited has been taken over. In other words the entire company was treated as an Undertaking for the purpose of the notification. It is the management of this Undertaking that was taken over by the Authorised Controller under Section 18-A of the Act. The notification nowhere confines the concept of undertaking to any part of the company s assets or activities as already noted. If this is the correct understanding of the notification, then there can be no doubt that the Authorised Controller could sue on behalf of the said Indian Electric Works Limited. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant contended that the land belonged to the company and the land did not belong to the Undertaking as such. We are not able to appreciate this subtle distinction sought to be made out by the learned counsel for the appellant. Reference was made to Sections 10 and 14 of the Act. Similarly Section 18-A and 18aa were referred. We have no doubt that a company may have several Undertakings and one of its Undertakings alone may be taken over under Section 18-A but when the notification does not limit the operation of the notification to a particular entity or Undertaking it is not possible to assume that the taking over of the management is confined to some imaginary activity of the company. The learned counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh Vs. Model Mills, Nagpur; ( AIR 1984 SC 1813 ). The Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the Undertaking in question was engaged in any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Department of Central Government, only because the management of the company was taken over by a notification under Section 18-A of the Act. Model Mills, Nagpur; ( AIR 1984 SC 1813 ). The Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the Undertaking in question was engaged in any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Department of Central Government, only because the management of the company was taken over by a notification under Section 18-A of the Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that by taking over the management under Section 18-A the activity does not become an activity carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the significant consequence that ensues on the issue of a notified order appointing Authorised Controller is to divert the management from the existing Managers and to vest it in the Authorised Controller and this change of management does not tantamount to either acquisition of the Undertaking or a take over of its ownership. The expression under the authority of any department of the Central Government would in ordinary parlance mean that the department is directly responsible for the management of the Undertaking. This is quite different from the power to run the industry under the authority of the department of the Central Government. The above citation in no way advances the proposition advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. ( 8 ) IN Upper India Couper Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. A. A. I and F. R. and others; (1992) 75 Company Cases (Delhi) 653 a Bench of this Court pointed out that the company is different from its Undertaking. A company may have one or more Undertakings. No two views are possible except the one stated by the Bench. But in the instant case the question of the representative character of the Authorised Controller to file the suit on behalf of the Company has to be considered. Since the management of the entire Undertaking known by the Company s name has been taken over it follows that the Board of Directors ceased to manage the Undertaking referred by the name of the Company. If so only Authorised Controller appointed under Section 18-A could have sued on behalf of the. Company. ( 9 ) IN re: Britannia Engineering Company Ltd. ; (1983) 54 Company Cases 277, an apartment was occupied by an employee of the company. If so only Authorised Controller appointed under Section 18-A could have sued on behalf of the. Company. ( 9 ) IN re: Britannia Engineering Company Ltd. ; (1983) 54 Company Cases 277, an apartment was occupied by an employee of the company. The question was whether the tenancy right which was an asset of the company was an Undertaking or not. The said decision has no bearing on the present problem before us. In fact the facts stated at page 283 of the report show that the Central Government had not taken over the particular asset involved i. e. to say the apartment in question. Therefore, it was held that the Official Liquidator was entitled to take possession of the apartment. ( 10 ) IN F. C. J. Worker s Union Vs. Food Corporation of India; AIR 1985 SC 488 the question was whether the appropriate Government , as regards the Regional Offices of the Food Corporation of India and their warehouses in the respective States is the State Government or the Central Government. The question arose under the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. The Supreme Court held that the State Government concerned was the appropriate Government . The relevancy of this decision is not clear for us. ( 11 ) THE decision of the Mysore High Court in International Cotton Corporation (P) Ltd. Vs. Bank of Maharashtra and an- other; (1970) 40 Company Cases 1154 is again based on the concept of ownership. It was held that the business or Undertaking of the company must be distinguished from the properties belonging to the company. ( 12 ) THE decision of this court in Maha Maya General Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shri Hardit Singh, Liquidator, National Planners Ltd. and others. ; ILR 1972 (2) Delhi 241 also has no bearing on the present question. ( 13 ) THE above apart, in the absence of any material on record to bifurcate the assets of the company from the alleged Undertaking of the Company there can be no escape from the conclusion that the Authorised Controller was competent to exercise the managerial power even in respect of the plot of land in question on behalf of the company. ( 14 ) RE: QUESTION NO. ( 14 ) RE: QUESTION NO. (ii): It is not the case of the first defendant that he was allotted the land in question or he was granted the land by any Competent Authority. He has not produced any evidence to show that he had any title to the land in question. The burden of proving adverse possession is on the first defendant. A reading of the evidence on record, shows that the first defendant has not discharged this burden. Even otherwise a reading of the entire evidence on record shows that the plaintiff has proved its title (as lessee) to the property in question. P. W. I was in service and was employed by the Delhi Improvement Trust. He brought the record pertaining to the land in question. He had spoken to the auction held in which the highest bid was offered by the plaintiff company. He has spoken to the possession having been handed over to the plaintiff company. The certificate of possession has been spoken to by him. He speaks to the lease deed and the signatures of the Competent Authority (G. L. Mittal) who signed on behalf of the Trust. The Registered Lease Deed was produced as Ex. P/2. P. W. 2 was an employee of the plaintiff company. He speaks to the boundary walls put up by the company around the plot. He also speaks to the certificate of possession bearing his signatures. Nothing serious/ damaging to the case pleaded by the plaintiff, was brought out in the cross-examination of these witnesses. ( 15 ) IT should be noted that first derendant has put up only a. chappar wherein he is carrying on the business of a tea shop. It is also in evidence that first defendant came to India as a refugee consequent upon the partition of the country. ( 16 ) P. W. 5 is the Record Keeper of the House Tax Department of Municipal Corporation of Delhi. He speaks to the assessment made in respect of the land in question and the records show the name of the plaintiff company as the owner. P. W. 6 is a dealer of the plaintiff company. He speaks to the supervision done by him when the boundary wall was put up by the plaintiff company. Chappar put up by the first defendant, according to him, covered an area measuring 6 X 9 . P. W. 6 is a dealer of the plaintiff company. He speaks to the supervision done by him when the boundary wall was put up by the plaintiff company. Chappar put up by the first defendant, according to him, covered an area measuring 6 X 9 . According to him the first defendant promised to vacate the said portion when the boundary wall was being put up. He speaks to the vouchers issued when the boundary wall was being put up. P. W. 7 was the Manager of the plaintiff company from the year 1956 to 1968. He executed the agreement on behalf of the company under which the plot came to the plaintiff company. He also speaks to the possession. ( 17 ) THE first defendant examined one neighbour residing about 20/ 25 yards away. He owns a dairy. It is obvious that the tea shop owner was purchasing milk from this person. He speaks to the alleged shifting of the stall by the first defendant in the very land. He asserts that the first defendant has been in possession for over 22 years, as on the date of his deposition recorded in December, 1972. D. W. 2 is another tea stall owner carrying on his business a furlong away. Similarly D. W. 3 is a/neighbour asserting that the first defendant has been carrying on his business for several years - over 20 years. D. W. 4 asserts that he put up the boundary wall in the year 1953 at the instance of the first defendant. D. W. 5 is a police official (Head Constable) who speaks about the complaint lodged against the first defendant on behalf of the plaintiff in March, 1958. His evidence in no way helps the case of the first defendant because the suit was filed within 12 years of March, 1958. D. W. 6 is another police officer who states that in the year 1957 he investigated the complaint against the first defendant. He asserts that even in the year 1953 the first defendant was running his tea stall in the same place. The defendant was examined as D. W. 8. He was examined in March, 1973 and he states that he occupied the plot about 23 years earlier He also stated that he erected 2 walls in the year 1952 or 1953. According to him he came to Delhi in the year 1949. The defendant was examined as D. W. 8. He was examined in March, 1973 and he states that he occupied the plot about 23 years earlier He also stated that he erected 2 walls in the year 1952 or 1953. According to him he came to Delhi in the year 1949. He states that he never obtained any ration card even though rationing was in force. He denied the suggestion that he occupied the plot only in the year 1957. He had no license to run the tea stall. We find his evidence is quite bald regarding the factum of his possession for over 12 years. He admits that auctions were conducted openly and in his presence. according to him he asked the contractor to erect the walls. It is surprising that such a small tea stall owner would venture into putting up of boundary walls to a large area. It is most probable that the first defendant must have trespassed into the area somewhere in the year 1957 and the plaintiff company initiated criminal action at that time. ( 18 ) IT was contended that the entries in the Revenue Records are not proofs regarding title, and for this purpose a decision of the Supreme Court in Guru Amarjit Singh Vs. Rattan Chand and Others; JT 1993 (4) SC 536 was cited. The learned counsel also cited a few decisions to contend that the plaintiff has not produced the best evidence available with the plaintiff. We are of the view that there is no scope to apply these propositions in abstract without reference to the material on record. The plaintiff has shown that the entire plot in question was auctioned and subsequently there was a registered lease in favour of the plaintiff company. The plaintiff company also had made payments to Delhi Improvement Trust. The first defendant is in occupation of a small portion of the land running a tea stall by putting up a chappar. The remaining part of the land is vacant. In such a situation question of producing the so called best evidence to prove the possession by the plaintiff does not arise. The presumption has to be in favour of the plaintiff that the plaintiff obtained possession immediately after the lease was granted. The remaining part of the land is vacant. In such a situation question of producing the so called best evidence to prove the possession by the plaintiff does not arise. The presumption has to be in favour of the plaintiff that the plaintiff obtained possession immediately after the lease was granted. In a Metropolitan city like Delhi it is impossible for an owner of a vacant land to keep a constant vigil or watch over a vacant land and it may not take much time for any person to put up a chappar and occupy a portion of the land without the knowledge of the owner or the lessee of the vacant land. Having regard to the material on record we are of the view that the trial court was justified in rejecting the claim of the first defendant. The plaintiff had not lost its right to the possession of the land by virtue of any action on the part of the first defendant. The suit was rightly decreed by the trial court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs.