JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners against the order of the Board of Revenue dated August 5, 1989. 2. The facts of the case are that a suit under Section 13 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, was filed by the respondent No. 3 Daya Ram for possession and redemption of mortgaged land in the court of Asstt. Collector, Sambhar Lake, wherein 7 issues were framed. Ultimately, the suit was dismissed by the trial court and it was held that the plaintiff failed to prove tenancy rights in his favour nor has proved the mortgage and therefore is not entitled for possession. 3. The plaintiff had claimed that the land was given to the petitioner-defendants by way of mortgage deed dated May 22, 1954 for a sum- of Rs. 701/- and they have refused to hand over the possession thereof even when the money was sent on May 28, 1960 through Madho Ram and Jeevan. The trial court also found that the defendants were having the possession since 1944 and, therefore, on the basis of adverse possession they are entitled to continue in possession and the suit was accordingly dismissed. 4. An appeal was preferred against the order of the trial court dismissing the suit before the Revenue Appellate Authority by the respondents Nos. 3 & 4 and the Revenue Appellate Authority vide its order dated November 19, 1985 reversed the order of the trial court. The plaintiff was held khatedar tenant on the basis of entries in revenue record. The fact of mortgage was admitted and after expiry of period of mortgage of ten years the defendants were held trespassers. Against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority a second appeal was preferred under Section 244 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the fact of mortgage was denied. The Board of Revenue observed that though the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority was very 'laconic, but the conclusion arrived at by it is supportable on law and it has discussed the issues on which the finding was given by the trial court. It was found that the defendants had admitted in their statements given on December 27, 1967 before the Sub Divisional Officer that the land in question was received by them by way of mortgage. It was found that the defendants had admitted in their statements given on December 27, 1967 before the Sub Divisional Officer that the land in question was received by them by way of mortgage. The order of the Settlement Officer dated May 8, 1958 in which this fact has been recorded was also taken into consideration. The Board of Revenue has also taken another fact that the mortgage deed was verified on May 12, 1954 and thereafter on June 25, 1954 an application was submitted by the defendants in which the fact of mortgage was admitted. The file of the Asset. Settlement Officer and various other documents were also taken into consideration and the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority was upheld. 5. Before us, learned counsel for the petitioners has raised the following arguments - Firstly, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners were in possession since 1944 and, therefore, on the basis of adverse possession they are entitled to continue in possession and as such they have acquired khatedari rights. It is also submitted that the fact that the petitioners were in possession has been admitted by the plaintiff in his statement. We have considered over this point. The trial court has mentioned that the petitioners are in possession since 1944. to 1952 and thereafter from 1954 till date. In the plaint submitted by the plaintiff it is mentioned that the land was mortgaged on May 22, 1954. In the reply submitted by the petitioners it is mentioned that they were in possession prior to Smvt. year 2012. Even if the reply of the petitioners is taken to be true, the Smvt. Year 2012 corresponds, to the year 1958. A reference has been made by the Board of Revenue, of revenue.record of settlement department of jamabandi of Smvt. years 2011 to 2030 from which it is evident that the respondent was a tenant. There is no document on the basis of which it could be found that the petitioners were in possession since 1944. To be in possession prior to 1958 does not mean that the petitioners Were in possession since 1944. The statement of the plaintiff that he has cultivated the land with Bhairu and Ramu jointly for 10 to 12 years does not mean that the petitioners was in possession continuously since 1944. To be in possession prior to 1958 does not mean that the petitioners Were in possession since 1944. The statement of the plaintiff that he has cultivated the land with Bhairu and Ramu jointly for 10 to 12 years does not mean that the petitioners was in possession continuously since 1944. The Board of Revenue has rightly come to the conclusion that the claim of the petitioners was based on a mortgage deed dated March 22, 1954. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners has no substance. 6. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that it was the burden of the plaintiff to prove the execution of the mortgage deed and the Board of Revenue as well as the Revenue Appellate Authority have not considered this aspect of the matter. Various documents which have been taken into consideration by the Board of Revenue including the admission of the petitioners, endorsement on Annr. R3/1, application submitted on June 24, 1954 and the order passed by the Asstt. Settlement Officer was sufficient to come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have been able to establish their claim by sufficient evidence on record that the land was mortgaged by the respondents and the petitioners have admitted themselves as mortgagee. If the claim was made by the plaintiff that the land was has been given to the petitioners by way of mortgage and the Revenue Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that it was on the basis of mortgage deed alone that they were in possession of the land in question and prior to the mortgage deed came to be executed there was no document in support of the petitioners. On the basis of the admission of the petitioner that he received the land by way of mortgage, the burden which was on the plaintiff stands discharged. 7. The next question which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in that the mortgage deed is inadmissible in evidence as it was not produced in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act and it was not proved even. This matter has also been taken into consideration by the Board of Revenue and it was found that the petitioner himself has admitted to have executed the mortgage deed. The fact of execution of the mortgage deed was admitted before the Asstt. This matter has also been taken into consideration by the Board of Revenue and it was found that the petitioner himself has admitted to have executed the mortgage deed. The fact of execution of the mortgage deed was admitted before the Asstt. Settlement Officer and also from the copy of Annex. R.3/1 it is evident that the petitioner has admitted the fact of execution of the mortgage deed. If a particular document was not available with the plaintiffs they are entitled to call for the file. It is not for this court to see as to how the file reached to the trial court. The fact has duly been mentioned that the file of the settlement was called for in which the original mortgage deed was existing and therefore it cannot be said that the mortgage deed has not been proved. Ramu in the statement dated December 27, 1957 has admitted the fact of execution of the mortgage deed before the Asstt. Settlement Officer and the fact is mentioned in the order dated May 8, 1958. In the application dated June 25, 1954 the petitioner has admitted execution to mortgage deed. With regard to the procedure which was required to be followed even under the Evidence Act for proving a document, from the judgments of the Board of Revenue it appears that this objection was not taken there that it was not proved in accordance with law, hence ;a not be considered here. This objection has also no force. 8. It has also been submitted that in accordance with the provisions of Section 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, the petitioners have acquired khatedari rights as they were sub-tenants. The finding of the Board of Revenue is that moment a mortgage deed is executed the relationship of sub-tenants, if any, come to end on the date, the mortgage deed was executed. The provisions of Section 19 of the Tenancy Act could not have been invoked and no assistance from the provisions of Section 19 of the Tenancy Act can be taken. The Board of Revenue has not committed any illegality in taking this view. This point has also no substance. 9. It has further been submitted that the suit should have been filed under Section 183 because the petitioners were trespassers. This contention too has no force. The Board of Revenue has not committed any illegality in taking this view. This point has also no substance. 9. It has further been submitted that the suit should have been filed under Section 183 because the petitioners were trespassers. This contention too has no force. The land was received by the petitioners by way of mortgage and therefore provisions of Section 43 of the Tenancy Act were applicable and not the provisions of Section 183. This contention also has no force. 10. It has also been submitted that since the petitioner failed to prove mortgage even on that ground the suit should have been filed under Section 183, The factum of mortgage stood proved from the documents before the Board of Revenue and this contention has also no force. 11. It has been submitted that since the mortgage deed is unregistered document no reliance can be placed on such a document. We do not find any force in this argument. An unregistered document can be relied upon and it is only for certain purposes that it cannot be considered to have been executed. The mortgage deed, a copy of which has been submitted in this court, is duly verified and attested. Even if it in not registered, the Board of Revenue was justified to come to the conclusion that the land was given on mortgage on the basis of admission of the petitioner. 12. No other point was pressed. There is no illegality or irregularity committed by the Board of Revenue requiring interference by this court in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction. The findings which have been given are of facts and this court is not sitting in appeal against the order of the Board of Revenue. 13. Consequently, the writ petition fails and it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed *******