JUDGMENT Sudhir Narain, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 7-5-1990 releasing the disputed accommodation in favour of the landlord-respondents under section 21 (1-A) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the order dated 12th January, 1993 passed by respondent no. 1 affirming the order of the Prescribed Authority in appeal. 2. Respondents nos 3 to 8 are landlords of House No. 1/2, R. A. Bazar, Cantt. Bareilly. The petitioner is tenant of a part of the said house consisting of two rooms and bath, kitchen etc Respondents no. 3 to 6 filed an application for release of this accommodation against the petitioner under section 21 (1-A) of the Act on the allegation that Mohammad Yasin, respondent no. 6, was In Government service. He was employed in the department of Navy, Central Government, and his last posting was in Bombay where he retired on January 30, 1978, During the course of employment he was provided with Government accommodation for residential purpose. He was residing in public building at Block No. 1/6, Naval Navin Nagar, Colaba, Bombay which he had vacated on his retirement from the employment. He requested the petitioner to vacate the disputed premises for residential purpose of the family of respondent no. 6 but the petitioner had been avoiding to vacate the disputed accommodation on one pretext or the other. He does not own any other house for residential purpose of his family. The petitioner contested the application denying that the need of Mohammad Yasin, respondent no. 6, was bona fide and genuine. It was stated that Mohammad Yasin is residing at J. B. Road, Bombay after his retirement and has settled there He is employed in the British Airways after his retirement and does not require the disputed accommodation. The application filed by the landlord-respondents was not maintainable under section 21 (1-A) of the Act, The petitioner will suffer greater hardship in case the application is allowed. 3. The parties led evidence before the Prescribed Authority the Prescribed Authority recorded finding that Mohammad Yasin retired from service and he had no alternative accommodation. The application filed by the landlord-respondents was not maintainable under section 21 (1-A) of the Act, The petitioner will suffer greater hardship in case the application is allowed. 3. The parties led evidence before the Prescribed Authority the Prescribed Authority recorded finding that Mohammad Yasin retired from service and he had no alternative accommodation. He does not own other building except the disputed property and his need was bona fide and his application was liable to be allowed under the provisions of section 21 (1-A) of the Act. The petitioner filed an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court dismissed the appeal. The petitioner aggrieved against the said order has file this writ petition. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Mohammad Yasin was owner of House No. 31, R. A. Bazar and therefore he had an alternative accommodation. The application filed by him under section 2tl (1-A) of the Act was not maintainable as there are other buildings of which he is owner in possession. The petitioner had filed written statement and therein he never stated that Mohammad Yasin was owner in possession of House No. 31, R. A. Bazar. In paragraph 14 of the writ petition it was stated that House No. 31, R. A. Bazar is in exclusive possession of Mohammad Yasin and after his retirement he had kept some goods in a portion of House No. 311, R. A, Bazar. A counter affidavit has been filed by Sher Mohammad and he has denied that Mohammad Yasin is owner of House No. 31, R. A. Bazar. His father-in-law was owner but he never gifted to him. He is however, residing in a portion of that house The accommodation of the said house consisted of three rooms and there are twelve members of his family and the accommodation is insufficient even for him. 5. The petitioner had filed written statement and in paragraph 8 of the written statement he himself stated that Mohammad Yasin was residing at Bombay. Regarding House No. 31, R. A. Bazar he stated that the same is occupied by the tenant but Mohammad Yasin could get it vacated. Mohammad Yasin has denied that House No. 31, R. N. Bazar was orally gifted to him and in pursuance of the said gift he became owner of the property. 6. Regarding House No. 31, R. A. Bazar he stated that the same is occupied by the tenant but Mohammad Yasin could get it vacated. Mohammad Yasin has denied that House No. 31, R. N. Bazar was orally gifted to him and in pursuance of the said gift he became owner of the property. 6. From the evidence as led by the parties it was clear that Mohammad Yasin did not possess or own any other house in his own name except the disputed house. He was residing ait Bombay in a rented accommodation. In these circumstances provisions of section 21 (1-A) of the Act was fully applicable which provides that in case a landlord was in occupation of a public building for residential purpose which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment, the Prescribed Authority on the application of landlord in that behalf may order eviction of a tenant from any building under the tenancy. Mohammad Yasin was admittedly in Government service and he was in occupation of public building for residential purpose and had to vacate the same on account of the cessation of his employment. It has been further found that he has no other accommodation in his ownership. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that he is residing at Bombay at present in a rented accommodation. In Smt. Shakuntala Kapoor v. VII Addl. District Judge, 1992 AWC 1313, it has been held that bar of alternative accommodation for such a landlord can be considered only when the accommodation is situate within the same city where the disputed accommodation is situate. Firstly, the accommodation which Mohammad Yasin is occupying is situated in Bombay and not in Uttar Pradesh. Secondly, even assuming he is residing in a rented accommodation, that will not be a ground to reject the application filed by him on the grounds that he is residing at Bombay in a rented accommodation. He has to reside some where and if he has taken an accommodation on rent that will not deprive him from getting his own house on the ground that he is living in a tenanted accommodation. He had stated that he and his family members would reside in the disputed accommodation. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that Mst. He had stated that he and his family members would reside in the disputed accommodation. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that Mst. Sakina Begum was the owner of the property in dispute and she died in the year 1984 and it is only after her death, the property was inherited by her sous and daughters. Section 21 (1-A) of the Act was applicable only regarding the property which was in ownership at the time of his retirement i.e. on 30-1-1978. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is mis-conceived. 8. Section 21 (1-A) of the Act does not contemplate that a landlord can file an application for release under section 21 (1-A) of the Act with regard to such building of which he is owner at the time of his retirement. Admittedly Mst. Sakina Begum was mother of Mohammad Yasin, his brothers and sisters. Sakina Begum died in the year 1984. The landlord have stated in their application that they were requesting the petitioner to vacate the disputed accommodation but he was avoiding to vacate it on one pretext or the other. There is no limitation for filing an application under section 21 (1-A) of the Act. If a necessary condition laid under Section 21 (1-A) of the Act is satisfied, a landlord is entitled for an order of eviction against his tenant. It was urged that the petitioner had retired in the year 1978 and the application was filed by the landlord-respondent in the year 1989 which indicated that there was no bona fide need of Mohammad Yasin. He placed reliance upon the decision Nansa Ram v. S P. Pathak, AIR 1983 SC 1239 , in support of his contention that the application under Section 21 (1-A) of the Act was filed after many years of retirement. This case has no application to the facts of this case. In para 73 of the writ petition it is stated that Mst. Sakina Begum was the owner of the property in question. She had expired in the year 1984. The landlord-respondents inherited rights in the property after her death. In the application it has been stated that the landlords were requesting the petitioner to vacate the accommodation and he was avoiding to vacate it on one pretext or the other. Sakina Begum was the owner of the property in question. She had expired in the year 1984. The landlord-respondents inherited rights in the property after her death. In the application it has been stated that the landlords were requesting the petitioner to vacate the accommodation and he was avoiding to vacate it on one pretext or the other. The court has to consider the circumstances on the date the application under section 21 (1-A) of the Act was allowed. Respondents nos. 1 and 2 concurrently recorded findings that Mohammad Yasin is not owner of any other building in any part of India. In view of these facts it cannot be held that the application filed by Mohammad Yasin was not bona fide and his application was not maintainable under section 21 (1-A) of the Act. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that during the pendency of appeal the petitioner had filed an application for amendment of his written statement. By the amendment he sought to introduce a fact that Mohammad Yasin was still an employee and living in a quarter allotted to him and further his two sons are receiving education at Bombay. Respondent no. 1 did not pass any order on the said amendment application. The arguments were heard on the amendment application but instead of passing order on the amendment application the appeal was itself disposed of. The impugned order passed by respondent no. 1 indicates that ho had taken into consideration the application for amendment in the written statement filed by the petitioner and did not accept the same. In the amendment application the petitioner had only stated that Mohammad Yasin was employed at Bambay. He has nowhere stated that he was tin government service and was occupying any public building in pursuance of the employment given to him. The amendment sought in the written statement was thus hardly relevant 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he had filed certain letters written by Mohammad Yasin and his wife during the pendency of the appeal. The petitioner had not filed an application to accept these letters as additional evidence. Mohammad Yasin and his wife, Tara, filed affidavit stating that they had not written those letters which had been filed by the petitioner in appeal. Those documents were forged documents. The petitioner had not filed an application to accept these letters as additional evidence. Mohammad Yasin and his wife, Tara, filed affidavit stating that they had not written those letters which had been filed by the petitioner in appeal. Those documents were forged documents. The petitioner committed a fraud by forging the inland letters which were never written by them. The copy of the affidavit filed by Mohammad Yasin and his wife has been filed as Annexures-4 and 5 to the counter affidavit. In view of these facts, those letters could not be relied upon which were private documents alleged to have been written by Mohammed Yasin to his wife during the pendency of the appeal. Lastly, it was urged that the petitioner had filed application for amendment and thereafter 7th December, 1992 was fixed in the case. On that date the affidavits of rebuttal were served upon the petitioner by the landlord- respondents and the appellate court fixed 8th January, 1993 for arguments. On 8th January, 1993 arguments were heard only on the amendment application and not on merits of the appeal and 12th January, 1993 was fixed for orders. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that Respondent No. I wrongly observed in his order that the counsel for the parties were heard on merits. Learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a photostat copy of the order-sheet as Annexure-6 to the writ petition. The order dated 8th January, 1993 indicates that the arguments were heard and 12th January, 1993 was fixed for orders. The order-sheet does not indicate that arguments were heard only on the amendment application. The appellate authority has stated that he heard arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. The court does not say that the arguments were confined only to amendment application. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 p. 526, it was held that where there is misconception as to the concession made by the advocate appearing before the Court, it will not generally appear in the record, the party has to bring it before the court by way of an affidavit and this can only be done by way of review. Neither order-sheet maintained by respondent no. 1 nor the order of respondent no. 1 indicates that the arguments of learned counsel for the parties were confined to the amendment application. Neither order-sheet maintained by respondent no. 1 nor the order of respondent no. 1 indicates that the arguments of learned counsel for the parties were confined to the amendment application. The petitioner has already filed an application for review. The order cannot be set aside on the ground that no arguments were heard by the court on merits of the case. 12. In the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner is, however, granted four months time to vacate the disputed accommodation provided he gives a written undertaking within three weeks from today that he would vacate the disputed accommodation within four months from today and will hand over peaceful possession to the landlord respondents within the said period. 13. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.