Judgment :- P. S. MISHRA, J. Petitioner's son by name Subburu alias Subramani alias Subramaniyam, aged about 22 years, has been detained under section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Book-leggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982). It is said that the petitioner's son assaulted one Nagarajan, resulting in his death on 13-11-1992, along with some other persons, in which case, a charge-sheet has been filed on 15-2-1993 and the case has been committed for Sessions trial. On 22-4-1993, it is said, he (petitioner's son) and three others, kidnapped, wrongfully confined and assaulted Bhaskar, Sampath and Kumar and attempted to murder Bhaskar. A police case is registered for the said offences against him and other. On 28-7-1993 he get involved himself in yet another occurrence, which has been described as the ground case for detention by the respondents. At about 7 a.m. on that day, one Mohan and his brother Suresh were standing before their house and talking to one Shahul Hameed. At that time, the petitioner's son came with a pen knife and threatened them in filthy language saying in Tamil as follows : Vernacular Matter - Omitted. However, Mohan, Suresh and Shahul Hameed went inside the house due to fear. Petitioner's son chased them "and trespassed into their house and caused damage by breaking the Television set and Video Cassette Recorder kept inside the house. Thiru Mohan requested him to spare them; but Thiru Subburu caught hold of the neck of Thiru Mohan with his left hand and attempted to cause his death by attempting to stab him with a knife by saying "Verancular Matter - Omitted" but the stab fell on the right hand of Thiru Mohan and he sustained bleeding injury. Thiru Suresh and Thiru Shahul Hameed tried to catch Thiru Subburu. Immediately Thiru Subburu pushed down Thiru Mohan and threatened them by shouting in loud voice by saying "Vernacular Matter - Omitted" and ran out of the house. Thiru Subburu threatened the public, who had gathered outside the house. On seeing Thiru Subburu armed with knife and on seeing his strocious rowdy behaviour, the public became feared and ran away due to fear. Thiru Subburu threatened the public, who had gathered outside the house. On seeing Thiru Subburu armed with knife and on seeing his strocious rowdy behaviour, the public became feared and ran away due to fear. It is said thereafter that, "again Thiru Subburu threatened Thiru Mohan and other by shouting in a loud rowdy noise by saying "Vernacular Matter - Omitted". and left the place. Thiru Subburu has threatened the public that on his mere presence, the public became scared and due to this, a tense situation prevails in the area. Mohan is said to have given a report, on which, it is said that a case under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and other ancillary offences, has been registered. Petitioner's son was arrested by the Inspector of Police on the same day and the knife was recovered from him in the presence of two witnesses. He was produced before the Judicial Magistrate No. 5, Salem, on 28-7-1993 and was remanded in a Special Sub Jail a remand prisoner. 2. A bail petition, it is said, had been moved on behalf of the petitioner's son, which has, however, been dismissed by the Sessions Judge. In the order, the detaining authority has however said : "As a detaining authority, I am aware that Thiru Subburu alias Subramani alias Subramaniyam is now lodged in Special Sub-Jail, Salem, as a demand prisoner and he would be proceeded under the normal law. However, I am satisfied that his activities warrant his detention under the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982. The bail application dated 3-8-1993 by this Subburu alias Subramani alias Subramaniyam was dismissed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Salem on 5-8-93. There is imminent possibility that he may come out on bail by filing bail application in the higher court. If he comes out on bail he will indulge in further activities which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Further the recourse to normal criminal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and therefore, I consider there is a compelling necessity to prevent him from indulging in similar offences. It is therefore necessary to detain him in custody under Tamil Nadu Act 14/82, with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 3. It is therefore necessary to detain him in custody under Tamil Nadu Act 14/82, with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in T. Devaki v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1990 Cri LJ 1140 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1086 ), in which case, a person, who was charged of a solitary assault on one individual, was considered for detention under section 3(1) of Act 14 of 1982 and the judgments of this Court in Rajendran alias Giri v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991 LW (Crl) 582; S. Suresh Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991 LW (Crl) 463; Paul Pandi alias Erunakandan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1992 LW (Crl) 339 : (1992 Cri LJ 1394) and an unreported judgment in Kannan alias Kannappan alias Great Kannappan v. State of Tamil Nadu W.P. 16381 of 1990 judgment dated 27-2-1991 on the subject, to suggest and contend that 'public order' for the purpose of preventive detention law, must not always be quoted with every disturbance caused to the public at large, that there is some element of disturbance, as has been indicated in the pronouncements of the Court, caused to the public order by every violation of law even if such violation is directed against one or more individual but unless the violence is such that it would have created alarm of a kind, which affects the even-flow of life, it will not attract the 'public order' clause of the Act of a goonda for his detention under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has however drawn our attention to the two judgments of the Supreme Court, one in the case of Victoria Fernandez v. Laimal Swama, AIR 1992 SC 687 : (1992 Cri LJ 702) and the other in the case of Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1992 SC 979 : (1992 Cri LJ 769) to suggest and contend that there may not be any departure from the distinction between the areas of 'public order' and 'law and order' in the various judgments of the Courts, including the Supreme Court, but it has to be applied on the facts of each case to examine whether the Court will find any fault with the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on its own estimation of the potentiality of the act of violence of the detenu to justify his detention for the reason that his activities would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. If we borrow the words from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Victoria Fernandez, AIR 1992 SC 687 : (1992 Cri LJ 702), the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has to be understood as follows : "The distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been explained by this Court time and again. It has been pointed out that while the expression 'Law and order' is wider in scope in as much as contravention of law always affects order, while 'public order' has a narrower ambit and 'public order' would be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public Order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of degree and extent of the teach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a new individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise the problem of law and order only. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a new individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise the problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order'. The question to ask is does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed ? This question has to be faced in every case on its facts (See Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, 1966 1 SCR 709 ; AIR 1966 SC 740 ) : (1966 Cri LJ 608); Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCR 288 ; AIR 1970 SC 1228 : (1970 Cri LJ 1136); Ram Ranjan Chaterjee v. State of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCR 143, AIR 1977 SC 1304 : (1977 Cri LJ 814); Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Adm., (1982) 2 SCC 403 ; AIR 1982 SC 1143 : (1982 Cri LJ 1191). 4. The above is the view that has been reiterated in the judgments of this Court in Paul Pandi's case 1992 LW (Crl) 339 : (1992 Cri LJ 1394); S. Subhash Babu's case 1991 LW (Crl) 463 and Rajendran's case 1991 LW (Crl) 582. In the unreported judgment of this Court in Kannan v. State of Tamil Nadu W.P. No. 16381 of 1990 order dated 27-2-1991, it is said as follows : "In catena of decisions, this Court as well as the Supreme Court has held and pointed out that every disorder is not disturbance to public order. The statement of law in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 by the Supreme Court has been so often quoted and repeated by the Courts that it will be difficult for any person to support that this approach of the Court is not known. Detaining authority, in particular, is expected to know when to take recourse to preventive detention law as an exception to the guarantee of freedom under Article 21 of the Constitution of India read with Article 22(1) and (2) thereof .... Detaining authority, in particular, is expected to know when to take recourse to preventive detention law as an exception to the guarantee of freedom under Article 21 of the Constitution of India read with Article 22(1) and (2) thereof .... The said statement of law once again been repeated by the Supreme Court in T. Devaki's case AIR 1990 SC 1086 . It is case, in our opinion in which, before deciding to detain the petitioner, the detaining authority could have bestowed some more considerations to this aspect of the law ...." In Harpreet Kaur's case AIR 1992 SC 979 : (1992 Cri LJ 769), the Supreme Court has dealt with a case of a bootlegger, who, in furtherance of his activities and to escape from the clutches of law, tried to run over, by his speeding vehicle, the police party, which tried to signal him to stop, exhorting all the time that he would ill anyone who would come in his way and he continued to drive in a reckless speed and dashed against a pedestrian causing injuries to him, where again, he exhorted that anyone who would come in his way would meet his death. Four witnesses, who agreed to give statements to the police on condition of anonymity, clearly stated that they would not depose against the detenu for fear of retaliation as the detenu had threatened to do away with anyone who would depose against him. The Supreme Court, on that basis, without for a moment entertaining any idea other than the above principles of law, as stated in the aforementioned case and various other cases, including the Constitutional Bench judgment in the case of Madhu Limaye AIR 1971 SC 2486 : (1971 Cri LJ 1720), has said that the activities of the detenu, therefore, were not merely bootlegging but went further to adversely affect the even-tempo of the society by creating a feeling of insecurity among those, who were likely to depose against him, as also the law enforcement agencies. 5. Besides the above cases, in yet another case of Kamalabai v. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur, 1993 SCC (Crl) 913 : (1992 Cri LJ 561), the Supreme Court has taken note of the attack by the detenu and others on the police party and said : "We cannot say that this is a stray act affecting law and order. 5. Besides the above cases, in yet another case of Kamalabai v. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur, 1993 SCC (Crl) 913 : (1992 Cri LJ 561), the Supreme Court has taken note of the attack by the detenu and others on the police party and said : "We cannot say that this is a stray act affecting law and order. Catching hold of a Sub-Inspector and threatening him in a public place like that naturally would have created panic in the locality. We cannot say that the ground has no nexus to the public order." 6. In the light of the principles of law, as above as pointed out by the Supreme Court, we have to approach the instant case by posing to ourselves, whether the detaining authority has asked the question. Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community, so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual living, or the tranquillity of the society disturbed or alternatively, whether he has kept in mind the distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' which is one of degree and extent and the reach of the act in question on society. We have seen in the grounds of detention the antecedents of the petitioner's son, who once in November, 1992, has allegedly committed homicide and in April, 1993, caused damage to one person and assaulted at least two others. He has been alleged to have committed the act of assaulting Mohan, when he was standing at the door of his house along with his brother and was talking to one Shahul Hameed, a friend of his. The assault by the detenu has been described as an act intended to kill Mohan, but the injury was by a pen knife and in the hand of the victim. 7. Those, who are responsible for the maintenance of law and order and who are primarily concerned with maintaining the even-tempo of the life of the people in the State as well as in different localities of the State can no doubt find themselves concerned with the activities of a person like the son of the petitioner, who appears to have little regard for the order of the society, and who can kill another person without any provocation and/or without any concern for the life of another. This concern of the law enforcing authorities can be appreciated by taking notice of the fact that any disturbance in the even tempo of life in any locality is focussed directly on them and they alone take the blame of the activities of anti-social elements. The Detaining Authority as well as the State Government, however, are charged not only with the responsibility of making the law enforcing agencies effective and ensure that there is no disturbance of the public order, but also of ensuring the guarantees to the individuals under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and see that the preventive detention law is not abused as a substitute for the laws, which deal with the individual crimes and every opportunity is afforded to the accused to defend himself, both on facts as well as on law. The task given to them is not easy. The dividing line, as we have noticed above, between the acts, which remain within the realm of 'law and order' and do not go beyond to affect the even tempo of life and the acts, which affect the even tempo of life, is very thin and the person, who has to deliver instant orders of detention of a person leading to deprivation of his liberty without trial and branding him as a goonda for even, is required to be ever vigilant and conscious of his duty to, on the one hand, prevent unlawful activities of the goondas, which affect the even flow of life and, on the other hand, that the individual should be left to be dealt with in the court of ordinary procedural law, so that he is not deprived of his personal liberty, save in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 8. 8. Keeping that concern in our view, when we approach the subject in the instant case and see the acts of the detenu, we are inclined to go by the view expressed in Devaki's case 1990 Cri LJ 1140 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1086 ); Rajendran's case 1991 LW (Crl) 582; Suresh Babu's case 1991 LW (Crl) 463; Paul Pandi's case (1992) LW (Crl) 339 : (1992 Cri LJ 1394) and Kannan's case W.P. No. 16381 of 1990 order dated 27-2-1991 and hold that the petitioner's son is not one, who can be said to have committed such act, which has created disturbance to the even tempo of life to the extent that the ordinary law of the land cannot effectively take care of his activities. 9. For the reasons, as above, we are inclined to interfere with the detention of the son of the petitioner and accordingly quash the order in C.M.P. No. 152/GOONDAS/93 (C2) dated 10-8-1993 on the file of the 2nd respondent and direct the respondents to release the petitioner's son Subburu alias Subramani alias Subramaniyam forthwith, if not wanted in connection with any other case. Petition allowed.