Judgment :- 1. Appellants were plaintiffs 2 and 3 While respondents were defendants, 1, 2 and 4 to 12 in the suit. 2. Appellants, along with two others, namely plaintiffs 1 and 4 for themselves and on behalf of Vania Chettiars Community people residing at Ramanathapuram Town, filed the suit in O.S. No. 43 of 1983 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ramanathapuram at Madurai for removal of the defendants from the trusteeship and for framing of a scheme, contending that the suit trust is a public one. 3. The suit originally as framed has been instituted against defendants 1 to 9 and during the pendency of the suit, third defendant died and in is place, his legal representatives-defendants 10 to 12 have been impleaded. 4. Defendants, on the other hand, resisted the suit contending that the trust had been founded by the great-grandfather of defendants 1 to 3 and the suit trust had been administered by them hereditarily for a century past and has been accepted by the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department. 5. The trial Court, on consideration of the materials placed, decreed the suit as prayed for by judgment dated 30th April 1987, posting the case for filing of a draft scheme on 1.7.1987. 6. The aggrieved defendants filed appeal in A.S. No. 56 of 1988 on the file of District Court, Ramanathapuram at Madurai. The lower Appellate Court, on consideration of the materials, however, reversed the judgment of the trial Court, by allowing the appeal, and dismissed the suit with costs. While doing so, it accepted the contention of the defendants and recorded a finding that it was a private trust, hitherto hereditarily administrated by them since its constitution. Recording such a finding, it also further recorded a finding that even assuming that the trust in question was a public trust, sanction as contemplated under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, had not been obtained before ever the suit was filed and therefore, the suit deserved dismissal, even on such a ground. 7. Aggrieved by the said Judgment and decree, plaintiffs 2 and 3 came forward with the present action. 8. Appellants also filed CMP. Nos. 7. Aggrieved by the said Judgment and decree, plaintiffs 2 and 3 came forward with the present action. 8. Appellants also filed CMP. Nos. 11256 and 14767 of 1992, the former one for a direction to the respondents-defendants to render accounts relating to the suit trust from 26.7.1979, date of plaint till disposal of the Second Appeal and the latter one filed under O. 23, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking permission to withdraw the present suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. 9. Notice was, however, ordered in the Latter CMP by a learned Judge of this Court on 2.2.1993. On service thereof, defendants entered appearance through Mr. P. Gopalan, learned counsel. 10. Arguments of either learned Counsel were heard. 11. The construction and interpretation of the salient provisions adumbrated under Sub-Section (2) of S. 107 and O. 23, R. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by superior Courts of jurisdiction, resulted in a settled proposition of law that the appellate Court, at any stage of the proceedings, can exercise its power, as that of the original Court of jurisdiction or court of first instance in the matter of granting permission for withdrawal of the suit. The fact that such a power is there does not necessarily mean that such a power is capable of being exercised in all eventualities and situations. But, it can definitely be exercised, if judicial discretion so warrants. If the suit had been dismissed on some technical ground, say for instance, want of notice and so on and so forth and the same being agitated further by way of first or second appeal and in such an eventuality, if permission is prayed for, for the withdrawal of the suit, the Court has to necessarily, use its discretion in a judicious way, in a bid to render justice to the parties and allow withdrawal as prayed for, if need be. On the other hand, if the suit had been dismissed, giving a finding on facts and such a finding not appearing to be perverse on the face of it and without setting aside such finding, permission prayed for, for withdrawal, if granted, would lead to a precarious and predicament situation, in the sense of depriving the very valuable right operating as res judicata which had already accrued and vested in favour of the other side, namely, defendants. 12. 12. In the case on hand, it is not as if the suit had been dismissed on a technical ground of want sanction under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure alone. As adverted to earlier, the suit has been dismissed by the lower appellate Court on the other ground by recording a finding that the suit trust is a private one, founded by the forefathers of defendants 1 to 3 hitherto hereditarily administered by them, ever since the inception. Such a finding as given by the lower appellate Court, cannot at all, in the facts and circumstances of the case, be stated to be perverse, though it is a reversing one. The lower appellate Court had taken into consideration the relevant materials, in the best of fashion possible, as revealed by its Judgment, without giving any room that such a finding is the resultant product of mis-or-malappreciation thereof, calling for interference. Further, there is no question of law, much less substantial question of law arising for consideration in this Second Appeal. 13. For the reasons as above, the Second Appeal as well as both CMPs deserve dismissal and they are accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.