RABIN BHATTACHARYYA, J. ( 1 ) R. Bhattacharyya, J.-A combined application under section 115 of the C. P. C. and also under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been directed by the aggrieved petitioner-Eastern India Motion Picture Association to dislodge the order being Order No. 33 dated 28. 4. 93, passed by the City Civil Court, 3rd Bench, Calcutta in Misc. Case No. 1338 of 1992. ( 2 ) IT will be unnecessary to make a full disclosure of the facts as there is no slim dispute between the parties regarding the factual exposure of the case centering round the revision. However, for appreciation, a brief synopsis of the case is highlighted. It is undisputed that the suitor and exhibitor of the feature films carrying on business under the name and style of "chaitali Cinema" at Bhangar Bazar, P. S. Bhangar, Dist.--South 24-Parganas. The suitor was constrained to file the above name Title Suit before the City Civil Court for declaration alongwith consequential reliefs among which the injunction was one. The learned court below restrained the petitioner-revisionist on the strength of an application preferred under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, read with section 151 of the C. P. C. , 1908 from blacklisting the suitor till the suitor was heard in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of the Association dated 31. 1. 1992. Since much could hovered around the litigation, the petitioner-revisionist as defendant for variation of the Order dated 31. 1. 1992, preferred an application under Order 39 Rule 4 of the C. P. C. It is uncontroverted that the order of ad interim injunction was made absolute. But the continuous action of the petitioner revisionist in blacklisting the suitor was not abated and kept its pecker up. The lone plea of the petitioner revisionist as defendant before the learned court below was that the suitor was a slave of successive violation of the rules and regulations of the Association which paved the way for blacklisting the suitor in accordance with its rules and Bye Laws. ( 3 ) THE learned court below after having a full scale hearing disposed of the matter when this revisional application for the desired relief. Mr. ( 3 ) THE learned court below after having a full scale hearing disposed of the matter when this revisional application for the desired relief. Mr. Subrata Datta, the learned Advocate, appearing for the petitioner-revisionist has assiduously aroued that the learned court below is denuded of power to adjudicate upon a dispute of this type as it is within the domain of the Bye-Laws of the Eastern India Motion Picture Association which alone could decide the controversy between the parties. In amplifying the submission he has canvassed with much labour and industry that the Civil Court is not a substitute for the Executive Committee of the E. I. M. P. A. Which according to the Bye-Laws is the authority competent as all decisions of Conciliation Board shall be subject to appeal to the Executive Committee. The Civil Court cannot explore power for according relief to any party whose case comes within the fold of Bye-Laws relating to disposal of disputes. ( 4 ) THE argument at the first blush seems to be attractive but when I taste the bottom of it, it is manifest that the argument is devoid of substance. The Bye Laws relating to disposal of disputes of E. I. M. P. A. do not even remotely suggest by its legion of clauses that a party if aggrieved by a decision of E. I. M. P. A. would be precluded from approaching the Court for exploring the relief. The inhibition about which Mr. Dutta being waxed eloquent is ill founded. ( 5 ) THE ouster of jurisdiction is given currency by Mr. Bhattacharjee for the O. P. cannot be readily inferred. It has been established by a catena of decisions that ouster of jurisdiction must be provided in the statute where cognizance is statutorily barred. Mr. Bhattacharjee even argued with much vehemence that Civil Court is not stripped of power to examine the prose dure followed by any domestic tribunal in adjudicating upon a dispute. As I have already indicated that approach to the Civil Court for relief has not been snapped of, its repetition in the argument will not advance the cause. ( 6 ) THEREFORE, I accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee and carrot share the submission of Mr. Subrata Datta for the petitioner-revisionist. The argument, therefore, fails. ( 7 ) MR. As I have already indicated that approach to the Civil Court for relief has not been snapped of, its repetition in the argument will not advance the cause. ( 6 ) THEREFORE, I accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee and carrot share the submission of Mr. Subrata Datta for the petitioner-revisionist. The argument, therefore, fails. ( 7 ) MR. Datta has next contended that it is within the power and reach of the petitioner-revisionist to blacklist an Exhibitor when he is foul of the rules, regulation or bye-laws of the E. LM. P. A. , the revisionist. The argument, in my view, does not gain any momentum. The petitioner revisionist in arguing the claim has made a confusing between the wood and the tree. The blacklisting is certainly a right enshrined in the Bye-Laws relating to disposal of disputes. But the same cannot be adhered to after giving a go by to the principle of audi alterim partem. It is worthy to note that the learned court below passed the ad interim order of injunction on 31. 1. 1992 which was subsequently made absolute. But it passes all comprehension to believe as to how the petitioner-revisionist passed the order of blacklisting on 1/3-2-1992 and 2. 9. 92. The revisionist simply disregarded the order of the Civil Court, although it had notice of the order of injunction. ( 8 ) MR. Datta in assailing the order has contended with much force that the order complained of was passed by the learned court below against all the provisions of the statute. The leaned Advocate went on arguing by way of substantiation of his claim that there was a complete non-application of mind as the court is not vested with power to give a direction to seek the permission of the court before further blacklisting the suitor. But this contention of Mr. Datta has been rebutted by Mr. Bhattacharjee on the ground that the domestic tribunal cannot usurp the power of the Civil Court, in particular, when the suit is pending before the Civil Court having had the power to pass a direction on any party for enforcement of its order. Mr. Datta could not enlighten me that the Civil Court is saddled with an obligation that the Bye-Laws of the E. LM. P. A. impose an insurmountable barrier for the Court to pass an order without skipping over the Bye-Laws. Mr. Datta could not enlighten me that the Civil Court is saddled with an obligation that the Bye-Laws of the E. LM. P. A. impose an insurmountable barrier for the Court to pass an order without skipping over the Bye-Laws. It is apposite to mention that the Bye-Laws maintain an unnatural silence about the power of the Civil Court. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Datta that there was no application of mind about the controversy in issue is a contention without any force. Section 115 of the C. P. C. is not attracted to the order complained of. Even if the proviso to section 115 does not remotely show that the order complained of, if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause any irreparable injury to the petitioner-revisionist. On the other hand, it is glaring that opportunity has been afforded by the learned court below to the petitioner-revisionist before any action is taken against the opposite patty dwelling on blacklisting by the reason of temporary injunction being still alive. The Court cannot take the role of silent spectator and see its order being frustrated by a party through a contrivance. The order impinged does not prove latently and patently that the Court had acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It is trite saying that if the subordinate court is possessed of jurisdiction and makes an order which does not suffer from want of jurisdiction or material irregularity, the High Court would be extremely slow to interfere with that order. The interference would be a travesty of justice. ( 9 ) THEREFORE, none of the contentions of Mr. Datta can be upheld and. therefore, all the contentions of Mr. Datta do not survive and, thus, rejected. For the foregoing reasons the contentions of Mr. Bhattacharjee survive. Accordingly, the revision is incompetent and is liable to be dismissed, but considering the circumstances without costs. Let Xerox copy of this judgment be delivered to learned Advocates for both the parties on their usual undertakings to apply for and obtain urgent certified copies. Revision fails.