JUDGMENT Sudhir Narayan 1. THIS writ petition is directed against the order dated 18th August 1993, passed by respondent no. 1, releasing the disputed premises in favour of landlord-respondents 3 and 4 and the order of respondent no. 1 dated 18th August, 1993, rejecting the revision preferred by the petitioner against the allotment order in favour of respondent no. 5. 2. THE facts in brief are that respondents 3 and 4 are owners and landlords of house no. 450, Begam Bagh, Meerut. THE disputed premises consisting of ground floor and first floor was under the tenancy of one Aman Singh Attray, Advocate, Meerut. Sri Attray had already constructed his own bouse in Saket Meerut. After the construction of the house by him proceedings under section 12 U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) started. Various persons filed allotment applications including Mahendra Singh Tyagi, Advocate, P. N. Sharma and the petitioner. On 16th July 1973 the Rent Central and Eviction Officer declared the house as vacant. On 30th August 1974 he allotted the disputed premises in favour of Sri P. N. Sharma. He, however, after allotment could obtain possession only of first floor of the premises. Sri Mahendra Singh Tyagi filed revision against the said order before the District Judge and his revision was dismissed on 25th July 1976. He filed writ petition No. 1568 of 1976 against the allotment order dated 30th August 1974 and the order passed in revision., During the pendency of writ petition further development took place. As Sri P. N. Sharma obtained possession of only first floor of the disputed premises and could not secure possession of ground floor which was also allotted to him, separate application were again filed for allotted of the ground floor. On 12-4-1978 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer held that ground floor should be again declared as vacant as there was actual vacancy. The landlord respondents 3 and 4 filed application for release of the said accommodation. The petitioner filed application for allotment. On 20th May 1978 the release application filed by the landlords was rejected and on the same day he passed allotment order in favour of the petitioner and immediately after the allotment order was passed he secured possesion of the ground floor of the disputed premises on the same day. The petitioner filed application for allotment. On 20th May 1978 the release application filed by the landlords was rejected and on the same day he passed allotment order in favour of the petitioner and immediately after the allotment order was passed he secured possesion of the ground floor of the disputed premises on the same day. Landlords filed two revisions, one against the order rejecting their release application and another against the allotment order. Sri P. N. Sharma also filed a revision against the order dated 12th April 1976 declaring ground floor portion of the premises in dispute again as vacant when the same had already been allotted in his favour on 30-8-1974 after holding that it as vacant. 3. ON 17-11-1978 this Court allowed the writ petition and the allotment order passed in favour of Sri P. N. Sharma on 30th August 1974 and quashed. The Rent Central and Eviction Office was directed to consider the question of allotment afresh in accordance with law. After the decision of the High Court in the writ petition the revision filed by the landlords against the order dated 20th May 1973, rejecting their application for release and the order of allotment passed in favour of the petitioner and the revision of Sri P. N. Sharma filed against the order of the declaration of vacancy came up for consideration before the IVth Additional District Judge, Meerut. The revision filed by the landlords was dismissed tut the revision filed by Sri P. N. Sharma was allowed. The allotment order dated 20th May 1978 was set aside. The revisional Court took the view that the order of Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 12th April 1978 declaring the ground floor portion of the disputed premises as vacant was erroneous as the premises had already been allotted in favour of Sri P. N. Sharma and the house had already been declared as vacant on 16th July 1973. The entire proceedings for release or allotment were vitiated. It was, however, made clear that the landlords can apply afresh for release of the house in their favour. The entire proceedings for release or allotment were vitiated. It was, however, made clear that the landlords can apply afresh for release of the house in their favour. The allotment order made in favour of Sri P. N. Sharma had already been set aside by the High Court but in case the judgment of the High Court is set aside in appeal filed by Sri P. N. Sharma, he shall continue to be a tenant of the premises in question. The Special Leave Petition filed by Sri P. N. Sharma in the Supreme Court was dismissed on 6th August 1979. 4. RESPONDENTS 3 and 4 filed release application afresh before the Rent Control and Eviction officer on the ground that wife of respondent no 3 requires the disputed premises for establishing a Nursery School. The petitioner filed objection against the said application One Sarju Prasad Tyagi who was Member of Legislative Council, filed application allotment of the disputed accommodation. Oil 6-10-1981, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application filed by respondents 3 and 4 for release of the disputed accommodation and on the same day he passed an order of allotment in favour of Sri Sarju Prasad Tyagi. The landlords filed revision against the order rejecting their application for release and the petitioner filed revision against the order allotting the disputed premises in favour of Sri Sarju Prasad Tyagi. Respondent no. 1 allowed the revision of the landlords by order dated 12th August 1983 and released the disputed accommodation in their favour. The revision filed by the petitioner was dismissed. The petitioner has challenged these orders in this writ petition. I have heard Sri K. R. Sirohi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sushii Harkauli, learned counsel for the respondents at length. 5. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner raise various legal and factual questions challenging the order passed by respondent no. 1. 1 am dealing with all these points in seriatim. 6. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had rejected the release application filed by the landlords and the revising authority under section 18 of the Act had no jurisdiction to release the disputed accommodation in their favour and at the most it could have remanded the matter for re consideration by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. This question has already been considered by this Court in several decisions and it has been held that there is no bar that the Revising Authority itself on finding that the need of the landlord is bonafide, instead of remanding the matter can pass an order for release in favour of the landlord. In Lokesh Kumar Dwivedii v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Lucknow. 1981 ARC (Short Notes of Cases 56) 34, it was held that where a revision is filed by a landlord against an order refusing to release the disputed accommodation and allotting it to some other person, the revising authority can pass an order setting aside allotment order and releasing the accommodation in landlords' favour. In P. C. Tripathi v. Ist Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1983 (1) ARC 58, the Court held that the revising authority while rescinding the final order made under sub-section (1) of section 18 of the Act has a power to pass an order releasing the disputed property in favour of the landlord. The words "rescind the final order" does not confine itself to remand the matter after an order passed by the District Magistrate under section 16 of the Act is set aside. The revising authority may itself after setting aside the order of the District Magistrate passed by him under section 16 (1) of the Act, can pass a final order or release in favour of the landlord. The same view was taken by Honourable N. D. Ojha, J. in Himmat Bahadur Singh v. XIIth Addl. District Judge, Kanpur, 1984 (I) ARC 433. 7. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision in Umesh Chandra v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Aligarh, 1979 AIRCJ 286. In that case the Court held that the Additional District Judge had not recorded any finding that the need of the landlord was bona fide and in absence of any such finding he could not have, in revision, set aside the order of Rent Control and Eviction Officer and release the property in his favour and an observation was also made that section 18 of the Act, under which the revision is filed against the order of Rent Control and Eviction Officer, does not give jurisdiction to revising authority to pass an order of release itself. The observation in the said case was obiter in as much as the Court had already come to the conclusion that the revising authority had not recorded any finding that the need of due landlord was bonafide. The subsequent decisions, referred to above, have considered the provisions of the Act and given the reasons which permits the Revising Authority to pass an order of release while setting aside the order of Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 8. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that those decisions require re-consideration as certain points were not taken into consideration. It is necessary to reproduce sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Act which reads as under : "(2) Where a part of a building is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, or is released on his favour under clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 16 for residential purposes, the allotment of the remaining part thereof under clause (a) of the said sub-section (1) shall be made in favour of a person nominated by the landlord Explanation. -Where a building in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes adjourns (whether horizontally or vertically) the building sought to be allotted, and- (a) there is a common entrance to or a common passage for both the buildings ; or (b) the two buildings share the sanitary conveniences or other amenities (not including electric connection) ; the notwithstanding that the two buildings are independently fit for residential purposes, they shall be deemed to be part of each other for the purpose of this sub-section. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the word 'or' in between the words 'rescind the final order made under sub-section (1) 'may remand the case to the District Magistrate' the word 'or' should be read as and because after rescinding the final order he can only pass an order of remand. The word 'or' should be read only as 'and'. This interpretation cannot be accepted. Unless under the context of the Statute, the Court is obliged to read the word 'or' as 'and' in a statute, the Court should accept the words used in the provisions itself. It is only while giving effect to legislative intent, the Court some times rends the word 'or' as conjunctive and vice versa for the word 'and' as 'or'. Unless under the context of the Statute, the Court is obliged to read the word 'or' as 'and' in a statute, the Court should accept the words used in the provisions itself. It is only while giving effect to legislative intent, the Court some times rends the word 'or' as conjunctive and vice versa for the word 'and' as 'or'. It is only to carry out the intention of the legislature in a given provision. The broad principle has been enumerated in G. P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation page 273 (Fifth Edition).- "Generally speaking, a distinction may be made between positive and negative conditions prescribed by statute for acquiring a right or benefit. Positive conditions separated by 'or' are read in the alternative but negative conditions connected by 'or' are construed as cumulative and 'or' is read as 'nor' or 'and'." There is no reason to read word 'or' as 'or' and 'and' under sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Act as suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner. After rescinding order passed by the District Magistrate, the revising authority may rescind the order and can pass final order or it may remand the case. It is not obliged to remand the case to the District Magistrate. It can itself pass the final order. This is further clear from the Explanation added to sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Act. The Explanation provides that the power to rescind the final order under the sub-section shall not include to pass an allotment order or direct passing of an allotment order in favour of a person different from the allottee mentioned in the order under revision. If the intention of the legislature was clear that the revising authority itself cannot have any power to release the property in question, it could have also been made clear under the said Explanation. The purpose of adding the Explanation to sub-section (2) of 'the Act is clear. The question of release of the property in between the District Magistrate and the landlord while in the case of consideration of allotment applications the matter is between the landlord and' the various prospective allottees who may be more than one and In that case, the need has to be considered of the various prospective allottees. This view was also taken in P. G. Tripathi's case (supra). 9. This view was also taken in P. G. Tripathi's case (supra). 9. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that Explanation added to a section does not enlarge the ambit of the section. He placed reliance upon S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabhiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582 , wherein it was held that an Explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term but has the plain meaning of the word and Itself shows that it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in a statutory provision. The similar view was expressed in Bhita Cooperative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Behar, AIR 1967 SC 389 . This legal position is well settled but it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and the Court can look into the purpose for which the Explanation was added to the section, vide D. G. Mahajan v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1977 SC 915 and M/s. Keshav Ji Rao Ji and Co. v. I. T. Commissioner, AIR 1991 SC 1806 . 10. THERE is one more reason to come to the conclusion that the revising authority itself has power to pass a final order of release while rescinding the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under section 16 (1) of the Act. Section 19 of the Act confers power of re-allotment in the event of landlord abusing the release order. Prior to amending U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 it referred to section 16 of the Act but after amendment the words 'revision under section 18' was inserted. This disclosed the legislative intent that unless there is power of release under section 18 of the Act by the revising authority this could not have been added under section 19 of the Act. This view was also expressed in the case of Lokesh Kumar Dwivedi (supra). The analysis of the various provisions of the Act clearly indicates that the revising authority has power to pass a final order of release instead of remanding the matter to the District Magistrate under section 16 of the Act. This view was also expressed in the case of Lokesh Kumar Dwivedi (supra). The analysis of the various provisions of the Act clearly indicates that the revising authority has power to pass a final order of release instead of remanding the matter to the District Magistrate under section 16 of the Act. In case the Court finds that the order passed by the subordinate authority is manifestly illegal and comes to the conclusion that the need of the landlord is bonafide as contemplated under section 16 02) of the Act, it should normally avoid remanding the matter. The Court should be slow to remand a matter in a protracted litigation In Bechan Pandey.v. Dulahin Janki Devi, AIR 1976 SC 866 , it was held that the Court should be loath to entertain a plea which would have the effect of condemning succeeding generation of the facilities to spend major part of their lives in protracted litigation. In Smt Jugla Devi v. Ist Additional District Judge, 1985 (I) ARC 450, the Court depricated the practice: of remanding the matter and held that when the evidence was on the record the revising authority should decide the case by applying its mind to such evidence instead of remanding it for decision by Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It may be noted that sub-Rule (4) of Rule 13 of the Rules framed under the Act provides that release application under section 16 (1) (b) of the Act stall, as far as possible, be decided within one month from the date of its presentation but in practice there is hardly any case which is decided within one month. On the other, hand, in many cases the dates are fixed after a month. In case the revising authority again remands the case, the application for release filed by the landlord will again take more time for decision of the application. In case there is bonafide need of the landlord he shall be deprived of from occupying the accommodation for long time and will be spending his time in litigation. Considering this aspect unless there are reasons to remand, the revising authority should apply its own mind to the facts of each case and if finds that the order of release can be passed in accordance with law, it should be slow to remand the matter to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 11. Considering this aspect unless there are reasons to remand, the revising authority should apply its own mind to the facts of each case and if finds that the order of release can be passed in accordance with law, it should be slow to remand the matter to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 11. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner next submitted that respondent no. 1 acted illegally in appointing a Commissioner to make local inspection during the pendency of the revision. This contention of the petitioner is untenable in view of the powers conferred on revising authority under section 34 of the Act which confers power an revising authority not only for the purpose of holding an inquiry but also on hearing any appeal or revision under the Act to exercise such powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of the matters enumerated under section 34 of the Act. One of such powers is of inspecting a building or its locality or issuing commission for examination of the witnesses or documents or local investigation under section 34 (1) (c) of the Act. The scope of such powers has been considered in Kishori Lal Shah v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Nainital, 1991 (2) ARC 297. Besides the revising authority has power to take additional evidence and to consider such evidence while hearing the revision under section 18 of the Act. See Radhey Shyarn v. Additional District Judge. Unnao, 1984 (2) ARC 404, and Uma Shankar v. A.D.J. Kanpur, 1990 (1) ARC 201. 12. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner then urged that the powers of revising authority under section 18 of the Act are very limited and it has no jurisdiction to record its own finding on the question of the bonafide need. The scope of revision is in pari materia with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He placed reliance upon the decision Shaik Jaffar v. Mohd. Pasha, AIR 1975 SC 794 , Rajbir Kaur v. M/s. Chokosiri and Co, AIR 1988 SC 1845 , Abdul Razzaq v. XIIIth Addl. District Judge Kanpur, 1985 (1) ARC 407 and Chhidda Singh v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Mathura, 1970 ARC 47. He placed reliance upon the decision Shaik Jaffar v. Mohd. Pasha, AIR 1975 SC 794 , Rajbir Kaur v. M/s. Chokosiri and Co, AIR 1988 SC 1845 , Abdul Razzaq v. XIIIth Addl. District Judge Kanpur, 1985 (1) ARC 407 and Chhidda Singh v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Mathura, 1970 ARC 47. It is, however, for the revising authority to consider on the facts of each case whether the District Magistrate acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity as provided under section 18 (1) (c) of the Act. This provision does not limit the power of the revising authority to record its own finding when it comes to the conclusion that the District Magistrate acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction particularly when the power has been conferred on the revising authority to take additional evidence and in case the revising authority accepts the additional evidence, it has power to consider the same instead of remanding the matter. In case the jurisdiction has not been exercised by the District Magistrate in accordance with law, it is always open to the revising authority to correct the same in exercise of its power under section 18 of the Act. See P. C. Tripathi's case (supra), Himmat Bahadur (supra) Sardar Savan Singh v. District Judge, Allahabad, 1978 UP RCC 524, Rajendna Kumar v. D. J. Meerut, 1979 ARC 366, and Smt. Kunti Devi v. Ist Addl. District Judge, 1979 ARC 476. In the instant case, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had taken the view that the application for release of the disputed accommodation was filed on the allegation that the wife of respondent no. 3 shall open a Nursery School while respondents 3 and 4 wen; colandlords and no need was alleged for respondent no. 4. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not apply his mind towards the evidence on record. The view taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was manifestly erroneous. It was not necessary that the need of each landlord should have been established for getting an accommodation released. This view was taken in Yogesh Saran v. Jyoti Prasad, 1978 UP RCC 563. 13. THE question was whether the accommodation in which respondent no. 3 was living was sufficient for running the Nursery School. Respondent no. 3 was residing in house no. 444. This view was taken in Yogesh Saran v. Jyoti Prasad, 1978 UP RCC 563. 13. THE question was whether the accommodation in which respondent no. 3 was living was sufficient for running the Nursery School. Respondent no. 3 was residing in house no. 444. THE revising authority appointed an Advocate Commissioner to inspect the said premises and a report was submitted that wife of respondent was running a Nursery School in the name and style of 'THE Little People School'. There was an office of the Principal. He reported that number of students shown in the register was 128 and at the time % of his visit about 89 students were present. Eight teachers including the principal were present. He gave the names of the teachers also. THE accommodation in house no. 444 was found insufficient. IVth Additional District Judge had also mads a local inspection before deciding the revision no. 157 of 1978 filed by the landlord respondents. He found that there were six living rooms in the accommodation where the landlord was residing and was running the school. After considering material evidence on record, respondent no. 1 took the view that the need of respondent no. 1 was benafide and genuine. THE Rent Control and Eviction Officer had rejected the application taking erroneous approach off law that unless the need of each of the landlord was pleaded and established, the application cannot be allowed. He had further failed to apply his mind to the evidence on record. Respondent no. 1 was justified in recording its own finding and releasing the property in dispute in favour of landlord respondents. 14. IN this court a supplementary affidavit has been filed by the petitioner stating that the landlord owns various houses namely, House nos. 440, 442, 444, 445, 446 and 449 besides 450 which is in dispute. It is, however, admitted that house no. 444 is a residential building in which respondent no. 3 is living with family. House no. 446 exclusively belongs to respondent no. 4 IN which she is living. Respondent no. 3 has denied that he is owner of house no. 445. As regards house nos. 440 and 442, they are servant quarters for which the necessary papers have been filed. House no. 449 is for Engineering work of respondent no. 3. As regards house no. 444 respondent no. 4 IN which she is living. Respondent no. 3 has denied that he is owner of house no. 445. As regards house nos. 440 and 442, they are servant quarters for which the necessary papers have been filed. House no. 449 is for Engineering work of respondent no. 3. As regards house no. 444 respondent no. 1 after considering the extent of accommodation in it, found that it is insufficient for running the school and the landlord bona fide requires the disputed accommodation. Learned counsel for the respondent rightly submitted that a prospective allottee Ires no right to file a writ petition against an order releasing the property in favour of the landlord respondent. He had no right to contest the release application as held in a Full Bench decision of this court in Talib Hasan v. 1st Additional District Judge, Nainital, 1986 (1) ARC 1. Even he has no right to file a revision under section 18 of the Act against an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer releasing the property in favour of a landlord. See Ved Prakash v. VIIIth A.D.J. Ghaziabad, 1993 (1) ARC 442. There is another aspect of the matter which further disentitles the petitioner for any relief in this petition. The allotment order was passed in favour of one Sarju Prasad Tyagi by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by order dated 6-10-1981. The accommodation was not allotted to the petitioner. Sarju Prasad Tyagi did not file any writ petition. The petitioner is continuing in occupation on the basis of an allotment order dated 20th May 1978 which has been set aside by the revising authority on 16th January 1979 in revision no. 198 of 1978 but till he is holding possession of the accommodation in dispute taking advantage of the protracted litigation. 15. IN view of the above the present writ petition is dismissed with Rs. 1,000/- as costs payable to it he contesting respondents. The petitioner shall hand over the possession of the disputed accommodation within one week from today to the landlord respondents and in case no such possession is delivered, the District Magistrate shall take suitable steps to see that the respondents 3 and 4 are delivered possession within two weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him. Petition dismissed.