JUDGMENT Miss Kamlesh Sharma, J.—Both these Civil Revisions (C.R. No. 126 of 1994 and C.R. No. 127 of 1994) are being decided by a common judgment as these involve similar facts and questions of law between the same parties Civil Revision No 126 of 1994 is directed against the order dated 18-3-1994 whereby the application under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C filed by the petitioner was allowed and the respondents were ordered to be impleaded in place of the original respondent Madan Lal, though the petitioner had prayed in his application for the impleadment of respondent No.3, Smt. Darshani Devi, being widow of Madan Lal. The petitioner is aggrieved by (he impugned order as respondent Nos.1 and 2 who are sons of Madan Lal original respondent have also been brought on record besides their mother, respondent No.3, as party respondents in Rent Petition No.1/2 of 1989 filed by the petitioner landlord on the ground of non-payment of rent and sub-letting. Admittedly, the premises in question is a shop which was in the occupation of Madan Lal on a monthly rent of Rs. 100 and continues to be in possession of respondents after his death. 2. So far Civil Revision No. 127 of 1994 is concerned, it is directed against the order dated 18-3-1994 whereby the application under Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. moved on behalf of the legal heirs was allowed and the respondents in the present petition were brought on record in Civil Suit No. 35/1 of 1990 pending in the Court of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Nahan, which was filed by original plaintiff Madan Lal In the said suit, Madan Lal has prayed for specific performance of contract arising out of a compromise dated 19-11-1987 between him and the petitioner landlord in terms whereof the petitioner landlord was to rebuild the shop with stipulated specifications and hand it over to Madan Lal on a monthly rent of Rs. 100 per month. The main grievance made in the Civil suit is that though the shop was rebuilt and handed over to him as per the terms of the compromise, yet, its specifications are not as agreed upon in the compromise. The petitioner-defendant has resisted the suit on various grounds and has denied the allegations made therein. 100 per month. The main grievance made in the Civil suit is that though the shop was rebuilt and handed over to him as per the terms of the compromise, yet, its specifications are not as agreed upon in the compromise. The petitioner-defendant has resisted the suit on various grounds and has denied the allegations made therein. When on the death of Madan Lal, his legal representatives moved an application under Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. for bringing them on record, the petitioner defendant opposed the same on the ground that only the widow of Madan Lal Respondent No.1 was required to be brought on record as plaintiff because only she has a right to inherit the statutory tenancy of Madan Lal. The trial Court has rejected this plea and allowed the application under Order 22, Rule 4, C.P.C bringing all the representatives on record. 3. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The common question of law arising in both the petitions is that on the interpretation of section 2 (j) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter called the 1987 Act) which of the legal representatives of Madan Lal has a right to continue with the suit No. 35/1 of 1990 pending in the Court of Sub-Judge 1st Class, Nahan, as well as to contest the rent petition No. 1/2 of 1989 pending in the Court of Rent Controller (2), Nahan. Section 2 (j) of the 1987 Act is as under :— " tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule I to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a municipal corporation or a Municipal Committee or a notified area committee or a cantonment board ; Explanation I.—The order of succession in the event of death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows :— (a) firstly, his surviving spouse ; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family upto the date of his death ; (c) thirdly, his parent(s), if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death ; and (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s) of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s), or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death ; Explanation II.—The right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs ; and (k).............." 4. Sh. Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner landlord has vehemently urged that on the correct interpretation of the definition of tenant as given in sub-section (j) of section 2 of the 1987 Act, it is only the widow of Madan Lal who is entitled to be substituted as plaintiff in the civil suit and as respondent tenant in the rent petition. In support of his arguments, he has referred to single Bench judgment of this Court in Kanta and others v. N.K. Vyas, 1994(2) RCR 311, wherein it has been observed that after the death of the tenant in the case before the said Bench, his widow had inherited the tenancy and not his son. Sh. Kuldip Singh has also referred to two more single Bench judgments of this Court in Smt. Indra Vati and another v. Smt. Devki Devi and others, 1)89 (1) Sim LC 36 and Narinder Kumar and another v. Ramesh Kumar and another, 1994 (4) SLJ 2903, which, according to him, are in conflict with the judgment in Kanta and others v N.K Vyas (supra) and his prayer is that the question of law involved in the present Revision petition may be referred to a larger Bench. 5. On the other hand, Sh. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents, has supported the impugned orders and opposed these Revision petitions. His precise argument is that all the three above referred judgments pertain to residential premises, as such, the law laid down therein, in respect of inheritance of statutory tenancy of residential premises, is not applicable to the present case which pertains to a shop, that is, commercial premises. In support of his submissions, Sh. Sood has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others, 1985 (1) RCR 459, and Full Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Harish Chander v. Kirpa Ram, 1986 (1) RCR 545. 6. After giving its best consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, this Court finds that there is no substance in the submissions made by Sh. Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner. 6. After giving its best consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, this Court finds that there is no substance in the submissions made by Sh. Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner. It cannot be disputed that in the judgments in Smt. Indra Vati and another v. Smt. Devki Devi and others ; Narinder Kumar and another v. Ramesh Kumar and another and Kanta and others v. N.K. Vyas (supra) the learned single Judges of this Court were dealing with the question of inheritance of statutory tenancy in respect of residential premises So far the two judgments in Smt. Indra Vatis case and Narinder Kumar and anothers case are concerned, the learned single Judges while interpreting the definition of the word tenant as given in sub-section (j) of section 2 of the 1987 Act, have concurrently held that on the death of statutory tenant, only those of his heirs, mentioned in Schedule I to the said section, who are ordinarily residing with him, shall inherit his estate in respect of tenancy rights While interpreting the order of succession appearing in Explanation I to the said section, the learned single Judge in Smt. Indra Vatis case (supra) has held that it provides only the sequence in which from amongst the various heirs the landlord shall treat a particular heir to be the tenant for the purpose of his dealing with those whose immovability is provided for by the legislature even after the death of the tenant. It was further explained that it would not be legitimate to restrict the meaning of the tenant to only one of the categories of persons in Explanation I and thus restricting it beyond what was already done by the legislature by confining it to those mentioned in Schedule I and subject to other restrictions that they should normally be residing with the tenant at the time of his death. It is correct that in the other judgment in Kanta Devi and others v. N.K. Vyas, the learned single Judge has come to a different conclusion and held that only one category of legal heirs, that is, the widow mentioned at Sr. It is correct that in the other judgment in Kanta Devi and others v. N.K. Vyas, the learned single Judge has come to a different conclusion and held that only one category of legal heirs, that is, the widow mentioned at Sr. No. (1) in Schedule I to section 2 (j) of the 1987 Act is entitled to inherit the tenancy rights of a deceased tenant but, with respect, this Court may state that neither reasons have been given for arriving at such a conclusion nor the earlier judgments in Smt. Indra Vati and another v. Smt. Devki Devi and others and Narinder Kumar and another v. Ramesh Kumar and another, were considered. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there is conflict between the judgments of learned single Judges of this Court in respect of inheritance of tenancy rights in respect of residential premises. 7. In the present case, this Court is dealing with non-residential/commercial premises and the law laid down in the cases of Smt, Indra Vati and another v. Smt Devki Devi and others and Narinder Kumar and another v. Ramesh Kumar and another, is not applicable and the answer is found in the judgment of the Supreme Court in 5m/. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others (supra) wherein the learned Judges were interpreting the definition of tenant given in section 2 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which is almost the same as section 2 (j) of the 1987 Act, except for the fact that Explanation (3) is not found in the 1987 Act. 8. The relevant provision of section 2 of the Delhi Rent Control Act is as under : "(2) (1) Tenant means any person............and includes : (i) .................. (ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy ; and (iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified respectively, in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, such of the aforesaid persons : (a) spouse, (b) son or daughter, or, where there are both son and daughter, both of them, (c) parents. (d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-deceased son, as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family upto the date of his death, but does not include— (A) ............ (B) ............ Explanation I.—The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows : (a) firstly, his surviving spouse ; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family up to the date of his death ; (c) thirdly, his parents, if there is no surviving spouses, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son or daughter or any of them did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death ; or (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his pre-deceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son. daughter or parents of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or parents, or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person up to the date of his death Explanation II —If the person, who acquires, by succession, the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, was not financially dependent on the deceased person on the date of his death, such successor shall acquire such right for a limited period of one year ; and, on the expiry of that period, or on his death, whichever is earlier, the right of such successor to continue in possession after the termination of tenancy shall become extinguished. Explanation III.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that,— (a) where, by reason of Explanation II, the right of any successor to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy becomes extinguished, such extinguishment shall not affect the right of any other successor of the same category to continue in possession after the termination of tenancy ; but if there is no other successor of the same category, the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy shall not on such extinguishment, pass on to any other successor, specified in any lower category or categories, as the case may be ; (b) the right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs. 9. While interpreting subsection (iii) of section 2 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Para 32 of their judgment held:— "...........all the three Explanations thereto is not in any way inconsistent with or contrary to sub-section (ii) of section 2 (1) which unequivocally states that tenant includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. In the absence of the provision contained in section 2(1) (iii) the heritable interest of the heirs of the statutory tenant would devolve on all the heirs of the so called statutory tenant on his death and the heirs of such tenant would in law step into his position. This sub-section (iii) of section 2 (1) seeks to restrict this right in so far as the residential premises are concerned. The heritability of the statutory tenancy which otherwise flows from the Act is restricted in case of residential premises only to the heirs mentioned in section 2 (1) (iii) and the heirs therein are entitled to remain in possession and to enjoy the protection under the Act in the manner and to the extent indicated in section 2 (1) (iii). The heritability of the statutory tenancy which otherwise flows from the Act is restricted in case of residential premises only to the heirs mentioned in section 2 (1) (iii) and the heirs therein are entitled to remain in possession and to enjoy the protection under the Act in the manner and to the extent indicated in section 2 (1) (iii). The Legislature which under the Rent Act affords protection against eviction to tenants whose tenancies have beep terminated and who continue to remain, in possession and who are generally termed as statutory tenants, is perfectly competent to lay down the manner and the extent of the protection and the rights and obligations of such tenants and their heirs. Section 2 (:) (iii) of the Act does not create any additional or special right in favour of the heirs of the so called statutory tenant on his death, but seeks to restrict the right of the heirs of such tenant in respect of residential premises. -As the status and rights of a contractual tenant even after determination of his tenancy when the tenant is at times described as the statutory tenant, are fully protected by the Act and the heirs of such tenant become entitled by virtue of the provisions of the Act to inherit the status and position of the statutory tenant on his death, the Legislature which has created this right has thought it fit in the case of residential premises to limit the rights of the heirs in the manner and to the extent provided in section 2 (1)(iii). It appears that the Legislature has not thought it fit to put any such restrictions with regards to tenants in respect of commercial premises in this Act " (Emphasis supplied) 10. It appears that the Legislature has not thought it fit to put any such restrictions with regards to tenants in respect of commercial premises in this Act " (Emphasis supplied) 10. While noticing other provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act wherein commercial premises have been treated differently from residential premises, and the factors which are peculiar to commercial premises only, the learned Judges have further held that in case of commercial premises governed by the Delhi Act, the Legislature has not thought it fit to place any kind of restriction on the ordinary law of inheritance with regard to succession, as in the case of commercial premises the heirs of the deceased tenant not only succeed to the tenancy rights in the premises but also to business as a whole, over which restrictions cannot be imposed by the Legislature under the Rent Act and the succession regarding the business which is a valuable heritable right, must devolve on all the heirs in accordance with the law of succession. Therefore, the learned Judges held that in the absence of any provision restricting the heritability of the tenancy in respect of commercial premises, it will devolve on the heirs in accordance with the law of succession and they have a right to continue to enjoy the protection afforded by the Rent Act and are to be evicted in accordance with the provisions thereof. What weighed with their Lordships was :— "The mere fact that in the Act no provision has been made with regard to the heirs of tenants in respect of commercial tenancies on the death of the tenant after termination of the tenancy, as has been done in the case of heirs of the tenants of residential premises does not indicate that the Legislature intended that the heirs of the tenants of commercial premises will cease to enjoy the protection afforded to the tenant under the Act. The Legislature could never have possibly intended that with the death of a tenant of the commercial premises, the business carried on by the tenant, however, flourishing it may be, and even if the same constituted the source of livelihood of the members of the family, must necessarily come to an end on the death of the tenant only because the tenant died after the contractual tenancy had been terminated. It could never have been the intention of the Legislature that the entire family of a tenant depending upon the business carried on by the tenant will be completely stranded and the business carried on for years in the premises which had been let out to the tenant must stop functioning at the premises which the heirs of the deceased tenant must necessarily vacate as they are afforded no protection under the Act....." 11. The learned Judges supported their conclusion by another consideration that commercial premises are not only let out to individuals but also to Companies, Corporations and other statutory bodies having a juristic personality, in which case question of death of tenant will not arise. Despite the termination of tenancy, such a juristic personality will go on enjoying the protection afforded under the Rent Act. If such a protection is not held available to individuals, it will result in unreasonable classification in favour of tenants who are juristic personalities, which could never be the intention of the Legislature. It was concluded by their Lordships :— “...........If it be held that commercial tenancies after the termination of the contractual tenancy of the tenant are not heritable on the death of the tenant and the heirs of the tenant are not entitled to enjoy the protection under the Act, an irreparable mischief which the Legislature could never have intended is likely to be caused. Any time after the creation of the contractual- tenancy, the landlord may determine the contractual tenancy allowing the tenant to continue to remain in possession of the premises, hoping for an early death of the tenant, so that on the death of a tenant he can immediately proceed to institute the proceedings for recovery of and recover possession of the premises as a matter of course, because the heirs would not have any right to remain in occupation and would not enjoy the protection of the Act. This would never have been intended by the Legislature while framing the Rent Acts for affording protection to the tenant against eviction that the landlord would be entitled to recover possession, even on the grounds for eviction as prescribed in the Rent Acts are made out." 12. The law laid down in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case (supra) applies in the present case on all fours. The law laid down in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case (supra) applies in the present case on all fours. Not only the definition of tenant as given in section 2 (j) of the 1987 Act is similar to that found in the Delhi Rent Control Act but admittedly there is no separate provision dealing with the inheritance of tenancy of commercial premises as in the Delhi Rent Control Act. There is also similarity in both the Acts so far different treatment in respect of grounds of eviction from residential and commercial premises is concerned Therefore, following the ratio in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case (supra), it is safe to hold that so far commercial premises governed by the 1987 Act arc concerned, the inheritance of their tenancy is governed by general law of succession and not by the 1987 Act and all the legal heirs of a deceased tenant of a commercial premises have a right to inherit his estate in respect of tenancy rights and after they step into the shoes of the deceased tenant, their eviction can be sought only in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Act. 13. This Court further finds support from the Full Bench Judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Harish Chander and others v. Kirpa Ram (supra) where the learned Judges were dealing with the definition tenant as given in Haryana Act which is similar to section 2 (j) of the 1987 Act, and considering the precise question whether the rights of statutory tenant in a non-residential building in the State of Haryana are not heritable under the Haryana Act. Their conclusion was that the condition and order of inheritance of tenancy given in section 2 (h) of the Haryana Act are limited in their application to a residential building only. The tenancy in respect of non-residential building, in the event of the death of a tenant, devolves on the heirs of the deceased tenant, in accordance with the general law of succession applicable to the tenant and the heirs, who steps into the shoes of deceased tenant, continue to enjoy the protection of the Act. 14. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in these petitions and these are dismissed. No costs. 15. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 9th January, 1995. 14. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in these petitions and these are dismissed. No costs. 15. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 9th January, 1995. The records, if any, of the trial Court be sent back immediately. Petition dismissed. -